“In face of it, however, and altho the dogs arrived of themselves and without human aid at the solution of the gate question, I am able to point out that the complete action was pieced together out of accidental experiences, which the dogs followed, I might say, unconsciously.

"While the large dog was young, he was allowed, like the little one, to go into the garden, and therefore the gate was usually not latched but simply closed. Now if he saw any one go in he would follow by thrusting his snout between the gate and the post, and so pushing the gate open. When he was grown I forbade his being taken in, and had the gate kept latched. But he naturally still tried to follow when any one entered, and tried in the old fashion to open it, which he could no longer do. Now it fell out that once, while trying, he raised his nose higher than usual, and hit the latch from below, so as to lift it off its hook, and the gate opened. From thenceforth he made the same movement of the head when trying to open it, and of course with the same result. He now knew how to open the gate when it was latched.

"The little dog had been the large one's teacher in many things, especially in the chasing of cats, and catching of mice and moles, so when the little one was heard barking, the other always hastened to him.

"If the barking came from the garden he opened the gate to get inside.

"But meanwhile the little dog, who wanted to get

REASON AND INSTINCT

II

out, the moment the gate opened slipped out between the big one's legs, and so the appearance of his having come with the intention of letting him out arose, and that it was simply an appearance transpired from the fact that, when the little dog did not succeed at once in getting out, the large one ran in, and nosed about the garden, plainly showing that he had expected to see something there.

In order to stop this opening of the gate, I fastened a string on the garden side, which, tightly drawn, held the gate firmly against the post, so that if the large dog raised the latch, and let go, it would every time fall back on the hook, and this device was successful for quite a time, until it happened one day that on my return from a walk upon which the little dog had accompanied me, I crossed the garden, and in passing through the gate the dog remained behind, and refused to come to my whistle.

"As it was beginning to rain and I knew how he disliked to get wet, I closed the gate in order to punish him in this manner.

"But I had hardly reached the house ere he was before the gate, whining and crying most piteously, for the rain was falling faster and faster. The big dog, to whom the rain was a matter of indifference, was instantly on hand, and tried his utmost to open the gate, but naturally without success. Almost in despair, the little dog bit at the gate, at the same time springing into the air in the attempt to jump over it, when he chanced to catch the string in his

teeth. It broke and the gate flew open. Now he knew the secret, and thenceforth bit the string whenever he wished to get out, so that I was obliged to change it." I

If every story of animal intelligence could be carefully analyzed and the history of its development known it would probably be evident, as in this case, that the mentality displayed was hardly worthy the name Reason. There is an association of means and end. The dog remembered that a certain result followed a certain action. In the first instance, when the gate was not hasped, simply pushing against it caused it to open. Accidentally discovering that raising the hasp with his nose, the result — open gate followed, simple memory of the association of the two occurrences caused him to repeat the movement. To this class of phenomena psychology has given the name Recept. This word is derived from Latin re (back), capio (to take), meaning something remembered.

This is in distinction from the larger word Concept, from the same root, but the prefix con, together, shows that it covers the association of things received. This term is applicable only to reasoning. In reasoning we put things together and pick out the essential quality of observed facts. In this instance, that the pushing of the gate must take place while the hasp was lifted, so that the hasp would not drop into its place again. Then there is formed in the mind a ' Psychology.

REASON AND INSTINCT

13

concept, the principle of hasps in general, and the test of a concept is the power to use the idea under similar circumstances.

This leads to Professor James' proposition: "The ability to deal with novel data is the technical differentia of reasoning." This is very well shown by the further history of the two dogs which I quote again:

"That the big dog in raising the latch did not in the least know that the latch closed the gate, that the raising of the same opened it, but that he merely repeated the automatic blow with his snout, which had once had such happy consequences, transpires from the following:

"The gate leading to the barn is fastened with a latch precisely like the one on the garden gate, only placed a little higher, still easily within the dog's reach. Here, too, occasionally the little dog is confined, and when he barks the big one makes every possible effort to open the gate, but it never has occurred to him to push the latch up. The brute cannot draw conclusions, that is, he cannot think."

These recepts might be defined as acquired instincts, or if that seems a contradiction of terms, acquired reflexes. It is certainly one step higher than the primary instincts, and is quite suggestive of the way in which our ancestors may have repeated certain actions till a tendency to do the same appeared in the offspring. The reason for many of our human instincts is now lost. Yet it never occurs to

us to question these actions in ourselves. "It takes what Berkeley calls a mind debauched by learning to make the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for why of any instinctive human act.”1

It was just said that the transmission of acquired habits might account for instincts, animal and human. This was the generally accepted view, altho it was recognized that the evidence was meager in the extreme. But in 1889 Weismann, of Freiburg, published a strong denial, outlining a theory which increases the scope of natural selection.

Weismann denies that functional qualities are transmissible, denies that the blacksmith's son is capable of any greater physical development than he would have been had his father followed some sedentary profession.

This view has gained many adherents in the intellectual world, and while it would be out of place to introduce the argument here, it must be mentioned that Herbert Spencer was strongly opposed. The principle of inheritance of acquired characteristics is part of the groundwork of his Synthetic Philosophy, and in the later controversy 3 with Weismann he held his ground manfully.

What we need is to bear in mind the fact that we are richly endowed with instincts, and that these form a basis from which are developed habits, habits

'James: Psychology.

2 Essays upon Heredity.

3 Contemporary Review, September, 1893, October, 1894.