had bound himself to take the land. As to the provision for the forfeiture of the $500, and the stipulation that the contract should become null and void upon nonpayment of the remainder of the purchase price, this court said: "The condition plainly is for the benefit of [112] the vendor, and hardly less plainly for his benefit alone, except so far as it may have fixed a time when Stewart might have called for performance if he had chosen to do so, which he did not. This being so, the word 'void' means voidable at the vendor's election, and the condition may be insisted upon or waived, at his choice. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234, 24 L. ed. 689; Oakes v. Manufacturers' F. & M. Ins. Co. 135 Mass. 248, 249; Titus v. Glen Falls Ins. Co. 81 N. Y. 410, 419." The condition in the contract in Stewart v. Griffith, that nonpayment should render the contract null and void, is the equivalent of the stipulation in the present agreement, much relied upon by the respondent, that, upon nonpayment of the stipulated sums, the rights of each of said parties should cease and determine. We think the attempted distinction between Stewart v. Griffith and the instant case is untenable. The enactment of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, which necessitates changes in bills of lading prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, renders moot the controversy presented by a petition which seeks to set aside an order of the Commission requiring carriers to use such bills of lading, and requires that an order granting a preliminary injunction to restrain the Commission from putting into force the bills of lading in the form prescribed be reversed, and that the cause be to dismiss the petition without costs to remanded to the court below with directions either party, and without prejudice to the right of the complainants to assail in the future any order of the Commission prescribing bills of lading after the enactment of the Transportation Act. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 38873920, 5481-5494, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] The circuit court of appeals reinforced its conclusion that the contract was an option by stating that it was usual to sell mining property under privileges of pur chase, and, when investigation showed that the property was not valuable, to terminate such options by forfeiting the sums paid therefor, and declining to make future payments. It is true that undeveloped mining property is often sold under option agreements. See 3 Lindley, Mines, § 859. But there is nothing to show that this contract was dependent upon the development of the Argued December 16 and 17, 1919. Decided mining property. The written agreement contains a positive undertaking to sell, upon the one part, and, upon the other [No. 541.] May 17, 1920. part, to buy, shares of the mining stock. APPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a decree granting a preliminary injunction to restrain the Interstate Commerce Commission from putting in force certain modified bills of lading. Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the Whether the shares sold constituted all As the recovery of the amount paid, with interest, as adjudged in the Circuit Court of Appeals, is founded upon its conclusion that the contract was an op See same case below, 259 Fed. 713. Solicitor General King and Mr. Charles W. Needham argued the cause, and, with Mr. P. J. Farrell, filed a brief for appellants. 1 See page 722, ante. Messrs. Roscoe H. Hupper and Theodore W. Reath argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Edgar H. Boles, George F. Brownell, Blewett Lee, Thaddeus H. Swank, and F. H. Wood, filed a brief for appellees. Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court: A petition was filed in the United States district court for the southern district of New York by numerous interstate carriers and carriers by water against the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission dated March 14, 1919, requiring the carriers to use two certain modified bills of lading, one pertaining to domestic and the other to export transportation. The cause came on for hearing upon application for a temporary injunction and upon a motion to dismiss the petition. The hearing was had before three judges, a circuit judge and two district judges. A majority concurred in holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission had no authority to prescribe the terms of carriers' bills of lading, and that in any event there was no power to prescribe an inland bill of lading depriving the carriers of the benefits of certain statutes of the United States limiting the liability of vessel owners. 259 Fed. 713. One of the district judges dissented, holding that the Commission had the power to prescribe bills of lading, and that the particular bills of lading in question were within the authority of the Commission. An order was entered refusing to dismiss the petition, and an injunction pendente lite was granted. From this order an appeal was taken directly to this court under the Statute of October 22, 1913. 38 Stat. at L. 220, chap. 32. [115] It appears that the matters in controversy as to the authority of the Commission and the character of the bills of lading were subjects of much inquiry before the Commission, where hearings were had, and an elaborate report upon the proposed changes in carriers' bills of lading resulted in the adoption by the Commission of the two bills of lading. 52 Inters. Com. Rep. 671. Pending this appeal Congress passed on February 28, 1920, the act known as the "Transportation Act of 1920," which terminated the Federal control of railroads, and amended in various particulars previous acts to regulate interstate commerce. In view of this act of Congress this court, on March 22, 1920, entered an order requesting counsel to file briefs concerning the effect of the act upon this cause. Briefs have been filed, and we now come to consider the altered situation arising from the new legislation, and what effect should be given to it in the disposition of this case. The thing sought to be accomplished by the prosecution of this suit was an annulment of the order of the Commission, and an injunction restraining the putting into effect and operation of such order, which prescribed the two forms of bills of lading. The temporary injunction granted was against putting into effect the Commission's order prescribing the forms of the bills of lading. The Transportation Act of 1920, passed pending this appeal, makes it evident (and it is in fact conceded in the brief filed by appellants) that changes will be required in both forms of bills of lading in order that they may conform to the requirements of the statute. We need not now discuss the details of these changes. It is sufficient to say that the act requires them as to both classes of bills. We are of opinion that the necessary effect of the enactment of this statute is to make the cause a moot one. In the appellant's brief it is insisted that the power of the Commission to prescribe bills of lading is still existent, [116] and has not been modified by the provisions of the new law. But that is only one of the questions in the case. It is true that the determination of it underlies the right of the Commission to prescribe new forms of bills of lading, but it is a settled principle in this court that it will determine only actual matters in controversy essential to the decision of the particular case before it. Where, by an act of the parties, or a subsequent law, the existing controversy has come to an end, the case becomes moot, and should be treated accordingly. However convenient it might be to have decided the question of the power of the Commission to require the carriers to comply with an order prescribing bills of lading, this court "is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare, for the government of future cases, principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. No stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the case before the court or in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the court in this regard." California v. San Pablo & T. R. Co. 149 U. S. 308, 314, 37 L. ed. 747, 748, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876; United States v. HamburgAmerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien Gesellschaft, 239 U. S. 466, 475, 476, 60 L. ed. 387, 391, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 212, and previous cases of this court therein cited. E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. In the present case what we have said ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN, & SOUTHmakes it apparent that the complainants ERN RAILWAY COMPANY. (No. 141.) do not now need an injunction to prevent the Commission from putting in force bills of lading in the form prescribed. The subsequent legislation necessitates the ST. adoption of different forms of bills in the event that the power of the Commission be sustained. This legislation, having that effect, renders the case moot. Berry v. Davis, 242 U. S. 468, 61 L. ed. 441, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208. LOUIS & SAN FRANCISCO RAIL E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND, & PACIFIC E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COM. In our view the proper course is to reverse the order, and remand the cause to the court below with directions to dismiss the petition, without costs to either party, and without prejudice to the right of the complainants to assail in the future any order of the Commission prescribing [117] bills of lading after the enactment of the new legislation. United MISSOURI, KANSAS, & TEXAS RAILStates v. Hamburg American Line and Berry v. Davis, supra. And it is so ordered. E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. ATCHISON, TOPEKA, & SANTA FE RAIL E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAIL- E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COM- Commerce Commission, and remanded the PANY. (No. 139.) cause for a new trial, are reviewable in the Federal Supreme Court by certiorari under the Judicial Code, § 240, in the case of those of such decrees which are made final by the combined effect of §§ 128 and 241, MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COM- because the requisite jurisdictional amount E. B. SPILLER, Plff. in Err., V. PANY. (No. 140.) Note.-On appellate jurisdiction of, Federal Supreme Court over circuit courts of appeals-see notes to St. Anthony's Church v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 59 L. ed. U. S. 1119; and Bagley v. General Fire Extinguisher Co. 53 L. ed. U. S. 605. As to what judgments or decrees are final for purposes of review-see notes to Gibbons v. Ogden, 5 L. ed. U. S. 302; Schlosser v. Hemphill, 49 L. ed. U. S. 1001; and Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Michigan R. Commission, 60 L. ed. U. S. 802. decrees by virtue of § 262, in aid of the documentary findings and reparation order of Interstate Commerce Commission. 3. The Interstate Commerce Commission is given a general degree of latitude in the investigation of reparation claims by the Act of February 4, 1887, §§ 13, 16, 17, as amended by the Acts of March 2, 1889, and June 29, 1906, and June 18, 1910, and the resulting findings and order of the Commission may not be rejected as evidence in a suit to recover the amounts of the reparation awards merely because of errors in its procedure not amounting to a denial of the right to a fair hearing, so long as the essential facts found are based upon substantial evidence. [For other cases, see Evidence, IV. k; Interstate Commerce Commission, in Dig. Sup. Ct. 1908.] Interstate Commerce Commission -review of decision qualifications of expert witness. 4. Whether a witness called before the Interstate Commerce Commission had shown such special knowledge as to qualify him to testify as an expert was for the Commission to determine, and its decision thereon is not to be set aside by the courts unless clearly shown to have been unfounded. [For other cases, see Interstate Commerce Commission; Witnesses, IV. a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Appeal objections to hearsay testimony sufficiency time. 10. There is nothing in the letter or spirit of the Interstate Commerce Acts inconsistent with the view that claims for reparation because of the exaction of unreasonable freight charges are assignable. [For other cases, see Assignment, I. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [Nos. 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, and 145.] 1920. 5. Assertions by counsel during a hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission in a reparation proceeding that Argued January 15, 1920. Decided May 17, there was a failure of proof, and suggestions that the proceeding ought to be dismissed, come too late and are too general in character to be equivalent to an objection to the reception of certain evidence as hearsay. valid. ju NINE INE WRITS of Error and of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to review decrees which reversed decrees of the District Court for the Western District of Missouri for the recovery of the amounts awarded in the reparation order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and remanded the cause for a new trial. Writs of error dismissed. Writs of certiorari allowed. Judgments of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and those of the District Court affirmed. See same case below, 158 C. C. A. 227, 246 Fed. 1; on rehearing, 161 C. C. A. 587, 249 Fed. 677. The facts are stated in the opinion. dicial review - award substantially the cause, and, with Messrs. Samuel H. Cowan, I. H. Burney, and Goodwin Creason, filed a brief for plaintiff in er 7. The refusal of the trial court in a suit for the recovery of amounts awarded in a reparation order made by the Irterstate Commerce Commission to treat the ror: The Commission is an investigating 811 body, and is not bound by the strict | Transp. Co. v. Barber, 56 N. Y. 544; rules of evidence. Atchison v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 80 Mo. 213; Ross v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 119 Mo. App. 290, 95 S. W. 977. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 44, 48 L. ed. 869, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 93, 57 L. ed. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 59 L. ed. 379, P.U.R. 1915A, 121, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 218 U. S. 110, 54 L. ed. 957, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651. The evidence on which the award by the Commission was based was not hearsay, but, even if it were, it is competent and admissible if not objected to at the time it is offered. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 48 L. ed. 860, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 L. ed. 431, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 606, 59 L. ed. 383, P.U.R. 1915A, 121, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 146; Kane v. Missouri P. R. Co. 251 Mo. 13, 157 S. W. 644; Wolf v. Edmunson, 153 C. C. A. 89, 240 Fed. 53; 1 Wigmore, Ev. §§ 18, 586; Gregory v. Dodge, 14 Wend. 617; 17 Cyc. 166, 564; Mathias v. O'Neill, 94 Mo. 527, 6 S. W. 253. The shippers and owners, being in possession of the live stock when delivered to the carriers, were prima facie the owners. 16 Cyc. 1074; Bradshaw v. Ashley, 180 U. S. 59, 45 L. ed. 423, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297; Belford, C. & Co. v. Scribner, 144 U. S. 488, 36 L. ed. 514, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734; The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U. S. 655, 44 L. ed. 929, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 803; Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 7 C. C. A. 130, 12 U. S. App. 665, 58 Fed. 152; Hare v. Young, 26 Idaho, 691, 146 Pac. 107; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Johnson, 4 C. Ć. A. 447, 10 U. S. App. 629, 54 Fed. 474; Northern P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 2 C. C. A. 446, 7 U. S. App. 254, 51 Fed. 658; Hudson v. Willis, 73 Tex. 256, 11 S. W. 273; Cooley, Torts, 3d ed. pp. 848-850; Hutchinson, Carr. 3d ed. §§ 1308, 1309, 1318, 1320. The carriers cannot question the title of the consignors, because the carriers were bailees. 10 C. J. p. 229, § 318; The Idaho, 93 U. S. 575, 23 L. ed. 978; Denver, S. P. & P. R. Co. v. Frame, 6 Colo. 382; Carter v. Southern R. Co. 111 Ga. 38, 50 L.R.A. 354, 36 S. E. 308; Great Western R. Co. v. McComas, 33 Ill. 185; Valentine v. Long Island R. Co. 102 App. Div. 419, 92 N. Y. Supp. 645; Western The damages claimed, and for which the award was made, arose out of tort, and affected the property, and not the person, of the shipper. Such causes of action survive the death of the claimant, and are assignable. Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 7 L. ed. 108; Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 396, 24 L. ed. 1067; Edmunds v. Illinois C. R. Co. 80 Fed. 78; 4 Cyc. 23, 24, 26; Davis v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 25 Fed. 786; 5 C. J. 593, 958, 985, 994; George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564, 26 L. ed. 232; Pom. Rem. & Rem. Rights, § 617; Remmers v. Remmers, 217 Mo. 560, 117 S. W. 1117; Rucker v. Bolles, 25 C. C. A. 600, 49 U. S. App. 358, 80 Fed. 511. Suppose the assignments were all for the benefit of the owners and shippers of the cattle, and that they retained an interest in them, it would not affect their validity. 4 Cyc. 67, 69, 71, 99, 100; 5 C. J. 145, 261, 262, 958, 985, 994, § 199; Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 33 Pac. 913; Ballinger v. Vates, 26 Colo. App. 116, 140 Pac. 931; Denver Engineering Works Co. v. Elkins, 179 Fed. 922; George v. Tate, 102 U. S. 564, 26 L. ed. 232; Winstead v. Bingham, 4 Woods, 510, 14 Fed. 1; Cowdrey v. Vandenburgh, 101 U. S. 572, 25 L. ed. 923; Western U. Teleg Co. v. Western & A. R. Co. 91 U. S. 283, 23 L. ed. 350; Pom. Rem. & Rem. Rights, 132; Withers v. Greene, 9 How. 213, 13 L. ed. 109; Scott v. Lunt, 7 Pet. 596, 8 L. ed. 797; Marvin v. Ellis, 9 Fed. 367; Krapp v. Eldridge, 33 Kan. 106, 5 Pac. 372; Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481; Guerney v. Moore, 131 Mo. 650, 32 S. W. 1132; Foster v. Central Nat. Bank, 183 N. Y. 379, 76 N. E. 338; King v. Miller, 53 Or. 62, 97 Pac. 542; Cummings v. Morris, 25 N. Y. 625; Chase v. Dodge, 111 Wis. 70, 86 N. W. 548; The Rupert City, 213 Fed. 263; Sheridan v. New York, 68 N. Y. 30; Allen v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228; Edmunds v. Illinois C. R. Co. 80 Fed. 78. The fact that the rights to reparation are conferred by statute does not change the rule. There are no words in the statute indicating that the rights are confined to the person, and could not be enforced by an heir, legal representative, or assignee. 4 Cyc. 26; 5 C. J. 593. The court of appeals erred in holding that the question of the reasonableness |