keep proper accounts, and pay the money into Court. He can dis train for rent in arrear within a year; he cannot give notice to quit, let the estate, or cut timber, without authority. (Vol. vi. pp. 119, 244.) A receiver is generally entitled to possession of the property, but cannot proceed to eject the tenant except by the authority of the Court. He should apply to the Court for authority to do such acts as may be beneficial to the estate. He cannot grant a lease, except under a power given him by the Court. (Vol. vi. pp. 30, 63.)

SPECIAL CASE.Disabilities·Construction of documents Protection-Registering.-Persons interested in any question cognisable in Chancery as to the construction of any instrument may state a special case thereon for the opinion of the Court. When lunatics, married women, or infants are concerned, their respective interests are represented by the committee, husband, guardian, &c. (Vol. v. p. 278.) Every executor, administrator, trustee, or other person, making any payment, or doing any act in conformity with the declaration contained in any decree made upon a special case, is fully and effectually protected and indemnified by such declaration. (Vol. v. p. 178.) A special case may be registered like any other lis pendens in equity. (Vol. v. p. 179.)

SUBPOENA.-Serving.-Every subpoena, except for costs, must be served within twelve weeks after the test of the writ. (Vol. vi. p. 242.)

SUITS, STEPS IN.-[Vol. v. pp. 117, 118.]-The regular course of an ordinary suit up to decree, is to file a bill, to serve the defendant with a copy, the defendant appears and gives notice thereof; the plaintiff files and serves interrogatories; the defendant then answers; sets down the cause on bill and answer, or gives notice of motion for decree, or files replication and goes into evidence. the hearing of the cause a decree is made which, if not final, directs accounts and inquiries at Chambers, and upon the chief clerk making his certificate a final decree is obtained. (Vol. v. p. 117; vol. vi. p. 136.)

Ou

TRAVERSING NOTE.-[Vol. v. p. 118.]- What A traversing note is filed when the plaintiff is in a position to support the allegations in the bill by evidence, having the same effect as if the defendant had answered denying the whole bill. (Vol. v. pp. 118, 315.)

EXAMINATION STUDIES.

MICHAELMAS TERM, 1866.

(Continued from p. 89.)

THE Common Law part will be found ante, pp. 1-3; the Conveyancing part will be found ante, pp. 87-89.

EQUITY.-The questions in this division, with the answers thereto, may be seen in vol. vi. pp. 241-245. No. I. (vol. vi. p. 241) is too difficult a question to put at the Examination, and, we may add, is too doubtfully framed, especially that part which concerns a corporation's "exceeding the powers of their Act." No. II. (vol. vi. p. 241) is by much too difficult and special a question to put to an articled clerk, unless he is to be considered to have more knowledge than could reasonably be expeeted even of an experienced equity counsel. No doubt the point is to be solved out of Lewin and Daniell, but these are not exactly the books with which an articled clerk is supposed to be familiar. As to No. III. (vol. vi. p. 241), it may be observed that injunctions are obtained on motion, of which, in general, notice must be given, though where the matter is pressing an injunction may be applied for without notice, but in such cases it is very common to grant an interim order to be in force only until a certain time, within which time the party should bring on his motion for an injunction. The full notice of motion for an injunction is two clear days, that is, Monday for Thursday; leave, however, may be obtained to give a shorter length of notice, in which case the notice should state the fact of such leave having been obtained. Where the defendant has not appeared, it is usual to ask for leave to serve a notice of the motion, as stated in 6 Exam. Chron. 166, 167. No. IV. (vol. vi. p. 242) is stated in such a manner as must necessarily render it difficult, especially under the excitement of an examination, to know what the examiners had in view; on reflection, no doubt, it might be made out, that the examiners were driving at the differences which exist in equity between mere volunteers and persons having paid a consideration and having no notice; but even then the instance given, namely, a mistake in a written instrument, is too far out of the usual course of reading and experience of a mere student to be a fair test of his industry or capacity. As to No. V. (vol. vi. p. 242), it has frequently been said that, though it has been laid down that relief will be granted against secret disposition of property by a woman just prior to her marriage, in disappointment of the just expectations of her then intended husband (Leg. Reas. Why, p. 29, No. L.), there never has been an

instance in which the Courts have set aside a disposition made by an intended wife; but this is not true, for very recently relief has been given, though there the wife joined in the suit. (Chambers v. Crabbe, 12 Law Tim. Rep., N.S., 46.) The rule is that deception will be inferred if, after the commencement of the treaty for marriage, the intended wife should attempt to make any disposition of her property without her intended husband's knowledge or concurrence. No. VI. (vol. vi. p. 242) asks whether to sustain a bill for specific performance there must be a pecuniary consideration shown? Now, considerations are either good or valuable; good, as natural love and affection; valuable, as money, marriage, &c. (F. Bk. 167.) The answer given to the question was that there must be a valuable consideration, which would not necessarily be a pecuniary one. We are inclined to think that the examiners meant an adequate consideration, and then what follows as to expectant heirs would have application, and the question be a sensible and proper one to ask. As to No. VII. (vol. vi. p. 243) relating to distribution of assets by an executor without an administration decree in equity, the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 35, s. 19, is commonly called Sir George Turner's Act (after the now L. J. Turner, who procured the passing of the Act), and thereby, as amended by the 23 and 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 14, the executors or administrators of any deceased person may obtain an order of the Court of Chancery for the purpose of ascertaining the debts and liabilities affecting the personal estate of such deceased person, and upon satisfaction thereof to indemnify the executor or administrator in administering the assets. The order may be obtained by petition at Chambers. (Hunter's Real Prop. Supp. p. 36). No. XII. (vol. vi. p. 244) brings out the rule of practice introduced by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86 (Jurisdiction of Equity Act), s. 42, rendering it unnecessary to make persons parties to suits who formerly must have been joined and substituting there for (sect. 42, rule 8) notice of the decree, and after which notice such interested parties are bound by the proceedings in the same manner as if they had been originally made parties to the suit, but they may obtain an order giving them leave to attend the proceedings under the decree.

BANKRUPTCY.-The questions in this division, with the answers thereto, will be found in vol. vi. pp. 245-248. As to No. I. (vol. vi. p. 245), bankruptcy is now the only means by which an insolvent person can obtain protection against his creditors (including under the term bankruptcy, trust-deeds registered under the last Bankruptcy Act), the proceedings formerly had in the Insolvent Court having been abrogated. It is the formal adjudication, followed by the advertisement in the Gazette, which constitutes the state of bankruptcy. As to No. II. (vol. vi. p. 245), it is, we presume, understood that there are commissioners in certain parts of the country as well as in town. The jurisdiction of the County

Courts in bankruptcy is only of recent origin, having been constituted by the Act of 1861, and applies originally only where the debtor makes himself bankrupt, and his debts do not exceed £300; but transfers may be made in other cases. (1 Exam. Chron. 209; 2 id. 60, 128; 3 id. 126). As it is possible that the Act brought into the House of Commons for consolidating and amending the Law of Bankruptcy may be passed this session, we refrain from further remarks on this division.

CRIMINAL LAW.-The questions on this branch will, with answers thereto, be found, ante, pp. 39-42, but they are of such a nature that we cannot usefully add any observations thereon.

HILARY TERM, 1867.
(Ante, pp. 21-42.)

COMMON LAW. The questions in this division, with the answers, will be found, ante, pp. 21-25. No. I. (p. 21) is a very old friend, and should be borne in mind as being one likely to be asked local actions are but few, actions being chiefly transitory, and then the venue may be laid in any county, subject to its being changed into the very county where the cause of action arose. Those who have our Common Law Practice would do well to read pp. 119 -122. No II. (p. 21) relates to disabilities to sue; the total incapacity is very rare, whilst the partial ones are very common, being infancy, marriage of women, and lunacy. The reason why, No. III. (p. 21), speaks of an action at law "for debt otherwise than on a bill of exchange," is, we presume, generally understood; for on a bill of exchange or promissory note within six months after becoming due summary proceedings may be taken, and the plaintiff obtain final judgment, unless the defendant has leave to appear, whereas in other actions the defendant himself decides whether he will appear or not. Those who have our Common Law Practice will do well to read pp. 69-74, sec. III., " Special Writ on Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note." As to No. IV. (p. 22), respecting the nature and effect of a bill of exchange, the parties to it, and their legal relations to each other, a little treatise might be written as an answer, but we content ourselves with referring those who have the work to the Principles of Common Law, where the law on bills of exchange is fully noticed. No. V. (p. 22) relates to guarantees, and requires the distinction to be borne in mind between original liabilities and collateral promises, which we have endeavoured to explain in Princ. Com. Law, pp. 149-152, where also, and at pp. 153-156, some other important topics relating to guarantees are noticed, and to which we refer those who have that work. No. VI. (p. 22) relates to that portion of the Statute of Frauds which requires contracts relative to the sale of goods and chattels of the

price of £10 or upward to be in writing, unless there has been a part payment of the price or part acceptance of the goods. The subject is fully noticed in Com. Law Princ. pp. 171, et seq. No. VII. (ante, p. 22) relates to the present proceedings in an action of ejectment, which are fully described in Pract. Com. Law, pp. 256-276. The old course of practice (with which it is useful to be acquainted) is shortly described in Princ. Com. Law, p. 355. No. VIII. (ante, p. 23) relates to that common tenancy which is construed to exist where no express tenancy is created (though it may exist by the express agreement of the parties), namely, a tenancy from year to year. It is assumed that no agreement was

entered into varying the usual period of the giving of a notice to quit in the case of such a tenancy. No. IX. (ante, p. 23) is a frequent question in some shape or other. We suppose it is pretty generally known that personal service of a writ of summons is the usual course, and that no other kind of service is effectual unless by leave of a judge. As to No. XV. (ante, p. 25), it is to be assumed, in order that the husband should be liable for his wife's debts in case of a separation, that he has not made his wife a sufficient allowance (see 5 Exam. Chron. 262; 6 id. 235). In Roscoe's Evidence (p. 366, 9th ed.), it is said :-"It is now settled that if the wife is living apart from her husband, and he, in fact, allows her a sufficient maintenance, he is not bound by her contracts; and it is immaterial whether the tradespeople had notice of that allowance or not," referring to the judgment of Alderson B. in Mizen v. Peck, 3 Mees. and W. 481.)

ASSETS-RESIDUARY ESTATE.

As mentioned in page 59, of the March number of the present volume, the Law Students' Debating Society appear to have affirmed the principle that on a deficiency of personal estate for payment of debts and general pecuniary legacies, the pecuniary legatees have the right to have the assets marshalled, so as to throw the debts on the real estate included in the residuary devise. Is this correct as to the residuary devise? Or, how does it accord with the decision of V. C. Stuart (vol. v. p. 208) that residuary real estate is not to be resorted to in priority to specifically devised realty, and that every devise of real estate, whether in general terms or not, is specific? Please say in your next number.

J. W. A.

NOTE.-The other judges do not follow the doctrines of V. C. Stuart as above mentioned. They hold that real estate comprised in