The Science of Thought, Volume 2Longmans, Green & Company, 1887 - 664 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
abstract adjectives admit animal Aristotle Aryan attributes become beginning Berkeley called causality colour conceived concepts connotation consciousness Darwin definition derived Descartes digger distinguish doubt elements evolution exist experience explain express fact faculty genera genus German grammar Greek growth guage Herbert Spencer historical human mind Hume ideas imagine instance intellect intuition Kant Kant's knowledge Latin Leibniz Logic matter meaning meant originally mental metaphor Mill Monon mortal nature never Noiré nouns object once origin of language Origin of Species Pânini perceived percepts philo philosophers phonetic possess possible predicate priori proposition proved question reason result roots Sanskrit Schopenhauer Science of Language seems sensations sense sensuous signs simply sounds speak species substance suffixes supposed syllogisms synthetical proposition T. H. Green tabula rasa theory things tion transition true truth understand verb words
Popular passages
Page 245 - ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For, it is evident, we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas ; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not
Page 250 - annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort
Page 245 - come to be made. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms, or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by
Page 239 - series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something whicli ex
Page 245 - separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one, each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.
Page 101 - noble a conception of the Deity to believe that He created a few original forms capable of self-development into other and needful forms, as to believe that He organised a fresh act of creation to supply the voids caused by the action of His laws.
Page 247 - suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length. This, which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so
Page 101 - I see no good reason why the views given in this volume should shock the religious feelings of any one. ... A celebrated author and divine has written to me that he has gradually learnt to see that it is just
Page 252 - with Locke that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why
Page 558 - Hereafter we shall be compelled to acknowledge that the only distinction between species and well-marked varieties is, that the latter are known, or believed to be connected at the present day by intermediate gradations, whereas species were formerly thus connected. It is quite possible that forms now generally acknowledged to be merely varieties may hereafter be thought worthy of specific names