Hobbes and the Social Contract TraditionCambridge University Press, 1986 - 299 pages This major study of Hobbes's political philosophy draws on recent developments in game and decision theory to explore whether the thrust of the argument in Leviathan, that it is in the interests of the people to create a ruler with absolute power, can be shown to be cogent. Professor Hampton has written a book of vital importance to political philosophers, political and social scientists, and intellectual historians. |
Contents
IV | 5 |
VI | 6 |
VII | 11 |
VIII | 24 |
IX | 27 |
X | 58 |
XII | 63 |
XIII | 68 |
XXXIII | 129 |
XXXIV | 132 |
XXXVI | 138 |
XXXVII | 147 |
XXXVIII | 150 |
XXXIX | 154 |
XL | 161 |
XLI | 166 |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute monarchy absolute sovereign account of conflict action agency agreement agency relationship argue argument for absolute authorization battle-of-the-sexes believe benefits Chapter Cive coin flip commonwealth conception contractarian convention cooperation coordination problem Covenant create creation David Gauthier defined desire discussed ethical ethical subjectivism expected-utility calculation explain fact fallback position free-rider problem game-theoretic Gauthier give given Hence Hobbes says Hobbes's argument Hobbes's psychology Hobbesian human hypothetical imperatives idea individual insofar institution interpretation irrational iterated PD judge justify laws of nature legal positivism Leviathan liberty Lockean maintain matrix means moral nonetheless obedience obey object one's party passage passions account PD game peace perform person players posse preferences premisses prisoner's dilemma promise psychological egoism punishment commands rational reason rebellion regime regress argument renege rule ruler self-interest self-preservation situation social contract argument social contract theory strategy structure subjectivist subjects supposed surrender theorists theory things tion