Instead of taking our breadstuffs only, this immense population would every year require more and more of the produce of our forests, while the funds which came here in return would accumulate till they grew into capital, and were reinvested in the manufacture of fresh sources of profit. Finally, the federal union would give no privileges to our Canadian vessels, steamers or otherwise, which they do not now possess; annexation would give free entry to our craft in every water of the continent.

The contrast is succinctly stated, but we think it is sufficiently striking to induce any one who reflects upon it to give up the federal union, and cleave to the larger and better measure.

GERMAN COMMERCE.

From the Economist.

THE NEW GERMAN FEDERAL EMPIRE.

In whatever light we regard Germany, it is unquestionably the most important "foreign relation" which this country can boast of. The only other country that has any pretensions to a comparison with it, is the United States of America. The manufactures of Great Britain are consumed in Germany to a larger amount than in any other country whatever. On the other hand, Germany supplies this country with wool, timber, flax, hemp, and grain, to an aggregate amount exceeding our imports from any other single country, unless it be in some years from the United States, in the trade of which cotton alone forms so important an item. If to our direct exports we add those which pass through Belgium, Holland, and other channels, the amount of British manufactures disposed of in Germany is not less than twelve millions annually. In other words, Germany, as a market for our goods, is equal to those of the possessions of the East India Company, Ceylon, the whole of the Australian colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the British possessions in North America, all taken together. When the German markets were paralyzed and deranged last year, in consequence of the political disturbances, which destroyed all credit and confidence, we had a striking example of the influence exerted by them on British industry. In the course of a few months our exports fell off upwards of £5,000,000. With tranquillity partially restored in Europe, our exports have increased as suddenly in the present year as they declined in 1848. According to the board of trade tables, which we publish this day,

those of the seven months exhibit an increase of more than five millions in 1849, compared with 1848. What was lost by continental revolutions in 1848, has been restored to our general commerce by the tranquillity, such as it is, which now reigns in Europe. And those sudden and great changes have chiefly affected our trade with Germany, because it is so much larger than any other.

In everything, therefore, which affects the permanency of that tranquillity, this country has a deep and important stake. There is no more vulgar error, common as it hitherto has been, than that our success and prosperity can be built up on the misfortunes of our neighbors. Thus it is impossible that those who understand the true importance of the commercial intercourse between this country and Germany, can look with apathy upon the efforts now making at Berlin to consolidate into some rational confederation the scattered elements of the great German empire. We are in no humor at the present time to criticize too severely the errors of the past, whether of omission or commission, which have been made by those in whose hands the destinies of Germany have been placed. They have been sufficiently numerous. We are rather disposed to aid, in every way we can, what appears to us to be the most likely means of cementing, if not all Germany, at least those states in the north which, from identity of interests and similarity of views, are capable of forming one great union, which will be sufficiently powerful to suppress domestic anarchy and forbid foreign aggression. By such a union alone can the peace of the north of Europe be guaranteed.

Taking the brilliant speech of M. de Radowitz, in the second Chamber at Berlin, as the true exponent of the policy of Count Brandenburg, and of the views and wishes of the King of Prussia, we must admit, that, for the first time since the revolutions of 1848, do we now see a well-founded hope for a reörganization of the German states into one united and intelligible policy. In the Frankfort Assembly we never had any confidence. It was based upon a theory which, however grand and imposing, embraced conflicting elements, which we had no hope to see reconciled. However much Austria and Prussia might appear to do homage to the "occasion," no one who considered the different principles and material interests which they represented, to say nothing of the private ambitions and jealousies which animated the representatives of two such great powers, could believe that either contemplated a true adherence to an arrangement which neither believed could be permanent.

But the Frankfort Assembly is now a matter of history. German unity, in the grand sense contemplated by that body, proved a failure, because it was based upon a vague theory, and not upon the wants and interests of the people. Since its dissolution it has been evident that the two great powers of Prussia and Austria have been striving states. These efforts on the part of Austria no doubt would have assumed a more decided shape long before now but for the occupation which she has had in Italy and Hungary. At the present moment there are three plans open to Germany. The first is to remain in its present dislocated condition, with even the organization of the Zollverein, although literally in force (unless superseded) till 1853, practically, for any great object of progress or improvement, in abeyance; the second is to make another attempt to form one empire, with the reigning family of Austria at its head; and the third is to form such a limited union of the states which comprised the Zollverein of 1833, with such others in the north as are disposed to join it, leaving Austria and some of the minor states in the south to an independent existence. The first of these plans could lead only to continual intrigues, conflicts, and anarchy. The second to a reactionary policy, both with regard to the liberties of the people and the freedom of commerce, which would soon prove fatal (in the present temper of the German nation) to the governments themselves, both central and local, however formed. The third seems the only plan which promises anything like permanency, because it is based upon actual existing facts, and not upon any vague theory, because it assimilates itself to the material wants and the views of the people, and does not rely upon the people assimilating themselves to its dogmas; because it is a constitution made for a people, suited to their interests and actual existence, and does not depend upon a people for its sake changing their habits and views in order to adopt it. Such is the proposal now made at Berlin, under the immediate sanction of Prussia. We have confidence in the Berlin constitution, because it is moderate in its pretensions, avoiding the grand but impracticable visions which proved fatal at Frankfort, and confining itself to an attempt to meet the real and present wants of that portion of Germany which can ever be permanently united. The whole objects and policy of this constitution are most ably explained in the speech of M. de Radowitz, already alluded to. He dwells with great stress upon the misfortunes of the past year-upon the anarchy which long prevailed and against which, as yet, no permanent security has been taken. The old organizations of 1815 and of 1833 have equally fallen to pieces, and are no longer of any true force. Yet, without organization, what is Germany? Confed

government, and those of the independent separate states, and based upon a free and liberal representative system.

What, then, has Germany to choose between at this moment? On the one hand, there is Prince Swarzenburg's proposal for a great confederate empire of seventy-four millions, of discordant and dissimilar elements, with Austria at the head, and to include a mutual guarantee of all possessions, and consequently of Lombardy and Venice; and of which, no doubt, the cabinet of Vienna would be the moving spirit, as well with respect to its commercial policy as its general liberties. On the other hand, there is the proposal of Prussia, to establish a federal union of those states whose interests and views are similar and identical-based upon a liberal representative system. The one is reaction in politics-protection in commerce. The other is " progress" in both. The one addresses itself to a vision-an incompatible theory; the other, to actual existing facts-to living realities. The one, from its discordant elements, and reactionary attributes, could not fail to lead to confusion, anarchy, and (finally) to military despotism; the other, to a gradual amelioration of the present condition of the people, the expansion of their liberties, and the accomplishment of free trade. At the present moment, the one works by private intrigue; the other, by open and clearly announced principles and plans.

No one who has at heart the maintenance of that tranquillity which is so far reestablished in Europe can feel indifferent as to the success of the Berlin project. It is already far advanced. Austria has lost its opportunity, if, indeed, it ever existed. On the 30th of the present month, the Reichstag will be fully convened in both houses, senate and representatives, at Berlin, when the constitution will be formally submitted, and, no doubt, accepted. On the 15th of October, the general German Parliament will be convoked, representing the new federal empire, which will embrace, including Holstein, a population of about twenty-eight millions, of which Prussia alone possesses sixteen millions. The only thing which is now necessary for the full success of a project so admirably calculated to meet the peculiar position and wants of the German states, is that the King of Prussia, and those statesmen who have originated and proposed it, shall carry it out in the true spirit of M. de Radowitz's professions. The cabinet of Berlin must be prepared to carry it out

whole, with whose several divisions foreign powers have nothing to do. It is necessary I should show that this demand contains the condition upon which the life of the nation depends." Prussia, in short, now seeks to establish a federal union, following the example of the United States of America, in

the credit and the honor of having laid the foundation of a great confederation, which, though independent in all its parts for local purposes, will form a powerful unity for all common objects, which will contain within itself the germs of progress and rational liberty. For our own part, we

The holy alliance is in a fair way of outdoing itself, of outheroding Herod.

Prussia, therefore, and Austria, will now take the arrangement of the German affairs into their hands jointly. They have the power again; and all they promised and executed since March, 1848, was only done with a reservation that they should continue to be powerless. The reactionary party, with a tuft and place-hunting nobility at their head, and in league with the family interests of the sovereigns, are seriously bent upon bringing back the good olden times, when the anointed of the Lord and his special and loyal favorites were, with the assistance of priesteraft and a hired soldiery, recklessly fleecing a flock of bipeds created for their support. But as long as Germany shall be inhabited by its present race, it cannot become like China; nor can the democratic principles of Christianity be thoroughly eradicated in civilized Europe, even though our modern saints do all in their power to reduce it to a hollow form.

If not the crowned heads themselves, yet the statesmen in the cabinets must have learned something within the two last memorable years. Besides, some of the most essential reforms have struck such deep roots within that short period, that they cannot be put down. In Austria religious toleration must be realized, even through that assembly of the Protestant dignitaries which first met at the call of the government of Vienna on the 2d of August, when it moved in solemn procession to the Protestant meeting-house, and proclaimed its confession to be on a level with that of its Catholic brethren.

Thus we may confidently hope that, although Austria, lying prostrate at the feet of the czar, will have an active hand in managing the new organization of German politics, we shall not return to the old régime. The new central power that is to be installed by Prussia and Austria jointly, will no doubt be considered as being de jure a successor to the old German Diet, and as operating on the basis of the treaties of 1815; but de facto it will be compelled to grant many salutary innovations, especially a general national representation, as Austria will not scruple to violate her constitution of the 4th of March. One should, however, be a conjurer to foresee what will be the state of our internal constitution or affairs a six-month hence, and whether Germany will become one, two, or seven.

who must not be enlightened, lest they should begin to think and to have a will of their own, instead of obeying. This is the counter-revolution that, at the present moment, thinks it is powerful again, and is resolved to use its power for going the full length towards bringing back the old régime.

The other tendency is that which does not consider either the power of the governments sufficiently great, or the victory gained sufficiently decisive, to attempt a counter-revolution. Absolutism is likewise what it drives at; but it sees that standing still or going back is impossible, and that a progressive movement is indispensable for the purpose of making advances to certain ideas of the age by certain forms; though there ought to be no essential change in the practical results. It would affect liberal appearances, and prefer concessions to violence; as the latter would be risking too much.

These tendencies are struggling for superiority in the cabinets, though in fact they aim at the same end. They both wish to put down republicanism throughout Europe, and they likewise agree in thinking the small German states a nuisance, not because the people there labor under many disadvantages, but because they consider them as breeding places of revolutionary ideas.

The unity of Germany or of Italy (countries which in so many respects are similarly circumstanced, as being the battle-fields for the rest of the European countries, never-failing objects for their policy, and an inexhaustible source for defraying the expense of other nations' wars) will not be acknowledged by the cabinets as a national or European desideratum, because it is a demand raised by the revolution.

But if Germany were united it would give a different direction to the whole policy of Europe; and it is next to impossible that the German powers should altogether overlook their vocation of rendering their country less insignificant. They must see that the interest of their own families is at variance here with the interest of the nation at large, and that they should forfeit every claim to respect and love if they did sacrifice the latter to their selfish ends. Thus the liberal as well as the counter-revolutionary absolutisms are compelled to shift their direction against their will.

This is especially true as regards Prussia. However much her cabinet inclines to absolutism or despotism, however great the abhorrence in which it

ting to exterminate every republic in Europe, from France down to Lubeck, or whether France herself be privy to a new holy alliance of which Prussia and Germany are to be the victims, we may regard the rumors of such matters as at least the smoke indicating that the diplomates are busily employed in their laboratories.

One fact is certain, that the continental cabinets consider the movement of 1848, which has shaken the foundations of so many governments, as a phenomenon, whose principle they are determined to uproot. It is a general crusade against what they call the revolution, that they are about.

But there are two tendencies in the cabinets. The one knows nothing about ideas; all history is to it but a play of intrigue and power; progress and reform are but concessions that are marks of weakness; it knows but an absolute government and an obedient people, whose persons and property are at the disposal of the sovereign and his retinue, and

to her. She cannot become the ally of a league whose object it is to uphold absolutism and legitimacy at any rate, to oppose political and social progress, and to repress that development which freedom and independence bestow on the life of a nation. She has become great through Protestantism, wherefore she cannot fetter the spirit of free inquiry; she has done so much for public instruction, and has been so proud of being called the intellectual state de préférence, that now she cannot shrink from the results of a high development of intellect. Prussia has, through the assistance of democracy, whose principle she embraced in 1806, risen from her deep fall to a considerable height: and she has so often boasted of having obtained all the results of the revolution by progressive reform, that she cannot now declare open war to democracy, or turn back and call every reform an emanation from the revolutionary principle.

Prussia has promised so much that her honor