be kept in commission all the year round. On the eve of the war Japan had in commission only what is called the Standing Squadron, apart from certain trading ships. It included the fine battleships Shikishima, Yashima, Hatsuse, Asahi, and Mikasa, together with ten cruisers. But they kept their torpedo craft almost continuously at work. This was the entire naval force which Japan had ready for action at the beginning of November last, when it was recognized that war might occur at any moment; the rest of the ships were in reserve.

That reserve was of a very real and efficient character. Year by year since Japan acquired her new Navy, paying for it, by the way, out of a portion of the indemnity of £32,000,000 provided by China, it had been a practice of the Japanese to mobilize the whole of their fleet. The lessons learnt during the operations were noted and applied. They had always foreseen the probability that the army and navy would have to act in conjunction, and also that in a naval action it was possible that the commander of a division of the fleet would be struck down and a substitute required. The annual peace operations were utilized not only to test the efficiency of the reserves, but they were also carried out in close combination with the army, and it was the custom to embark practically all available senior naval officers in order that they might profit by the cruising and tactical exercises, and a number of army officers also went afloat. In the manœuvres in 1900, apart from officers actually engaged on board the mobilized vessels, the fleet included four rear-admirals, seven captains, twenty commanders, and eleven chief engineers, while junior engineer officers were detailed to all engine-rooms, merely to watch the work there and gain experience. Twenty-three officers of the general staff of the Japanese Army

were also present on duty during the manœuvres, some being on board the ships, while others watched the operations from the coast fortresses. The reasoning of the Japanese authorities was this, these exercises of the fleet entail a heavy expense, and it is essential that every available officer should gain advantage from them, and it is also desirable that in view of joint operations, those responsible for the army should have full knowledge of, and sympathy with, the fleet.

How, it may be asked, has this policy stood the test of war? Late in October, Vice-Admiral Togo was detailed to take over the command of the Standing Squadron. This officer, who had shown his courage, ability, and high qualities of leadership so conspicuously in the Chino-Japanese War, at once took in hand the task of putting the finishing polish upon the war-training of his force-not "spit and polish" of old fame. Target practice became the continual occupation of the ships, even while the negotiations were in progress. At the same time the admirals commanding the Imperial dockyards were engaged in mobilizing the reserve fleet. The operation was carried out so quietly that nothing more than hints as to what was going forward appeared in the Press of Japan. Had the venue of these preparations been Great Britain, every detail would have been chronicled from day to day, and probably exaggerated, and the Government would have been bombarded with questions by irresponsible M.P.'s, who would have pointed out that such action was provocative of war. Japan has a constitution infinitely better suited to the waging of successful war than that of Great Britain, with the result that she was able to put on her armor without the rest of the world gaining knowledge of her action. instance, at the end of October Admiral Togo became Commander-in

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Chief of the squadron, and put to sea, and the notification which appeared was that it had left "for an unknown destination." What that destination was we can now surmise. Even at that date Japan was preparing that advanced temporary base in the Elliot Islands which has been in some measure the secret of the success of her operations in the Bay of Korea and the Yellow Sea. While the negotiations were being dragged on from week to week, Admiral Togo was engaged in preparing the groundwork of his campaign, and day by day was receiving further accessions of strength from the dockyards.

Had Japan been a thoroughly modern democratic country like, say, the United States, or even Great Britain, in which every man criticizes the plans of those who have made naval science their life-long study, Admiral Togo would have received many suggestions, complaints, and possibly even threats. On the eve of the outbreak of hostilities he had concentrated the whole of the fleet of Japan in or about the naval dockyard at Saseho. He had left the whole coast line of the islands of Japan, which is about the same as that of the British Isles, unprotected, and he had not even dispatched a squadron to guard Formosa. The whole littoral of the empire, with the exception of Saseho and its vicinity, was without any local naval defence. During the SpanishAmerican War, when Cervera's squadron was supposed to be in the neighborhood of the Cape Verde Islands, the people who lived on the Atlantic coast of the United States raised loud complaints that they were without protection. a democratic country even the best strategists cannot ignore the ignorant outcries of the people. As a result of the protests of those who lived on the Atlantic sea coast, the plans of the Strategy Board were delayed, and under civilian pressure had to be amend

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ed. Those who had paid for the fleet regarded ships of war (which were really built in order that the venue of hostilities might be removed from their shores, and that the enemy's coasts might become their frontier), as mere instruments of coast defence; had they had their way to the full extent the whole course of the war with Spain would have been changed. In Japan there is no many-tongued democracy to interfere with the schemes of the naval and military authorities. From the very first the Press was quietly, but firmly, muzzled as far as preparations for war were concerned. Government then sat on the shore ends of the cables, and those whose business it was to initiate and prosecute the campaign were left free from those irritations and distractions which, in time of war, are a source of weakness to every country with a free Press and a right of free speech in all circumstances. When war is in the air silence is golden, and Japan owes not a little of her success to the fact that her trained advisers of the navy, as well as the army, were able to lay their plans without unnecessary interfer

ence.

The

Admiral Togo, acting on the soundest authority, was consequently in a position to concentrate his fleet instead of dissipating it. The issue of war depends upon the result of the clash of massed forces of men or ships as the case may be. This is the basis of the naval policy of Germany; every ship flying the black eagle is kept in the North Sea or in the Baltic; Germany is building a navy which may never be little more than about half as strong as the fleet of Great Britain, but she is building it on the assumption that "generally a great sea Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us." Her watchword is "Concentration," and that, too, was the

watchword of Admiral Togo. He recognized that his fleet was much inferior to all the ships of Russia, but he also realized that the Baltic was 12,000 miles away, and that he might do a good deal before the men-of-war from Western waters could reach the Far East, if he struck quickly with his full force.

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When the Japanese, irritated, but not deceived, by the prevarications of the Russians, broke off negotiations February 6th, Admiral Togo had the whole mobilized fleet of Japan at Saseho. Directly it was decided to withdraw the Japanese representative from Russia, and to hand Baron von Rosen his papers at Tokio, word was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. It reached him late on February 5th, and he immediately summoned a council, which was attended by the divisional commanders and by the senior captains of the fleet. These officers sat in solemn council throughout the night, and at dawn they separated with everything arranged. They were in possession of complete knowledge of the disposition of the ships possessed by Russia; they knew not only their fighting value on paper, but the deductions from that fighting value which could be safely made owing to the inability of the Russians to dock the ships for cleaning purposes; the inadequate crews on board some of them, and the absence of any real war-training.

They were aware that Admiral Stark had the main body of the fleet at Port Arthur and had lately been cruising; they were also aware that, apparently owing to the importunity of the Russian Minister at Seoul, a cruiser and a gunboat were at Chemulpo, while three armored cruisers and a protected cruiser had gone to Vladivostok to be docked and repaired; and they knew that a gunboat, the Mandjour, was at Shanghai. Now if the Japanese had been a thoroughly intelligent, demo

cratic, self-assertive people, they would have told the Navy Department that it was out of the question to leave all the northern coast of Japan unprotected against raids by those four powerful cruisers at Vladivostok, within a few hours' steaming of their shores, and the Governor of Formosa would have put in his claim to ships to protect the territory under his control. Admiral Togo, fortunately, had no such distraction. He decided on his course of action without thought of any matter except the defeat of Russia. The Vladivostok ships might make their way out to sea-as they did-and bombard one or more coast towns, but such a raid, inconvenient as it might be, could not affect the issue of the war. He determined, for the time, to ignore the isolated Vladivostok squadron, and to bend himself to the prosecution of war in a manner best adapted to lead to the defeat of the main body of the Russian fleet.

On the morning of February 6th detailed plans for the campaign had been settled, orders had been issued to the officers concerned, and Admiral Togo, in order to take at once the actively offensive rôle, swept out of sight of the shores of Japan (in order that he might defend them), and away from the menacing squadron stationed at Vladivostok. Lieutenant Mutsumura, a staff officer under Admiral Togo, has supplied some particulars of what followed. The fleet was organized in four tactical units, and, accompanied by torpedo-boats and destroyers, sailed on the 6th. Off Mok-po, Rear-Admiral Uryu, Commander of the Fourth Fleet, was detached, amid cries of "Banzai" and band playing, to Chemulpo, with a message from Togo, running, "I congratulate you, in anticipation, on success." The same night was spent by the other three fleets in reconnoitring, the seas running so high that the crews of the torpedo craft, wallowing

many of the officers were cheering a spectacle representing the victory of the Tsar's forces-on the stage. Many officers were ashore, but it is an entire misapprehension to state that the ships were without executive officers on board. In view of the critical state of affairs and the knowledge that war might be declared at any moment, the holding of Mrs. Stark's evening party was a grave indiscretion which will be handed down to later generations as an illustration of the manner in which the fate of nations may hang upon a most trifling event. While the whole civilized world was holding its breath expecting each day to hear the echo of the first gun which should open the war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Pacific Squadron was ashore, and had left his ships in the outer harbor, unprotected from torpedo attack. In view of his failure to appreciate the serious impasse which the negotiations had reached,-he had, it must be remembered, the Viceroy's daily paper, the Novi Krai, always hopeful and boastful, published at his very doorhis error in leaving his ships in the outer roadstead is not surprising. Owing to the narrow and tortuous channel leading into the inner harbor, and the restricted deep water available there, this officer, no doubt anxious to give as little work to his subordinates as possible, thought it convenient to all concerned not to trouble to place his ships out of reach of a danger he did not apprehend, and the gravity of which, if he had foreseen it, there is every reason to conclude he would have under-estimated. The Japanese destroyers, on the night of the 8th, entered the outer harbor under cover of darkness, and succeeded in torpedoing the Russian battleships Tsarevitch and Retvisan, and the cruiser Pallada, putting these three important ships, as events have since shown, out of action for the remainder of the war. They

had to be grounded; although the Pallada is reported to have been put in dock for repairs, and the Tsarevitch to have had a mud dock constructed round her, the Retvisan was hopelessly "holed." On the following morning the Japanese fleet closed in and succeeded in temporarily damaging by gun fire the Poltava, the Diana, the Askold, and the Novik.

In commenting upon this torpedo raid which gave Japan the advantage which always lies with the belligerent who can get in a first decisive blow, efforts have been made to rob Admiral Togo and his officers of the credit which is due to them for their enterprise, skill, and courage, but history will assuredly not fail to do full justice to the success which the Japanese achieved in thus placing the Russian fleet, fairly well-matched with the Japanese as it was, in a position of inferiority so serious that for many weeks not a single Russian ship went to sea, and Admiral Wirenius, then in the Red Sea, almost immediately received orders not to proceed further. The damage which had been done to the Port Arthur squadron was so serious that Admiral Stark was not in a position to co-operate with the officers in command of the reinforcements, nor was that officer in sufficient strength to move forward alone. By his first blow Admiral Togo not only disabled the Port Arthur ships, but securing to himself by this means a marked superiority of power, he also got between the three Russian forces immediately concerned, those under Admiral Stark at Port Arthur, Admiral Wirenius in the Red Sea, and Admiral von Stackleberg at Vladivostok. The torpedo alone achieved this important strategic end, and from the night of February 8th, apart altogether from the result of the gun fire of next day, all the anticipations and prophecies which had been previously indulged in by observers