elapsed after its accrual, and on the other hand that it might be brought to hearing long after six years had expired. My reference to six years relates, of course, to the principal limitation in the statute of 16 Jac. 1, c. 21. The Mentor was a case where sixteen years had elapsed between the alleged accrual of the right to claim in prize and the date when a monition to proceed to adjudication was brought before the court. Lord Stowell dealt with the matter in his judgment, at p. 180, in these words:

It is not within my recollection that a case of such antiquity has ever been suffered to originate in this court. I do not say that the Statute of Limitations extends to prize cases; it certainly does not."

The old rule as to the limitation of claims in prize is summed up in Pratt's Story on Prize, p. 40, and placed upon the grounds of natural justice on which it was no doubt always held to depend.

A certain sense of surprise is inevitable when, at this period in the administration of prize law, after more than eight years of the very active exercise of the jurisdiction in a time when both the Naval Prize Act of 1864 and the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 are familiar statutes, the court is invited to declare that by virtue of provisions in our municipal law any proceeding in prize by a neutral against a commissioned captor in respect of a seizure, detention or sale of the ship or goods of such a neutral must be taken within six months of the accrual of the right of claim. This fact was among the reasons why time to consider my judgment.

took

Although the matter in question depends upon the construction of an Act of the Imperial Parliament, it seems to me to be of little use to examine decisions of the courts of municipal jurisdiction in order to ascertain, for example, whether a claim in prize is analogous to an action in rem like that in the case of The Burns (96 L. T. Rep. 684; (1907) P. 137; 10 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 424); or to a claim for compensation under a statute, like that in the case of Delany v. Metropolitan Board of Works (17 L. T. Rep. 262; L. Rep. 3 C. P. 111); or to a claim in respect of a wrongful seizure under a Sanitary Act, like that of the Glasgow Corporation v. Smithfield Meat Company (1912, Sess. Cas. 364); or to an action to restrain a public authority by injunction, like Fielden v. Morley Corporation (82 L. T. Rep. 29; (1900) A. C. 133).

A claim in prize is not a claim under municipal law and cannot be instituted or determined before any municipal tribunal. In Le Caux v. Eden (2 Doug. 594, 600) the Court of King's Bench decided in 1789 in accordance with a view often previously declared by Lord Mansfield, that an action will not lie for false imprisonment where the imprisonment was merely in consequence of taking a ship as prize, although the ship has been acquitted. Buller, J. explained the decision in a famous judgment. Lord Mansfield, as the learned reporter says, "did not go into the argument at large, but adhered to the opinion he had so repeatedly

[PRIZE CT.

and peremptorily given at nisi prius and probably thought it more decent to leave the discussion of it to the other judges." It was held by the Court of Queen's Bench in 1782 in the case of Smart v. Wolff (1789, 3 T. R. 323, 341) that "Where there is a question of prize a Court of Common Law cannot even take cognisance of a claim for freight." The ground of this judgment was that even the demand of freight "involves in it the question of prize, and whether or not the goods are contraband, and many other questions all which

must be subjected to the direction of some forum governed by the same law in all countries."

In any other court than a Court of Prize, a commissioned captor would seem to have no need of the protection of Statutes of Limitation against civil proceedings for any act done by him in good faith under his commission, unless a thing done or omitted contrary to the statutory directions in the Naval Prize Act 1864 could be made the subject of proceedings under municipal law. As to that I need not pronounce any opinion. The suppositious case of a wilful abuse of armed power by a commissioned captor need not be separately considered, for there certainly is jurisdiction in prize to deal with such a case, and, so far as I know, no authority to deal with it elsewhere. I assume for the purposes of to-day that an action or proceeding in respect of such an abuse of power would be no less and no more within the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 than any other action or proceeding in prize by a neutral claimant.

The first question to be considered here is whether, apart from its reference to the Naval Prize Act 1864, the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 could be held to extend to proceedings in prize. This cannot be determined, in my view of the matter, upon a mere consideration of words, as, for example, by construction of the words "action or other proceeding in the Act of 1893 in the light of the definitions in the Judicature Act 1873. Nor does the fact that the present proceeding was commenced by a writ carry the argument further. That is a matter of form. What is to be regarded is the scope and intended operation of the statute.

The prime characteristics of the jurisdiction in prize are first that it is exercised by a tribunal deemed by common consent of the civilised States of the World to be invested with authority to determine the rights of the subjects of any of them in respect of claims which arise out of captures at sea in the exercise of belligerent rights, and, secondly, that it is governed by international law. In the words of the commission which before 1864 conferred the jurisdiction in prize in this country, the court is "to proceed upon all and all manner of captures seizures prizes and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be taken; and to hear and determine according to the course of the Admiralty and the law of nations." This ancient jurisdiction is embodied in the statutory

powers of the court as defined by the Prize Act 1864.

The position and functions of the Prize Court as a tribunal which administers international law in questions of belligerent right arising between its own State and foreign States and persons was considered in the Privy Council in the case of The Zamora (114 L. T. Rep. 626 ; (1916) 2 A. C. 77, 91; 13 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 144, 330), and is discussed in the judgment there delivered by Lord Parker: "Of course the Prize Court is a municipal court "-Lord Parker said-" and its decrees and orders owe their validity to municipal law. The law it enforces may therefore, in one sense, be considered a branch of municipal law. Nevertheless, the distinction between municipal law and international law is well defined. A court which administers municipal law is bound by and gives effect to the law as laid down by the Sovereign State which calls it into being. It need inquire only what that law is, but a court which administers international law must ascertain and give effect to a law which is not laid down by any particular State, but originates in the practice and usage long observed by civilised nations in their relation towards each other, or in express international agreement."

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To determine the scope and intent of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 with regard to the "action or proceeding" here in question it is necessary to bear in mind a principle of construction of statutes long established in the municipal law, namely, that prima facie the British legislation is deemed to legislate only with regard to the rights and duties of subjects of the British Crown. Lord Hatherley, when he was Sir William Page Wood, in Cope v. Doherty (1858, 4 K. & J. 367, 390), defined this principle, which, as he held, renders it proper for every Court of Judicature" in this country "in construing the enactments of the Legislature, to presume primá facie and unless the contrary be expressed or be implied from the absolute necessity of the case, that the Legislature intended by its enactments to regulate the rights which should subsist between its own subjects, and not in any way to affect the rights of foreigners, whether by way of restricting or augmenting their natural rights." Lord Hatherley thus adopted and applied a judgment of Dr. Lushington in the case of The Zollverein (1856, Swa. 96), where the same principles had been invoked in order to determine whether by a statute relating to the instance jurisdiction in Admiralty the British legislation could be deemed by an enactment in general terms to have restricted "the privileges which foreign owners enjoy under the general law of nations."

That the effect of statutes of limitations as between litigants before municipal tribunals is deemed to be among the matters of procedure which are governed by the lex fori is not, I think, a relevant consideration in the present

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inquiry. Sir Albert Dicey says in his treatise on the Conflict of Laws, 2nd edit., p. 708, while the principle that procedure is governed by the lex fori is of general application and universally admitted, it extends in its general acceptance only to proceedings under the law of this country by which the restriction upon the right of suit is imposed."

Reading the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 with due regard to its purport and scope I am of opinion that that Act was primarily designed to deal, as it does effectually deal, with actions brought and proceedings taken in English municipal courts by public authorities and persons acting or purporting to act under public authority in England, and that it ought not to be held to apply to the claim here in question unless its provisions show an unmistakeable intention to that effect. To quote from Dr. Lushington's judgment in the case of The Zollverein (ubi sup.) there must be words "so clear that there can by no possibility be a mistake." But if there be found in the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 a clearly expressed intention to include proceedings in prize within the limitations there enacted by the Legislature I have no other duty in the matter than to give effect to the Act. In the course of giving judgment in the case of The Zamora, Lord Parker declared the law thus: "It cannot, of course, be disputed that a Prize Court, like any other court, is bound by the legislative enactments of its own Sovereign State. A British Prize Court would certainly be bound by Acts of the Imperial Legislature. But it is none the less true that if the Imperial Legislature passed an Act the provisions of which were inconsistent with the law of nations, the Prize Court in giving effect to such provisions would no longer be administering international law. It would in the field covered by such provisions be deprived of its proper functions as a Prize Court." This last-mentioned conclusion strongly emphasises, in my mind, the importance of a careful examination of the statute now in question.

The express provision in the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, which is relied upon as showing an intention in the Legislature to include proceedings in prize within the limitations established by the Act, is the provision in sect. 2. This section repeals "so much of any public general Act as enacts that in any proceeding to which the Act applies the proceeding is to be commenced within a particular time," and in particular the Naval Prize Act 1864-in part, namely, sect. 51. Sect. 51 of the Act of 1864 contains the limitation of actions which I have already cited. The words in the Act of 1893 which are to be considered are those then which impliedly, if not explicitly, describes an "action or proceeding" such as is specified in the Naval Prize Act 1864, s. 51, as a proceeding to which “ this Act"-the Act of 1893-applies. It was argued by the Attorney-General that the words

I have cited must be so construed as to bring within the limitation in the Act of 1893 any proceeding in prize against a commissioned captor, and by consequence if not a fortiori any proceeding in prize against the ProcuratorGeneral.

Now the limitation in the Act of 1864 for which the general provision of the Act of 1893 is now substituted was a limitation only upon actions and proceedings for things alleged to be done or omitted under the Act of 1864. That Act, with its various regulations as to things to be done in prize, no doubt imposes some statutory duties upon captors, as I have already indicated, as well as upon persons concerned in the matter of administration with which the statute deals. It does not, however, purport to deal with the substantive law of prize, the right of capture, and the relative interests of captor and claimant in captured goods. Sect. 55 of the Act, indeed, expressly provides that Courts of Prize shall as heretofore take cognisance of and judicially proceed upon any capture, seizure, prize or reprisal, and hear and determine the same according to the course of Admiralty and the law of nations.

How and where an action or proceeding for breach of duty under the Act of 1864 may be judicially dealt with it is not necessary to consider. Primâ facie such a delinquency falls to be adjudicated upon in a municipal court. At any rate, the statutory limitation upon such an action or proceeding which was expressed in the Act of 1864 is not a limitation upon a proceeding in prize, and the Act of 1893 does not in terms alter its character or extend its operation.

Since the Naval Prize Act 1864 did not introduce any limits of time for proceedings in prize, properly so called, and the Public Authorities Protection Act deals expressly with the limitation in that statute, does not in express terms extend its scope, and is not primarily or specifically an Act to alter the law of prize, I am satisfied the Legislature did not intend to make and has not by the Act of 1893 made the drastic change in the law of prize which has been contended for on behalf of the Crown in this case.

Whether the plaintiffs have been guilty of delay which ought on equitable grounds to bar their claims, and whether the captor as represented by the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay which has occurred so as to be entitled to be relieved from making any answer on the merits of these claims, are not among the material questions now to be determined. Nor have I to decide whether any innocuous lapse of time would have been an answer without more to a claim by the plaintiffs for a monition to the defendant as representing the captor of the Wilhelmina to proceed to adjudication. That matter which was mentioned at the hearing can be dealt with if and when it arises.

Upon the point of law raised by par. 4 of Vol. 129.-3327.

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the Answer there must be judgment for the plaintiffs.

Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Wm. A. Crump and Son.

Solicitor for the defendants, The Treasury Solicitor.

House of Lords.

Jan. 26, 29, and March 20.

(Before Lords CAVE, L.C., DUNEDIN, SHAW, BUCKMASTER, and CARSON.)

RUSSELL v. RUDD. (a)

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL IN ENGLAND.

Workmen's Compensation-Personal injury by accident Claim for compensation-Compensation paid for period-Not fixed by award or agreement Agreement to accept lump sumSettlement of all claims-Refusal to record on ground of inadequacy-" Redemption of weekly payment"-Validity Contracting out of the Act-Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), sched. 1 (17), sched. 2 (9).

The

A workman, having been injured by accident, was paid 35s. a week during incapacity for six months, but there was no agreement or award for the payment of any definite sum. At the end of that period the employer announced his intention of not continuing the payment for the future, owing to the incapacity having diminished, but suggested that he was prepared to pay a lump sum in full settlement. workman agreed to accept 75l. in full settlement of all claims. Upon the written agreement being sent to the registrar to record, he refused to record it on the ground of inadequacy, and the County Court judge affirmed his decision. Held (Lord Carson dissenting), that the intention of the Act was that a workman suffering from incapacity due to an accident within the Act should receive a weekly sum, subject to review from time to time, but which might be redeemed by agreement with the employer subject to the approval of the County Court. To substitute for compensation of that character the payment of a lump sum, fixed only by agreement between employer and workman and free from any examination by the court was to contract out of the Act, and therefore void under sect. 3 (1); and held, that the agreement in question was an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment by a lump sum within the meaning of sched. I, par. 17, and sched. II., pars. 9 and 10, even although the amount of the weekly payment had not in fact been fixed. Ryan v. Hartley (106 L. T. Rep. 702; (1912) 2 K. B. 150), Hudson v. Camberwell Corpor ation (116 L. T. Rep. 523), Rawlings Limited v. Hodgson (119 L. T. Rep. 137), Williams v. (a) Reported by W. C. SANDFORD, Esq., Barrister-atLaw.

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Minister of Munitions (121 L. T. Rep. 341), and Haydock v. Goodier (125 L. T. Rep.. 71; (1921) 2 K. B. 384) overruled.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (126 L. T. Rep. 734) reversed.

APPEAL from the order of the Court of Appeal, made in the matter of an arbitration in the County Court of Middlesex, under the Workmen's Compensation Acts 1906–1919.

The appellant was a workman in the employment of the respondent, and on the 26th Oct. 1920 met with an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The respondent made a weekly payment of 35s. as compensation until June 1921. Two interviews took place in June between the appellant and a representative of the insurance company acting on behalf of the respondent, who stated to the appellant that in view of a medical report the company would not continue to pay him his full compensation, and made an offer to him of 751. in settlement of all claims, which the appellant agreed to accept. The appellant had made no claim against the respondent otherwise than under the Workmen's Compensation Acts. On the 20th June 1921 the respondent forwarded to the registrar of the County Court a form of memorandum and a form of information under par. 9 of sched. II. of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 with the request for the registrar to record the memorandum of the said agreement as follows: "The said Henry Russell agrees to accept and the said George Rudd agrees to pay the sum of seventy-five pounds in full settlement and discharge of all claims in respect of the aforementioned accident."

The registrar refused to record the said memorandum on the ground of inadequacy and referred the request to record it to His Honour Judge Crawford, County Court judge.

The appellant was paid 35s. a week compensation in weekly payments up to the 13th Aug. 1921, but after that date the respondent terminated the payments of compensation and refused to make any more payments to the appellant and contended that the whole matter had been settled by the said agreement. On the 12th Sept. 1921 the appellant filed with the registrar a request for arbitration in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Rules 1913– 1920. The arbitration and reference of the application to record the memorandum came on for hearing before Judge Crawford on the 1st Nov. 1921, who found as a fact that the agreement was an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment, that the sum of 751. was inadequate, and he refused to record the memorandum of the agreement, and in the arbitration proceedings made an award in favour of the appellant of 13s. 6d. a week from the 14th Aug. 1921.

The Court of Appeal (Lord Sterndale, M.R., Warrington and Scrutton, L.JJ.) allowed the appeal, and ordered the said award to be set aside and the said memorandum of agreement to be recorded and an award for the respondent to be entered with costs.

The workman appealed on the grounds that (1) it is a question of fact whether an agreement is an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment or not ; (2) the said agreement was in fact an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment and that there was evidence upon which the County Court judge could so hold; (3) the Court of Appeal was wrong in holding that there cannot be an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment unless there is in existence at the time of making the agreement a fixed weekly payment agreed or awarded; and (4) in holding that the County Court judge had no jurisdiction to refuse to record the said memorandum of the agreement on the ground of inadequacy of amount, and that it ought to have been recorded by the registrar without inquiry; (5) if the said agreement was not an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment it was no bar to the appellant's claim for compensation by reason of the provisions of sect. 3 (1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906.

The respondent supported the judgment of the Court of Appeal on the grounds that (1) the County Court judge misdirected himself in holding that the agreement was one in redemption of a weekly payment; (2) there was no agreement or award for future weekly payments at all; (3) there was no jurisdiction to refuse to record the agreement of compromise on the ground of inadequacy ; (4) the agreement sought to be recorded was an agreement to settle all claims and not an agreement for redemption of a weekly payment; (5) the County Court judge had no jurisdiction to award compensation.

Harold Morris, K.C., and S. J. Duncan, for the appellant.

Compston, K.C., and Shakespeare, for the respondent.

The House took time for consideration.

Lord CAVE, L.C.-This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal in England reversing an order and award of the judge of the Edmonton County Court, and raises important questions under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906.

The appellant, Henry Russell, was a carman in the employment of the respondent, and on the 26th Oct. 1920 met with an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and received injuries. The respondent did not dispute his liability to pay compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and without entering into any agreement with the appellant paid him 35s. per week (the maximum sum to which he could be entitled as compensation) from the time of the accident until the 13th Aug. 1921. In the month of June 1921 an agent of the insurance company in which the respondent was insured, called upon the appellant and informed him that, in view of a medical report, he would no longer receive full compensation and proceeded to negotiate with him for a settlement of all claims for a lump sum; and, ultimately, an

agreement was entered into in the following terms: The said Henry Russell agrees to accept and the said George Rudd agrees to pay the sum of 751. in full settlement and discharge of all claims in respect of the aforementioned accident."

The respondent shortly afterwards forwarded to the registrar of the County Court a memorandum of the above agreement with the necessary forms, and applied to have it recorded under par. 9 of the second schedule to the Act. The registrar refused to record the memorandum on the ground of inadequacy, and referred the matter to the County Court judge in accordance with clause (d) of the above-mentioned paragraph. Meanwhile, the appellant, whose compensation had been stopped on the 13th Aug., filed a request for arbitration in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Rules, and this application came on for hearing before the judge, together with the reference of the abovementioned application to record the memorandum. The learned CountyCourt judge, after hearing evidence and arguments on the matter, found as a fact that the above-mentioned agreement was an agreement as to the redemption of a weekly payment within par. 9 of sched. II. to the Act, and that the sum of 751. was inadequate; and he refused to record the memorandum, and in the arbitration proceedings made an award in favour of the appellant of 13s. 6d. a week from the 14th Aug. 1921. The respondent appealed against the order and award of the County Court judge, and the Court of Appeal on the 7th Feb. 1922 allowed the appeal and ordered the award to be set aside and the memorandum of agreement to be recorded and an award for the respondent to be entered with costs. Thereupon the present appeal was brought.

Before dealing with the questions which arise for decision on this appeal, it appears desirable to describe shortly the scheme of the Act so far as now material. Sect. 1 (1) provides that if in any employment personal injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as after mentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the first schedule to the Act. The compensation provided by the first schedule takes the form, where the death of the workman results from the injury, of a lump sum payable to his dependants, and where total or partial incapacity for work results, then of a weekly payment during the incapacity. Sect. 1 (3)| provides that if any question arises in any proceedings under the Act as to the liability to pay compensation under the Act (including any question as to whether the person injured is a workman to whom the Act applies), or as to the amount or duration of compensation under the Act," the question, if not settled by agreement, shall, subject to the provision of the first schedule to this Act, be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the second schedule to this Act." The second schedule contains a number of provisions as to arbitration and also pro

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visions for recording in the County Court a memorandum of any agreement. There are also certain provisions to which I will refer later, for the redemption of a weekly payment by a lump sum. By sect. 3 (1), provision is made for registering a scheme conferring upon the workmen in any employment alternative benefits not less favourable than those provided by the Act and it is provided that, save as aforesaid, this Act shall apply notwithstanding any contract to the contrary made after the commencement of this Act."

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In

The first question which arises on this appeal is whether, apart from the provisions contained in the schedules to the Act relating to the redemption of a weekly payment by a lump sum, the agreement made between the appellant and the respondent in this case is a valid agreement. In my opinion it is not. The provision in sect. 3 (1) that the Act shall apply notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, affects not only agreements made before an accident occurs, but also agreements entered into after an accident has happened. This was so held by Lord Wren. bury in Clawley v. Carlton Main Colliery Company Limited (119 L. T. Rep. 715; (1918 A. C. 744, 758). Of course the prohibition does not apply to agreements authorised by the Act itself; and it is argued on behalf of the respondent that the agreement in question was authorised by sect. 1 (3), and particularly by the words "if not settled by agreement." my opinion these words do not cover an agreement for the payment to a workman suffering from incapacity of a lump sum in settlement of all claims under the Act. The effect of sect. 1 (1) of the Act is to entitle such a workman to compensation in the form of a weekly payment; and the effect of sect. 1 (3), so far as material, is that any question as to the amount or duration of compensation under the Act," that is to say, in a case of incapacity of the amount or duration of the weekly payment, may be settled either by agreement between the employer and the workman, or by arbitration. It is plain that an arbitrator could not, under this sub-section, award compensation in the form of a lump sum; and, in my opinion, the power to settle by agreement is limited in like manner. The intention of the Act is that a workman who is suffering from total or partial incapacity caused by an accident shall receive a weekly sum, which shall be subject to review from time to time (sched. I., par. 16), and shall be incapable of being assigned or charged (sched. I., par. 19), but which may be redeemed by agreement with the employer (sched. I., par. 17), subject to the approval of such agreement by the County Court (sched. II., par. 9). To substitute for compensation of that character the payment of a lump sum, fixed only by agreement between employer and workman and free from any examination by the court, is to contract out of the Act, and accordingly is a contravention of sect. 3 (1) of the Act and void. The second question which arises is whether agreements such as the agreement in question fall within sched. I., par. 17, and sched. II.,