by abandoning a right which, rarely, if ever, in the past materially determined the issue of war, and which is likely to be much less efficacious in modern circumstances. To strike with all one's might at the armed forces of the enemy --to waste no energy in harassing his mercantile marine-seems to be the accepted theory of most naval experts. If England were successful in the struggle there need be no harrowing of commerce; her end would be gained; if she were beaten at sea, no amount of captured prizes would materially mitigate the disaster. One or two of the arguments against the change are opposed to fact. It is, for example, incorrect to say that the practices on land as to private property are "substantially" the same as on sea. They have not been, in fact, the same among civilized nations for centuries; the distinction is sharply drawn in Articles 68 to 81 of the Code of the laws of war, prepared at The Hague, and generally accepted by civilized nations.s There may be some ground for assimilating the practice in both kinds of warfare, so as to sanction the seizure at sea of private property when, and only when, military necessities in the strict sense require it. That, however, is not the practice. Nor is there much justification, apart from natural national self-complacency, for the apprehension that while England would be true to any promise, other States would be false. In recent years-in the Franco-German, the Spanish-American, and, broadly speaking, the Russo-Japanese War-there were no conspicuous instances of breach of engagements. The advocates of socalled Real politik assume an amount of perfidy which is in fact rare. Soldiers and statesmen shrink from infamy which ruthless theorists regard as highly probable and venial.

See, for example, Article 72: "Private property cannot be confiscated."

Here is a description of the manner in

It may be true that the gain to this. country from the change would be lessened, perhaps seriously endangered, if the prize courts of our adversary were, loosely and irregularly, to extend the conception of contraband or of blockade, or if notifications as to contraband, such as those made by Russia in March and May, 1904, were common. Such possibilities suggest, as others which might be named also do, the need of agreement as to these matters. They are strong reasons why questions between neutrals and belligerents should be determined not, as now, by a belligerent's court, but by some less interested, more trustworthy tribunal. For other countries the question may not be what it is for us. Few of them have a large mercantile marine, or draw the bulk of their food supplies from abroad. Not having the facilities for revictualling and obtaining supplies given us by our Colonies and possessions, and not being free to use, except under irksome conditions, neutral waters for any of these purposes, they might be tempted to feed upon the enemy's commerce-to do that which was done by Captain Semmes and by Admiral Suffren before him. To some countries it may not be clear that as belligerents they would be gainers by the change, though the majority of them seem inclined to make it and accept the risks. But for England, dependent for about four-fifths of her food upon imports, with ships on every sea, and with much of her income derived from the carrying trade, the weight of argument is in favor of the change.

One consideration should have weight. These are not times, and ours is not a country, in which war can go on with little effect upon domestic affairs, or in which they can be kept apart; industry might be profoundly disorganwhich war was once carried on:-"Il (Marechal de Saxe) avait toujours dans ses camps un Opera Comique. C'etait a ce spectacle

ized by a prolonged campaign; reverses might be followed by outbursts of discontent, and the worst might come to pass. No scheme of national indemnity or insurance might protect a Government from adversaries at home more formidable than those which its armies or fleets encountered abroad. It is not merely a province, a colony, or an indemnity which may be forfeited by an unsuccessful or dubious war; the stakes are heavier; they may be all that a nation can risk. The crowds of unemployed would every day increase. The elements of disaffection would grow, and one cannot be sure that they would want organization. The quartern loaf at a shilling would be intolerable to a population long accustomed to pay about 5d. (See report, p. 69.) Truly, as Sir Henry Maine said, "The position of England is one of unexampled danger." "So long," says Sir Robert Reid, in his cogent argument on this point,

as the present law prevails we are not only liable to be ruined by naval defeat; we are also liable to be ruined by a doubtful war. . . . Who can compute the effect of such a situation on the prices of the necessaries of life and industry; or the difficulty of recovering on the conclusion of peace the carrying trade which war might so easily cripple? The boldest Minister might well flinch from continuing a war with short supplies and famine prices at home.

The majority report of the Commission on Food Supplies, which is studiously moderate in terms, recognizes this peril:

qu'il donnait l'ordre des batailles et ces joursla, entre les deux pieces, la principale actrice annoncait ainsi: Messieurs, demain relache au theatre, a cause de la bataille que donnera M. le Marechal; apres demain le Coq du Village, Les Amours Grivois," etc. "Marmontel's Memoirs " I., p. 227.

10 See the striking letter of Sir R. T. Reid in

We do not apprehend that any situation is likely to arise in which there would be a risk of the actual starvation of our population into submission. But we do regard with much concern the effect of war upon prices, and especially therefore on the condition of the poorer classes; for they will be the first to feel the pinch, and it is on them that the strain of increased prices would chiefly fall. . . . It would be unwise to disregard the dangers that might accrue from what we have described as the "panic" rise of prices of staple articles of food which might take place in the excitement sure to be caused by the outbreak of a great maritime war."

A minority of the Commissioners speak more emphatically upon this point:

In the event of war between the United Kingdom and one or more of the Great Powers, the rise in the price of bread is certain to be great, and very possibly immense; and for how long a period it may continue no one with any accuracy can foretell. The suffering in consequence among the poor, and especially if the rise was much prolonged, would lead to the danger of pressure being placed upon the Government, and add to their embarrassments at moments of a great crisis.12

It is true that the Food Commission look for safety against these perils in a system of National indemnity against captures, which is at best a costly and doubtful expedient. But they make their recommendation on the assumption that international law remains unchanged. Change that law and the problem is as good as solved.

the "Times" of October 14th, 1905, and Mr. Leverton Harris's letter, September 12th, 1905. 11 P. 59 of Report.

12 P. 89.

18 See Reservation made by Mr. E. Robertson, K.C., M.P., and Mr. John Wilson, M.P., in signing the Report, p. 104.

So

Men whose opinions deserve to have weight (Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Mr. John Stuart Mill, Sir Robert Phillimore, etc.) have supported the existing rule on the ground that it operated as a deterrent of war, and brought home its existence to the whole body of the people. These imposing names notwithstanding, this argument is far from conclusive. It would be difficult to adduce a clear instance in which this influence has operated for peace. far, too, as it operates as a deterrent to nations with large mercantile marines, it is an incentive to others without such a vulnerable point. How often have foreign enemies of England urged their Governments to take a line hostile to her because her commerce at sea is almost defenceless, and would fall an easy prey to swift cruisers. Give immunity to private property at sea, and bellicose Anglophobes are deprived of one of their chief arguments, that which appeals most strongly to the worst popular passions. Even if the gain from immunity from capture were more uncertain than it is, such doubts would not be decisive. In the perplexities of private life honorable men see the way out in doing what is right. That also is the safe guide for nations in making an election between two courses to take the path which leads to a good understanding and peace.

The remark, often made when this matter is discussed, is that it is not ripe for settlement; we must wait. When, if not now, will it be ripe? When are circumstances likely to be more favorable than they are? With the rise of Japan into the position of a first-class Power, the prospect of China ceasing soon to be inert and helpless, and the enfeebling of Russia, there is little short of a revolution in the conditions which international law postulates. There is an end, it may be, of the Christian hegemony of the world, not incompatible with an improvement in the Chris

tian practices of nations. The change in the balance of Power may facilitate a settlement of this question. The assent of some States likely to count inore and more as naval Powers is pretty sure to be given to immunity of private property.

I make one remark as to the present outlook for neutrals. In the past, speaking generally, they have had scanty consideration. Rules have been framed, precedents laid down, mainly to suit the convenience of belligerents. There has been no judge of the influence or eminence of Lord Stowell moulding jurisprudence to meet the wants of neutrals. Their turn may at last have come. What an advance there might be if England, identifying herself with their cause-which is really her cause-took counsel and acted in concert with other States and sought to make the jurisprudence of the sea accord with the requirements of modern commerce. Chief among such Powers is the United States, the first to propound the principles as to neutrality adopted in this country, and whose prize courts apply the same rules as to contraband, blockade, the reception of belligerent cruisers, etc. Much the same is true of Scandinavian countries; and I need not say that it is to their interest to strengthen the rights of neutrals. The practice and jurisprudence of Germany, so far as declared, seems to be akin to ours. Japan has adopted our rules and is guided by our precedents. As to some points the practice of France differs from ours, and is in certain respects more favorable to neutrals than ours. Surely never between that country and England was the state of feeling more conducive than now to a reasonable settlement. A league of pacific neutrality, more formidable and likely to be more permanent than the armed neutrality of the past, does not seem impossible. I have said nothing as to the many questions affecting neu

trals which the late war brought to the front. These can be disposed of only by careful consideration of details, by a policy of give-and-take, and by means of more than one conference, preceded by systematic preparation. Nor have I referred to the education of the public conscience which may lead to the The Contemporary Review.

condemnation by honest men of blockade running, and of the lending of money to belligerents to carry on unjust wars. The question of immunity of private property at sea from capture claims precedence. It would be perhaps the greatest advance in international law since Grotius's time. John Macdonell.

I had an experience the other day, very disagreeable but most wholesome, which held up for a moment a mirror to my life and character. I suppose that, at least once in his life, everyone has known what it is, in some corridor or stairway, to see a figure advancing towards him, and then to discover with a shock of surprise that he has been advancing to a mirror, and that the stranger is himself. This happened to me some short while ago, and I was by no means favorably impressed by what I saw!

Well, the other day I was conducting an argument with an irascible man. His temper suddenly boiled over, and he said several personal things to me, of which I did not at once recognize the truth; but I have since considered the criticisms, and have decided that they are mainly true, heightened perhaps by a little tinge of temper.

I am sorry my friend said the things, because it is difficult to meet, on cordial terms, a man whom one knows to hold an unfavorable opinion of oneself. But in one way I am glad he said them, because I do not think I could in any other way have discerned the truth. If a friend had said them without anger, he would no doubt have so gilded the pill that it would have seemed rather a precious ornament than a bitter remedy.

I will not here say in detail what my friend accused me of, but it amounted to a charge of egotism; and as egotism is a common fault, and particularly common with lonely and unmarried men, I will make no excuse for propounding a few considerations on the point, and how it may perhaps be cured, or if not cured, at least modified.

I suppose that the egotist is the man who regards the world as a setting for himself, as opposed to the man who realizes that he is a small unit in a gigantic system. The characteristic of the egotist is to consider himself of too great importance, while the danger of the non-egotist is not sufficiently to realize his significance. Egotism is the natural temptation of all those whose individuality is strong; the man of intense desires, of acute perceptions, of vigorous preferences, of eager temperament, is in danger of trying to construct his life too sedulously on his own lines; and yet these are the very people who help other people most, and in whom the hope of the race lies. Meek, humble, timid persons, who accept things as they are, who tread in beaten paths, who are easily persuaded, who are cautious, prudent and submissive, leave things very much as they find them. I need make no attempt at indicating the line that such

people ought to follow, because it is unhappily certain that they will follow the line of least resistance, and that they have no more power of initiative than the bricks of a wall or the waters of a stream. The following considerations will be addressed to people of a certain vividness of nature, who have strong impulses, fervent convictions, vigorous desires. I shall try to suggest a species of discipline that can be practised by such persons, a line that they can follow, in order that they may aim at, and perhaps attain, a due subordination and co-ordination of themselves and their temperaments. To treat of intellectual egotism first, the danger that besets such people as I have described is a want of sympathy with other points of view, and the first thing that such natures must aim at is the getting rid of what I will call the sectarian spirit. We ought to realize that intellectual truth is not the property of any creed or school or nation; the whole lesson of history is the lesson of the danger of affirmation. The great difference between the modern and the ancient world is the growth of the scientific spirit, and the meaning and value of evidence. There are many kinds of certainties. There is the absolute scientific certainty of such propositions as that two and two make four, and cannot possibly make five. This is of course only the principle that two and two cannot be said to make four, but that they are four, and that 2 + 2 and 4 are only different ways of describing the same phenomenon. Then there come the lesser certainties, that is to say, the certainties that justify practical action. man who is aware that he has twenty thousand pounds in the hands of trustees, whose duty it is to pay him the interest, is justified in spending a certain income; but he cannot be said to know at any moment that the capital is there, because the trustees may have ab

A

sconded with the money, and the man may not have been informed of the fact. The danger of the egotist is that he is apt to regard as scientific certainties what are only relative certainties; and the first step towards the tolerant attitude is to get rid of these prejudices as far as possible, and to perceive that the first duty of the philosopher is not to deal in assumptions, but to realize that other people's regions of what may be called practical certainties-that is to say, the assurances which justify practical actionmay be both smaller or even larger than his own. The first duty then of the man of vivid nature is to fight resolutely against the sin of impatience. He must realize that some people may regard as a certainty what is to him a questionable opinion, and that his business is not the destruction of the certainties of others, but the defining the limits of his own. The sympathy that can be practised intellectually is the resolute attempt to enter into the position of others. The temptation to argue with people of convinced views should be resolutely resisted; argument only strengthens and fortifies the convictions of opponents, and I can honestly say that I have never yet met a man of strong intellectual fibre who was ever converted by argument. Yet I am sure that it is a duty for all of us to aim at a just appreciation of various points of view, and that we ought to try to understand others rather than to persuade them.

So far I have been speaking of the intellectual region, and I would sum it up by saying that I think that the duty of every thoughtful person, who desires to avoid egotism in the intellectual region is to cultivate what may be called the scientific, or even the sceptical spirit, to weigh evidence, and not to form conclusions without evidence. Thus one avoids the dangers of