value by what he does, and which the law will protect. But neither the patron nor the benefice, nor the future unknown successor has any such interest in the parsonage or glebe." This is a case where not only the purpose of the erection, but the relation of the party who made it to those under whom he held and to those who were to succeed him, was permitted to determine the question. In Vaughen v. Haldeman, 33 Penn. State R. 522, gas fixtures, such as chandeliers and side brackets, put up and and attached to the gas pipes by the owner of the premises, were decided to be personal property, so that they did not pass on a sale of the real estate. This decision was based on the consideration, as expressed by the court, that "lamps, chandeliers, candlesticks, candelabra, sconces, and various contrivances for lighting houses, by means of candles, oils, or other fluids, have never been considered fixtures." It is said, that "it is supposed that the introduction of carburetted hydrogen gas may have changed the character of the apparatus, because it must be connected with the pipes through which the gaseous fluid is brought into the building.' But the court decided that there was nothing to distinguish the new apparatus, as it was screwed on to the pipes and cemented only to prevent the escape of gas, from the old lamps, chandeliers and candlesticks, in use before the intro duction of gas for lighting buildings. This decision cannot be sustained upon principle where gas pipes are regarded as fixtures. They are so necessary to each other, that they cannot be separated without destroying the usefulness of both. It is no answer to say that others can be fitted to the pipes. Such reasoning would allow the removal of parts of any machine. The truth is, that there is very little, if any, analogy between the case decided and the case of the oil lamps to which it was likened. The oil lamp is a perfect thing of itself, and is removed entire and fitted for immediate use anywhere. To make the cases analogous, we must assume that the body of the lamp is a fixture, and that the question is, whether the tubes which conduct the wicks to the fluid can be removed as personal property. In Hellawell v. Eastwood, 6 Exch. R. 295, cotton spinning machines, fixed by means of screws, some into the wooden floor, and some into lead poured in a melted state into holes in stones, for the purpose of receiving the screws, were decided to be personal property, liable to distress for the rent of the premises. The court remarked: "They were never a part of the freehold, any more than a carpet would be which is attached to the floor by nails for the purpose of keeping it stretched out, or curtains, looking-glasses, pictures, and other matters of an ornamental nature, which have been slightly attached to the walls of the dwelling as furniture." But there seems to have been a distinction sometimes made between machines attached for trade purposes and things annexed to a dwelling-house, for its convenience and comfort. Thus, in Cohen v. Kyler. 27 Missouri R. 122, it was held that a bathing tub and lead pipes, fastened to the walls and floor of a building by nails, were fixtures. The decision was put upon the ground that such things add greatly to the value, comfort and convenience of the building. This is an instance where the purpose and use of the thing are allowed to control the question. In the case of Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Man. Co. 12 N. H. 233, it was said in regard to the question, what was necessary to constitute a fixture, that "some of the excepted cases seem to have made the question depend upon the character of the fastening, whether slight or otherwise. But this is a criterion of a questionable character, not sustained by the weight of the decisions. More depends upon the nature of the article, and of its use as connected with the use of the freehold." And in Wall v. Hinds, 4 Gray, 271, it was said that, in determining whether a chattel has become a fixture, there were two points to be considered, namely, the mode of annexation, that is, whether they were annexed to the fabric of the house, so that they could be taken down and removed without substantial injury to the building or to themselves; and the intention with which they were annexed, and the purposes which the annexation was designed to answer; "that is, whether they were intended for a permanent and substantial improvement to the realty, perpetui usus causa, or, as it is sometimes said, pour un profit del inheritance, or, whether they were put up and used for a temporary object, or for the more convenient occupation and enjoyment of the premises for the particular purpose for which the tenant used them, so that they were useful and necessary rather to the comfortable and convenient occupation of the building, than to the building itself." Applying those principles to the case before them, the court held that a cistern, water pipes and gas pipes were removable by the tenant. They had been put in the house by the tenant for the accommodation of his business of keeping boarders, and were within the rule as to trade fixtures. The cistern was of wood, lined with lead, rested on the floor of the attic, and was filled with water by pipes which passed from the city aqueduct into the cellar of the building, and up through the floors of the other stories to the cistern. Other pipes also conducted the water from the cistern to sinks in different rooms of the house. The gas pipes were put up in the ordinary manner. Stoves put in a house, where there are no fire places, are not fixtures when not otherwise connected with the house than by the entering of the pipe into the chimney. Freeland v. Southworth, 24 Wen. 191. But where stoves are, so imbedded in the fire places or chimneys that they cannot be removed without pulling down or demolishing the fire places or chimneys, they are fixtures, and cannot be removed by the tenant. Goddard v. Chase, 7 Mass. 432. In Hill v. Wentworth, 28 Vt. 428, the questions involved were, whether certain machinery for making paper, in a paper mill, was a fixture. The action was trover for a quantity of iron. It was decided that the engines, used for grinding rags into pulp, an iron boiler set in brick work, and the iron pipe connected with it, paper presses, calendar rolls in an iron frame, screwed to timbers which were spiked to the floor, a rag cutter, a trimming press, set in a frame which was screwed to the floor, and a machine for making paper, fastened to the floor by cleats, were no part of the real property. But the iron shafting, put up in the building for the purpose of putting in motion the machinery, by means of hangers of iron, bolted to the beams and sills of the building, were held to be a part of the real estate. The previous cases in the Vermont courts were generally reviewed in this case, as well as some of the leading cases of other States; and the court deduced and declared the following general rules or principles as to what is necessary to constitute a fixture. It is said: "We think the rule in this State should be that the various articles of machinery belonging to a manufactory are, in no respect, real estate, excepting as they are a part of the freehold, or substantially attached to it; and that it is not sufficient to make them a part of the freehold if they are attached to the building for the purpose, and in the manner adapted to keep them steady, and that their use may be more beneficial as chattels, and in such a way that will admit of their removal without any material injury to the freehold or to the chattels." It was further said: That "in determining the character of what the plaintiff claims to be fixtures, or a part of the realty, we must not only have reference to the manner and extent of the annexation, but also to the object and purpose of it. Whether the articles in question were personal property or fixtures, should be determinable, and plainly appear, from an inspection of the property itself, taking into consideration their nature, the mode and extent of their annexation, and their purpose and object, from which the intention would be indicated. "To change the nature and legal qualities of a chattel into a fixture, requires a positive act on the part of the person making the annexation, and his intention so to do should positively appear; and, if this be left in doubt, the article should be held still to be personal property." The same questions are fully considered in T'eaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio State R. 511, where the machinery of a woolen factory, consisting of carding machines, spinning machines, power looms, &c., connected and used in the manner common to such factories, were held to be, not fixtures, but personal property. In regard to the doctrine of physical annexation it is said : "This doctrine, however, does not furnish a criterion of uniform application, or one which will bear the test of exami nation." It is further remarked, that "there is another class of authorities in which it is laid down that the true test of a fixture is the adaptation of the article to the use or purpose to which the realty is appropriated, however slight its physical connection with it. And some cases have gone so far as to make this the only test, and even to dispense with actual or physical annexation." But it is said that this rule "will not bear examination as a criterion of general application." And they repeat the argument often used against that criterion, that if such be the sole test of a fixture, "then the implements and domestic animals necessary for the cultivation of a farm, and a great variety of other articles subject to the use of the land or its appurtenances, which never have been and never can be recognized as such, would be fixtures." And they prescribe, as deducible from the authorities, three rules as the criterion "of general and uniform application," as follows: "1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto. "2d. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with which it is connected. "3d. The intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold; this intention being inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, |