The Spirit of Modern Philosophy: An Essay in the Form of LecturesHoughton, Mifflin, 1892 - 519 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute agnosticism aspect battle of Jena called caprice century conceived consciousness critical deeper deepest Descartes describable divine doctrine doubt embody essen essence eternal evil evolution existence experience express fact faith fashion feel Fichte Fichte's Friedrich Schlegel Goethe heart Hegel human idealism idealistic ideas individual infinite innate ideas inner insight Johann Gottlieb Fichte Kant Kant's Kantian Königsberg lectures live logic look matter mean merely metaphysical mind modern monism moral order mystery mystical namely nature never notion Novalis object once organic outer order paradox passion permanent pessimism philosophical skepticism philosophy physical Plato present problem rational real world reality reason reflection relation religious rience romantic romanticists Schelling Schopenhauer Schopenhauer's seems self-consciousness sense significance skepticism sort soul space speculation Spinoza spirit Suabian subjective idealism suggest sure theory things thinkers thou thought tion true truth unity universal unknowable Werke whole
Popular passages
Page 83 - First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them ; and thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities...
Page 98 - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Page 393 - SWEET day, so cool, so calm, so bright, The bridal of the earth and sky! The dew shall weep thy fall to-night; For thou must die. Sweet rose, whose hue, angry and brave, Bids the rash gazer wipe his eye, Thy root is ever in its grave, And thou must die. Sweet spring, full of sweet days and roses, A box where sweets compacted lie, My music shows ye have your closes, And all must die.
Page 83 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: — How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless varíerv? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE.
Page 83 - This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation.
Page 354 - Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults, To give in evidence. What then ? what rests ? Try what repentance can : what can it not ? Yet what can it, when one cannot repent ? O wretched state ! O bosom, black as death ! O limed soul, that, struggling to be free, Art more engaged ! Help, angels, make assay ! Bow, stubborn knees ! and, heart, with strings of steel, Be soft as sinews of the new-born babe : All may be well ! [retires and kneels.
Page 134 - Flow thro' our deeds and make them pure, That we may lift from out of dust A voice as unto him that hears, A cry above the conquer' d years To one that with us works, and trust, With faith that comes of self-control, The truths that never can be proved Until we close with all we loved, And all we flow from, soul in soul.
Page 62 - The moving Finger writes, and having writ, Moves on ; nor all your piety nor wit Can lure it back to cancel half a line, Nor all your tears wipe out a word of it.
Page 95 - When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection — any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other.
Page 91 - When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience to be independent of it.