In this case two petitions had been presented against the return of the sitting member, Mr. Campbell. The first of these was presented by the unsuccessful candidate, Mr. William Balliol Brett, and alleged: -1. That at the last election the sitting member and the petitioner were candidates for the said borough, and that the mayor of Helston (the returning officer) had voted before four o'clock, and that after four o'clock the mayor, by word of mouth, and without entering the vote in the poll-book, illegally, wilfully, improperly, and wrongfully gave a casting vote for Mr. Campbell, and declared him duly elected, instead of returning the petitioner and Mr. Campbell by separate indentures. 2. That illegal votes were at the said election tendered and entered for the sitting member Mr. Campbell, and that the real majority was for the petitioner Mr. Brett. 3. That one person at the said election voted after four o'clock. 4. That voters voted who were incapacitated by non-residence within the statutory limits. 5. That voters voted who had been improperly admitted by the revising barrister. 6. That some voters voted twice. 7. That voters voted who were in the receipt of parochial relief. 8. That voters voted who had become disqualified since the register was formed, and prayed that the election and return might be declared wholly null and void, or that the return might be amended. The second petition was presented by electors, and alleged:-1. In the same terms as that of Mr. Brett, with the exception of the word "improperly." 2. Bribery and corruption by Mr. Campbell, his agents and others. 3. Corrupt treating by Mr. Campbell, his agents and others. 4. Intimidation, bribery, and treating by Mr. Campbell, his agents and others. 5. That the majority for Mr. Campbell was only colourable, and the real majority was for the petitioner Mr. Brett. 6. That voters voted who had become disqualified by non-residence since the last registration. 7. That voters voted who had been improperly admitted by the revising barrister. 8. That some persons voted twice at the election. 9. That certain living voters were personated. 10. That certain dead persons, on the register as voters, were personated. 11. That voters voted who were in the receipt of parochial relief. 12. That voters voted who had, since the last registration, become disqualified by reason of legal incapacity. 13. That certain persons voted who were treated. 14. That certain persons voted who did bribe, treat, [ELECTION PET. and use undue influence. 15. That the majority for Mr. Campbell was only apparent, and that Mr. Brett really had a majority. And prayed that the return should be amended, and Mr. Brett declared duly elected. W. H. Cooke, Q. C., Clark, and St. Aubyn were counsel for both sets of petitioners. Giffard, Q. C. and Henry James for the sitting member. The facts of the case appeared to be admitted as follows:-At the last election two candidates, Mr. Campbell and Mr. Brett, were put in nomination, and after a show of hands a poll was demanded, which was held on the 1st May 1866. At the close of the poll, at four o'clock, the numbers polled for Mr. Campbell and Mr. Brett were found to be equal, namely, 153 for each. Upon this the returning officer, the mayor of the borough, who had previously during the day voted for Mr. Campbell, gave by word of mouth, and without entering the vote in the poll-book, his casting vote in Mr. Campbell's favour, saying, "If I have a casting vote I vote for Mr. Campbell," and thereupon returned Mr. Campbell by the usual form of indenture. Cooke briefly opened the case, as detailed above, on behalf of the petitioner, and stated that the counsel for Mr. Campbell, the sitting member, were prepared to admit a real majority existent against him, and therefore he proposed to strike off the vote of one Isaac Rogers, which had been given for Mr. Campbell, although the voter had really ceased to reside within seven miles of the borough of Helston. Mr. Naylor, from the Crown-office, produced the writ and return for Helston from the Crown-office, and the poll-books, which showed an equality of votes; and he pointed out the first vote given by the mayor, "Thomas Rogers." Isaac Rogers being called, said:-I voted at the last election. I am a Wesleyan minister. At the time of the general election in July 1865 I was attached to the Helston Circuit of the Wesleyan Connection, and resided at Helston. In Aug. 1865 I went to Hinckley in Leicestershire, and a few weeks after that I was succeeded by another minister at Helston. I have since that period resided at Hinckley. of the law upon the subject of residence. By the CHAIRMAN.-I was unaware of the state Giffard then tendered Mr. Campbell to contradict the allegations in the petition presented by electors of personal bribery on his part. Cooke. We do not intend to prove personal bribery against Mr. Campbell. We must put in everything comprehended in the words of the statute, which are in this case strictly followed. The lists of objections to voters, in fact, make the charge, not the petition. candidate at the last election for the borough of Helston, and that he was entirely innocent of any bribery, treating, or intimidation. Mr. Campbell being sworn, stated that he was a It then appeared that the mayor of Helston, who had been summoned on a speaker's warrant, had, by reason of some misapprehension, been told that his presence would not be required, and therefore was not present, to tender his explanation and purge his contempt. The room was then cleared, and The COMMITTEE, after consultation with Mr. Rickards, the Speaker's counsel, came to the following resolutions:-1. That the Committee had the purposes of navigation. The canal was opened in 1774. The company had erected before 1802 a dam across the Bradford Beck, and made upon the stones of the dam a culvert out of the beck into the reservoir or basin before mentioned, and had ever since diverted the water, as they required it, into this reservoir or basin. V.C. W.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. COMPANY OF PROPRIETORS OF THE BRADFORD CANAL. [V.C. W. altered the poll by striking off the name of Isaac | made, into which supplies of water are brought for Rogers. 2. That the sitting member, Robert Campbell, Esq., was not duly elected to serve in Parliament as a burgess for the borough of Helston. 3. That William Balliol Brett, Esq., was duly elected to serve in Parliament as a burgess for the borough of Helston. 4. That no bribery, treating, or extensive bad practices had been proved to have existed at the last election for the borough of Helston. 5. That the returning officer at the said election had wrongly returned Robert Campbell as a burgess to serve in Parliament for the said borough. 6. That no explanation had been offered by the returning officer of his conduct in making the said return. [In consequence of the above case and the resolutions thereon being reported to the House, the following resolution was proposed in the House of Commons on the 26th July 1866, and carried on a division by 135 ayes to 6 noes:- "That, according to the law and usage of Parliament, it is the duty of the sheriff or other returning officer in England, in case of an equal number of votes being polled for two or more candidates at an election, to return all such candidates."] A company and its lessees had been indicted at common Held, that, the court conceiving that the decision at law nuisance: Delay or laches may not be imputed to the Attorney- Bradford Beck is the principal stream of water flowing through the town of Bradford in Yorkshire. By an Act of the 11 Geo. a company was incorporated to make a navigable cut or canal from a bridge called Hoppy Bridge to join the Leeds and Liverpool Canal at a place called Windhill, about three miles off, and to supply the canal with water from such springs, soughs, brooks, drains, streams, and watercourses running into a brook called Bowling Mill Beck as should be found within the distance of 2000 yards of Hoppy Bridge. This Bowling Mill Beck unites with Bradford Beck above mentioned at a point about 350 yards above Hoppy Bridge. At the head of the canal a reservoir or basin was At this time the canal passed through open fields, but of late years great numbers of private houses had been erected in roads running in the same direction as the canal, at distances from it of about 100 up to 600 yards. The present information was filed by the AttorneyGeneral at the relation of certain persons, tradesmen and inhabitants of Bradford, and one a shareholder of the Bradford Navigation, for an injunction to in the company, against the Company of Proprietors restrain the company and their lessees, Crowther and Dixon, "from diverting into their canal, or allowing to pass into the same, or collecting, or keeping, or continuing therein any filth, sewage, or polluted matter or water, so as to be a public nuisance." In Aug. 1864, an indictment had been preferred at the Leeds Assizes against the defts. the company, and their said lessees, for the same alleged nuisance. The indictment was removed by certiorari and came on for hearing at the Spring Assizes at Leeds in March 1865, and a verdict for the Crown returned by consent, subject to a special case for the court above. This was argued on the 10th June, and judgment directed to be entered up for the Crown against Crowther and Dixon, who had given notice of appeal. They had been indemnified in these proceedings by the company. The information alleged that during the last thirty or forty years, the town of Bradford had greatly increased in the neighbourhood of the Bowling Mill Beck and Bradford Beck, and a great number of drains or sewers had been made to the water with which the canal was supplied, oriempty themselves into these two streams, so that ginally free from any serious impurity, was now matter, and that Bradford Beck, the point where extremely impure and loaded with foul and feculent the water was turned from it into the canal, was an open sewer. That Bradford Beck itself was a rapid fall, and after much rain was flooded, so that although the water was impure, no deposit of an offensive kind took place. That the water in the canal, on the other hand, was for all practical purposes stagnant, and as there was no flow of water, a deposit of mud, composed chiefly of sewage, had been formed, which had had the effect of giving up unwholesome and offensive gases and smells, particularly when disturbed by the passing of the canal boats and craft. The lease under which the defts. the lessees held from the company would expire in April 1866. The information was filed on the 21st June 1865. An interim injunction had been thereupon granted upon an undertaking by defts. to cleanse the reservoir or basin of the canal from time to time by means of flushing it. The defts., the company, put in their answer in Nov. 1865, by which they in effect admitted the allegations of the information as to the impurity of the water in the canal, and they insisted that the company were entitled to use the water of the Bradford Beck for supplying their canal, and that without regard to such water being so foul as that when so used it created a public nuisance, and that such nuisance was legalised by the Act of Parliament incorporating the company, and they thought it probable that the company would continue to supply the canal with the water from the Bradford Beck upon the expiration of the lease granted by them. V.C. W.] ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. COMPANY OF PROPRIETORS of the Bradford CANAL. [V.C. W. They also insisted that the corporation of Brad- | as established. He had been certainly somewhat ford were bound to cleanse the Bradford Beck. struck with what might be the consequence of acting upon a decision that was bona fide about to be appealed from, in case it should be reversed. But he thought the sound view of the case was, that this may be a very good argument in reference to the time that should be allowed; but he did not think that he ought to hold his hand simply on account of the decision being under appeal, unless A strong case had been before him in Betts' case, he had some doubt of the justice of the decision. decision of the Q. B. (1 El. & Ě. 990) was against when he granted an interlocutory injunction. The the view which he had there taken, and he felt such a strong doubt of the propriety of the decision that he had ventured to grant an interlocutory injunction, but the decision of the Ex. Ch. being also against his view (Ib. 1020) he had felt himself Swaine v. Great Northern Railway Company, 3 New bound to dissolve the injunction. Then the H. of Rep. 109; on app. 3 N. R. 399; 9 L. T. Rep. L. (10 H. of L. Cas. 117) ultimately decided accordAttorney-General v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Coming to his view which he had originally taken, so pany, 3 De G. M. & G. 304; 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. The other facts of the case and the arguments of counsel are stated in the judgment. The Attorney-General (Sir Roundell Palmer), G. M. Giffard, Q. C., and H. Cadman Jones, for he information, stated the facts of the case. Rolt, Q. C., Amphlett, Q. C., and John Pearson, for the defts., made many points, all commented upon by the V.C., and cited Durell v. Pritchard, on app. 1 Law Rep. Ch. 244; 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 545; Deere v. Guest, 1 Myl. & Cr. 516; N. S. 571; 692. March 16.-The VICE-CHANCELLOR now gave udgment and said:-With regard to the merits of this case, it appeared to him to have been settled by the decision at law, as to the propriety of which he could not entertain any doubt, that the defts. at law, the lessees of the company, have been guilty of a nuisance in allowing a continued flow of water, in a filthy and polluted condition, into this canal. It is clear from the evidence that from this water there is a constant deposit in the canal of foul and fetid mud; and that the increase and accumulation of that which some of the witnesses declared to be a nuisance some twelve or fifteen years ago, from the circumstance of its being, as the defts.' own witnesses call it, a growing evil, has become a nuisance that is now utterly intolerable. The answer of the company admits in effect the state of the nuisance. The admissions in the special case go even farther than that; and the evidence places the fact beyond a doubt that the canal is a nuisance. Now for this nuisance the company's lessees have been indicted, and the court of law sustained the indictment. It is true the company have full power to draw the water as alleged, which they may require for all the purposes of their canal; and some works having been erected by them seventy years ago, they are only doing that which for seventy years past they have been continuously doing. But when the Legislature authorised the drawing of water from the beck into the canal it was a pure stream. Fifty years ago it was comparatively pure, but it has become more and more polluted. The information states that thirty years ago it began to become impure; and this impurity has been rapidly progressing until about ten years ago, when, as some of the defts.' witnesses say, matters were nearly as bad as they are at present. The two last dry summers have aroused the attention of everybody to the enormity of the evil, and proceedings at law have at length been taken. The lessees of the company are the persons who allow the water to flow into this canal; they have control over the water; it is somewhat pedantic to draw distinctions between nonfeasance and misfeasance, it is a matter which they can put a stop to, and for which they are liable. But the company and the lessees say they intend to appea. and it is contended that he ought not, pending that appeal, to consider the law that Mr. Betts unfortunately lost all the benefit which he might have had from the injunction, in consequence of the intermediate decision of the Ex. Ch. The chief defence in this case has been this: "We are not the persons who create this nuisance: somebody else creates it by fouling the water; the water comes to us foul; we only go on using that which has come to us for seventy years past, and it is fouled through no fault of ours." That is not a sound view of the case. He could quite understand, if this had been a case in which a company had power to cut a channel for the purpose of drawing water from a given river, and then the channels so cut were made navigable, and the company had no further control over it, that it might have been said that the company were not answerable for doing an illegal act. But here the only authority which the Act of Parliament gives them is to draw water; it does not say they are to draw foul or filthy water, or that they were to draw all these nuisances into the canal. They have the sole control over the flow of the water into the canal; and if, as was put by the Attorney-General in his opening, it was found that the water became so foul with filth and sand as to block up the canal, they would not let it into their canal at all. In that state of things a court of law has said the lessees have created a nuisance, for which they have become indictable, for which they have in fact been found guilty. The four judges have concurred in that, and he did not find sufficient ground for doubting the decision to say that he ought to hold his hand in granting an injunction. Then there were other grounds alleged, amongst which was this: it is said that the case having been tried at common law, there is no reason at all for this court to interfere. And it is further said, as part of that reasoning, that the court of common law will regard this factthat, after all, the company are innocent parties; they are guilty, no doubt, in the sense of allowing foul water to flow in; but they are not the parties who create the evil; they cannot themselves cleanse or take steps for cleansing the beck, therefore they ought not to be attacked; and when brought up for judgment, that will be considered, and a very slight fine will be inflicted upon them. And, by parity of reasoning, it is said that a court of equity should see that the proper persons to be sued are those who are guilty of bringing the pollution into the beck, and ought not to restrain the defts. But he could not admit that answer. It might be urged that, in cases like Tipping's case and others, in which a person is annoyed with a number of nuisances, if the plt. cannot trace a specific grievance to the person whom he is suing, as in Wood v. Sutcliffe, he cannot be relieved. Lord Cranworth, in Wood v. Sutcliffe, seems to have thought this: "You have not shown V.C. W.] ATTorney-General v. COMPANY OF PROPRIETORS OF THE BRADFORD CANAL. [V.C. W. any special grievance; you cannot satisfy me that, if I grant the injunction to-day, you will be one whit the better off to-morrow; and the evil which this gentleman is doing, as compared with others, is so trifling, that I cannot see my way to grant an injunction." But he thought the present case fell far short of anything of that kind. The defts. say that, if the canal is a nuisance, the beck is a greater nuisance, and that by stopping the canal a worse nuisance still will be created, because the whole of this filth will then be thrown into the beck. That may or may not be the case; if it is, it may afford a ground for prosecuting those who do the act complained of. He was by no means satisfied that the nuisance in the beck was so great as in the canal, for the course of the beck is cer tainly more rapid. The witness Beardmore says there are rapids in the stream; though he admits, on the other hand, that there are holes and pools in the beck, where a nuisance accumulates. It may be said that the persons who are annoyed by this nuisance in the canal will not be annoyed by the eddies and pools in the stream. He could not say how that would be, but it was quite enough to say that the persons who are represented by the Attorney-General are annoyed, and as they have made out the annoyance, he could not stop to inquire if any other persons may be annoyed by these eddies and pools. Nor did he think it ought to interfere with his decision if it were shown that there would be some annoyance felt from the fact of a larger quantity of this offensive matter being sent down the beck. That is an argument which might be presented in every case where there are several evils assailing those who complain. It would be impossible for the court to wait till bills were filed in those cases, and be governed to some extent by the decisions of those other cases. During the whole of the argument it had appeared to him that there was only one point that required much consideration, and that was the question of delay. It was said that the public have submitted to this evil for about ten years, and during that time they have allowed the company to go on drawing the water. If they had interfered earlier, the company might have limited their capital; they might have seen what difficulties they would have to encounter. It was said that barges and boats have been built, and stock and capital procured upon the faith of no interference taking place. It might have been added that persons have bought shares in the undertaking upon the faith that having been allowed to go on for ten years doing this they would never be interfered with. Now he did not doubt that there may be cases, such as Lord Eldon put in the case of the Attorney-General v. Johnson, in which laches might be imputed to the public through the medium of the Attorney-General, cases of large expenditure incurred in buildings which are seen by the public, and are allowed to go on without the slightest complaint on the part of anyone. Of course such cases as those might afford very good ground for saying that the public, like other people, should not have allowed that expenditure to be incurred, and afterwards to have come forward and complain of the invasion of rights which they might have asserted earlier. But the case here is of a totally different description. It has been described in the defts.' evidence as a gradual and growing evil. The company are not sought to be restrained from using their canal. The Legislature and the parties both desire that the canal should be kept open, but it is not desired that any nuisance should be created to other persons by dirty water being used for that purpose. His decision in the Kingston case, 11 Jur. N. S. 596, had been pressed upon him. It is said, "A person is complained of if he comes too soon, and if he delays coming he is said to be guilty of laches." Now that in cases of this kind persons are obliged to wait for a considerable time before it can be ascertained that a case has arisen for them to put themselves in motion and come to the court, is an argument which certainly applies more reasonably to the general public whose interests are to be protected, than to a single individual who may file a bill in this court as soon as he is aggrieved. The public wait, no doubt, for a certain time to see whether the evil will diminish. In this instance they waited to see whether it might not be diminished by a certain state of the weather, when the flush of the stream came in, and then there came these two hot summers, when the evil became intolerable, and led to the litigation. Now, is it an answer to that to say, that money has been spent upon the faith of its going on? He could not concur that such an answer could be given to a case of that description, or that a defence founded on their faith in being allowed to continue the nuisance can be supported. The only argument which remains is that which was suggested by the company that the suit ought not to have been brought against them, but against their lessees. It appears that the lease will expire in the month of April, and that the lessees having been indicted, the company have indemnified their lessees in the indictment, and are about to indemnify them in the appeal. The company take the whole case upon themselves. [The V. C. here again referred to the passages in the company's answer before stated.] That is wholly independent of what has been done by their lessees. They do not threaten to continue the nuisance, but they say that very probably they will continue it. The only point is this: the company may say, if the decision of the Court of Q. B. should be affirmed, it having been decided against the lessees only, this court must wait until another indictment is brought against themselves. It certainly is true that the indictment was preferred against the company, as well as against the lessees, but in his view of the case it could not possibly have been sustained against the company; the principle of the decision is, that the lessees having the whole thing under their control were answerable for drawing that foul water into the canal. How could the company be answerable for that, not having done it? The estate is out of the company during the lease; they have no authority, they have parted with it to their lessees, and the lessees are the people who are properly indicted. But he thought that as in their answer the company say they insist upon the right, that is a strong reason to induce the court to say that they shall be liable to the injunction. Then the only question is with regard to the time. He did not agree with the Attorney-General as to the length of time to be given. In a case of this magnitude he should not be justified in giving the time with a view solely to the appeal; but he did feel this, that what was to be done must require a considerable time to do, and that, therefore, a considerable time should be allowed. And then the question of delay has its weight; undoubtedly those who have been delayed, have not excluded themselves from the remedy. They have been delayed several years in taking the steps they now have successfully taken. Still, upon the ground of the consideration which the court always has, in cases where a good deal of time must necessarily elapse to enable the parties to comply with an injunction without being put to grievance, annoyance, and expense, he thought the right course to take was this, to grant a perpetual injunction in the terms of the first paragraph of the prayer of the information, from diverting into the canal, or collecting, or keeping, or continuing therein, any filth or polluted matter or water so as Monday, July 30, 1866. PEASE V. COATES. A purchaser covenanted not to erect any building which Held, that he had not thereby broken the covenant. This was a motion for an injunction to restrain the deft. from selling beer at a house of which he was the owner, and from using the house and premises, or permitting the same to be used, for the sale of beer, wine, malt liquors, or spirits. The plts. had purchased an estate at Saltburn-by-the-Sea, in Yorkshire, for the purpose of selling part of it in building lots. By an indenture dated the 29th Dec. 1865, the plts. granted part of their estate, and therein described as lot 51, to one John Wallis in fee, subject to the covenants contained in a deed dated the 1st July 1862. The deed of covenant of the 1st July 1862 had been executed by all the purchasers of the plts.' estate, and amongst others, by John Wallis. By this deed each of the parties to it of the first part covenanted with the plts., their heirs and assigns, as follows: [V.C. W. for injunction, turned by consent into a motion for decree, and the question was whether such sale of beer was a breach of the covenant entered into with the vendors. G. M. Giffard, Q.C. and E. Fry, for the plts., contended that there had been a breach of the covenant by the deft., and cited Wilson v. Hart, 12 L. T. Rep. N. S. 798; 14 L. T. Rolt, Q. C. and Cecil Russell, for the deft., contended that, as it was a covenant in restraint of trade, it must be construed strictly, and that the term public-house could not be applied to any other house than a house of public entertainment. If it were held that the deft.'s house was a public-house, then Fortnum and Mason's, and all shops which had licences to sell foreign wines, &c. were equally publichouses. They cited Jones v. Thorne, 1 B. & C. 715; Simons v. Farren, 1 Bing. N. C. 126; The VICE-CHANCELLOR remarked that by common law every keeper of a public-house was obliged to receive strangers. Giffard, Q. C. in reply. The VICE-CHANCELLOR-The present question is, whether, where a person has taken out a licence to sell beer not to be drunk on the premises, he has broken a covenant not to use the house as a publichouse for the sale of beer. The word "publichouse" is of quite modern introduction. In the earlier editions of the works relating to the subject we find alehouse is the word used; in one edition the word public-house is in the margin. Nor can I derive much assistance from the Acts of Parliament beyond this, that by the statute 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 64, persons were enabled to take out excise licences without applying to magistrates; and the Legislature thought it necessary by sect. 31 to provide that covenants not to use a house as a That he or she the purchaser, his or her heirs, appointees, any time or times hereafter use, exercise, or carry on, or per-public-house should extend to persons licensed or assigns, or his, her, or their tenants, shall not nor will at mit or suffer to be used, exercised, or carried on in or upon the lot or lots purchased by him or her aforesaid, or any part thereof, or the building or buildings to be erected thereon, any of the trades or businesses of a tanner, carrier, fellmonger, soapboiler, candle manufacturer, tallow melter, nightman, tripeman, blacksmith, or farrier, or any manufacturing trade, business, or employment whatsoever, which is or may be deemed a public or private nuisance; and no building or buildings which shall be erected on any of the lots shall be used as a public-house for the sale of beer, wine, malt liquors or spirits, without the consent in writing of the said vendors, their heirs or assigns, for that purpose had or obtained. John Wallis erected a house on the lot so sold to him, and afterwards sold the same to the deft. The deft., without the consent of the plts., obtained a licence to sell beer by retail, "not to be drunk on the premises." The licence was granted under the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 61, which enacted (sect. 21) that the powers and provisions contained in the previous Acts of the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 64, and 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 85, should apply to persons licensed under the Act. Sect. 31 of the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4 is as follows: Provided always, and be it enacted, that any and every covenant or clause of restriction contained in any lease or contract between any landlord and tenant, whereby the trade or business of a victualler or publican is prohibited from being carried on in any house, building, or place mentioned or comprised in such lease or contract, or whereby any such house, building, or place is prohibited from being used as a public-house or alehouse, shall apply and extend, and shall be construed to apply and extend, to every person who shall be licensed to sell beer, ale, porter, or perry, under the provisions of this Act, and to any and every house specified and mentioned in the licence granted to such person. The cause now came on to be heard on motion under that Act if between landlord and tenant, and so seem to have thought that such a covenant as this is would not have extended to licences, even under that Act, without the express saving clause; and under that Act the licences were for selling beer to be consumed on the premises. Again, if I were to hold this to be a public-house, I should seem to be destroying the meaning of the word public, for under the doctrine of Marks v. Benjamin (ubi sup.), it would have to be extended to grocers' shops and places where a limited licence of this kind is taken out. Looking at the fact that anybody may take out the licence, that the conveyance is dated subsequently to the Act of Parliament, and to the whole scope of the covenant, which is to prevent trades being carried on which would be a nuisance and to prevent the house being made the resort of tipplers-which alone might be a nuisance-I see the more strongly that the deft. has not broken the covenant. As the question arises on a point of law, the bill must be dismissed with costs. Solicitors: R. T. Jarvis; Williamson and Hill. |