not entitled, they withheld a portion of his salary, and upon a mandamus unsuccessfully resisted his claim; and thereby incurred costs, for payment of which the Quarter Sessions made an order, which it was the duty of the clerk of the peace to enter on the records of the court and certify to the county treasurer for settlement. The Clerk of the Peace, conceiving that the order was illegal, because no full bill of costs had been brought before the Court, and also because he thought the costs were not such as ought properly to be charged upon the county rates, but should have been paid by the justices, who by disputing his claim had improperly incurred them, declined to record the order or to give necessary certificate. The Quarter Sessions thereupon referred it to the finance committee, to consider and report what ought to be done under the circumstances; and upon their report a charge was preferred against the clerk of the peace, in the name of the county treasurer, under the 1 W. & M., c. 21, s. 6, of having "misdemeaned himself in the execution of his office." The matter was heard before the justices at the next Court of Quarter Sessions, and they unanimously found that the clerk of the peace had been guilty of the offence charged against him, and adjudged him to be dismissed from his office, and appointed the defendant to succeed him. In an action by the clerk of the peace for money had and received to try the defendant's right to the fees of the office: Held, that the justices in Quarter Sessions, being a competent tribunal to hear and determine the charge, and having determined it, the Court of Common Pleas could not question the propriety of their decision; and that no such interest appeared in the justices, or in any of them, as to disqualify them from acting as judges in the matter. (Wildes v. Russell, 28th May, 1866, L. R. 1 C. P. 722.)

COSTS-Security for costs-Companies' Act, 1862, s. 69.-In ordinary suits in equity, where the plaintiff is ordered to give security for costs the penalty of the bond is limited to the sum £100. Upon an application under s. 69 of the Companies' Act 1862: Held, varying the order of Wood, V. C., that the security for costs given by a limited company is not confined to £100, but must be for an amount equal to the probable amount of costs payable. (Imperial Bank of China, India, and Japan v. Bank of Hindustan, China, and Japan, 12th June, 1866, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 437.)

COVENANT-Running with the land-Covenant not to use house as a beer-shop-Constructive notice-Yearly tenant.-A covenant concerning land, though not running with the land, by reason of its not naming the assigns, may in equity become binding on an assignee of the land. It appeared that the owner of a freehold house had entered into a covenant with the plaintiff who was a previous owner, that the building should not be used as a beer-shop. The house was afterwards let to the defendant as tenant from year to

year, without express notice of the covenant: Held (affirming the decision of Wood, V. C.), that although the covenant might not at law run with the land, the defendant was bound by it in equity. The rule that a purchaser who does not inquire into his vendor's title is affected with notice of what appears upon it applies equally to a yearly tenant as to the purchaser of a greater interest. Per Turner, L. J. A covenant by a purchaser of land not naming his assigns, that no building erected on the land shall be used as a beershop, does not run with the land. (Wilson v. Hart, 28th May, 1866, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 463.)

:

DECREE-Conduct of proceedings-Executor.-If an executor refuses to take proceedings which ought to be taken in a pending suit, the Court will give the plaintiff power to take them in his name; but where there is no case of misconduct made out against the executor, and he is willing to conduct the proceedings, he will be allowed to conduct the same. In the following case, a decree having been made for the administration of personal estate at the suit of the residuary legatees, it was found necessary that proceedings should be taken in equity against a person who had had dealings with the testatrix. The executor was willing to conduct them, and no case of misconduct was established against him-an order of Stuart, V. C., giving the plaintiffs liberty to take proceedings in the name of the executor was discharged on appeal, and the executor directed to take them. (Harrison v. Richards, 7th June, 1866, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 473.)

DISCOVERY-Under s. 50 of the C. L. P. Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125-Attorneys' books-Affidavit.-By s. 50 of the C. L. P. Act, 1854, upon the application of either party to any cause or other civil proceeding in any of the superior courts, upon an affidavit by such party of his belief that any document, to the production of which he is entitled for the purpose of discovery or otherwise, is in the possession or power of the opposite party, it shall be lawful for the Court or judge to order that the party against whom such application is made, or if such party is a body corporate, that some officer, to be named, of such body corporate, shall answer on affidavit, stating what documents he or they has or have in his or their possession or power relating to the matters in dispute, or what he knows as to the custody they or any of them are in, and whether he or they objects or object (and if so, on what grounds) to the production of such as are in his or their possession or power; and, upon such affidavit being made the Court or judge may make such further order thereon as shall be just. It has been decided in the following case, that to entitle a party to discovery, under the above 50th section of the C. L. P. Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125), he must show by affidavit that his adversary is in possession of some one document to the production of which he is entitled. The Court

will not, in an action against an attorney for negligence, make an order for the production of his books upon a mere suggestion of his client's belief that they contain entries relating to the matters complained of. (Evans v. Louis, 30th May, 1866, L. R. 1 C. P. 656.)

EVIDENCE-Deposition of witness taken under 1 Will. 4, c. 22 -Admissibility of—" Permanent" sickness—What sufficient proof of— Affidavit of medical attendant-Power of Court to review the judges' decision.-Where a statute gives power to a judge at nisi prius to exercise a discretion as to the admission of a document in evidence, his decision is subject to the general supervision and control of the Court out of which the record comes, unless the express language of the statute makes his decision final. The 1 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 10, makes the deposition of a witness taken under it inadmissible in evidence, unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the judge that the deponent is unable, from permanent sickness or other permanent infirmity, to attend the trial. Held, that, though it is competent to the Court to review his decision, it is for the judge to satisfy himself of the deponent's inability to attend, by such evidence as he shall think fit; and that the Court will not interfere, unless it be shown that the judge has been misled by false evidence, or that injustice has resulted from the course pursued at the trial. Quære, whether an affidavit of the witness's ordinary medical attendant would be admissible evidence for such a purpose. Semble, per Willes, J., it would. The word "permanent" in the above section does not mean that the sickness is an incurable one, but imports such a state of disability as to preclude the hope of the deponent being able to attend in any reasonable time. (The Duke of Beaufort v. Crawshay, 7th June, 1866, L. R. 1 C. P. 699.)

that

HUSBAND AND WIFE-Dissolution of marriage—Decree nisi and decrees absolute-(23 & 24 Vict. c. 144, s. 7, 29 Vict. c. 32, s. 3.)-By the last-mentioned act, the decree nisi for a divorce cannot be made absolute until six (instead of three) calendar months thereafter, unless the Court fixes a shorter time. In the following case it was held that the 3rd section of the 29th Vict. c. 32, extending the time for making decrees nisi absolute from three to six months, applies to suits pending at the time when the Act came into operation (11th June, 1866). But where decrees nisi had been pronounced before the Act came into operation, whereby three months had been fixed as the time at the expiration of which they were to be made absolute, the Court held that it was at liberty under the proviso to the section, "unless the Court shall, under the power now vested in it, fix a shorter time," to make them absolute at the end of three months. (Watton v. Watton, 26th June, 1866, L. R. 1 P. D. 227.)

HUSBAND AND WIFE.-Dissolution of marriage-Previous decree of judicial separation on ground of husband's cruelty

Husband's subsequent adultery.-(See Ritchie v. Ritchie, 4 Macq. Ho. Lds. Rep. 162.)-Where a wife had obtained a decree of judicial separation on the ground of the husband's cruelty, and continued to live separate from him, and the husband subsequently committed adultery, upon proof of such adultery, and of the decree for judicial separation, the Court made a decree nisi for the dissolution of the marriage. (Bland v. Bland, 28th July, 1866, L. R. 1 P. & D. 237.)

LIGHTS. (See 6 EXAM. CHRON. 223.)-Injunction-Trivial damage-Form of decree-Reservation of right to bring action— The Court will not grant an injunction to restrain the erection of a building on account of its obstructing the plaintiff's light unless the plaintiff can show that he will sustain substantial damage. If he cannot do this, his ground of application to the Court fails, and no inquiry will be granted as to damages, and the bill will be altogether dismissed; but without prejudice to an action at law. Decree of Kindersley, V. C., reversed. Clarke v. Clark, (L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. p. 16, and 6 Exam. Chron. 223) followed (Robson v. Whittingham, 17th Jan., 1866, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 442).

MISREPRESENTATION-Fraudulent-Damages. In an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff may recover damages for any injury which is the direct and natural consequence of his acting on the faith of the defendant's representations. Therefore, where a cattle dealer sold to the plaintiff a cow, and fraudulently represented that it was free from infectious disease, when he knew that it was not, and the plaintiff having placed the cow with five others, they caught the disease and died :-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, as damages, the value of all the cows. (Mullett v. Mason, 8th June, 1866, L. R. 1 C. P. 559.)

MONEY PAID-On a distress of plaintiff's goods being on defendant's premises.—Where one man is compelled to pay a debt for which another is legally responsible, the law implies a promise by the latter to indemnify the former. The plaintiff, under a bill of sale, seized goods on the defendant's premises, and with his knowledge, but without any express request, allowed them to remain there until rent became due. The landlord having distrained them, the plaintiff paid the rent and expenses :-Held, that this was not a compulsory payment by the plaintiff of a debt of the defendant, for his benefit, or at his implied request. Exall v. Partridge (8 T. R. 308) distinguished. (England v. Marsden, 23rd April, 1866, L. R. 1 C. P. 529.) C. J. Erle said :-"The proposition which has been contended for on the part of the plaintiff is, that where the owner of goods places them upon the premises of another, and rent becomes due, and the landlord distrains the goods, and the owner pays the

landlord's claim in order to release his goods, the payment so made is a payment made under compulsion of law, and may be recovered in an action against the tenant; and for this Exall v. Partridge (8 T. R. 308) is relied on. There is, however, one great distinction between that case and this. There, Partridge was a coachmaker, and Exall, at his request, bailed his carriage with him. The landlord distrained it for rent, and Exall cleared it from that burthen by paying the sum claimed ; and it was held that the action lay, because the carriage was left upon the defendant's premises, at the defendant's request, and for his benefit. Here, however, the plaintiff's goods were upon the defendant's premises for the benefit of the owner of the goods and without any request of the defendant. The plaintiff having seized the goods under the bill of sale, they were his absolute property; he had a right to take them away; indeed, it was his duty to take them away. He probably left them on the premises for his own purposes, in order that he might sell them to more advantage. At all events, they were not left there at the request or for the benefit of the defendant. It is to my mind precisely the same as if he had placed the goods upon the defendant's premises without the defendant's leave and the landlord had come in and distrained them. (England v. Marsden, 23rd April, 1866, L. R., 1 C. P. 529.)

NUISANCE.-Master and servant-Master liable on indictment for act of servant.-As a general rule a principal is not criminally answerable for the act of his agent, but this does not apply where the proceeding is in substance in the nature of a civil proceeding. Therefore the owner of works carried on for his profit by his agents is liable to be indicted for a public nuisance caused by acts of his workmen in carrying on the works, though done by them without his knowledge and contrary to his general orders. (The Queen v. Stephens, 14th June, 1866, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702.)

PLEADING-Time to plead-Rule of Court, Easter Term, 1856 -Signing judgment after plea delivered.-A defendant who has a day's time to plead from the happening of an event, has the whole of the day following that on which the event happens in which to plead. The rule of Court, which orders that "service of pleadings, if made after two p.m. on Saturday, shall be deemed as made on the following Monday," was not intended to affect the rights of parties, but only to relieve the clerks in the plea office. Therefore, when a defendant had one day's time to plead from the return of a cheque, which was returned on Friday, and the plaintiff signed judgment on Saturday after two o'clock, no plea having been delivered: held, that the judgment was irregular. (Connelly v. Bremner, 4th June, 1866, L. R. 1 C. P. 557.)