the governors of neighbouring colonies possess, for from the great distance of the several settlements from each other, the defective information they possess on public affairs, the rare and short occasions on which New Zealand statesmen are brought together in the General Assembly, it is almost impossible for the governor to consult them as to whether they will or will not form a new Government, or for them to determine what support they can reckon upon in the General Assembly, if they undertake to do so.

"It should also be remembered, in reference to the two distinct populations in this country, that the native population, who are the largest landed proprietors in the Northern island, are unrepresented in the General Assembly. The other population, the European one, is the governing body. Necessarily, in a civil war, the feeling of race exercises some influence. Men's passions more or less lead them to adopt extreme views, and to hasty and often ill-considered acts, in which they are sustained by a public opinion to which there is little or no counterpoise; so that, surrounded by such influences, it would be very difficult for a minister, endued with the very calmest mind, to arrive at a correct conclusion. And this difficulty is greatly increased when he has to please a constituency in which almost universal suffrage prevails, and which is often composed of one race engaged in a civil war with a race which it is to govern, and which is to be subdued by an army supplied to the mother country.

"Great Britain, in whose service the officers and men of her naval and military forces have engaged themselves, often, from the highest motives, owes something to the feelings of these officers and men, and something to the welfare of the wives and children of her soldiers; and I do not think that, when two populations are arrayed against one another, as is now the case in this colony, the uncontrolled power over the lives, actions, and honour of these officers and men, and of the welfare of their wives and children, should be handed over to irresponsible persons, or at least but feebly responsible to a Colonial Legislature, the seats of the members of which depend upon constituencies who must by the course of events be more or less excited against another race which is unrepresented in that Legislature."

VOL. II.

On the 8th October, Governor Sir George Grey communicated that before his responsible advisers would assent to his issuing the proclamation he wished to put forth offering to receive the submission of such tribes who had been involved in the rebellion as would take the oath of allegiance and make the cession of such territory as might be fixed by the lieutenantgeneral and himself, which they would only have done in each case after hearing and considering the opinion of ministers, they required him to give a vague assurance that the cessions taken should be to the extent required for the purposes of settlement and of defraying part of the expenses of the war. The governor could not give the assurance asked for in the vague terms in which it was put to him. He thought it, however, desirable to ascertain, if their wishes could be met, what was the quantity of land they required to be taken, and in what localities, and he received a statement of the quantities of land to be taken in cessions or otherwise which they would now deem sufficient, viz., 1,600,000 acres, although it appears that this quantity falls very far short of what was proposed in the general assembly, and that they only made this modification for the purpose of avoiding any imputation even, of prolonging the war for the acquisition of territory, Out of this quantity they required 600,000 acres to be taken at Taranaki and Whanganui; that is, more than 900 square miles. As the governor thought that hardly 100 miles length of territory between these places still remained in the hands of the natives, and that that country was probably on the whole of no immediate value for settlement for an average distance of nine miles inland, it appeared, if he was right in thus thinking, that the result would be that he should have to take the entire native territory of friendly natives and all others in that district. The governor therefore asked his responsible advisers to furnish him with tracings which would show approximately the boundaries of the territory it would be necessary for him to confiscate in the Waikato country and in the province of Taranaki and near Whanganui. To this they answered that they were, even at that date, unable to supply tracings which would show even approximately the boundaries of the territory that they proposed to confiscate, and that they had not sufficient information to de

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termine even the precise localities. It was impossible to act on such vague statements. It seemed wrong that her Majesty's forces should be sent to conquer land anywhere, with no direct and certain object aimed at. It seemed due equally to the European inhabitants of this country and the natives that the aim and scope of the war should be determined, and that it should be known what was required, and the acquisition of what territory would bring the war to a close. The governor, therefore, again requested definite information upon this subject, and in reply received the tracings.

On the 26th January, 1865, the Right Hon. Edward Cardwell sent a despatch to the governor, Sir George Grey, with reference to the proclamation, and also upon the differences between the governor, the responsible advisers and the assembly, in the following terms:"I approve the step you have taken in issuing a proclamation stating to the rebel natives the terms on which her Majesty's clemency will be extended to them. In my last despatch I expressed my great regret that some sufficient steps had not long ago been taken with this view. I cannot but think that at some former periods, as for instance immediately after your success at Rangiriri and the occupation of Ngaruawahia by the Queen's troops, or again after the success of Colonel Greer at Tauranga, the opportunity might have been seized with great advantage of making known the terms on which those who had been in arms might return to their allegiance. It may be doubted now whether, after the unfortunate escape of the prisoners and their establishment in a fortified position in the hitherto undisturbed district north of Auckland, the same prospect of success attends the measure. Nevertheless I do not hesitate to approve it. I sincerely regret indeed that the consent of your ministers has been withheld from this important step. It was, however, absolutely necessary for you to act with decision. In consulting with General Cameron and Sir W. Wiseman,—and taking in concurrence with them the step which, after full consideration, you believed to be the most judicious, you acted in conformity with your instructions and fulfilled the intentions of her Majesty's Government. I trust that the result has answered your expec

tations,-ard in that case, I doubt not you will have proceeded without delay to specify the quantity of land which you require to be ceded by the rebel tribes.

"It may, however, not improbably have happened that the measure taken after so long delay, and under circumstances comparatively so unfavourable, may have failed:-or may have been attended only with very partial success. In this case you will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that you have given to the rebels an opportunity of obtaining terms; and that the refusal of those terms has been their own act. You will then do well to proceed at once to carry into effect the Settlements Act, in conformity with the instructions conveyed to you in my despatch of April last. You will, I think, do well to state in the most public manner, the extent of the confiscation you propose to sanction; and let the hostile natives understand that if they abstain from further acts of war, and return to habits of obedience and order, they will remain in undisturbed possession of all the lands which are not included in the confiscation.

"The limits to which that confiscation must be carried can only be decided on the spot, with local knowledge, and with an immediate application to the circumstances of the time. This is a matter encompassed with difficulties of detail, involving most important considerations of justice, policy, and finance. But the principles by which her Majesty's Government expect you to be guided in fixing these limits are laid down as clearly as I could express them in my despatch of April 26th.

"I have been in communication on this subject with the Secretary of State for War. The time at which you will receive this despatch will nearly coincide with the termination of your summer, and the usual cessation of active military operations in New Zealand. It will also coincide with the period at which the estimates now about to be submitted to the Imperial Parliament will come into operation.

"You were quite right in refusing your assent to any plan of operations, which in your judgment and that of General Cameron would have rendered large reinforcements necessary, -might have involved their detention in the

country for many years, and I presume would, by carrying the troops into positions still more remote from Auckland, have added to the cost of transport already so enormous. It appears now that in consequence of the pressure of the military expenditure upon the colonial treasury the colonial ministers have thought it incumbent upon them to issue a sudden and unexpected order, by which all the local forces at Taranaki, except the military settlers, have been struck off pay and rations; and I understand that, generally, the retrenchment of military expenditure is regarded by them as necessary in the present circumstances. They will, I think, be prepared at the same time to expect that her Majesty's Government will have the same object in view, and will at least refuse their sanction to new and more extended operations.

"But if the objects of the war are not extended beyond those limits which appear to have been contemplated by you in your despatch of 6th January, 1864, and were approved by her Majesty's Government in my despatch of 26th April last, her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would now be possible considerably to reduce the force maintained in New Zealand, and to curtail within much narrower limits the proportionate expense of the commissariat and transport necessary for that force.

"In the Waikato District, the defeated natives appear to have retreated to positions to which it is practically impossible to follow them. without entering upon new and expensive operations of indefinite extent, and of extraordinary local difficulty. At Taranaki the insurgents have been driven from their strongholds, and New Plymouth so far relieved from danger that the Colonial Government have thought themselves justified in discontinuing the services of the militia. At Tauranga the submission of the natives has been complete, and the only danger which has been suggested in that quarter is that which General Cameron apprehends may arise if the Colonial Government persist in their intention of purchasing a very large extent of country, a portion of which is at a great distance from his posts, while the right to sell it is disputed by one of the tribes of the Thames.

"In determining the limits of confiscation you will have to arrive, between conflicting

difficulties, at a decision of great importance to the future welfare of the colony. On the one hand, I agree with your advisers that any exhibition of vacillation or weakness at the present juncture would be very unfortunate; and it is always a subject for careful consideration, in dealing with a native race, whether any concession even in the hour of conquest may not be regarded in that light. On the other hand, to push into the heart of a hostile country, like the Upper Waikato, a narrow line of undefended settlements, might be to lay the certain train for future conflicts. If you considered that you were called upon to confiscate in the Taranaki district the entire native territory of friendly natives and all others, you had evidently no alternative but to refuse your assent. Such a course would evidently be at variance with your instructions and with the plainest rules of justice, and would be incompatible with any hope of enduring peace. I will not attempt to prescribe to you in detail the frontier which you should establish either at Waikato or at New Plymouth. It would be impossible for me safely to do so. But acting in the spirit of your instructions, you will take care to lay down such limits as may in your judgment, after consultation with the general, appear to be most consistent with justice, both towards tribes and individuals, and best calculated to secure the safety of the colonists. All land included under such confiscation will be justly assigned to the colonial Government for purposes either of settlement, or of sale, or for fulfilling the pledges given to the proposed military settlers. But to conquer more land than may be necessary with a view to the future safety of the colonists, is not an object for which her Majesty's Government consider that it is possible to maintain an army in New Zealand; nor can they consent to the confiscation of territory, however justly forfeited by rebellion, which would render necessary the employment of an Imperial force to protect the new occupiers against the former owners of the land.

"There may, indeed, be districts conquered from the hostile natives which they may justly deserve to lose, and which the colony may fairly expect, as a result of its efforts and expenditure, to acquire; and yet these districts may, in your opinion and that of the general,

be so situated as not to justify you in holding them by scattered detachments of the Queen's troops, both on account of the heavy expense for transport to which the Imperial Government would continue to be exposed, and the unsuitable nature of the service itself. In this case, you will be at liberty to retain the territory so situated, subject to the general conditions which I have attached to every act of forfeiture, provided that the colonial Government be prepared to hold it with its own local forces, or military settlers, or both; and that in your opinion it can be safely forfeited, without sowing the seed of future hostility with the natives.

"The Imperial Parliament has provided with great liberality for the expense incurred in two campaigns, and has offered to the colony to guarantee a loan unusually large in proportion to the resources of the colony. This liberality has been shown upon the faith of repeated statements respecting the policy which has been prescribed to you in your instructions with regard both to the operations of the war, and to the confiscation of native land. It would not be possible for her Majesty's Government to submit to Parliament for the ensuing year estimates rendered necessary by an opposite policy; or by an intention of continuing the war longer than was required for carrying into effect the policy which had been declared.

"I saw with great satisfaction that your assembly was about to meet; and trust that their deliberations will have done much to terminate those painful controversies, in which you have been involved with your responsible advisers. I do not think that I should advance the public interest by entering into any lengthened discussion of those differences which have so frequently arisen between yourself and your ministers, or of the voluminous minutes in which they are conveyed. Indeed, voluminous as are the papers already before me respecting the unfortunate escape of the prisoners from Kawau, that controversy is not closed, and the subject is not even ripe for me to form, or to express, my view upon it.

"I will, however, say, I do not consider myself as reversing the principles laid down in the Duke of Newcastle's despatch of the 26th of February, 1863, No. 22, but as dealing with a state of things to which that despatch was

not in any degree intended to apply. The Duke of Newcastle wrote when a comparatively small number of her Majesty's troops were present in the colony, and before those troops were engaged in hostilities, and he explained with reference to that state of things that the governor had certain limited responsibilities respecting the government of the natives and the exclusive power of determining whether, and in what manner, her Majesty's forces should be employed. But he did not define or endeavour to define the relations between the Imperial and Colonial Governments after a civil war should have actually broken out. So far was the Duke of Newcastle from intending to give up to the colonial ministers the control of questions affecting peace and war, that in his despatch of 26th of February 1863, No. 22, he stated expressly:

"You would be bound to judge for yourself as to the justice and propriety of employing, and the best mode of employing, her Majesty's forces. In this matter you might of course fortify yourself by taking the opinions of your ministers, but the responsibility would rest with yourself and the officer in command.'

"In these words he plainly indicated, as I think, that principle of conduct in these matters, which it has been necessary for me, under very different circumstances, to carry into practical effect. On my own part, I have always declared my determination not to interfere with the principle of local self-government, as regards the affairs either of the colonists or of the natives. But self-government means the control by any people of their own forces, their own finances, and their own relations of peace and war. It does not mean that the right of establishing a policy shall belong to one body, and the duty of providing the means of carrying that policy into effect shall be laid upon another. The principal responsibility of carrying on this war, and even the chief share in the cost of its operations, has devolved upon the mother-country; and it has been impossible for the home Government to permit the control of the war to fall into the hands of the colonial ministers, where their opinions have differed from those of the officers more directly responsible to the Crown. Questions may of course be raised as to the application of this principle, but it is the only

principle upon which her Majesty's Government could consent to carry on a war for the security of the colonists.

"The views of ministerial authority entertained by your advisers appear to me wholly foreign to the circumstances in which the colony is placed; and I cannot but feel that every consideration of gratitude to the mothercountry, and even of enlightened self-interest should have led them to support cordially almost any line of policy which the governor and general might deliberately adopt, rather than engage in a struggle for power, with its attendant controversies, delays, and changes of purpose.

"It must be clearly understood that her Majesty's Government do not acknowledge the obligation to carry on war at the expense of this country till the natives are so broken or disheartened as to render further war impossible. Nor, again, do they think it indispensable to require that any specific conditions should be made respecting the universal recognition of European law in districts in which we have not, as yet, the power practically to ensure to the natives the benefits of European institutions.

The objects which her Majesty's Government have been desirous of effecting for the colonists are substantially these:-They have wished to carry on the war till the rebels had been unequivocally defeated. This has been accomplished in the Waikato and Tauranga districts, and less completely at Taranaki also. They have wished to inflict upon the rebel tribes, or some of them, an exemplary punishment in the way of forfeiture of lands, which shall deter them from any wanton aggression in future. This your instructions enable you to execute. Finally, they wish to restore a peace which shall enable Europeans and Maories to cultivate their lands and pursue their own interests in such security as the nature of the case admits of, and shall remove any immediate occasion of quarrel. Such a peace might restore to the Natives the advantages of European intercourse and trade, and give opportunity for that intercourse and trade to produce their invariable results in the growth of civilization and the extinction of anomalous and irregular authority.

"I have been desirous of thus explaining the

views of her Majesty's Government, in order that no misapprehension may exist in New Zealand of the obligations admitted or of the intentions entertained by them.

"Before this time the decision of the general assembly upon the questions of the loan, the contribution for imperial aid, and the modification of the Settlements act, will have been arrived at. You will have had the opportunity of consulting the statesmen whose support you have looked for; and I shall learn with pleasure that you have been enabled to form an administration possessing the confidence of the assembly, and acting cordially with you. Upon the assembly itself a grave responsibility will have rested. Their decisions will in all probability affect in no slight degree the duration of the present unhappy conflict, the future peace and welfare of the colony, and the maintenance of satisfactory relations between the two races and between the colony, and the mother-country. I shall await with great interest your report of their deliberations, the result of which will necessarily receive the very serious consideration of her Majesty's Government. There is no disposition on our part to withdraw from the colonial government any portion of that control over the affairs either of the settlers or of the natives, which has already been vested in them; and I shall sincerely rejoice in the termination of the war, not only on its own account, but also because it will relieve the home Government from duties and responsibilities which a state of war necessarily imposes upon us, but which are in their nature difficult and unsatisfactory.

"I have written this despatch in concert with the Secretary of State for War. He intends to instruct General Cameron to make arrangements for the return to England of a portion of the forces now under his command; but the specific instructions are open to modification according to the news which he may receive by the next mail with respect to the prisoners escaped fron Kawau, and to the state of affairs in the northern portion of the island. They will be sent to General Cameron by the next mail from England."