Bulgaria. In 1881-1882 he exhibited these works all over Europe, and this was the period of his greatest and most sensational renown.

From the close of the Russo-Turkish campaign until the declaration of the present war with Japan-a period of about twenty-six years-Verestschagin saw no more active service. He still travelled, however, especially in Palestine and Syria, and a series of pictures, mostly dealing with Biblical subjects, was the outcome of these journeys.

Deprived of contemporary incidents from which to draw material for his chief study, Verestschagin now turned his attention to that epic period in national history, Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. Tolstoi had already made use of this dramatic chapter in Russian history in his colossal novel, "Peace and War." Verestschagin treated it from an equally original and realistic point of view. He began by collecting all manner of new documentary evidence, and made a comprehensive study of the chief figure in the drama, carefully "excluding all inclination towards the legendary." Externally, Verestschagin represents Napoleon quite differently to any of his predecessors. The conventional gray overcoat and cocked hat in which he could not possibly have survived a Russian winter, are replaced by a long sable mantle and a cap with ear lappets.

The series of fifteen pictures entitled "Napoleon in Russia," was exhibited at the Grafton Galleries in London in 1898. The pictures were received with interest, but they did not carry the same conviction as those of Verestschagin's earlier periods. The same criticism seems to apply to them which Stassov delivered upon the "Indian Poems;" that in spite of his care, thoughtfulness and attention to archæological detail, Verestschagin The Fortnightly Review.

was not at ease in the past precisely because he had no imagination.

The "1812" series possesses a purely literary value, but for the most part these pictures leave us cold, and make no powerful emotional appeal, such as compels our sympathy in his first-hand experiences of the Turkestan and Bulgarian campaigns. Some falling off in his customary perfection of technique was also observable, as though the artist was at last wearing out his colossal energy and power of taking pains. With this series and some important studies-mostly of mountain scenery-in South Russia, Verestschagin's great work as an artist may be said to have terminated. What the stimulus of the Russo-Japanese War might have urged him to accomplish it is impossible to divine; but at sixtytwo it is reasonable to suppose that he had probably given out the best that was in him. He himself must have felt a pang of disappointment that his life-work had failed of its object.

Comparing Verestschagin with other military painters of the nineteenth century, Charlet, Raffet, de Neuville, or Horace Vernet, we are struck by the justness of the Russian's outlook, and by the absence of all false patriotism. He holds no brief for any army, but raises his voice in protest against incold-blooded cruelty humanity and wherever he sees it. In his genius lies something often lacking in great artists: a profound sympathy with the needs and questions of his own day. He resembles his compatriot Tolstoi in that he accepts no traditions of art, no social conventions, no respect of nationality; and the profound contemporary feeling displayed in his pictures finds its counterpart in the works of the "Verestschagin's picgreat novelist. tures," said the painter Kramskoi, "are a more valuable possession to Russia than any territorial acquisitions."

Rosa Newmarch.

In France, as in England, the series of Conventions signed on April 8 last by the two Governments has received general approval. The visits of King Edward to Paris and Monsieur Loubet to London created a favorable atmosphere, and prepared public opinion to give a cordial welcome to any arrangement bearing witness to the good relations existing between the two peoples. In France it was perhaps rather the outward and visible sign of an understanding than the actual terms and details of the understanding itself which was most approved. Only those who are specially interested in foreign and colonial affairs went so far as to study the text of the documents; the general public did not follow their example. A closer acquaintance with the new Agreement has almost invariably led to the conclusion that Frenchmen could not declare themselves altogether satisfied with what they had obtained. I have been told that English experts on this question are of the opposite opinion, and that they maintain that a careful comparison of the concessions made and the benefits received shows that France has had the best of the bargain. It is probable that every agreement voluntarily entered into by two countries, where both of the contracting parties have had to give way on many points, has been followed by similar regrets and reservations. We naturally attach more importance to the sacrifices which we make to others than to those which others make to

us.

I.

What is called the Anglo-French Agreement comprises three distinct instruments, which have nothing in

common except the day of their signature.

of

The first of these instruments alone has the form of a regular Convention requiring the formal approval Parliament, in France at any rate. Each of the two others comprises mutual declarations on the part of the Governments of France and Great Britain, which constitute solemn and binding engagements. The object of the convention is to put an end once for all to the difficulties which have arisen from time to time, in connection with the ancient privileges of the French fishermen of Newfoundland. The disputes and misunderstandings which occurred continually in the course of the last century were due to no provocation on the part of the French Government. The English, on their part, desired nothing better than duly to observe privileges which through their long standing and for a hundred other reasons were rendered worthy of respect. But there were other factors in the problem; the Colonial population and the local Parliament were more troublesome to the Home Government than 200,000,000 of men in India. satisfy their demands Congresses were summoned and Arbitration Conferences were held before the days of the Hague. Learned discussions arose upon the question whether the lobster was a fish. Queen Anne and Louis XIV. had forgotten to settle this question when arranging the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht. In virtue of the Convention of April 8, 1904, France renounces her privileges in Newfoundland. These privileges, if I am not mistaken, were the last remnant of the Treaty of Utrecht, which laid down the law for Europe during threequarters of a century, and for the

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fishermen of the French shore during 200 years. The Chancelleries of Europe will miss it sadly, and so will the French fishermen. They cannot see that the strips of territory ceded to us by Great Britain in Africa offer them an adequate compensation. They demand that at least the Treaty shall formally recognize their right to procure bait, without which the right of fishing is an empty word. It is probable that such claims will be recognized, if only to avoid the possibility of two more centuries of wrangling and disputes in Newfoundland. Be that as it may, whether it be revised or not, the Convention of April 8, 1904, will not revolutionize the world, and will not eclipse in history the defunct Treaty of 1713.

It is not this Convention which can lend any great significance to the Anglo-French Agreement, and still less is it the arrangement which relates to Siam, to Madagascar, and to the New Hebrides. So far as Siam is concerned it might be thought at first sight that the declaration of the French and British Governments says nothing new. It simply confirms the Convention of January 15, 1896, signed by Lord Salisbury and Monsieur de Courcel. But when diplomacy speaks, even if at times she says nothing, she at least means to say something. In the present case that something appears to be a new limitation to the disadvantage of France. Was there not, perhaps, a wish to exclude the possible activity of France from points where it might have been exerted to her advantage in a conflict with Siam? In that case we may probably congratulate ourselves that the language of the document is not more explicit. In Madagascar we had exercised our incontrovertible right of sovereignty, won by conquest and annexation, by including the Island in the French Customs Union. The British Government pro

tested. It has now abandoned its claims in this matter in order to promote an understanding with regard to jurisdiction and postal service in Zanzibar. The Government of the Republic has taken note of this; and we, for our part, have done likewise, without any emotion, on either side of the Channel. We read with equal composure in the third protocol of the third arrangement that the two Governments will some day do something in the New Hebrides. What that something may be is at present unknown; but for the sake of precaution it is declared in advance that there will be no interference with the political status quo. We might, perhaps, have expected that a careful study of the possibilities of the case would have led to some agreement with regard to the solution of the problem. But it was necessary to give the arrangement an appearance of some solidity, and if everything superfluous were to be omitted from diplomatic documents they would certainly look far too unsubstantial.

The fact is that in the new AngloFrench understanding there is only one part which is of real interest-it is what we may call the parallel agreement which applies at one and the same time to Egypt and to Morocco. To forestall any misapprehension let us hasten to state that France has not given Egypt to England, nor has England given Morocco to France. Egypt is no longer a French possession, and Morocco does not belong to England; better founded proprietary rights are necessary for the making of presents. But we waive our right to oppose England in her present action in Egypt, and England, on her part, will raise no difficulties with regard to our future action in Morocco. The influence of France has been so deeply impressed upon the land of the Pharaohs that her rights there are admitted by all, and

that the justice of her claims cannot be disputed. She has expended in Egypt her science, her blood, and her treasure. More than any one else she has contributed to recall to life the past of ancient Egypt. The Suez Canal is her work. She is the first creditor of the Egyptian Government. One hour of forgetfulness twenty years ago cannot efface the efforts of a century. Great Britain, the actual mistress of Egypt, which is in her military occupation, finds herself face to face with the claims of France in that country. In the name of formal and repeated engagements France demanded the evacuation of Egyptian territory. By invoking her own indefeasible rights she prevented Great Britain from making free use of the wealth of Egypt.

In virtue of the new arrangement Frances renounces this policy, and, in the language of the Agreement, will no longer oppose the action of England in this country. On the other hand the British Government recognizes the exceptional position of France in Morocco, and undertakes not to interfere with her action there. Great Britain gives us a free hand in Morocco, as we give her a free hand in Egypt. That is the root of the matter, cleared from all the refinements and reservations of diplomacy. Which of the two contracting parties has gained most by this arrangement? Much might be said on both sides of this question, for the balance in which political concessions are weighed is not sufficiently accurate or delicate. If we admit that France receives more than she concedes, it may be pointed out on the other hand that she has given a draft payable at sight, and has received one which cannot be cashed until it matures, which it will do in the near future I allow, but at a date which is not yet certain. The future alone can decide the question of profit and loss. The

chorus of approval with which the settlement has been greeted by English politicians at any rate shows the importance which is attached in London to the concessions obtained from France in regard to Egypt.

II.

The conclusion of a Convention, the signature of documents, and the announcement of mutual engagements is no new departure in the history of the relations between England and France. During the last twenty years the archives of the two countries have been enriched with the texts of numerous treaties, long or short, insignificant or of great importance, of momentary or of lasting effect. A full list of them would occupy several pages of this Re view. Africa has been parcelled out from North to South and from East to West; frontiers have been traced in all parts of the continent by instruments of this nature. Similarly there are many questions of territorial rights, of zones of action, and of spheres of influence, in Eastern Asia. The Conventions thus made were frequently of considerable interest; they were followed by important consequences, and in this respect were in no way inferior to that which we have just made, or to those which we may make in the future. They bear witness to the great desire of both countries to arrive at some settlement with regard to their mutual differences, which were some. times of a serious nature. The Conventions of 1887 and 1888, relating to the New Hebrides, the Leeward Islands, and the Somali Coast, are not forgotten. Those of 1889, 1890, and 1891, by which the frontiers of the French and English possessions in Western and in Central Africa were delimited, and by which their respective spheres of influence were defined, are still within our recollection. The

years 1893 and 1896 saw the settlement of the important questions of the Upper Mekong and of Siam. The questions of Tunis, of Dahomey, of the Ivory Coast, and of the Soudan, the delimitation of the frontiers in Central and Northern Africa, brought about new and important arrangements between the two countries in the years 1897, 1898, and 1899. On the present occasion, instead of signing Conven tions and Declarations in succession, according as the questions were ripe for settlement, it was decided to wait until all could be dated on the same day. A group of three such documents has been presented, one of which, at least, is only there to swell the number. But the actual facts were of secondary importance; it was the impression to be produced to which the greatest significance was attached, and in politics impressions often count for much. The Governments of France and England have profoundly impressed public opinion; that was what they desired, and they have achieved their object.

The settlement of April 8 may therefore, especially in what it emphasises, be regarded as the inauguration of a new era. It affirms the existence of friendly relations between the two countries and shows that both alike are desirous to arrive at an understanding, and to put an end to the differences which unavoidably arise from the defence of their respective interests. It is the outward and visible sign and the first product of the entente cordiale. England and France, in fact, are now under a new régime, in which the significant features are good feeling and harmony, to which the name of "entente cordiale" has been applied. Very well then. Success to the entente cordiale! In France we are most anxious to be on the best of terms with our excellent neighbors across the Channel, and to see the development of sincere and

cordial goodwill on both sides. The new régime has none but supporters.

But what then was the old régime? Was it really so different from the new one as we are inclined to think in our anxiety to enhance the merits of the latter? We were at peace, and we should soon have had peace for a full century. Without the assistance of any Treaty of Arbitration we have managed to settle our differences in a peaceful manner. Let us hope that arbitration will be as successful as diplomacy has been. That is the best we can hope for; more successful it certainly will not be. We were at peace then, and our personal relations were becoming closer from day to day. The number of English travellers who visited France every year was enormous and was increasing steadily from season to season. What we call "export" in the interior, that is to say, what our merchants and industrialists sold to English buyers who came to Paris, was continually growing without pause or fluctuation. It is impossible to translate this trade into figures, for there are neither Bureaux of Statistics nor Customs returns by which it can be checked. The amount of our official exports to England is, however, well known; of those goods, that is, which are forwarded with all due formalities, certificates of origin, bills of lading, and the like. In these we have a barometer by which the state of our commercial relations can be exactly measured. Under the old régime, now despised and condemned, this barometer rose steadily; it showed a marked tendency to remain at "set fair." No two nations have ever been able to point to better commercial relations; no people has ever had better customers than the English have proved to the French. The truth of this may easily be proved. Forty years ago, in 1861, our exports to England amounted to some £20,000,000. Ten