Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Volume 29Harvard University Press, 1918 |
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Page 43 - What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is ? That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is.
Page 49 - But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual...
Page 11 - Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things.
Page 8 - The initiated do not learn anything so much as feel certain emotions and are put in a certain frame of mind'.
Page 160 - En una de sus cartas francesas21 acumula Escalígero estos desahogos: "Lucain. . . tue le lecteur de ses longues comparaisons, antithéses, déclamations, philosophie, astrologie, et, pour mieux parler, de son immodestie. Je ne nie point qu'il n'ait de bonnes choses, mais je nie qu'elles soient poétiques.
Page 19 - Necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And...
Page 32 - ... imitate anything else ; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward only those characters which are suitable to their profession — the courageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like...
Page 20 - But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice.
Page 135 - Schlussfrage man eine seltsame nennen darf (RGIA 660) : ,Scaliger stand auf dem Gipfel universaler lebendiger philologischer Gelehrsamkeit, wie keiner nach ihm: und so hoch in Wissenschaft jeder Art, dass er mit eignem Urtheil, was ihm auch vorkommen mochte, fassen, nutzen und richten konnte. Was ist gegen ihn der buchgelehrte Salmasius? Und warum nennt Frankreich nicht Scaliger gegen Leibniz?
Page 39 - Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty. Quite true. Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty, nor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like, — such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?...