ELECTION PET.] KING'S COUNTY. Counsel for the sitting member, O'Malley, Q. C., Ballantine, Serjt., Coffey, Q. C., Biron, and Gray. It appeared that at the last election for King's County three candidates went to the poll, and the result as declared by the sheriff was, for John Gilbert King, 2192; Sir Patrick O'Brien, Bart., 1246; John Pope Hennessy, 1240. [ELECTION PET. | plaining of the election and return, but where the errors alleged are patent upon the face of the pollbook no lists are required: (Rogers, 520, “Scrutiny.") There is no question as to the title of the voter, but as to the conduct of the returning officer: (see The Bedfordshire, Middlesex, and Carnarvon Burghs cases, in Luders.) The sections quoted only apply to cases of scrutiny of votes upon the poll, and not to irregularities in casting up the poll-books. The Sligo case quoted prayed a scrutiny, and the 55th of the returning officer being in error. Evidence-Custody of the register-A certified copy of section of the Act quoted does not apply to the case the register admitted. O'Malley objected, referring to statute 13 & 14 Vict. c. 69, s. 65.-The witness was under-sheriff. The registers under the Irish Act ought to be in the custody of the sheriff. The sub-sheriff has no custody of the books; the old register may still be wanted, and the custody should be preserved. Longfield, Q. C. submitted that these books were admissible as public registers; and under statute 13 & 14 Vict. c. 69, s. 65, certified copies are sufficient evidence. The old sheriff hands over the new register to the new sheriff. The Clerk of the Peace proved the custody of the registers which were in force at the last election. O'Malley, Q. C. objected that the original register was required. The COMMITTEE (having also consulted the Speaker's counsel) determined, that under the circumstances the committee would accept a certified copy of the register as evidence. plates both acts; the word "or" is used deterO'Malley.-The 55th section of the Act contemminately, and parties complaining of an election or return are bound to deliver lists. In the Carnarvon case, the 74th section was ancillary to the matter in question, and there was no case to be gone into unless the 55th section was complied with. The COMMITTEE resolved that the object of history and meaning of erasures in the poll-book, the committee is to learn from the poll-clerk the and they will therefore recall the poll-clerk. Power of sheriff to alter the entry of a vote. In page 6 of the poll-book, at No. 66, I made a wrong entry. John Fegan voted for King and Hennessy. I made the mark in the O'Brien column by mistake. Michael Brown's number had either voted before or belonged to another booth. The deputy-sheriff looked at the roll and called out the number to me. I entered the number. I wrote Brown's name before the sheriff referred to the roll, and when he did I struck it out. This was before the voter left the booth. I struck it out because the sheriff decided he had no right to vote. The COMMITTEE desired to hear counsel upon the question of the sheriff's power to alter the entry of a vote. O'Malley objected to going further into the case. Assuming that Brown voted twice, the committee decided to hear the grounds on which the poll-clerk made the alteration. These grounds are, that the deputy's clerk supposes that the sheriff acted on the assumption that the voter had no right to vote. Had a list been given of objections to double votes, Errors on the poll-book-Lists of the votes questioned then it would have been competent to go into the need not be proven. Cooke, Q. C. proposed to go into the state of the poll-book of Ballybrigg, in one page of which there were two erasures, and called a witness who was a poll-clerk at the election, to identify he pollbook as in his handwriting, and to explain the state of the poll-book. O'Malley, Q. C. objected that the other side had no right to go into the question at all. No lists whatever of persons objected to have been delivered to the agents for the sitting member, as required under the statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 98, ss. 55, 57. This is an attempt to strike off a voter who is not included in any list. The other side may say that they wish to amend the poll-books; but that is really to amend the return. In sect. 55 of the Act, both events are contemplated; and "parties complaining of or defending a return shall deliver lists to the other side of voters objected to;" in this case the return is complained of, and individual cases must be selected in order to alter the return, and lists are therefore required: Sligo case, Wolf. & Dew, 225; Cooke, Q. C.-We do not object to the right of any party to vote. This certainly is a petition com case. The vote was duly given, and duly counted up, and now, without furnishing any list, they seek to strike the voter off the poll. Cooke, Q. C.-The Reform Act precludes the returning officer from refusing tendered votes. If Brown wished to give his vote, not being on the register, the returning officer must put him down as tendered; (see The Carnarvon case, in Luders.) O'Malley, Q. C.-The question is the right of the voter to vote. The committee asked the po11-clerk his reasons for striking out the vote. These reasons are insufficient, and the committee have no right to go any further. Michael Brown is on the register, and he voted, or else some one personated him. A man on the register can only be rejected by his own answers to the parliamentary questions under the stat. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 69, which is the Irish Act as to the rejection of votes at the poll upon questions being put. Here the sheriff makes the alterations which the Act of Parliament directly deprives him of the power of making. Even supposing the sheriff has the right, no ground has here been shown for his so acting. The COMMITTEE resolved:-The second entry of Michael Brown's vote must be considered as not on the poll, and that the question of wrong entries on ELECTION PET.] KING'S COUNTY. [ELECTION PET. the poll must be concluded before any other branch | It is not competent for the other side to go one step of the case is opened. Alterations in the poll-book. In the case of James Healey, whose vote stood recorded for King and O'Brien, with a marginal note of "referred to the assessor," the poll-clerk deposed that the voter gave his vote for King and Hennessy; that by mistake it was entered for King and O'Brien, and then the note was made by the under-sheriff, of the mistake having been referred to the assessor. The COMMITTEE resolved, that the marginal note is not such an alteration of the poll-book as to come within the scope of the present inquiry, and that the vote must be retained. In the cases of John Cleary and Robert Rowe the poll-clerk, John Dann, deposed that Cleary's vote was recorded for O'Brien, but afterwards struck through, and Rowe's vote was recorded for all three candidates. The COMMITTEE resolved to leave Cleary's vote as it stood upon the poll-book, and to strike out Rowe's vote altogether. In the case of Samuel Mason the name of the voter had been entered underneath the line drawn by the clerk at the bottom of the page and had not been reckoned in the totals at the foot of the page; it was proposed to call the voter to speak to the fact of his having voted, but The COMMITTEE resolved that the evidence of the voter cannot be received, nor could the check-clerk, nor the inspector of the booth be called, and that in the present state of the poll-book Mason's vote must be taken to be null and void. In the case of William Woods the vote was entered for all three candidates, but from the evidence of the poll-clerk it appeared that from the "totting-up" of the page he could swear that Woods' vote was split for Hennessy and King. The COMMITTEE resolved to receive the numbers as they appeared upon the poll-book, and that the vote of Woods was given for Hennessy and King. The case of Robert St. Leger, standing upon the same grounds, was not contested, and was amended as given for Hennessy and King. Evidence-Voter called to prove how he voted. In the case of William Wallace it appeared that a person voted in that name twice in the same booth, and was therefore struck out in one place. In the poll-book, page 9, the voter was numbered as 433, and in the poll-book, page 4, the voter was numbered as 433. Long field tendered the voter as a witness to explain the circumstances of the vote being given. O'Malley, Q. C. objected.-Had lists been given in, the voter might have been called. We rely upon the committee's former decision, when they would hear the poll-clerk and the returning officer, and in such cases no lists were required, the cases being those of mistakes and corrections upon the face of the poll-book, to explain which the committee might call witnesses. The committee have guarded their decision within limits. Patent errors requiring correction might be inquired into by the committee themselves from the proper officers, and then there is no necessity for lists; here the case is different. 66 further without showing why they have given no lists. The 55th section of the Act speaks of a 'petition against the election or return." This petition is against the return, and we may say that the parties so complaining of the return are bound to furnish us with lists. The object of the lists mentioned in the Act is twofold: first, that the other side may be able to judge, from cases already proved, of the probable results of future cases; and secondly, to enable the other side to marshal their evidence so as to rebut and explain the case against them. Longfield, Q. C.-Evidence may be given to explain an ambiguity in the poll-book. A witness, by reason of that ambiguity, made the totals in that page to give twelve, nineteen, and eleven votes for the three candidates; these totals were wrong, and therefore we call the voter as a witness to explain the facts. We contend that certain votes should be added to the poll; here there is not any objection to the voter, we do not object to the validity of the vote, and according to Rogers on Elections, 563, it is not necessary to give in lists of names to be added to the poll: (see W. & D. 58; the Cambridge case, under Youngman's case.) We call the voter, and ask the committee to entertain his evidence to and 74 of the Act as quoted do not apply, and explain the ambiguity on the poll. The sections 56 as to the duties of poll-clerks, see Clerk on Election Law, 407. O'Malley, Q. C. in reply.-The Cambridge case now quoted was a case of tendered votes, which stand on a different footing to those now in question, inasmuch as by their object and end they, the tendered votes, may obtain the settlement of the question whether a revising barrister has been right or not by the decision of a Parliamentary committee. The voter cannot be allowed to alter the record, or to establish the validity of his own vote, without notice being given to the other side by lists being delivered. The COMMITTEE.-The question is not how the voter gave his vote, but how his vote was recorded; and therefore the voter cannot be called to say how he voted. Eventually the COMMITTEE, after hearing evidence as to the facts of entries of votes in several cases, themselves went through the totals of the poll-books, and declared the result to be :-For John Gilbert King, 2192; Sir Patrick O'Brien, 1244; John P. Hennessy, 1242. And declared that, on the face of the poll-books, Sir Patrick O'Brien was duly elected. The question then arose as to the petition of Mr. Mitchel, also presented against the return. O'Malley contended that, no evidence being offered thereon, that petition should be deemed frivolous and vexatious, and so reported. The CHAIRMAN stated that the committee con sidered they could only inquire into the existence of any corrupt compromise having been entered into in respect of the second petition being withdrawn, and no such compromise being here to be reported upon, the petition, though not prosecuted, will not be reported as vexatious. BAIL.] WATTS v. JUSTICES OF KENT-Ex parte BLEWITT, re THE JUSTICES OF SHROPSHIRE. [BAIL. BAIL COURT. Reported by F. TURNER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Monday, May 7, 1866. WATTS v. JUSTICES OF KENT. PERCH V. THE SAME. Award by justices-Friendy societies. An award by justices in pursuance of an application by a member of a friendly society, the rules of which provide that such matters shall be heard before justices, is a judicial proceeding on which they are bound to state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. A rule had been obtained calling on these justices to show cause why they should not state a case setting forth the facts and grounds of their determination in these matters. F. M. White now showed cause. The proceedings before justices were under the rules of a benefit society at Sundridge, by which, in case of any dispute between the members, reference should be made to justices under 21 & 22 Vict. c. 101, s. 5. One of the rules was, that if any member became a member of any other society he should be expelled. Another rule was, that no expulsion should take place without notice to the offender. The Act 18 & 19 Vict. c. 63, s. 14, gave power to one friendly society, by act of a general meeting of the members, to amalgamate with any other such society. At a meeting of the Sundridge society it was resolved to amalgamate with the Tunbridge branch of the Odd Fellows. The amalgamation was objected to, and ultimately fell through altogether, but while it was in progress, a member named Wadmore and some others, believing it was going on all right, joined the Tunbridge Odd Fellows. For this offence, in Feb. 1865, Wadmore was expelled the Sundridge society without notice. He brought the matter before the justices, and they decided in his favour that the required notice had not been given him, and that the expulsion was illegal. This, it was submitted, was not a matter contemplated by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. It is a mere matter of arbitration, in which the justices are substituted for arbitrators. It is true that the section speaks of proceeding by "information or complaint," but the court will look at the substance and not at the words merely. The matter is in substance and in truth one of arbitration, and not of judicial discretion, and therefore not within the scope of this Act. It is like the refusal of justices to enforce payment of rates, in which it was held that stating a case was not the proper way of proceeding: Walker v. Great Western Railway, 29 L. J. 107, M. C, Wheeler v. Birmington, 29 L. J. 175, note, 6 Jur. N. S. 698; 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 171. though that also is commenced "by information or complaint." The words "summary jurisdiction" in the preamble of 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43 mean summary jurisdiction in the ordinary sense, not, as in this case, where the justices are simply substituted for other arbitrators. SHEE, J. read 20 & 21 Vict. c. 101, s. 5, and also the rule of the society giving the power to refer to magistrates. Does not that go beyond a mere reference? It speaks of expulsion-a complete casting out from the society. A reference would rather act between the members themselves as to their status, &c. The reason for the decision in the cases cited was that the acts were merely ministerial: (Townsend v. Read, 29 L. J. 223, M. C.; 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 180.) But in this case the justices had a discretion. White again submitted that the summary juris diction meant by the preamble was the ordinary summary jurisdiction. Here the power of the magistrate was given, less by the statute than by the rules of the society. Again, the first conviction took place so long ago as April 20, 1865. The case, it is true, was applied for within the required three days, and some little time was occupied in settling its terms, but the application is now stale, and only part of the interval is accounted for. And again, the request to state a case only applies to Wadmore's case, and the person who first applied was Watts, the secretary of the society, against whom the complaint was made. He has now withdrawn, and does not wish to go on with the matter at all. The justices say their authority to state a case was given by Watts, who was the party aggrieved by their decision, supposing it to be erroneous. He now says, "I do not want to go on," and so does his attorney. The men were reinstated, and have paid their arrears of subscription. The only persons anxious to proceed are the attorneys on the other side, who say Watts was but the officer of the society, and as the other members are interested, they can go on without Watts's consent. point, 21 & 22 Vict. c. 101, s. 7, provides for this Harington in support of the rule.-As to the last very case (section read). tion as to the delay. SHEE, J. held that it did, but asked for explana Harington satisfactorily accounted for this, which had arisen entirely from abortive endeavours to get the justices or their clerks to state the case. SHEE, J. thought the objection on the ground of delay had been answered, and ordered the mandamus to issue, but as the justices were the only parties, and were acting in their public capacity, no costs would be given against them. Rule absolute for a mandamus, without costs. The Court will not grant a certiorari to bring up a conviction by justices in a matter over which they have jurisdiction, even though it be alleged that they convicted without any evidence whatever. Garth moved for a rule for a certiorari to bring up a conviction by the Justices of Shropshire for removing four cows from Cranmere to Mirfield, contrary to an order of Petty Sessions, made on Nov. 11, 1865, under the authority of an Order in Council in pursuance of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 105. The ground of the present application was, that Blewitt was convicted merely on the faith of a charge by a police constable, without any hearing of the complaint, plea of guilty, evidence given, or witness called. The deft.'s affidavit stated that the case was called on; the police superintendent stated the charge; the deft. told the justices that he had heard that his son had sent some cows, but whether he had done so or not, he (the deft.) could not say. The magistrates, without hearing any evidence, then fined the deft. 101. and costs, and this conviction it was now sought to bring up with a view to its being quashed. There was an affidavit by the son that he was the person who sent the beasts, and that his father knew nothing about it; another son confirmed this by a BAIL.] REG. v. POLLARD AND OTHERS-Reg. v. BOYCOTT. separate affidavit, as did also a reporter and five other persons who were present during the proceedings. On the other hand, there was an affidavit by the superintendent of police, saying that he laid the information, and had two witnesses in attendance to prove the charge. The case was called on in the usual way, and the information was read over, when the applicant admitted the offence, and said he was willing to pay a small fine. The justices retired to deliberate, and on their return they fined him 104 and costs, but he said nothing about appeal till after he knew the amount of the penalty. The justices and their clerk made affidavits, in which they swore to the same version of the facts, but these were met by additional affidavits by a person who had been convicted of a similar offence at the same sitting, but whose case came on before that of the applicant, in which that person said that all the circumstances to which the justices and their officers swore, really took place with respect to him, and not to Blewitt, the applicant. Matthews objected to the use of these further affidavits. Garth thought they should be used. The case was at first intended to go before the judge at chambers. LUSH, J. thought they might be used, the justices to have a right to reply if they thought fit. Garth then read the affidavit which set out the above facts, and stated that the applicant said he was not guilty. There were also similar affidavits from six or seven different persons. [BAIL. REG. v. POLLARD AND OTHERS (Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire). Obstructing works of local board of health-Claim of private right-Duty of justices to state a case. If a deft. be charged with obstructing the works of a local board of health, he is not necessarily entitled to have the case dismissed by the magistrates because the obstruction took place in assertion of a private right. Nor are justices, under such circumstances, warranted in refusing as frivolous an application to state a case. Field, Q. C. and Kemplay showed cause against a rule obtained by the Cleckheaton Local Board of Health, calling on the deft. and others, justices of the West Riding, to state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. The defts. had refused an application made to them at the time as being frivolous. The board of health were carrying on some drainage works under the Public Health Act (11 & 12 Vict. c. 63), 8. 45. One Nutter, a member of the Cleckheaton Co-operative Society, was summoned under sect. 148 of the same Act, for obstructing the works. All he did was, to fill up as fast as it was dug the trench which the complainants' workmen were digging on the premises of the society. This was manifestly not a "wilful obstruction " within the Act; and the magistrates had done rightly in dismissing the complaint and refusing the application for a case. Maule and Alfred Wills in support of the rule.— The offence was clearly proved, and no witnesses were called on behalf of the deft. Nutter. The magistrates mentioned several legal objections, and referred to 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63, s. 143, and ulti LUSH, J. suggested that the justices should have mately dismissed the case. They then certified time allowed them to answer, when Matthews said he thought the case might be got rid of at once. Even if the magistrates had convicted without evidence, the rule must be discharged, as the remedy by certiorari was taken away, except where justices had acted altogether without jurisdiction. Ex parte Hopwood, 15 Q. B. 121. Garth contested this. It would be a monstrous thing, and contrary to all natural justice, if magistrates should have the power to convict without evidence. A certiorari had been allowed to issue in some cases notwithstanding the statute, as where a conviction had been obtained by fraud; Paley on Convictions, 5th edit. 410; Reg. v. Alleyne, 4 E. & B. 186; 1 Jur. N. S. 869. LUSH, J. thought these cases did not apply. The justices had jurisdiction to enter upon the inquiry, and therefore the case was not one for certiorari. The proper course was by appeal. The rule, therefore, must be refused. Matthews asked for costs, but LUSH, J., acting on the ordinary rule that no costs were given when cause was shown in the first instance, declined to grant them. Rule refused, without costs. under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 4, that the application to state a case was frivolous. The affidavits were read, from which it appeared that the justices thought the Act did not apply. Kemplay, in reply, urged that the affidavits were insufficient, as they did not show that sect. 45 had been complied with. Also that the decision was manifestly on the facts and not on the law. LUSH, J. said :-The contrary appears. The justices clearly had decided a matter of law, for they had based their opinion on the construction of the cited sections of the Act. The rule must be made absolute. To qualify under the above sections, it is sufficient if a municipal officer has bonâ fide a place of "residence" within the borough, even though, from fortuitous circumstances, he does not sleep there. Huddleston, Q. C. and Crompton Hutton showed cause against a rule obtained by Griffits calling on the deft. to show by what authority he claims to exercise the office of alderman of Kidderminster. The rule had been obtained on several grounds, all but one of which had been answered by the deft.'s affidavits. The other was a matter of legal construction, upon which depended the question whether the deft, was entitled to be on the burgéss-list as one who was, on the 31st Aug. 1865, and for the whole of the two preceding years, an inhabitant householder" within the meaning of the Act. By 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 28, an alderman must be entitled to be on the burgess-list. By sect. 9 of the same Act every one entitled to be on that list BAIL.] REG. v. HEYWORTH AND OTHERS (Justices of the West Derby Hundred). [BAIL. a broad distinction between the two. Take the case of a lodging-house keeper, who has his furniture and servants in a house in town, but himself lodges away. He is occupier of the house, but not inhabitant. LUSH, J.-I am inclined to be with you, that habitation must be qua householder, and not qua lodger. But is it not enough to hold a house and inhabit it constructively? The registration cases seem to show that it is. Griffits.-The words of the statutes differ. Suppose a barrister takes chambers, and puts a bed there; that would not give him a right to say he inhabits. tion that a man must actually sleep in the house LUSH, J.-Your argument involves the proposihe inhabits. Suppose he sleeps there only one night in the two years. Griffits.-That will not do. LUSH, J.-Then how many will? must be a person of full age, and must possess | borough, or within seven miles thereof." There is certain specified qualifications. He is not so entitled unless he has occupied a house, warehouse, counting-house, or shop within the borough, and has also been an inhabitant householder within the borough, or within seven miles thereof, on the last day of August in the year, and the whole of the two preceding years. There are also provisions as to payment of rates, about which no question arises. The deft. is a solicitor in Kidderminster, who has held office as alderman and as mayor under the qualification now objected to. He is on the burgess-list, and is duly enrolled. He was objected to in 1862 by one George Hathaway, but the revising barrister decided n his favour. His premises consisted of a house, on the ground floor of which was his office, and above ithat were sitting and bed rooms in which he and all his family had till recently resided. Down to the present time his son and his friends had frequently, and his servants had constantly, slept in the house, and he had always had a bed there for himself, though, as it happened, it had never been occupied for the last three years. The only reason for this was that the deft.'s wife's health forbade her residing in the town, and the deft. had taken apartments for her at Cheltenham and Malvern, and latterly Angborough and Frant, which last-named places are within two miles of the borough boundary, to and from which the deft. goes daily to his place of business in Worcester-street, Kidderminster. This is a perfectly good qualification. As to "occupation" there is no dispute, but it is good also as to "residence." The affidavits show that the deft. keeps his bed, his servants, his wines, and his library in the house; that he takes his meals there, and uses it in all respects as his place of dwelling except that, for a temporary reason, he does not sleep there at nights. He is a householder by reason of the house he holds, and he is also an inhabitant living within the required distance. The policy of the Act seems to be to require the mayor and aldermen to be persons of some substance, and to live so near to the spot as to be within call when wanted. The deft. fulfils both these conditions. Re Creek, 3 B. & S. 459, is the only thing in point, but Chitty's Statutes, 2nd vol. 964, says the occupier of a house, shop, &c., is not entitled to be on the burgess-roll, unless he also holds a house. But this deft. has the house in Worcester-street, Kidderminster. LUSH, J.-And says that is his only fixed residence. Crompton Hutton.-The only way the plt. can put his case is, that a man cannot be the occupier of the same tenement in respect of which he claims to be householder. The deft. is a householder in respect of the tenement in Worcester-street; and if he does not inhabit there he inhabits within seven miles, therefore quacunque viâ datâ, the objection fails. But his lodgings are taken from week to week, and his holding them may cease at any moment. They are not his domicil. The plt. must go this length, that if a man, from delicate health or any cause, does not sleep in his usual place of abode, he loses his qualification. Griffits. It is for the jury. The whole question is whether inhabiting is colourable or real. LUSH, J.-The rule must be discharged. The deft. is occupier of an entire house, and is therefore within sect. 9 if he also inhabits the house. I agree with Mr. Griffits that he must inhabit a house within the borough, or within seven miles; and looking at the facts, I am of opinion that Mr. Boycott does so inhabit this house in Worcesterstreet, Kidderminster. He has no other fixed residence; he takes his meals there, has his furniture, wines, and library there; his son, his friends, and his servants sleep there, and he only does not sleep there himself because of the state of his wife's health. It is impossible to say that a man must always sleep in the house he inhabits, and the rule must therefore be discharged with costs. Rule discharged, with costs. REG. v. HEYWORTH AND OTHERS (Justices of the West Derby Hundred). Unlicensed slaughterhouse — Conviction for using. A conviction for "using" an unlicensed slaughterhouse under 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34, s. 126, cannot be sustained against a person who merely pays the owner of the premises for being allowed to kill animals there. Brown, Q. C. showed cause against a rule obtained by Charles Russell, calling on the defts. to state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43. Richard Harold was charged with unlawfully "using " as a slaughterhouse a certain place which had not been licensed as required by 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34, s. 126. Sect. 125 gives power to the Public Health Commissioners to register existing slaughterhouses; sect. 126 imposes a penalty of 51. for using or suffering to be used an unlicensed place, and 57. for every subsequent day Huddleston, Q. C.-And that would disqualify the during which it shall be so used. Harold, a workwhole corporation of London. Griffits in support of the rule.-The question is narrowed to this: Does the deft. occupy a house, &c.? and is he, in addition, an inhabitant householder in the borough? The Act requires both. It is very singular, but the Act does not say occupy or inhabit any house, but "occupy any house," &c., "and during the same time shall also have been an inhabitant householder within the man employed by Bennett, a butcher, drove some cattle to an unlicensed slaughterhouse belonging to the New Cattle Market Company, to whom he paid 2s. per head for the use of the place and the necessary tackle. There were other persons on the premises, and Harold had access only to part of the building. It was objected that Harold was not the occupant of the slaughterhouse, and also that the information should have been laid against the slaughterhouse company. But this had already |