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But while ministerial and administrative questions have thus sunk to the second rank, the subjects of finance and international policy have risen to an almost ex

Bishop of Poitiers, and these again by has paralyzed its forces, and sensibly others, followed the example of Cardinal diminished the asperities of party politics Lavigerie; and the Conservative party, by bringing about a truce in the conflict which has so long held firmly together in between Monarchists and Republicans. denouncing the Republican system as in- As to the advanced Radicals, they have compatible with the interests of religion, at this moment neither chiefs nor pronow finds itself divided into at least three gramme. They dare not name revision, opposing sections and this, although so utterly has it been discredited by the we leave altogether out of count both the Boulangist use of it; and it is not the Bonapartists and the tiny group of irrec- least use calling themselves Socialists, for oncilable Legitimists, who refuse to recall the parties are Socialists now. M. de ognize the Comte de Paris, and maintain Mun, M. Clémenceau, M. Constans, M. the right of the Spanish Bourbons to the de Cassagnac are all Socialists, each after throne of France. First, there are the his fashion. The fact is, that in France Orleanists pure and simple, led by the at the present moment all questions of Comte d'Haussonville, who has succeeded internal policy are laid to rest, and this M. Bocher in the leadership of the party. unwonted calm has produced in ParliaTheir numbers, their energy, and the ment a sort of universal good-will which force of their convictions diminish from gives the ministry an indefinite lease of day to day; but they cling to the Restora- life. tion as indispensable, and enter the electoral contest only to affirm the monarchical principle. Then there are the moderate Conservatives, led by MM. Piou and De la Marzelle. These take a purely constitutional standpoint, and seek to ally them-clusive importance. selves with the Republican Left Centre. For twenty-one years France has been They make no excessive claims in the alone in Europe. From the time of the matter of religion, and only ask for a Congress of Berlin in 1878, she may inmodification of the anti-clerical policy of deed be said to have resumed her part in the government. Finally, there is the that detestable discord which goes by the purely Catholic party, which is in course name of the European Concert; but it has of formation out of the two preceding been as an insignificant member of the groups. It declares itself indifferent to orchestra, not as one of the first violins. the form of government, and will go to Her position was the result of her defeat. the electors with a purely social and reli- But the enemies of Republicanism of gious programme. The most eminent course laid it to the form of government, members of this group are, in the Cham- and averred that a Republic was necessaber of Deputies, M. de Mun, and, in the rily isolated, while a Monarchy would Senate, M. Chesnelong; and they dream have nothing to do but take its choice of of an ideal policy at once Catholic, dem- alliances. The history of the nineteenth ocratic, and socialistic. In our opinion, century does not bear out this theory. M. d'Haussonville is right when he says Except for two short intervals, under Louis that the electors will be even less disposed Philippe and under Napoleon III., when to enrol themselves in the Catholic than the entente cordiale subsisted between in the Royalist party, and that the only France and England, France has been result of all these subdivisions will be to isolated ever since 1830. In 1840 all throw many Conservative electors into the Europe was in coalition against her. In arms of moderate Republicanism. We 1870 no one raised a finger to avert her must wait to see whether these Catholic fate. On the contrary, every one had socialistic ideas take any hold on the mass something to gain from her abasement. of the people; but it is meanwhile certain Russia seized the opportunity to efface that the development of such views within the consequences of the Treaty of Paris, the bosom of the Conservative party itself Italy to possess herself of Rome, England

to develop her commerce, and Austria to brought into fashion. England, who had make her own arrangements with the new just been receiving the emperor with the German Empire. Since '89 France has cordiality due to a young, generous, and been always under suspicion. She has powerful sovereign closely allied by blood never had a solid alliance or an enduring with her own reigning family, had the good friendship. When she was strong, or was taste and good feeling to emphasize the supposed to be strong, she could make success of the voyage of the French squadshift without it. But to-day she needs ron, and at the same time to deprive it of allies; first, to counterpoise the Triple any exclusive character, by inviting the Alliance, and next, as an answer to those fleet to an official reception at Portsmouth. who, even in France, assert that the re- This brilliant reception, which produced a public is naturally regarded with distrust very happy effect on our navy, served also by all monarchical governments. This is to dissipate the unfavorable impression the explanation of the transports of delight created by the rumors which had been with which the accounts of the reception afloat that England was about to join the of our fleet at Cronstadt and St. Peters- Triple Alliance for the purpose of mainburg were received in France. To thought- taining the status quo in the Mediterraful minds the effect of these Russophile nean. demonstrations, extravagant and puerile as they often are, and of the Russian mania for everything French, is not altogether reassuring. They realize that this hot and rapid friendship is not the outcome of any true identity of principles or policy, of material or intellectual interests, but simply of a common antipathy and a common fear; and that this passion of the French democracy for a czar, and of the Russian populace for a Republican democracy this strange drawing together of two countries the most unfitted for mutual understanding and co-operation may well result in such a heating of popular passions as may drive us into a European war which their respective governments have neither desired nor provided for. For our own part, we have already pointed out in these pages how, in our opinion, the true interests of France and Germany would lead each to seek the friendship of the other. France has nothing to gain from an alliance with Russia, even if she succeeded, by her aid, in obtaining a victory over Germany. But it must be recognized, on the other hand, that all reconciliation between France and Germany is impossible, so long as Germany keeps Alsace and Lorraine under the yoke; and that France is meanwhile placed in a position in which she must accept such alliances as are offered to her. She cannot reasonably be reproached for having thought it good policy to send her fleet cruising in the Baltic as soon as she was assured that it would meet with a friendly reception at Stockholm, a warm reception at Copenhagen, and an enthusiastic reception at Cronstadt. It was due to herself that she should thus take her part, and with a certain éclat, in those international ceremonials and civilities which the incessant activity of the German emperor has

The success of the Baltic cruise, and the sensation produced by the demeanor of the czar, who rose with all his court to listen standing to that "Marseillaise" to the strains of which France made war a century ago on crowns and thrones, was consummated by the spectacle of the grand manœuvres in the autumn. For the first time, it was a real army, an army of a hundred thousand men, that was mobilized in the plains of Champagne, of Lorraine, and of Burgundy (that is to say, in the countries which would become the theatre of war in case of a new German invasion), under the command of General Saussier, the general destined for the command-inchief in time of war, and in the presence of the minister of war, M. de Freycinet, and of the chief of the general staff, General de Miribel. To add to the character of solemnity given to the occasion as a sort of public reconstitution of the military forces of France, M. Carnot himself, for the first time, presided at the grand review in which the manœuvres terminated. It is true that some parts of our military organization—as, for instance, the rela tions between the commissariat and the command, the divisional artillery, and the quality of our cavalry and artillery horses

- may be open to criticism; but the manoeuvres as a whole produced on those who witnessed them the impression that the military forces of France were now so considerable that she has no need to give place to any one, or to suffer any longer in silence those secret or open humiliations which have not been spared her these twenty years. The able and prudent speeches of MM. de Freycinet and Carnot emphasized this aspect of the situation; they declared the determination of France to pursue a policy of peace, but at the same time to put up with no affront; and

they pointed to the attitude of Russia in relation to France as a proof that she has been able to inspire confidence in the continuity of her aims and the moderation of her acts.

The moral effect produced by the Cronstadt reception and the autumn manœuvres was very great. Nothing, indeed, had really changed in the European situation within the last year; France and Russia had long been approaching each other, driven by the necessities of their respective positions; and the reorganization of the French army had been going on for many years. But the celebrations of this year have given the nation a new sense of moral and material recovery; they have made her conscious of her strength, of what she has gained by twenty years of hard effort, and also of the value of wisdom and self-concentration. And they have at the same time demonstrated to all Europe that a change has taken place in the equilibrium of political forces, and that the period of the absolute hegemony of Germany is ended. General Caprivi himself recognized this fact when he observed in his speech at Osnabrück that the rapprochement between France and Russia meant the re-establishment of the balance of power.

And now, what will be the effect of this new situation on the chances of peace or war? It is very difficult to foretell. On the one hand, France, conscious of her improved position in Europe, will feel with the less impatient bitterness the diminution of her strength caused by the loss of Alsace and Lorraine; but, on the other hand, the very sense of her strength, and that of her allies, may lead her to adopt an arrogant tone, or to make imprudent demonstrations. The patriotism of Frenchmen, free to express itself without fear, may grow headstrong and highminded. Their enemies, meanwhile, will doubtless become more circumspect, in view of the new grouping of the European powers; but they may, at the same time, think themselves seriously menaced, and proceed to seek in war the advantages which peace no longer assures to them. A general disarmament becomes less and less probable; and how is it possible long to keep the peace, with armaments so tremendous, so crushingly burdensome, especially when every nation except Russia has reached the utmost limit of possible effort, while Russia can go on arming and fortifying for an almost indefinite time at the expense of all the rest? How is the Emperor William, with his irritable and

impatient character, to be expected to go on watching year after year the gradual lessening of the preponderance of Germany, by the mere growth of her neighbors' strength, and the inevitable relaxation of the artificial bonds of the Triple Alliance?

A year ago the relations between France and Germany seemed to be steadily improving. On each side there was a certain desire for reconciliation. The German emperor seemed to be occupying himself exclusively with home affairs and social questions. In France, his speeches and his actions were followed with a feeling very much akin to sympathy. Some idealists even flattered themselves that he was on the eve of solving the Alsace-Lorraine difficulty by neutralization, or even by partial restitution. But since the spring of this year the relations between the two countries have again been chilled, not to say embittered. An incident of secondary importance contributed to this re-estrangement; and time enough has now perhaps elapsed for it to be not quite useless to say a few words on the subject, which has been very commonly misunderstood. I refer to the affair of the non-participation of French painters in the Berlin Exhibition.

I need not recall the incidents, which are fresh in every one's mind. But it will be remembered how, in 1890, the welcome given at Berlin to the French delegates attending the conference on social questions and the Medical Congress, the milder measures adopted in Alsace-Lorraine in the matter of passport regulations, and the warmth and evident sincerity with which the emperor avowed himself the friend of peace, had created in France an almost universal desire to be on friendly terms with Germany, and to carry on normal relations with her in all matters scientific, artistic, economic, and the like. The invitation addressed to French painters by the Society of Artists in Berlin, who were organizing the International Exhibition there for the spring of 1891, was favorably received by the leading men of the French school. The few isolated protests which were raised against their taking part in the Exhibition would have produced no effect at all if it had not been for the unfortunate accident of the Empress Frederick's thinking it necessary to visit Paris at that particular moment, with her daughter, Princess Margaret. It was in vain that she attempted to give a purely private character to her visit. She could not prevent the reporters from getting on her track and commenting on her every

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passports. This puerile retort, by which
the Alsatians were punished for the
- that there is a
offences of the French, has at least served
to bring out this truth
real solidarity between France and Alsace,
that so long as the Alsatians are oppressed
no reconciliation is possible between
France and Germany, and that if petty
incidents, like this of the French artists
and the Exhibition, are enough to agitate
two great nations, it is because they are
only the symptoms of a deep-lying mis-
chief, of an essentially grave and perilous

This tension between France and Germany was increased by the success of the French Exhibition at Moscow, by the Russophile demonstration which followed the Cronstadt reception, and finally by the very undiplomatic speech of the emperor at Erfurt, where he recalled the days of humiliation which had prepared for Germany the hour of her revenge.

On the other hand, two fresh incidents have occurred to alleviate these painful impressions- the performance of "Lohengrin " in Paris, and the suppression of the passport system.

step, nor the journals which live upon scandal and make a business of Chauvinism, from making her visit the pretext for violent attacks on Germany and on those French painters who were intending to exhibit at Berlin, nor rowdy politicians from playing their own game by stirring up the popular passions. MM. Déroulède, Cassagnac, and Rochefort distinguished themselves particularly in this campaign; and M. Déroulède seized the opportunity to bring his famous “Ligue des Patriotes into evidence again. It was not long before most of the painters who had prom-international situation. ised to send to the Berlin Exhibition withdrew their support - some, like M. Detaille, declaring that they had been deceived, and that patriotism forbade their exhibiting in the Prussian capital, others simply excusing themselves as yielding to scruples they did not share. A very few among whom was M. Bouguereau had the courage of their opinions and sent to the Exhibition all the same. Foreigners supposed that this sudden change in the attitude of the French artists was due to the nagging of a few journalists and the ravings of a few fanatics; they said that At first sight, it seems simply ridiculous the French are always carried away by who clamors loudest, and that in France that the performance of an opera which madmen are allowed to lay down the law has been played for forty years on every for men in their right senses. But it really stage in Europe should have any political was not the newspapers that decided the importance whatever; and when we find There was a real the relations between France and Gerquestion in this case. misunderstanding as to the position of the many actually at the mercy of a question Empress Frederick, whose visit, little as of music or paintings, it might be possible she intended it, seemed to the French to draw unflattering conclusions on the painters to be of the nature of an official subject of French frivolity. But it must step on the part of the German govern- be remembered that all human affairs ment; but, more than this, it was regarded have two different scales of importance: as a ballon d'essai to prepare the way for they have their value as they are in thema future visit of the emperor himself. If selves, and their symbolic and represensuch a visit had taken place, somebody or tative value. It has been seen how other would have been sure to insult him, questions of general policy were involved and then the only choice for France would in the affair of the French artists. The Lohengrin" question had also attained have been between humiliation and a war for indeed it was already believed that in the minds of many Frenchmen a nathe young emperor was perfectly ready for tional importance. Not only was Wagner, war in case of the least offence being on account of the various hard hits at the offered to his mother, For those who French contained in his works, and espeentertained this belief, it was no mere cially on account of his feeble and harmChauvinistic fanaticism, but an act of wise less farce on the capitulation of Paris, as a fanatical and thoughtful patriotism, to abstain from composed in 1871, regarded — by those going to Berlin, and thus to warn the em- who had not read himperor that the moment had not yet come anti-Frenchman, but it was also vaguely when he could hope to visit Paris without felt that the triumph of Wagnerian music danger to the peace of Europe. And Wil-in France is the confession of an indisput liam II. forthwith took upon him to justify this view, by meeting the refusal of the French artists with a return to the most vexatious measures on the frontier, and with increased strictness in the matter of

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able German sovereignty. The Wagnerian drama is the culminating point of that magnificent artistic evolution which begins with Bach and Handel, and passes on through Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven,

Schubert, Weber, and Schumann, to end in Wagner, and which towers above the musical creations of other countries as incontestably as Italian painting over that of all other painters. Now the Wagnerian drama was claimed by Wagner himself and by his disciples as an essentially national outgrowth, in opposition to the French or Italian opera. The Bayreuth theatre could never have been created but for that German national sentiment which, kindled by the victories of 1870, recognized in the work of Wagner the true expression of the national genius, nor could it have existed until German unity was a fait accompli. To open the lyric stage of Paris to this music, whose superb beauty must make it, for a time at least, regnant and supreme, is to recognize as it were the hegemony of Germany in its highest and purest form in the form, therefore, to which French sensibilities must be most keenly alive. And to these two objections the first sufficiently puerile, the second not quite without justification must be added the jealousy of French composers and publishers, who recognize in the Wagnerian music a formidable competitor, the inherent gaminerie of the Paris crowd, ever glad of an excuse for shouting and hissing, and the intrigues of the anti-Republican parties, eager to cast suspicion on the patriotism of the government, and to create an agitation out of which, by happy chance, might|| spring a riot, a revolution, or even a war.

It was owing to all these causes together that "Lohengrin" became a political question. As long ago as 1884, M. Carvalho wanted to play it at the Opéra Comique. He was prevented by the clamors of a section of the press, which declared that a theatre subventioned by the government could not perform the works of a foreign enemy. Wagner was then still living. In 1888, M. Lamoureux, the courageous and admirable manager of the concerts of the Champs Elysées, undertook to produce "Lohengrin" at the Eden Theatre. Wagner was dead; M. Lamoureux's was a purely private enterprise. One might have thought that the anti-Wagnerians would have quieted down. But unluckily the Boulangist agitation was then in full blast, and the Ligue des Patriotes, which was placed at the service of the Boulangists, welcomed the opportu. nity of showing its strength in the streets. M. Goblet, then prime minister, dared not support M. Lamoureux; and notwithstanding the success, from a musical point of view, of the first night, "Lohengrin

had to be given up, at an enormous loss. MM. Ritt and Gailhard have been more fortunate; and it is at the headquarters of the musical drama in France, at the theatre most heavily subventioned of all French theatres, and with M. Lamoureux as conductor, that "Lohengrin" has been performed at last amidst enthusiastic applause, richly merited by the beauty of the work itself, by its perfect execution, and by the talent of the singers - MM. Van Dyck and Renaud, Mesdames Caron and Fierens. Public opinion had become almost unanimous in demanding that a masterpiece which had already been received with applause at Lyons, Rouen, Angers, and Bordeaux, should be performed in Paris. The opposition was by this time represented by the mere débris of the Boulangist party; and the government energetically supported the managers of the opera, and indeed was not sorry to show that it was not going to allow a handful of bawlers to take the law out of its hands. It had had the weakness, some months before, to forbid the representation of M. Sardou's "Thermidor" at the Théâtre Français, in order to please a few fanatics of the Extreme Left, who declared the piece an attack on the French Revolution. They were not disposed to fall into such a mistake again. The almost exaggerated energy with which every attempt at a riot was put down and the unanimity of the press, with the exception of two or three papers of no moral importance whatever (such as the Autorité and the Intransigeant), in commending the action of the government produced an excellent impression in France and in Europe. It showed that the government was conscious of its strength, and determined to make itself respected; and that the mass of the public was not to be carried away by the factitious clamors of a sham patriotism, and was no longer disposed to mix up political antipathies with questions of a purely artistic nature.

Another thing which occurred at the same moment tended still further to appease public feeling, and to dispel the anxieties aroused by the Erfurt speech. This was the entire suppression of the passport regulations in Alsace-Lorraine. It would be difficult to convey any idea of the state of irritation kept up both in France and in Alsace by this passport system, by which the Alsatians were made incessantly conscious of the weight of the foreign yoke, while in France the old wound was being perpetually reopened. It was a constant humiliation to have to

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