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The curtain is finally rung down on the could and did sympathize with in a most poignant melodrama of our times, deep fanaticism of partisanship; but the and Major Dreyfus and General Pic- Dreyfus. affair and the complex probquart have reaped the reward of suffer- lems of political psychology it raised ing and constancy. "La vérité est en remained, and probably still remain, to marche, rien ne l'arrêtera,” proclaimed most Englishwen a chaotic and uninteland predicted Zola. His words have ligible puzzle. It was characteristic of come inevitably true, and in their tri- them and of their strong passion for inumph the dead have a share even dividual justice that the man from first greater than the living. A regenerated to last was the pre-eminent issue. It France accepts with placidity and re-.

not less characteristic of the lief a verdict that seven years ago French that Dreyfus himself should · might have plunged her into civil war; soon be swallowed up in the controand a case which touched some of the versy that raged around him, or should deepest problems of human government, hold his own in it merely as a battledivided a great nation for many years ground for prejudices, principles, ideas, into fierce and irreconcilable sections, and inveterate instincts to contend on. and enthralled the minds and rasped The attitude of each people was a faiththe conscience of the entire outer ful reflection of its national temperaworld, comes tranquilly to an end. It ment, and neither could wholly appreis doubtful whether we in England ever ciate the other's point of view. There really understood the Dreyfus affair. was nothing more difficult for EnglishSome features of it we grasped perhaps men to understand in the Dreyfus afmore clearly and quickly than did the fair than why the French did not unFreuch themselves, and their inability derstand it. There was nothing more to share our standpoint seemed to us bewildering to the French than the failsomething more malign than the mere ure of other nations to put themselves madness of perversity. There is no in their place. need to linger on all that was said “I would rather," said Goethe, "enagainst France and the French charac- dure an injustice than see a disorderly ter, and the French army and judiciary act committed.” It was between those by English commentators whose ardent who accepted and those who opposed insularity was at once embittered and this principle that the struggle to which redeemed by an outraged sense of jus Dreyfus gave his name was at first tice. It was for most Englishmen most bitterly sustained. Order seemed enough that a man had been

ranged on one side, justice on the demned on evidence and by methods other, and France had suddenly to that looked like a revival of Star Cham- make her choice. Order included, or ber procedure. The personal tragedy appeared to include, everything that a absorbed them; in the political intrigues Frenchman held dear-the honor of the that revolved around it they were less army, which to a degree we cannot concerned; and to the momentous con- realize is the honor of the nation and flict of ideas of which it became the of every man and woman in the nation, symbol they remained throughout quite internal peace, the pressing necessities singularly indifferent and impervious. of national defence, the very existence Dreyfus and the horror of his fate they of the Republic. It was inevitable that

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tens of thousands should invoke the safety of the State as the supreme law, and declare that the interests of one man could not require the sacrifice of the interests of all. The resultant conflict was the most harrowing of all struggles in which a democracy can engage, it was a contlict not merely of opinions, interests, or even instincts, but of fundamental duties. Patriotism, the highest expediency, the love of flag and fatherland, and a jealous care for the prestige and efficiency of that great institution which is a monument of national renunciation combined with a hundred less worldly motives to stitie the voice of justice. Xor were these the only factors in the combat. Developing from them came another and wider conflict between forces that have vibrated throughout French history, and have rendered it the most interesting and suggestive of all national annals. With a reverence for authority derived from her Latin past, and still pervading her Catholicism and her military and civil organization, France has unceasingly combined a spirit of free inquiry, of independent and rationalistic interpretation, of progress by revolution. The Dreyfus affair flung these tendencies into deadly antagonism. Even those who were brought to admit that justice must be preferred to order maintained that the admission had no reference to the prisoner on Devil's Island, that he was not innocent, that seven officers had condemned him, that tive ministers of war had successively pronounced him guilty, and that their words and verdicts were to be implicitly trusted. Thus the struggle broadened out into a convulsive conflict between authority and the spirit of free inquiry. It was the old religious issue fought out anew on a secular battlefield. In England we have never been tried by such an issue under circumstances that in any way parallel those of France, and there was

something not wholly generous in our reproaches when France for a moment quailed before it. Everything that could distract and terrify the mind and nerves of the Republic and becloud its judgment a venomous outburst of anti-semitism, militarism scarcely less subversive than in Boulanger's day, clericalism and royalism fomenting every discord, and chauvinism preying upon the popular suspicions and unrest -contributed to the dethronement of reason and the installation of blind and furious passion.

Yet through that terrible ordeal France has forced a wayward but triumphant path. She is stronger and not weaker for the Dreyfus affair. She has passed through a crisis that tortured men's hearts and consciences not indeed unscathed but with firmer fibre, a greater knowledege of herself, some reasons for shame and many more for pride. In nearly everything that makes for national well-being the France of 1906 is incomparably better off than the France of 1894. At the time of the first court-martial the country was betraying the exhaustion of its gallant reconstruction. A profound lassitude and pessimism had penetrated the national mind. The Panama scandals had strained all but the most robust faith in the Republican theory. The soul of France, one might have said, was dormant, if not dying. The national decadence was accepted as a clear if curious fact, just worth the trouble of analyzing and tracing back to this cause and to that. The smiling genius of the land had passed, it seemed, into a total eclipse of hopelessness. Sincerity, earnestness, originality bad all perished. It was a time when France from sheer ennui might have welcomed a pretender. There came, instead, the Dreyfus affair, probing and stirring the most heedless conscience, hurling against naked realities, shattering parties, raising everywhere the extremes of


fratricidal strife, but energizing the national character with a new will and steadfastness, and evoking the display of the most heroic as well as the basest qualities. The Dreyfus affair brought to a sudden head almost all the ills from which the country suffered.

Thanks to its rough and radical surgery she was able after a supreme struggle to throw them off. The ordeal wrought many changes in internal politics and external relations, but the greatest change of all was in the moral tone and conscience of France.

Tue Outlook.


The Russian Girondins have fallen. The moderate majority in the Duma, who have hitherto displayed great selfcontrol, and who, it is well understood, would have furnished a competent Ministry if the Court would have promised them its sincere support, have at length irritated the reactionaries into action which, though legal in form, in practice involves a coup d'état. The Czar in his Ukase dissolving the Duma states that the Deputies have “strayed into spheres beyond their competence," and blames them for making inquiries into the acts of local authorities-who, it would seem, are not even to be censured by the representatives of the people--and for “making comments" upon the imperfections

of fundamental laws. Nicholas II., it is clear, does not even comprehend what representatives are for. There is, however, another story in circulation which is at least inore probable than the one shadowed forth in the Ukase. The Duma might have gone on talking with impunity but that the great officers at headquarters discovered that the soldiers were beginning to attend to its talk, and that in consequence there was an increasing readiness to mutiny against grievances, and to refuse in many cases to fire upon unarmed "rebels." Even the Cossacks were beginning to think that obedience could be stretched too far, so much so that a special garrison was despatched to the Cossack centre, Taganrog. The

officers perceived

that the peasants were hoping everything from the Duma, and feared that if time were allowed, the recruits, who come in large proportion from among the peasantry, would all show themselves disaffected. They therefore represented to the Czar that if the autocracy were to be preserved the Duma must be dissolved at once. It is probable, also, though not yet certain, that these representations were strengthened by the arrival in St. Petersburg of the Grand Duke Vladimir, who had just escaped assassination on his railway journey from Paris, and who is believed to be the most reactionary as well as the most determined of his nephew's immediate circle. The stroke was therefore struck; the Tauris Palace, where the Duma sat, was OCCUpied by troops; and the Deputies retired, a few of them to the districts which elected them, but a large proportion to Viborg, in Finland, whence they issued a Proclamation which is undoubtedly an open incitement to revolution. They call upon all Russia not only to support the Duma, without which, they say, no legislation can be legal, but to refuse payment of taxes and the regular demands for recruits. The former device is rather futile, for the Russiau Government can issue paper to an unlimited extent; and the latter cannot be carried out unless over the vast extent of Russia unarmed men are prepared to risk encounters with the soldiery. Both, however, signify a


call to the people, if they desire free- of men. The Russian Army has no dom, to defy the Czar. The Revolution Suvoroff, indeed no successful general is, in fact, officially' proclaimed.

of any kind, who might bind the solWhether it can “march" wholly de- diers by personal loyalty to himself, pends-we must say it again, though it and no Cromwell or soldier who could is for the hundredth time-upon the lead a rebel force to victory. That stertemper of the troops, and upon this ility of dominant capacity which is the subject evidence is extraordinarily con- marked feature of the Russian bureauflicting. The War Office evidently be- cracy extends also to its opponents. In lieves that if some of the barrack griev- any one of the three contingencies the ances of the men are removed, more es- loss to Russia must be frightful, for in pecially their insufficient supply of food, so vast a country a hostile people canthe soldiers will, in the last resort, de- not be rapidly put down, and unless the clare for the autocracy. They have revolution can be rapidly put down sogood arguments on their side. Among ciety must for a time go utterly to all soldiers the necessity of discipline pieces. The landlord cannot be made is admitted, and the severities of disci- safe, the Empire as an Empire cannot pline are condoned as regrettable but be made mobile, and the Treasury canunavoidable incidents of the military not be refilled. The external world will career. And the soldiers are few who not go on lending millions except on can bear to be attacked by mobs, even ruinous terms, internal commerce of their own countrymen, without re- must be suspended, and the mere de. sorting to the arms which, as they struction of property which results know, will at once ensure their own from universal disorder must destroy, safety and manifest their own supe- or at least suspend, all the sources of riority. On the other hand, in Russia prosperity. The appearance of a man the soldiers, with the exception of the of genius on either side may, of course, Cossacks, are, even in cities, unusually falsify all predictions; but at present sensitive to the popular hatred, and in the appearances point to anarchy in the the country districts share the strong- near future; and the European world, est feeling of those who are expected not only in Russia, but everywhere, is to rise in insurrection. They, too, suffering from a general, though, it is think that the land belongs to them, to be hoped, temporary, flood of mediand that to shoot down their brothers ocrity. The rocks are covered by the for claiming the land is definitely an advancing flood and the mud throws up oppression. There is, therefore, serious nothing that is well above the surface. fear of an agrarian movement, which There remains a contingency which may include a great military mutiny, must be considered, if possible, by the and result either in an effort to change light of reason rather than of either the dynasty, and with it the Court panic or prejudice. It is quite clear, policy, or to re-establish the Duma, as many well-informed persons believe, which thus re-established by the sword that if the Revolution shows symptoms must become a Convention; or if the of winning, the Romanoffs, like the barracks, in Marshal MacMahon's Bourbons, will summon the foreigner phrase, “fire upon the barracks,” in a to their aid, and that William II., like civil war, the end of which will depend, his ancestor, may think it his duty to like the end of all wars, upon the com- intervene. We cast aside all rumors parative strength of the contending as to arrangements already made, and forces and the genius of their leaders. rely for an ad interim judgment only who as yet are hidden from the sight upon patent political facts.

So far as

we can see, if Russian Poland rises the epoch, and will not, we are satisfied, German Emperor not only may, but feel willing to bring upon himself the must intervene. He cannot allow a hostility of the Liberals throughout Eumovement to succeed which might cost rope. Powerful as he is, and strong as him great provinces, even if it did not is the scipline of his Army, he has provoke into action all the revolution- to deal with a vast mass of Socialist ary elements in his own States. The opinion, which will undoubtedly be exthree Powers which partitioned Poland cited past all ordinary means of remust continue to hold down Poland, or pression by sympathy with a great, confess themselves defeated by a race and, on the hypothesis, successful, peaswhich for a hundred years has been ant uprising. The Emperor is not an taught to see in revolution its only incautious man, and may well be inhope of independence. As far as the clined to limit his action to Poland, or Vistula, therefore, in the supposed con- perhaps to Poland and the southern tingency-that is, in the case of the Baltic Provinces. On the other hand, Revolution winning in the struggle--we the Emperor W’illiam is a near kinsman expect German intervention. The of the Romanoffs; he sincerely believes really doubtful point is whether the in "the Monarchic principle"; and the German Emperor will cross the Vis- spectacle of an army defeated by peastula. The decision will depend upon ants, or of a civil war within the ranks, himself, for his Army will undoubtedly must be to him almost past endurance. obey his orders, and, indeed, will be in It is useless in such circumstances to motion before it has time to deliberate predict, but intervention must be rewhether those orders are acceptable or garded as one of the dangerous possinot; but his policy is extremely difficult bilities resulting from the unrest in to predict. On the one hand, it must be Russia, the danger being all the greater remembered that the military occupa- because it is most improbable that the tion of Poland is by itself a most serios Hapsburgs will suffer themselves to be effort, and one which, owing to tradi- dragged at the heels of the Hohenzoltion as well as other easily visible lerns into an adventure which can causes, may produce terrible agitation hardly by any possibility benefit themin France. It may be taken as certain, selves. Galicia is not a province which too, that the opinion of the masses in will risk untold misery in order to Germany is not favorable to the Ro- swell a Polish revolt. The easy-going manoffs, and will be greatly outraged despotism there has ever since 1819 by an expenditure of German life and been found by Poles much more entreasure in order to restore their au- durable than the scientific rigidity of tocracy. William II. understands his the Prussian system.

The Spectator.


That “undervaluer of money,” Sir Henry Wotton, the Provost of Eton, would speak of angling as a moderator of passions and a calmer of unquiet thoughts. Walton knew him well, and in a charming touch or two of friend

ship tells us how his “forraign imployments in the service of this Nation" and choice gifts of mind and character made his company esteemed as one of the delights of mankind. Wotton for his part painted a picture of Walton in

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