tween these two classes there is a radical difference; and agreement to submit differences of the latter kind to arbitration is quite another matter from agreement regarding the other kind only.

The function of a Court dealing with differences of the first kind is to investigate the facts, and to give an award according to the finding. The only equitable and rational ground on which judgment could be based in the latter kind is the general well-being of mankind. The function of a Court dealing with this class of dispute would be the regulating and controlling of living forces. It has to be acknowledged that such a Court would have a great power over the nations. The nations attaching to it would surrender control of their external policy, and would come into different relation to each other.

It is on this ground that objections will be based. The subjecting of the nation to the control of an outside authority will, in itself, as a surrender of independence, be raised as an objection sufficient to disqualify the scheme. To regard nations as isolated entities is fallacious. Absolute independence exists only in the imagination. There is no European nation that has not derived the greater part of all that makes it what it is from foreign sources. All that is good in the lives of these nations has been con

tributed to by each. Take any one of them, look at its industry, its arts, and even the thoughts of its people, and then imagine what it would be if all that can be traced as having come from outside sources, only during the last thousand years, were to be taken away. The whole structure collapses. Mankind is one. When men talk of their nation's independence, it is important to keep this truth in mind. But what the objecting ones have in mind, when they speak of independence, is absolute freedom of the na

tion from control by any authority outside itself. They say this freedom from control is essential for the preservation of our "rights." They speak of our "rights" as of something particularly ours, as certain special privileges. cious.

But the idea is utterly fallaWe have no such rights. Ask those who speak about the necessity of defending our “rights” what they mean, and what rational answer can they give? To these objectors we have to put the question: Do they wish our nation to domineer in the world and force its will on other peoples, or do they wish other peoples to be treated considerately and dealt with justly? To say that they all do desire other nations to be treated justly would be more optimistic than true. But there are, perhaps, few among them who would not say they wish justice to be done, and who do not believe that they wish it. If they mean anything rational when they speak of our "rights," it is that they wish right and justice to be done. But they see only one side of the matter: they are thinking of preventing ourselves from being wronged, and not at all about securing other nations against wrong from us. Having allowed that they wish justice to be done, we question the objectors further. How is a just settlement to be arrived at when a difference occurs between two parties, whether men or nations? There is only one way. It is to submit the matter, and to submit it without reserve, to a capable third party for decision. The man who refuses to do this is in opposition to justice. The position of one professing a desire for justice and refusing to do this is absurd. The insisting by any man on his own interpretation of a dispute is partiality, while justice consists in impartiality. The essence of justice is the submission of selfish desires to the larger considerations of the general good. If men were to act on

this principle-or rather want of principle in their private affairs, society would be impossible. A man of good sense who has a dispute with another will never, even if he be absolutely certain that he is in the right, refuse to submit it for settlement to a properly constituted authority; because he knows that all men feel sure they are right when in a dispute, though they are nearly all in some degree mistaken, and because he will see that if they refused to take this course they could not live a good life together. The verdict may go against him-judges not being infallible-but he knows it is better to submit to it than to gain what he claimed by violent means. Consideration for others, tolerance and forbearance are virtues. Self-assertion is anti-social and immoral, and the mark of a shallow and narrow mind. And morality is the same for nations as for individuals. That which is wrong in the single man is not less wrong in the nation. The demand which is made on the man to conform to the good life of society, calls with equal force on every nation to conform to the good life of mankind.

The truth of this argument cannot be questioned. There is no way of escape from the position. The man who wishes to have justice done between the nations must allow that the only way to get it is by their placing all differences for settlement with an independent judicial authority. Some of the objectors, while allowing the truth of this argument, as a theory, will say that it would not succeed in practice, because we cannot get a perfect judicial authority. If there is any reason in this argument, it applies with equal force to the settlement of differences between individuals. All judges are more or less partial, and liable to give erring judgments. Shall it be said, therefore, that it is better for men to settle their private differences

by the assertion of force than by appeal to justice? It may be said, however, that there is no authority, either existing or to be found, standing in the same disinterested and independent relation to the nations as does a judge to individual disputants, and consequently disputes between nations could not be settled so satisfactorily. This is only another way of expressing that traditional view, which, existing as a prejudice, is the source of all these objections, that all other peoples are inherently hostile to us. To regard all men of other nations as devoid of justice, is as senseless as it would be to regard them all as saints. It happens, however, that this matter is beyond the theoretical stage. The successful issue of the many differences between nations which have been referred to arbitration during the last fifty years proves the groundless nature of this objection. And per

haps it may be possible to form a better international judicial authority than those used on these occasions. The impossibility of our having differences determined by an exact and perfect rule is not important; but that we settle them judicially, by use of the best means we have, is of supreme importance. The principle involved affects in the deepest way the wellbeing of man.

It is implied in the text of the existing treaties that, besides independence, the "vital interests" and the "honor" of a nation would be endangered by committal without reservation to arbitration. If the foregoing argument is worth anything, it proves that the thorough acceptance of arbitration is required by justice, and would be the best course for us. If this be true, it is absurd to suppose that it can ever clash with our vital interests. It is perhaps most reasonable to suppose that this term has been used as providing an excuse, whenever one may be

desired, for a refusal to submit a difference to the Arbitration Court. And how can our honor be jeopardized by appeal to justice? Only by taking honor to mean loyalty to that conception of conduct that requires a man to personally furnish pain to any other who may offend him. Can this code conception of honor, based on a brutish plane of feeling and thought, be taken to guide our nation? Our average citizen is far beyond this. True honor requires one to act the noblest part, and calls for the strictest loyalty to justice.

But the

To make resort to arbitration by the nations a success, there should be a capable, impartial, and stable judicial authority. It is the fact that no such reliable authority exists that makes statesmen shy of arbitration. nations have not yet made an intelligent attempt to form such an authority. The personnel, of the Arbitration Court ought to have permanent existence, and not be subject to the choice of the disputants, as is the method with the Court at the Hague, since such choice inclines to partiality. Each contracting nation should choose a man, more if necessary, as a member of the Court. When arranging the scheme, the representatives of the nations should solemnly pledge their respective governments and peoples to select a man with the single purpose of securing high character, capacity, and impartiality. It should be agreed that the men elected shall each renounce the special claim which his nation has on him, and shall by his election enter into membership of all the contracting nations, and that thenceforward to the end of their lives their bond and obligation shall be to all these nations alike. Each man elected should be required to make a solemn pledge to do his utmost to free himself from the influence of party interests, and to make it his sole regard to pro

mote the well-being of the nations by the impartial and wise conduct of the Court. A neutral language should be chosen for the official use of the Court. The spreading use of Esperanto in several nations in recent years proves that such a language, suitable for all purposes, can be acquired without great difficulty. Each contracting nation should bind itself to submit to the Court every matter of difference between it and the other contracting nations which they fail to settle diplomatically; and they should agree to jointly maintain the Court's authority. The Court would have no authority over the internal affairs of any nation. Its sole function would be to give awards in matters of difference submitted to it. The territorial position of the contracting nations should be recognized as unalterable, and not to be called in question. While the contracting nations would be bound to submit to the Arbitration Court's decision in all matters placed with it, the standing of the Court would be only that of an instrument of these nations, subject to their control, to be modified and reformed by them as circumstances may show the need.

Which nations should be invited to join in this scheme? A little consideration makes it clear that all cannot be invited to join: there must be qualifications. It is essential to its success that the members of the Arbitration Court be men of high character, broad mind, and world-wide knowledge. Only by assurance that the Court will be formed of men of this character can the great nations, who are chiefly concerned, have confidence in it. Is it not likely that the men who would be elected by many of the small nations, if they were invited to join, would fail to reach this standard? Then let the great military nations form the scheme among themselves. It could be started by any two of these, if the

others should be unwilling to join at first. The purpose of this exclusion, be it understood, is simply to limit the power of control of the Arbitration Court, and the right of election of arbiters; it is not in the least to prevent the excluded nations from resorting to arbitration.

We have before us an evil of the gravest nature. Is not this the way by which we can overcome it? If we do not shape such a scheme, it will not be because it cannot be done, nor because we can give a good reason why we should not try to do it; it will be from timidity and sheer mental incapacity to raise ourselves from the old trodden round, and follow the guidance of reason in adjusting ourselves to better conditions. The order of the world does not depend entirely on our will, however. Human society tends to unity; and the change is constantly going on, regardless of what governments do or fail to do. That aggregating influence which has formed the great States does not cease its activity. Between the peoples of Europe of to-day and their ancestors of a hundred years ago there is a great difference. There has been a great change in view of life and in feeling toward other nations.

There

is now a far higher average general knowledge of life and the world; there is a more friendly regard of foreign Westminster Review.

peoples; and there is a different attitude toward war. On the other side of the Atlantic is a great State that takes in people from all the European nations; and there men dwell as neighbors who, had they remained in Europe, might have been compelled by their respective Governments to go and shoot each other. This and other factors have wrought a great change during the last century. There is a general dissatisfaction with the present military position of the nations. In every great military nation the number of people who oppose war is rapidly growing: and the more intelligent section of the laboring people have seen that their interests are alike in all nations, and they have denounced war. International congresses, political and industrial, are now of common occurrence. Groups of workmen, of doctors, journalists, city councillors, and scholars now visit other nations, and are received with the utmost cordiality, and even with enthusiasm; and there now exists a body composed of members of the parliaments of all nations with the purpose of promoting peace. Are not these things significant?

The time is ripe. To unite the nations in justice, needs only the sense to see the way and the will to take it. The eternal Sphinx is putting to us one of her silent questions. What is the answer to be?

Harry Hodgson.

With just so much right as Scotsmen claim Sir Walter Scott as their national novelist, many admirers of Charles James Lever demand that the latter be regarded as the national Irish romancer. But while the works of Scott are beloved by his compatriots, those of Lever are by no means popular with

his countrymen. The reasons are not far to seek: Scott glorified his characters, making his heroes and heroines the noblest of their race; Lever, the possessor of a sense of humor far keener than that of the greater writer, sacrificed everything in the endeavor to amuse. Those of Lever's detractors

who hail from the Emerald Isle complain bitterly that he has done much "to perpetuate the current errors as to Irish character," yet it cannot truthfully be asserted that he has on the whole been guilty of gross misrepresentation; and the various accusations, carefully examined, amount to little more than a charge of having depicted only certain classes of society. It is true that except en passant, as in the opening chapters of Tom Burke of "Ours," Lever did not treat of the political aspect of the Irish question; but that was not because he was unpatriotic, but because he had little interest in the problem; and it must be admitted that he did not portray the hardworking clerk or the honest business man of everyday life. He was at his best when describing the men who drank deep, rowed hard, gamed heavily, fought bravely, and led a devil-maycare life; but also he depicted with graphic pen the wretched state of the peasantry, and drew with no unskilful hand the pitiful lot of the decayed Irish gentleman.

The humorist cannot but poke kindly fun at the weaknesses of his fellows, and Lever could not refrain from goodhumored laughter at his countrymen's foibles. In his earlier books he made fun of most things, but he never wrote irreverently of sacred subjects, and always showed himself keenly alive to the holiness of the affection between parents and children, and to the beauty of love between man and woman. He wrote of youth and its joys: of the days qu'on est bien à vingt ans, when ambition is much but love is more, when frankness has not given place to diplomacy, when rash bravery rather than discretion is the rule. He wrote not of philosophy, nor of morality, but of the joyous times before high-spirited men come to forty year, and abandon "wine, woman, and song" for the serious business of life. He wrote, it

must be remembered, of an era when existence was not so strenuous as it is now, when less was expected from a man and less consequently was forthcoming, when the duel was of frequent occurrence, drunkenness regarded only as a venial fault, and practical joking an everyday occurrence.

It has been well said that Lever rollicked through life rather than lived, and when writing his books there is no doubt he drew largely on his experiences. One hears of his establishing in Dublin a Burschenschaft, the members of which wore scarlet vests with gilt buttons and a red skull-cap adorned with white tassels when they assembled for the suppers, songs, and conversational jousts that formed the staple of the night's entertainment. One hears how he took a party of friends to a ball at a house some miles distant in a furniture van, a hearse, and a mourning carriage; and of how, when practising as a doctor at Coleraine, and riding to visit a patient, he leaped his horse over a turf-cart that blocked the way. This latter exploit is introduced into many of the stories, and was cleverly parodied by Thackeray and Bret Harte. "Knowing my horse, I put him at the Emperor's head, and Bugaboo I went at it like a shot. He was riding his famous white Arab, and turned quite pale as I came up and went over the horse and the Emperor, scarcely brushing the cockade which he wore." And, lest you should doubt the likelihood of such a jump, Thackeray has given you a picture showing Phil Fogarty clearing, not only Napoleon, but Murat and Sieyès as well. "Cut him down!' said Sieyès, once an abbè but now a gigantic cuirassier; and he made a pass at me with his sword. But he little knew an Irishman on an Irish horse. Bugaboo cleared Sieyes, and fetched the monster a slap with his near hind hoof which sent him reeling from his saddle-and away I went,