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the demerit of the criminal is entirely resolved into misfortune. It is but a step further, if a step, to arraign the right of even the Supreme Governor to punish, and to explode the idea of a day of Retribution.

Art. II. Remarks on the Use and Abuse of some Political Terms. By George Cornewall Lewis, Esq., Student of Christ Church, Oxford. 8vo. pp. xxxii. 264. Price 9s. London, 1832.

TO such of our readers as are anxious to cultivate the Art of Thinking, and to understand either the opinions they hold or those they disavow, we strongly recommend the present work, with the confidence of obtaining their thanks for bringing it under their notice. And such readers we may invite to a perusal of the subsequent remarks;-for we cannot venture to promise to others a very entertaining article.

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"There is, perhaps,' remarks Mr. Lewis, no moral or political 'treatise of any length, certainly no considerable argumentative 'work, of which the conclusions are not in some degree affected 'by an incautious employment, or an unperceived ambiguity of 'language.' To so great an extent does this source of fallacious reasoning mingle itself with the decisions and arguments of our highest authorities, that Locke goes so far as to express a doubt, whether language, as it has been employed, has contributed 'more to the improvement or to the hinderance of knowledge.' This opinion, it is impossible to regard as any thing more than an hyperbole; since language, whatever be its ambiguities, is the only means of knowledge, as well as the instrument by which we 'think and reason.' But the instances cited by the present Writer, of the liability of even the most acute reasoners to impose upon themselves and mislead their readers by verbal fallacies, will surprise those persons who have not considered the powerful influence of equivocal language in deceiving the mind. The speculative parts of Blackstone's Commentaries, the most elegant production, perhaps, in our legal literature, Mr. Lewis characterizes as an epitome of popular fallacies and misconceptions on 'most of the fundamental doctrines of jurisprudence and government.' Paley, the most lucid of writers, occasionally falls into similar error. We undertook, in our last volume, to shew that Hooker's whole fabric of argument is built upon a fallacy of this description. In noticing the recent disputes about the constitution, it was also shewn that the whole question hinged upon the ambiguity of the term. In metaphysical theology, the same cause has given rise to tedious and angry logomachy.

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* Eclectic for October, 1832, p. 285. + Eclectic for June, 1832, p. 471.

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The remedy usually proposed by logicians and philosophers for this acknowledged source of misapprehension, is technical definition. When writers have precisely defined their terms, they imagine that they have secured themselves against all danger of using them fallaciously. Metaphysicians have pleased themselves with the idea of thus reducing their terms to the simplicity and unchangeable force of algebraic signs. Definitions, however, are generally little better than assumptions, implying a meaning that requires both to be explained and to be proved. Besides, as Archbishop Whately remarks, it is not the same thing to be acquainted with the ambiguity of a term, and to be 'practically aware of it, and watchful of the consequences con'nected with it.' After giving the most precise definition of a word, a writer may be found unconsciously passing from his own defined signification of the term to another, and drawing an inference from his own blunder. It is not enough to understand the meaning of terms, whether conventionally agreed upon or arbitrarily defined: unless we are careful to understand our own meaning at the moment of using them, in the precise connexion in which they occur, they will often be found to slip their meaning, and cheat us with a verbal fallacy. It is impossible,' Mr. Lewis justly remarks, to legislate in matters of language: the 'evils arising from its imperfection may be eluded, but can never 'be removed.' The best way to obviate the ambiguity arising from the variable meaning of words, is, not to attempt to stereotype the forms of thought, but to keep always in recollection the essential imperfection of language as the instrument of thought, so as to rely less upon the intrinsic power of words, than upon the manner of using them.

An inquiry into the meaning of terms is, however, very different from an endeavour to define them, and far more useful. The one is an attempt to ascertain a fact; the other, to lay down a rule, or to frame an hypothesis. What words really mean, can be determined only by their actual use: they mean what the person employing them intends by them, and the meaning lies, not in the words, but in the intention. Mr. Lewis's object in this volume is, to illustrate the various uses of the principal terms belonging to political science. His inquiry aspires to occupy 'middle place between a technical dictionary and a scientific 'treatise.'

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Even if the definitions which I have either borrowed or suggested should be thought incorrect', he remarks, 'yet the investigation of the various senses of each word as occurring in popular language, must, if properly employed, furnish to others the means of detecting fallacy in political discussion..... The following researches relate, not to the truth of any particular propositions, but to the meaning of certain terms used in political reasoning: which, being often employed in

different senses in the premises and conclusion, have given rise to countless inconclusive arguments, and have thus caused fallacies of argument, in the proper meaning of the word. The soundness of an inference cannot depend on the truth of a proposition, though it may depend on the use of a term.' pp. v—vii.

In fact, unsound inferences very generally turn upon the double sense of a word. A palpable example of this occurs in a sentence cited from the Edinburgh Review, in which the word 'right' is used in two different senses, and the argument entirely hinges upon the double sense.

If it be right that the property of men should be protected, and if this can only be done by means of Government, then it must be right that some person or persons should possess political power. That is to say, some person or persons must have a right to political power." p. 14.

The apparent force of this argument, Mr. Lewis remarks, rests on a mere verbal fallacy. Right and wrong are terms relating to a standard of morality. It is right, in the sense of just, that the property of men should be protected; and it is right, in the sense of fit and expedient, that some person or persons should be invested with the powers of government for the purpose of affording this protection. But the right, that is the lawful claim, of any persons to exercise political power, cannot be deduced from the abstract rectitude of the principle, that property should be so protected. Had it been said, merely, that some person or persons must have political power, the inference would have been correct, though not very weighty. If it be right that property should be protected, some persons must have political power for that purpose; but unless to possess power, and to have a right to possess power, are the same thing, such power may happen to be in the hands of those who have no right to it, and it may consequently be very wrong that they should possess it. Or, again, they may have even a right derived from law, which, the law being itself unjust, it is morally wrong that they should have. Blackstone's definition of municipal law, betrays a similar confusion of ideas. According to him, Law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a State, command'ing what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.' Were this the fact, there could be no bad laws; or, that which commands what is contrary to moral rectitude, would cease to be law. But it is evident from the argument by which this incorrect definition is supported, that the learned Writer confounded legal rights with the morality of actions. It is the business of the law', he says, 'considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce (such) rights, ' and to restrain or redress wrongs.' But how can the law be said to command rights, and to prohibit wrongs? Law creates rights, and determines them; it also defines and punishes wrongs; but

it may command what is wrong, and prohibit what is right; which is the case with all laws that violate liberty of conscience, by commanding a hypocritical conformity to outward rites of religion, and prohibiting the free performance of religious duties.

Dismissing from consideration the terms right and wrong, as denoting the moral qualities of actions, let us examine the substantive right, which is itself used with a latitude that becomes a source of ambiguity. The following is Mr. Lewis's definition of the term.

When the sovereign power commands its subject to do or forbear from certain acts, the claim for such performances or forbearances which one person thereby has upon another, is called a right; the liability to such performances or forbearances, is called a duty; and the omission of an act commanded to be done, or the doing of an act commanded to be forborne, is called a wrong.

All rights, therefore, must be subsequent to the establishment of government, and are the creatures of the sovereign power; no claim upon another, which may not be enforced by process of law, i. e. by calling in the assistance of the sovereign, however recommended by moral justice, can, without an abuse of language, be termed a right. The existence of a moral claim may often be a matter of doubt when the facts are ascertained, and one party may demand what the other may not think himself bound in conscience to yield; but, the facts being given, the existence of a right, or a legal claim, can never admit of dispute, as it is defined and conferred by a third party, who will, if required, step in to enforce it.

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Properly, therefore, right signifies a claim conferred or sanctioned by the sovereign power, i. e. a legal right. Sometimes, however, it is used to mean a claim recommended by the practice, analogy, or doctrines of the constitution, i. e. a constitutional right; and, sometimes, a claim recommended by views of justice or public policy, i. e. a moral right.

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By the first and proper sense, is meant a claim which may be enforced in a court of law, or by the proper authorities, and which actually exists by the two last, a claim which cannot be enforced by any public authority, and which does not exist. Thus, in the first sense, it is said that a man has a right to his own property, reputation, &c., meaning that he has an available claim which can be enforced by process of law. It is also said that, constitutionally, every British subject who pays taxes, has a right to vote for a member of the House of Commons; meaning that such a claim is supported by the practice or doctrines of our constitution. It is also said, that all the people have a right to be represented; that they have a right to choose their own governors, to cashier their governors for misconduct, and to frame a government for themselves; that the poor have a right to be maintained by the rich; that the poor have a right to spoil the land-owners, and divide their lands; that the poor have a right to spoil the rich, and divide their property, &c. In the latter cases, the persons who use these expressions mean that, in their opinion, there is a claim founded in justice and expediency, which they call a right; though, in truth,

what they mean to express is, that it ought, by the sanction of the legislature, to be made a right.' pp. 7-9.

We hear of original rights, natural rights, indefeasible rights, inalienable rights, imprescriptible rights, hereditary rights, indestructible rights, inherent rights, &c., where there is no pretence of legislative sanction: indeed, the only object of using these names is to induce the legislature to convert these supposed rights into real rights, by giving them the sanction of law. The phrase, natural right, takes its origin from the doctrine of a state of nature, which will be more fully explained below. It appears to signify a claim recommended by natural law, or by those rules which were recognised by common consent, when mankind were in a state of nature. An indefeasible right is a right which man enjoyed in a state of nature, and which he only surrendered conditionally at the making of the social compact; so that nothing has since been able to defeat or destroy it, and it is ready to be revived at any time. An imprescriptible right is a right which was prior to the social compact, and which continues to exist without being subject to prescription or failure by lapse of time. An inalienable right is a right which cannot be alienated from a man. Indestructible rights, inherent rights, hereditary rights, birthrights of liberty, &c., appear to have nearly the same meaning: viz. that they are dormant rights, never exercised by the possessors, and not extinguishable by any law. In fact, however, these imprescriptible, inalienable, indefeasible rights, in most cases never have been rights, or, if they have, long since were alienated and defeated by the sovereign power. These various expressions have all taken their origin from the theory of the state of nature and the social compact; but they are frequently used by persons who have never heard of this absurd and mischievous doctrine, and would perhaps reject it if they knew it. All that those persons mean is, that, in their opinion, the claims which they call rights ought, in sound policy, to be sanctioned by law. It is the duty of such persons to shew that sound policy requires what they require; but as this would require a process of reasoning, and as reasoning is often both hard to invent and to understand, they prefer begging the question at issue by employing some of the high-sounding phrases just mentioned.' pp. 23-24.

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In a subsequent section, civil liberty is defined as signifying, in its positive sense, those rights, the enjoyment of which is "beneficial to the possessor of them', or the possession of certain 'rights by one part over another part of the community.' Li'berties, in the plural number, when employed with a political ' reference, is always equivalent with rights.' Liberty is also used to denote immunity from burdensome duties, or exemption from hurtful restraints. In a note, the unsatisfactory character of Blackstone's definition is pointed out.

• Blackstone divides rights into absolute and negative; and absolute rights he defines to be such as would belong to persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is entitled to enjoy, whether out of society or in it."-1 Com. 123. He then says, that "the absolute rights of man are usually summed in one general appellation, and de

VOL. IX.-N.S.

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