IRELAND.] THE EARL OF ANTRIM; no Resp. net was situated more than three miles from the mouth of said river Glenarm, as defined by the commissioners, and from the point fixed by them from which the distances for the purposes of the Salmon Fishery Acts were to be measured; but the commissioners held that the definitions and boundaries marked out by them, and the points from which distances were to be measured, as shown on the map referred to in their definition used by the app., and duly published as required by the statutes, was conclusive evidence upon said inquiry under the 9th section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 108, and the 33rd section of 26 & 27 Vict. c. 114, as to the said Carnlough net being within three miles of the mouth of said Glenarm river, and they refused to receive any evidence of the distance by measurement dehors said definition and map, or to show that the principle of measurement they had adopted was wrong; and they ordered both said nets to be abated and removed. The app. being aggrieved by the said decision applied to the commissioners within the time required by and in accordance with the provisions of the Salmon Fishery (Ireland) Act 1863, to settle a special case by way of appeal for the Court of Q. B.; and the commissioners, in compliance with said application, submit the above facts, with the grounds of their decision, for the consideration of said court, the question being whether, upon the above facts, the decision of the commissioners was correct. If so, it is to stand; but if not, such order is to be made as the court shall think right. SIR EDWARD MACNAGHTEN; no Resp. [IRELAND. said court, the question being-whether, upon the above facts, the decision of the commissioners was correct? If so, it is to stand; but if not, such order is to be made as the court shall think right. The special case in Sir Edward MacNaghten's appeal was as follows:-At a meeting of the said commissioners holden at Ballymoney, in said county, the 30th Aug. 1864, the app., being the party interested in the using said weir or fixed net, having been duly summoned to appear before the commissioners "that there might then and there be an inquiry touching the legality or illegalily of said weir or fixed net, and that a decision might be made by the commissioners with respect to its abatement or removal," appeared personally and with counsel and solicitor, and no person appeared to oppose said case. And the app. insisted on the right to maintain and use said weir or fixed net under the 18th section of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 106, by reason of its being erected by him within the limits and bounds of a several fishery to which the app. claimed to be entitled along the estuary in which said nets were erected. In these cases the title and question being the same the cases were by consent heard together, and therefore a joint case for appeal is stated. It was proved, and the commissioners decided, that Sir E. MacNaghten was entitled to a several fishery in the river Bushi, and had the exclusive right of catching salmon in the whole of said river, including all tributary rivers and lakes upon its course; and that the said nets, which were bag nets, were situated within the estuary of the river Bush, as the same was duly fixed, marked out, and defined by the said commissioners pursuant to the statutes in that behalf, and also within three miles of the mouth of the said river, as so defined and marked out; and it was contended that upon that state of facts they were legal under the proviso at the end of the 3rd section of the 26 & 27 Vict. c. 114 (notwithstanding their being within the estuary as aforesaid, and therefore illegal within the enactment in the first part of the 3rd section); but the commissioners held and decided otherwise, and ordered that the nets should be abated and removed. The app., feeling aggrieved by the, said decision, has applied to the commissioners within the time required by and in accordance with the provisions of the Salmon Fishery (Ireland) Act 1863, to settle a special case by way of appeal for the Court of Q. B.; and the commissioners, in compliance with said application, submit the above facts with the grounds of their decision for the consideration of Brewster, Q. C. and Harrison, Q. C. for the apps.The commissioners had no right to state anything in their special case about the Altmore River; neither it nor the ordnance map was referred to below. With respect to the Carnlough net, the commissioners were wrong in holding their map conclusive as to the net being within three miles of the mouth of the river. At all events Lord Antrim must be taken as having the sole right of fishing in the river and its tributaries. The case shows that he has that sole right in as much of the river as salmon can get at, and it would be unreasonable to hold that he can be affected by the proprietorship of streams which are above an obstacle that salmon cannot get over. The word "tributary" in the third section must mean a tributary where salmon can go and breed. Supposing a gentleman had the sole right ef fishing in the river up to the Powerscourt Waterfall, could that right be affected because he was not the owner of some of the little mountain streams which fall into the main river above the fall? The proprietors above such an insuperable obstable could not be injured by any nets below. As to the Glenarm net, there is no reason for abating a net in the estuary, when outside of the estuary, and even within the three mile limit, if we are right in our contention on the Carnlough net, we could, as sole proprietors of the right of fishing, put as many nets as we like. Mills for the Attorney-General.-As to the Carnlough net, the court must decide upon the plain words of the Act, which exempt from illegality, only in the case of a river "in the whole of which, including all its tributary rivers and lakes upon its course, the proprietor of such bag-net has the exclusive right of catching salmon." The case shows that that state of facts does not exist here. The obstacle spoken of in the case may be removed. As to the Glenarm net, it is expressly found to be within the estuary, and the exception at the end of the third section does not apply to nets so placed. O'BRIEN, J.-In this case of Lord Antrim's there were two bag-nets, one the Glenarm bag-net, and the other the Carnlough bag-net. They were both declared illegal, but on different grounds. The Glenarm bag-net is found to be within the estuary. The Carnlough bag-net is found to be within three miles of the mouth of the river. As to the Carnlough bag-net, it is contended by Lord Antrim that as he is the owner within the third section, as he has the exclusive right of catching salmon in the whole of that river, therefore his net was saved by the exception in that section. Now, it is clear that he is the owner of the entire of the soil of the river, and has the exclusive right of fishing up to the "Salmon Leap," where there is a fall of fifteen feet. Beyond that, there is a junction of two streams, and the soil on one side of the river in each belongs to other proprietors, and of course if he cannot establish his right to the benefit of these sections by reason of having the sole right of fishing up to the “Salmon Leap," his case fails. Now there would be a good deal of difficulty in getting over the objection relied upon by Mr. Mills. But having regard to the purpose for which this legislation was made, we cannot give a technical construction to the Act. Cases were put yesterday of little driblets of streams falling into the upper part of a river. There was a case put by Mr. Harrison, of Powerscourt Waterfall, where a stream above the fall is a tributary but it would be absurd to say that a person having the exclusive right of fishing below the fall would be affected by not having that right above it. Having regard to the rights of the parties, and that it was intended for the benefit and protection of the persons above that a bag-net should not be placed within three statute miles of the mouth, we do not think that parties above this fall can be injured in this instance. The case finds in express terms that no salmon can now pass up beyond that fall called the "Salmon Leap." It is true that on one occasion one salmon was seen above it during the time that some alterations were made in the passage, but afterwards the passage for salmon was broken up, and they now cannot pass. It has been suggested that at some time hereafter, by some act of Lord Antrim, which is not very likely, as it is against his own interest, or by some convulsion of nature, a gap might be made for the salmon. We are not to speculate on that, but to decide on the present state of affairs; and it being found by the case that no salmon can pass up, we think that for the purposes of this section we may hold Lord Antrim as having the exclusive right of catching salmon in the river, and such parts of the tributaries as the salmon can get at. There was a reference in the case, not very regular, perhaps, to another river which was not referred to on the hearing below. It is enough for us to say that the case must be considered on the evidence adduced before the com missioners, and we should not, in justice to the parties decide on a matter which was not before the commissioners. That decides as to both these weirs upon this point. As to the Carnlough weir, there is no other objection, except whether it is within three miles of the mouth of the river. The question on this was the same as that which we have just decided in Hodder's case. It is not necessary for us to decide that point as to either weir. If it was, we should follow the decision in Hodder's case. Therefore, so far as Carnlough bagnet goes, the order below must be reversed. With respect, however, to the Glenarm bag-net the case is different. That is expressly found to be within the estuary. The argument as to this did not occupy much time, and the grounds put by Mr. Mills were not answered. It is admitted that the 17th section of the last Act gave the commissioners power of defining conclusively what was the estuary and the mouth of the river. It gave them that power. That being so, I believe there is no controversy on that part of the case. We have to consider whether there is anything in the case respecting this bag-net to take it out of the third section. It is said that it is declared to be illegal. as being within three statute miles of the mouth of the river, and therefore that Lord Antrim is entitled to be within the benefit of the third section; but it is declared illegal also by reason of its being within the estuary of the river; and the benefit of the proviso is expressly confined to cases where the only reason for the net being illegal is its being within three miles. It says that "after the passing of this Act no bag-net shall be placed or allowed to continue in any river or the estuary of any river, as such river or estuary has been defined by the Commissioners of Fisheries, or shall be defined by the commissioners under this Act, or within a distance of less than three statute miles from the mouth of any river as defined as aforesaid; " and then it provides "that no bag-net now legally existing shall be liable to be abated or removed, or be deemed illegal under this Act, by reason of its being within three miles of the mouth of a river, in the whole of which, including all tributary lakes and rivers upon its course, the proprietor of such bag-net has the exclusive right of catching salmon." That leaves untouched the [IRELAND. illegality by reason of being with the estuary. Therefore I think the decision of the commissioners was right on that subject. As to Sir E. M'Naghten's weirs we were told that both the nets were within the estuary, and therefore the observations I have made as to the Glenarm bag-net in Lord Antrim's case apply, and the decision must be affirmed. In Lord Antrim's case, therefore, our ruling is to affirm the decision of the commissioners, so far as it declares the Glenarm bag-net illegal as being within the estuary, and to reverse it as to the other ground and as to M-Naghten's case we affirm the decision. FITZGERALD, J.-I concur with the judgment of the court. The first question I should consider as one of considerable doubt; but the better opinion seems to be the one that has been arrived at. I may state that if it had not been for the finding of the commissioners, in point of fact, I should doubt the existence of this insuperable obstacle. The name the place had in the country is "the Salmon Leap," which evidently points to the salmon getting over it. But the commissioners have found that it is a difficulty over which the salmon do not and cannot get. There is a finding that Lord Antrim has in these bays and in this river the sole and exclusive right of fishing for salmon. I think, though not without doubt, that we should not in a case of this kind involving private rights, adhere too strictly to the words of the Act. On the strict words of the Act the commissioners were right. But having regard to the provisions of this Act, and the language of the 5 & 6 Vict., the words may mean "having an exclusive right of fishing on the river so far as it is frequented by salmon." On the other point I entertain no doubt. This bag-net is a very destructive engine, and all the more so the closer it is to the mouth of the river, and I can understand how, for public purposes, the party should be prevented from destroying the fish by catching them in the mouth of the river, or up from it or near it, and we must hold that catching them in the estuary, even though the party has there an exclusive right of fishing, is in contravention of the Act of Parliament. With respect to what has been said as to the commissioners mentioning in their case a stream which was not mentioned below, I must say that I think they were right, as a description of the place, to refer to the Altmore stream. It is their duty to give a description of the place, where the weirs situated, and in that view they were right. COURT OF EXCHEQUER. (IRELAND.) Reported by W. A. SARGENT, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. (Before the FULL COURT.) KING v. POE. (a) are Demurrer-Forcible removal from church-Right of (a) From the Irish Jurist, by permission. brought an action then against deft. for assault and false imprisonment, and deft. pleaded the above facts: Held, on demurrer to the defences, that they must be set aside as not justifying the assault or even the false imprisonment, as deft. had not brought the offence charged against plt. within the provisions of the Act. Quære, if a magistrate has a right to arrest a person guilty of a misdemeanor before his eyes, where there has not been any breach of the peace actual or apprehended. This was a demurrer to defences. The first count of the summons and plaint was as follows:-Henry Harrington Poe, the deft., is summoned to answer the complaint of William King, the plt., who complains that deft. on the 8th Jan. 1865 assaulted and beat plt. Second count.-And also that deft. on the 8th Jan. 1865 assaulted plt. and gave him into the custody of a policeman, and caused him to be imprisoned in a police-office. Third count. And also that deft., on the 8th Jan. 1865, maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, assaulted plt. and caused him to be imprisoned. Second defence to third count.-And for a further defence to the third count deft. says that he did the acts therein mentioned without malice, and with reasonable and probable cause. Third defence to first, second, and third counts.And for a further defence to said first, second, and third counts (save as to so much of the third count as charges the deft. with malice and want of probable cause), and which defence deft. prays may be taken as pleaded separately to each of said counts, deft. says that before and at the time of the committing of the grievances in said first, second, and third counts mentioned, the church of Nenagh was a parochial church of the parish of Nenagh, situated In the county of Tipperary, and one John Hamilton Dundas and one Jas. Jocelyn Poe were the churchwardens of said parish, and had duly allocated certain seats in said church to Stawell L. Heard, John J. C. Canning, Robert W. Exshaw, William Creed, Edward Fishbourne, Arthur F. Smith, and Alfred C. English, being parishioners of said parish, and entitled to be seated in said church; and that plt. before the time of the committing of said trespass (although the said James Jocelyn Poe, being one of such churchwardens as aforesaid, offered to procure for plt. a proper and convenient seat in said church), wilfully of purpose and contemptuously in said church on the Sabbath-day, and during the time that Divine service was being celebrated in said church, disturbed and disquieted same and the congregation therein by wilfully getting into said seats so allotted to the said Stawell L. Heard, John J. C. Canning, Robert W. Exshaw, William Creed, Edward Fishbourne, Arthur F. Smith, and Alfred C. English, and forcibly keeping possession thereof, and by making divers loud noises, and by otherwise conducting himself in an indecent, irreverent, and unbecoming manner; whereupon said James Jocelyn Poe, one of the churchwardens as aforesaid for the preserving of due decorum, reverence, and decency in said church, and for the removing of such interruption of Divine service and disturbance of the congregation, requested plt. to leave said seat and to cease said disturbance and disquieting of Divine service and of the congregation, and to cease such indecent and irreverent conduct as aforesaid, which plt. wholly refused to do, and continued in said seats disturbing and disquieting Divine service and the congregation in said church, whereupon deft. then and there, being a justice of the peace for the said county of Tipperary, and having himself seen and had view of all plt.'s said acts and conduct, and of the offence so [IRELAND. committed by him as aforesaid, and having also been requested by said James Jocelyn Poe to act as a justice of the peace in respect of said acts, and conduct, and offence of plt., did then and there request of plt. to cease such indecent and unbecoming conduct, and to cease his interruption, disturbance, and disquieting of Divine service and of said congregation, and from committing such offences as aforesaid, which plt. wholly refused to do, whereupon deft., being such justice of the peace, and having said view and personal cognisance of such offences, then and there took plt. into custody, and detained and imprisoned him for a time only reasonably sufficient to examine into such offence as aforesaid, and to receive the informations of the Rev. Jonathan Christopher Head, who was one of the officiating clergymen, and of the said James Jocelyn Poe, touching said offence; and before such a reasonable time had elapsed the said Jona than Christopher Head, who was one of the officiating clergymen in said church during the time aforesaid, and the said James Jocelyn Poe, came before deft., then and there being such justice of the peace as aforesaid, and then and there duly made oath that plt. had on the Sabbath-day, in the church of Nenagh, and during the time that Divine service was being celebrated there, maliciously and contemptuously disquieted and disturbed same and the congregation therein assembled, and interrupted the celebration of Divine service; whereupon deft. called upon plt. to be bound in sureties as required by the statute in such case made and provided; and because plt. could not procure such sureties, but made default in that behalf, deft. duly made his warrant and committed plt. to gaol until plt. should find two sureties pursuant to the form of the statute in that case made and provided, which are the trespasses in the first, second, and third counts complained of and in the introductory part of this plea mentioned. Fifth defence to first and second counts. And for a further defence to said first and second counts, and which defence deft. prays may be taken as pleaded separately to each of said counts, deft. says that the trespasses therein complained of were committed prior to and subsequent to a certain committal hereinafter mentioned; and that before and at the time of the committing of the grievances in said first and second counts mentioned the church of Nenagh was a parochial church, &c. [same as last plea]. And deft. says, as to so much of said trespasses as were occasioned by said committal, that in making said committal deft. acted without jurisdiction, and that said committal has not been quashed. Plt. demurred to the above pleas, and his grounds of demurrer were as follows:-As to second defence to third count: 1. That no ground of defence is disclosed, for deft., while admitting the assault and imprisonment, does not justify either, or assign any legal excuse for committing the trespasses complained of. 2. That deft. does not take issue upon any material or traversable fact upon which an issue could be knit, but while confessing the trespasses complained of, only seeks to put in issue the motives by which he was influenced. 3. That the defence pleaded is wholly irrelevant as regards the real cause of action stated in the third count of the summons and plaint. As to the third defence to the first, second, and third counts: 1. That the third defence, which is pleaded to the first, second, and third counts of the summons and plaint (save as to so much of the third count as charges deft. with malice and want of probable cause) professes to be an answer to the whole of the trespasses complained of, and to justify each and every of them, but does not disclose any legal excuse or justification for the commission of the trespasses complained of. 2. That the third defence does not show any offence committed by the plt. for which he could be legally arrested without a warrant; and it is not averred in said defence that plt. had committed a breach of the peace, or that there was any reasonable ground for apprehending that any breach of the peace would be committed. 3. That it is not shown that any person having a legal right to a seat in said church was prevented by plt. from occupying the same, or that the churchwardens of said church or any other person having lawful authority required deft. to take plt. into custody, or to detain or imprison him; and even if such matters were shown, still the alleged conduct of plt. in the church would not have justified deft. in arresting him, or committing the several trespasses complained of. 4. That deft. had no authority or right to detain or imprison plt. until he should ascertain whether informations would be sworn against him. 5. That the matters stated in the defence do not amount to an offence within the statute referred to in the defence, or to any offence for which plt. could be legally imprisoned or committed as the defence admits he was. 6. That deft. had not any authority or jurisdiction under the circumstances in defence set forth to call upon plt. to be bound in sureties, or to commit plt. to gaol until he should find two sureties, especially without a previous summons. 7. That the warrant of committal relied on in the defence is irrelevant and void on the face of it. As to the fifth defence to the first and second counts: 1. That the fifth defence which is pleaded to the first and second counts of the summons and plaint, so far as it professes to be an answer to the trespasses complained of prior to the committal to the gaol as in defence mentioned, professes to be an answer to the whole of the trespasses complained of, and to justify the commission of each and every of them, but does not disclose any legal ground of excuse or justification for the commission of the trespasses complained of. 2. That it is not averred in said defence that plt. had, while in the church at Nenagh, committed any crime for which he should be arrested without a warrant, or that he had committed a breach of the peace, or that there was any reasonable ground for apprehending that a breach of the peace would be committed. 3. That it is not averred in said defence that any person having a legal right to a seat in said church was prevented by plt. from occupying the same, or that the churchwardens of said church, or any other person having lawful authority, required deft. to take plt. into custody, or to detain or imprison him; and even if such matter had been averred, the alleged acts of plt. in the church would not have warranted deft. in committing the several trespasses complained of. 4. That deft. had no authority or right to detain or imprison plt. until he should ascertain whether informations would be sworn against him. 5. That the matters stated in the plea do not amount to an offence within the statute therein referred to, or to any other offence for which plt. could be legally imprisoned or committed, as it is admitted he was. 6. That the warrant relied on in the defence is void and invalid on the face of it. 7. That the committal relied on in the fifth defence was not a conviction or order within the provisions of 12 Vict. c. 16; and there was no necessity to quash it before bringing the action. 8. That the committal was not an act done under any warrant or process to compel appearance, nor was any summons served on plt. previous to such warrant, personally or otherwise. As [IRELAND. Brandt v. Craddock, 27 L. J., N. S., 314, Ex.; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32; Mainwaring v. Giles, 5 B. & AL 356; Collet v. Bailiffs of Shrewsbury, 2 Leon. 34. to authority to arrest without summons or charge made: As As Atkinson v. Carty, 1 Jebb & Sym. 369; Windham v. Clere, Cro. Eliz. 130, 1 Lev. 187; Caudle v. Seymour, 1 Q B 889; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 87, sects. 58, 83. to breach of peace actual or apprehended : Cooke v. Leonard, 4 B. & C. 351; Timothy v. Simpson, 1 Cr. M. & R. 757; Williams v. Jones, Cas. temp. Hardwicke, 284. to warrant of committal: 12 Vict. c. 16; Lalor v. Bland, 8 Ir. C. L. R. 115; M Donald v. Bulwer, 13 Ir. C. L. R. 549. No name was inserted in the warrant of committal, Armstrong v. Turquand, 9 Ir. C. L. R. 32; Ryan, contra, in support of the pleas.-The deft is sued in the plaint as a justice of the peace for in the margin there is the addition of "Justice or the Peace" to the name of deft., though I admit he is not sued as such in the body of the plaint. Now, if those words are material in the plaint, deft. should plead to them, as he has done; if they are not, they are then a trap laid by plt., a thing which he should not be allowed to do. As to the main point in the case: Walshe, Q. C. in reply.-Unless the offence charged against plt. in the defences comes under the provisions of the Toleration Act (6 Geo. 1, c. 5), s. 14, there is no misdemeanor here. Now, there are two things mentioned in the Act, viz., that the person must come in contemptuously and disturb the congregation; the words are not in the alternative. These two circumstances did not occur in the present case; therefore, if the offence did not come within the Act referred to, the whole defence falls to the ground. But I say further, that there is no authority for a magistrate's right to arrest for a misdemeanor on view: (Burn's Justice of the Peace," Arrest.") No one can be arrested for a misLover (with him J. E. Walshe, Q. C.), for plt., demeanor without a warrant, though he may be opened the demurrer : for treason or felony: (Martin Leeser's case, Cro. IRELAND.] JOHN WHITLEY (app.) v. M'CLEANE (resp.) James, 497.) All the authorities cited on the other Burton v. Henson, 10 M. & W. 105; By the provisions of the statute there must be two only to a very strong case of suspicion. The plea does not justify the battery. The warrant is no justification, for there is a blank for the name of the offending party. PIGOT, C. B.-We are all of opinion that the demurrer must be allowed. If plt. wished to bring | his action against deft. as a justice of the peace, he should have alleged that deft. was a justice of the peace, and it is not sufficient that these words occur in the margin. But plt. did not proceed against deft. as a justice of the peace, and then deft. cannot rely on the fact of his being a justice of the peace as a material circumstance. With respect to the main point in the case, we are unanimous that the demurrer must be allowed, because the deft. has not brought the offence charged within the Act of Parliament. Deft. alleges the act of misconduct to have been as follows. [Here his Lordship referred to the pleas as given above.] Whereas the Act provides: "That if any person or persons do or shall willingly and of purpose maliciously or contemptuously come into any cathedral or parish church, chapel, or other congregation permitted by this Act, and disquiet or disturb the same, or misuse any preacher or teacher, such person or persons, upon proof thereof, before any justice of the peace, by two or more sufficient witnesses, shall find two sureties to be bound by recognisances in the penal sum of 50l. to appear at the next general or quarter sessions to be held for the county wherein such offence shall be committed, and in default of such sureties, shall be committed to prison, there to remain till the next general or quarter sessions, and upon conviction of the said offence at the said general or quarter sessions, shall suffer the pain and penalty of 201." Now, there is no allegation that plt., willingly and of purpose, came into the church, &c. Nor did deft. proceed as the Act provided. The Act was intended to provide a remedy against wilful misconduct. No authority was cited to show that the offence of interrupting Divine service is a misdemeanor at common law. Even if it were a misdemeanor at common law, there was no authority cited to show that a magistrate has a right to arrest a person, guilty before his eyes of a misdemeanor, where there is no breach of the peace, and where it is not necessary to arrest the offender to prevent the renewal of the act. Whether it would be lawful to remove a person guilty of such misconduct as plt. is charged with, it is not necessary for us to decide; but I, for one, cannot allow such misconduct as is charged against plt. to pass without declaring my opinion-that such an offender might be removed and prevented from desecrating the house of God. But that was not what was done in this case; but a jurisdiction was assumed to make plt. amenable under the Act, and on the Act the plea was founded, and as the offence does not come within that provided against by the Act, this defence cannot be sustained. It is not necessary to say more than this :-The offence complained of was one of assault and battery and false imprisonment; and the first part of the summons and plaint remains unjustified, even if the second [IRELAND. was justified, and as the defence is bad in part, it is REGISTRY APPEAL COURT. Reported by WILLIAM WOODLOCK, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1865. (Before O'BRIEN, HAYES, and O'HAGAN, JJ., and FITZGERALD, B.) JOHN WHITLEY (app.) M'CLEANE (resp.)(a) Franchise-Rated occupier-Destruction of premises by fire. A party rated as occupier of "houses and yard” does not lose his right to appear on the list of voters by reason of the houses being destroyed by fire, he still continuing to hold the site on which they stood. Appeal from a decision of the chairman of the county of Armagh. The case stated was as follows: In this case the app.'s name appeared on the list, No. 7, of persons entitled to vote at the election of a member for the borough of Enniskillen. The premises out of which he claimed as a jointly rated Occupier with Thomas Richard Whitley and Joseph Boothe Whitley, were rated in the rate made on the 21st July 1863, at 351. sterling, and are therein described as "houses and yard No. 29, High-street." That he was duly registered as a voter at the October sessions in the year 1864, out of said premises as a jointly and rated occupier with Thomas Richard Whitley and Joseph Boothe Whitley for said premises, under said description of "houses and yard No. 29, High-street." That on the 2nd rate was struck, Aug. in the year 1864, a with said Thomas Richard Whitley and Joseph in which said John Whitley was jointly rated Boothe Whitley for the sum of 621. sterling. for premises therein described, “house, stores, offices, and yard, No. 29, High-street." That said John Whitley, on said 2nd Aug., was in possession (jointly, as aforesaid) of the same premises which he possessed at the period of making the rate of the 21st July 1863, neither more or less. That the rate of the 2nd Aug. 1864 was struck after the lists for the revision of October sessions in the year 1864 were published, and that revision did not proceed on the rate of the 2nd Aug. 1864. On the 8th Oct. 1864, almost the whole of the premises mentioned in said rate of the 2nd Aug. 1864 were burned to the ground, and John Whitley and his co-occupiers had to transfer portions which had been burned. John Whitley their business to other premises in place of those and his co-occupiers never parted the possession of of the premises mentioned in said rate of the 2nd the ruins, or of anything included within the ambit the ground that he was not rated on the last rate Aug. 1864. John Whitley was duly objected to on that of the 2nd Aug. 1864) at a sum of not less the borough, which had been occupied jointly by him for than 87. sterling in respect of premises lying within This question depends upon the question, whether, the twelve months next preceding the 20th July 1865. within the meaning of the Act 13 & 14 Vict. c. 69, tinued within the meaning of that Act as those s. 5, the premises, after they were so burned, conmentioned in the rating of the 2nd Aug. 1864. I held that they were not, and struck off the name. If I am right, the name remains off; if I am wrong, the name should be put on the list.-P. J. BLAKE, Chairman for the county of Fermanagh. (a) From the Irish Jurist, by permission. |