Opinion of the Court. The petitioners, who now come to this court for a prohibition, allege that they are cotton factors and commission merchants, residing and doing business in Savannah, and that they were the consignees of the cotton constituting the cargo of the said steamboat, except a few bales. They state that the said steamboat was engaged exclusively in inland navigation of the Savannah River, between the ports of Augusta and Savannah and intermediate ports and places on either side of the said river, and that she was not a sea-going vessel. They further state the various suits brought by them, respectively, namely, ten different suits, mostly in the city court of Savannah, for different sums, amounting in the aggregate to nearly sixteen thousand dollars; and that in all of said suits, except two attachments, personal service was made on the said Lawton, the owner of said steamboat. The petitioners further state the filing of the said libel, and that an appraisement of the steamboat and freight had been made, amounting to a total of $3496.75, for which sum the said Lawton had entered into the usual stipulation. They further state that afterwards, on the 9th of April, 1888, they objected to the said District Court taking further cognizance of the case, and moved to dismiss the libel on the grounds that the said court was without jurisdiction in the premises, and that the 4th section of the act of Congress, approved June 19, 1886, on which the said action. was based, is unconstitutional and void; but that the said court overruled the said motion and determined to proceed with the further cognizance of the cause. The petitioners further state, and rely upon the fact, that the greater part of the cotton was shipped by Georgia consignors, from divers points or places within the State of Georgia, to be transported to Savannah, Georgia, to consignees who were residents and citizens of Savannah, and was the subject of a commerce strictly internal. The act of Congress to which the petitioners refer as being the act on which the libel of Lawton was based, and which they contend is unconstitutional and void, is the 4th section of the act approved June 19, 1886, entitled, "An act to abolish certain fees for official services to American vessels, and to Opinion of the Court. amend the laws relating to shipping, commissioners, seamen and owners of vessels, and for other purposes." 24 Stat. 79. By the section referred to, section 4289 of the Revised Statutes was amended so as to read as follows: "Sec. 4289. The provisions of the seven preceding sections, and of section eighteen of an act entitled 'An act to remove certain burdens on the American merchant marine and encourage the American foreign carrying trade, and for other purposes, approved June 26, 1884, relating to the limitations of the liability of the owners of vessels, shall apply to all sea-going vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal-boats, barges and lighters.'" The purport and effect of this section is apparent from an inspection of the original limited liability act passed March 3, 1851. 9 Stat. 635, c. 43. After exempting ship owners from liability for loss or damage occasioned by fire on board of their ships, happening without any design or neglect of theirs; and for loss of precious metals or jewelry of which they or the masters of their vessels have not received written notice; and declaring that their liability shall in no case exceed the value of their interest in the ship and freight then pending, for any loss, damage or injury to any property caused by the master, crew or other persons, without their privity or knowledge; and making other provisions for carrying out the design of the act; a final clause is added in the words following, to wit: "This act shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal-boat, barge or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatever, used in rivers or inland navigation." The whole act was afterwards carried into the Revised Statutes and constitutes sections 4281 to 4289, inclusive, the section. respecting precious metals and jewelry having been somewhat enlarged by an amendment made in 1871. The final words of the act above quoted constitute section 4289 of the Revised Statutes, which, as before stated, was amended by the act of 1886 so as to make the limited liability act apply to all kinds of vessels, not only sea-going vessels, but those used on lakes or rivers, or in inland navigation, including canal-boats, barges and lighters. The 4th section of the act of 1886 also regulates Opinion of the Court. the application of the 18th section of an act approved June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57, which reduced the individual liability of a ship owner for all debts and liabilities of the ship to the proportion of his individual share in the vessel. This section requires no further notice. The only question in the case therefore is, whether the 4th section of the act of 1886, extending the limited liability act to vessels used on a river in inland navigation, like the steamboat in question, is, as contended, unconstitutional and void. It is unnecessary to inquire whether the section is valid as to all the kinds of vessels named in it; if it is valid as to the kind to which the steamboat Katie belongs it is sufficient for the purposes of this case. And this question we think can be solved by a reference to two or three propositions which have become the settled law of this country. It is unnecessary to invoke the power given to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, in order to find authority to pass the law in question. The act of Congress which limits the liability of ship owners was passed in amendment of the maritime law of the country, and the power to make such amendments is coextensive with that law. It is not confined to the boundaries or class of subjects which limit and characterize the power to regulate commerce; but, in maritime matters, it extends to all matters and places to which the maritime law extends. The subject has frequently been up for consideration by this court for many years past, and but one view has been expressed. It was gone over so fully, however, in the late case of Butler v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, that we cannot do better than to quote a single passage from the opinion of the court in that case. We there said: "The law of limited liability, as we have frequently had occasion to assert, was enacted by Congress as a part of the maritime law of this country, and therefore it is coextensive, in its operation, with the whole territorial domain of that law. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, 127; The Lottawana, 21 Wall. 558, 577; The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, 29, 31; Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Iill Manufacturing Co., Opinion of the Court. 109 U. S. 578, 593. In The Lottawana we said: 'It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution contemplated that the law should forever remain unalterable. Congress undoubtedly has authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be needed.' p. 577. Again, on page 575, speaking of the maritime jurisdiction referred to in the Constitution, and the system of law to be administered thereby, it was said: "The Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states.' In The Scotland this language was used: 'But it is enough to say, that the rule of limited responsibility is now our maritime rule. It is the rule by which, through the act of Congress, we have announced that we propose to administer justice in maritime cases.' p. 31. Again, in the same case, p. 29, we said: 'But, whilst the rule adopted by Congress is the same as the rule of the general maritime law, its efficacy as a rule depends upon the statute, and not upon any inherent force of the maritime law. As explained in The Lottawana the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country; and this particular rule of the maritime law had never been adopted in this country until it was enacted by statute. Therefore, whilst it is now a part of our maritime law, it is, nevertheless, statute law.' And in Providence & New York Steamship Co. v. Hill Man'f'g Co. it was said: 'The rule of limited liability prescribed by the act of 1851 is nothing more than the old maritime rule, administered in courts of admiralty in all countries except England, from time immemorial; and if this were not so, the subject matter itself is one that belongs to the department of maritime law.' p. 593. "These quotations are believed to express the general, if Opinion of the Court. not unanimous, views of the members of this court for nearly twenty years past; and they leave us in no doubt that, whilst the general maritime law, with slight modifications, is accepted as law in this country, it is subject to such amendments as Congress may see fit to adopt. One of the modifications of the maritime law, as received here, was a rejection of the law of limited liability. We have rectified that. Congress has restored that article to our maritime code. We cannot doubt its power to do this. As the Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to 'all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' and as this jurisdiction is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on the same subject must necessarily be in the national legislature, and not in the state legislatures. It is true, we have held that the boundaries and limits of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are matters of judicial cognizance, and cannot be affected or controlled by legislation, whether state or national. Chief Justice Taney, in The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522, 526, 527; The Lottawana, 21 Wall. 558, 575, 576. But within these boundaries and limits the law itself is that which has always been received as maritime law in this country, with such amendments and modifications as Congress may from time to time have adopted. "It being clear, then, that the law of limited liability of ship owners is part of our maritime code, the extent of its territorial operation (as before intimated) cannot be doubtful. It is necessarily co-extensive with that of the general admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that by the settled law of this country extends wherever public navigation extends — on the sea and the great inland lakes, and the navigable waters connecting therewith. Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 441; The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443; Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How. 296; Commercial Transportation Co. v. Fitzhugh, 1 Black, 574." pp. 555-557. It being established, therefore, that the law of limited liability is part of the maritime law of the United States, it only remains to determine whether that law may be applied to navigable rivers above tide water, such as the Savannah River, and to vessels engaged in commerce on such a river, like the |