ing the effect of the records of one state in every other. () (12) But it should appear that the offense of which the witness was convicted would disqualify at common law, or by some statute of the country. (k) To impeach the credit of a witness, on the ground that he has been convicted of an infamous crime in a neighboring state, the record of his conviction there is receivable. (1) It is a general rule, that every description of legal infamy resulting from a conviction may be so entirely removed by a pardon from the governor, as to render the party, who was before disabled, a competent witness. (m) This rule, however, does not extend to a case where the incompetence is made part of the judgment, by a particular statute; and therefore, after a conviction for perjury or subornation of perjury under the Revised Statutes, (n) the defendant, though pardoned, can not be examined as a witness, until the judgment is reversed. (o) (13) But a person convicted of perjury at common law is restored to his competency by pardon. (p) In this state the governor is empowered to grant pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of 428] impeachment. (9) *And in all cases where he is authorized to grant pardons, he may grant the same upon such (i) 3 Hawk. Rep., 393. 2 Har, & McHen., 120. 378. 1 Har. & John., 378. (k) 2 Har. & McHen., 378, 120. 1 Har. & John., 572. (2) 9 Pick., 496. (m) 1 Chit. Cr. L., 601. Arch. Cr. Pl., 145. (12) The provision of the Revised Statutes (2 R. S., 701, § 23), declaring a person sentenced upon a conviction for felony, to be incompetent as a witness, does not apply to a conviction in another state. It has reference only to a conviction in this state. (Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y., 466.) It seems that the fact that, under the laws of another state, where a conviction was had, a person convicted of the offense was incompetent as a witness, does not affect his competency in this state. (Id.) The provision of the United States constitution, declaring that full faith and credit shall be given to the records of other states (art. 4, § 1), does not require that personal disabilities, imposed upon a person convicted of crime in one state should follow him, and be enforced in other states. (Id.) The defendant having testified as a witness in his own behalf, a record of his conviction in the state of Ohio, for a felony, was offered by the plaintiff and received in evidence. The defendant was, thereupon, asked by his counsel, whether he was guilty of the offense of which he had been convicted. Held, that it was error to exclude the question. (Id.) (13) A person convicted of perjury is an incompetent witness, though he has been pardoned by the governor, and the pardon purports to restore him to all his civil rights, the legislature having provided that such convict shall not be received as a witness till such judgment be reversed. Such is the law, though the exclusive power of pardon be vested in the governor. (Houghtaling v. Kelderhouse, 1 Park., 241.) Such incapacity to testify is the result of a rule of evidence, and is not a punishment of the offense. (ld.) conditions, and with such restrictions, and under such limitations, as he may think proper. (r) (14) The effect of a pardon is to acquit the offender of all the penalties (r) 2 R. S., 745, 21. (Superseded by Code Cr. Pro., § 692.) (14) The Code of Criminal Procedure contains these provisions in respect to reprieves, commutations and pardons: Power of governor.]-The governor has power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions, and with such restrictions and limitations as he may think proper, subject to the regulations provided in this chapter. (§ 692.) Convictions for treason.]-He may also suspend the execution of the sentence upon a conviction for treason, until the case can be reported to the legislature, at its next meeting, when the legislature must either pardon or commute the sentence, direct the execution thereof, or grant a further reprieve. (§ 693.) Annual report to legislature.]—He must annually communicate to the legislature each case of reprieve, commutation or pardon; stating the name of the convict, the crime of which he was convicted, the sentence and its date, and the date of the commutation, pardon or reprieve. (§ 694.) Requiring report of case.]-When an application is made to the governor for a pardon, he may require the presiding judge of the court before which the conviction was had, or the district attorney, by whom the action was prosecuted, to furnish him, without delay, with a statement of the facts proved on the trial, and of any other facts having reference to the propriety of granting or refusing the pardon. (§ 695.) Notice of application.]-At least ten days before the governor acts upon an application for a pardon, written notice of the intention to apply therefor, signed by the person applying, must be served upon the district attorney of the county where the conviction was had, and proof, by affidavit, of the service must be presented to the governor. (§ 696.) Publishing notice.]-Unless dispensed with by the governor, a copy of the notice must also be published, for thirty days from the first publication, in the state paper, if there be one, and in a paper in the county in which the conviction was had, nearest to the place of conviction; and in the city of New York, in a paper designated by the governor, with reference to its having the largest circulation. (§ 697.) Filing papers.]-When the governor grants a reprieve, commutation or pardon, he must, within ten days thereafter, file all the papers presented to him in relation thereto, in the office of the secretary of state, by whom they must be kept as records open to public inspection. (§ 698.) annexed to the conviction, and to give him a new credit and capacity. (s) A proviso in a pardon excepting all legal disabilities, is repugnant and void. (t) A pardon in these words, "I do hereby remit unto him the said J. B., the remainder of the said sentence" (before recited in the pardon), "and order him to be liberated from further confinement on payment of costs," was held sufficient in form to restore competency. (u) If the pardon is conditional, the performance of the condition ought to be shown; for on that depends all its efficacy. Thus, where pardon is on condition of transportation for a number of years, the witness is not competent before the expiration of the term, or other lawful determination. (v) Where a prisoner had been pardoned on condition of leaving the state for a specified time, and the condition was not complied with, the court, after the expiration of the time, held the pardon to be void, and passed sentence. (w) But where, in a similar case, it appeared that the prisoner had been insane after the conditional pardon was granted, the court, upon his being seized and brought up for sentence, discharged him, upon condition of his leaving the state within the same period originally limited in the pardon. (x). A pardon signed by the governor, and under the great seal, proves itself. So a pardon signed by the governor of another state and bearing the great seal of such state, is admissible without other proof authenticating it. (y) The competency of the witness may also be restored, by showing a reversal of the judgment of conviction, upon writ of error. (2) 6th. Incompetency from privileged communications.] Counsel, solicitors, and attorneys, are privileged from giving (and, indeed, they will not be permitted to give) evidence of any matters confided to them by their clients in their professional capacity; (a) either in the cause respecting which the communication was made, or in any other; (b) and whether the client be a party to the cause or not.(c) (14 a) (14 a) ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS; HUSBAND AND WIFE. Attorneys, etc., not to disclose.]-An attorney or counselor at law shall not be allowed to disclose a communication, made by his client to him, or his advice given thereon, in the course of his professional employment. (Code Civ. Pro., § 83.) And what is here said as to attorneys, is equally applicable to their agents, (d) and their clerks, (e) and to interpreters between them and their clients. (ƒ) This privilege, however, is to be considered as excluding the * disclosure merely of such facts [*429] as have been communicated confidentially by the client to the attorney, &c., in his professional capacity; and therefore does not extend to facts known to the attorney previously to his retainer. (g) The privilege of confidential communications to an attorney is confined to such as are made for the purpose of commencing, prosecu ting, or defending a suit. (h) All the cases seem to agree that the privilege continues after the particular suit is terminated, and extends to causes with which the client has no concern. (i) But counsel may be required to testify if the privilege be waived by the party who consulted with him, although the interest in the subjectmatter respecting which the confidential communication was made has passed to a third person, and he objects to the disclosure. (k) And if after the relation of attorney and client has ceased, the latter voluntarily repeats what he had communicated while the relation existed, the attorney is not privileged from disclosing it. (1) So all matters not confidentially communicated, and matters which the attorney might have known without being intrusted as attorney in the cause, must be disclosed. (m) Thus an attorney may be called to prove a deed executed by his client, which he has attested. (n) So to prove the contents of a notice to produce, or an erasure in a deed belonging to his client. (0) So to prove a matter of fact, communicated by the client in order to obtain information, and not legal advice. (p) So of communications made by the opposite party. (2) 34. (d) 2 Stark., 239. (e) 2 Car. & Payne, 195, 337. (f) Peake, 78. (g) Arch. Cr. Pl., 150. (h) 2 Car. & Payne, 518. Ry. & Moo. C. C., (i) Cowen & Hill's Notes, 1574. 12 Moore, 520. (k) 19 Wend., 353. This section applies to every examination of a person as a witness, unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived by the client. (Id., § 836, as amended by Laws of 1877, ch. 416.) Husband and wife.]—No husband or wife shall be compelled to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage. (Laws of 1867, ch. 887, § 3; 3 R. S., 7th ed., 2570.) A husband or wife shall not be compelled, or without consent of the other, if living, allowed to disclose a confidential communication, made to the other during marriage. In an action for criminal conversation the plaintiff's wife can not, without his consent, disclose any confidential communication had or made between herself and the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Pro., § 831.) Another class of privileged communications relates to confessions made to clergymen, and information acquired by physicians in their professional characters. The Revised Statutes prohibit any minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatever from disclosing any confessions made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such denomination. (r) (14 b) But admissions made to a clergyman, may be received in evidence in a criminal case if not made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by his church. (8) The statute also provides that no person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall be allowed to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending any patient, in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any [430] act for him as a surgeon. () (15) Whether * under this section, the privilege of concealing knowledge thus (r) 2 R. S., 406, § 72; superseded by Code Civ. (t) 2 R. S., 406, 73; superseded by Code Civ. Pro., 833. Pro., 834. (s) 13 Wend., 312. (14 b) CLERGYMEN. Not to disclose.]-A clergyman or other minister of any religion, shall not be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he belongs. (Code Civ. Pro., § 833.) This section applies to every examination of a person as a witness, unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived by the person confessing. (Id.. § 836, as amended by Laws of 1877, ch. 416.) (15) PHYSICIANS, ETC. Not to disclose.]-A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient, in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity. (Code Civ. Pro., § 834.) This section applies to every examination of a person as a witness, unless the provisions thereof are expressly waived by the patient. (Id., § 836, as amended by Laws of 1877, ch. 416.) On the trial of an indictment for causing the death of W. by poison, a physician, who was called to see W. when sick from the poison, and who examined and prescribed for him, was called as a witness for the prosecution, and asked to state the condition in which he found W., at that time, both from his own observation and what W. told him. This was objected to on the ground that the evidence was prohibited by the Code of Civil Procedure, § 834. The court overruled the objection, and the witness stated what he learned from his own examination of W. made in the presence of W.'s wife and the prisoner, and from their statements. There was nothing of a confidential nature in any thing he so learned. Held that the evidence was competent. (Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y., 424.) The object of the statute prohibiting the disclosure of professional information, acquired by a physician in attending a patient, is to protect the latter, not to shield one charged with his murder. (Id.) In an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, a physician testified to certain circumstances and conversations tending to establish the fact of adultery, and stated |