Opinion of the Court. debts and legacies, which he charges upon the real estate. In the eleventh clause, he directs his executors to pay to his brother a certain part of the income "until the final division of my estate, which shall take place at the end of twenty years after my decease, and not sooner." And in the twenty-first clause he declares his wish that Wood shall collect the rents and have the general care and supervision of the affairs of the estate during the same period. These provisions, had the testator said nothing more upon the subject, might have been construed as assuming or implying that the trust estate was to terminate at the end of twenty years from the testator's death, without any act or conveyance on the part of the trustees. But the will contains other provisions concerning the powers and duties of the trustees, which are wholly inconsistent with such a conclusion. The sixteenth clause is as follows: "I will and direct that no part of my estate, neither the real nor the personal, shall be sold, mortgaged (except for building) or in any manner incumbered, until the end of twenty years from and after my decease, when it may be divided or sold for the purposes of making a division between my devisees as herein directed." The very object of this clause is to define when and for what purposes the trustees may mortgage or may sell the real estate. Before the end of twenty years, it is neither to be mortgaged (except for building, as allowed in the first clause) nor to be sold. At the end of the twenty years, all authority to mortgage it is to cease, but "it may be divided or sold for the purposes of making a division between my devisees as herein directed." This division or sale (like all sales or mortgages spoken of in this clause) is evidently one to be made by the trustees, under authority derived from the testator, and while the legal title remains in them; not a judicial division or sale for the purpose of partition, after the legal title has passed to the residuary devisees. Again; in the eighteenth clause, the testator directs that, in the event of any of the legatees or annuitants being alive at the end of twenty years after his death, there shall be a division of all his estate at that time, "anything herein contained Opinion of the Court. to the contrary notwithstanding;" and that "in such case my executors, in making division of the said estate, shall apportion each legacy or annuity on the estate assigned to my devisees, who are hereby charged with the payment of the same according to the apportionment of my said executors." This clause puts beyond doubt the intention of the testator, not only that the division of his estate, and the assignment and conveyance of the several shares to each devisee, shall be made by his executors, but that the question which share shall be charged with the payment of any legacy or annuity shall depend upon the act of the executors in making the division among the devisees. Although, at the expiration of twenty years from the testator's death, all the legacies and annuities to others than the residuary devisees had in fact been paid, yet the duty still remained in the executors and trustees to make a division, by sale if necessary. Under the circumstances of this case, it was impracticable to make the division, either by the partition of the lands themselves, or by selling them and distributing the proceeds, immediately upon the expiration of the twenty years; and until a division was made, in one form or the other, by the executors and trustees, the legal title must remain in them. The sale and conveyance by them, whether directly to the residuary devisees, or to third persons for the purpose of paying the proceeds to those devisees, was not in the exercise of a power over an estate vested in other persons, but was for the purpose of terminating an estate vested in the executors and trustees themselves, by conveying it to others. The twentieth clause, by which the daughter's share, in case of her marriage, is to be conveyed at the expiration of the twenty years by the trustees named in the will to trustees for the benefit of herself and her children, and the twenty-second clause, by which the share of the widow, in case of her marrying again, is to be held by the executors and trustees in trust for her, are also worthy of notice in this connection, although they might not, standing alone, affect the time of vesting of the legal title in the shares of the brother and the nephew. ford v. Snyder, 137 U. S. 521. Well Opinion of the Court. There can be no doubt that all the powers conferred, and all the trusts imposed, were annexed to the office of executors, and not to a distinct office of trustees. And, taking the whole will together, it is quite clear that the legal title of the executors and trustees did not absolutely terminate upon the expiration of twenty years from the death of the testator, because it was necessary, for the purpose of enabling them to execute the trusts and to carry out the provisions of the will, that the legal title should be and continue in them until they had, by sale or otherwise, settled the estate, and conveyed to the devisees severally their shares in the estate or its proceeds. The testator doubtless intended that after the expiration of the twenty years the estate should cease to be held and managed by his executors and trustees as a whole, and should be divided into four parts to be held in severalty by or for his residuary devisees. But he intended, and expressly provided, that the division should be made by his executors and trustees; and therefore their trust estate could not terminate until they had made the division and conveyed the shares. McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 377; Kirkland v. Cox, 94 Illinois, 400; Perry on Trusts, §§ 305, 315, 320. Whether, in case of unreasonable delay on their part to make the division, a court of equity might have compelled them to do so, is a question not presented by this record. The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Kirkland V. Cox, above cited, is much in point. In that case, the testator devised and bequeathed all his estate, real and personal, to trustees, to control and manage it, and to make such disposition of it as should in their judgment increase its value; to pay to his daughter such instalments as they should deem sufficient for her support until she reached the age of thirty-five years, and then to convey the estate to her in fee; authorizing them, however, if she should be then married to a man whom they thought unworthy, to continue to hold the title in trust during his life; and further providing that, if she died without issue, the whole estate, after paying certain legacies, should "be divided equally between" three charitable corporations. It was held that the powers conferred on the trustees implied. Opinion of the Court. a power to sell the lands and convert them into money or interest-bearing securities; and, therefore, that the trustees took and held the title in fee simple, notwithstanding the death of the daughter before reaching the age of thirty-five years, the court saying: "The power implied to sell is to sell the whole title and to this is essential the power to convey that title, requiring, as a condition precedent, a fee simple estate in the trustees. The property is devised to the trustees to sell and convey if they deem it advisable, or to hold and control until it is to be transferred as directed; and in the contingency that has arisen, it was intended that it should be the duty of the trustees to make the equal division of the property between the corporations designated and convey it accordingly — for the grant to these corporations is in severalty, and not as tenants in common, and their title must necessarily rest on the conveyance of the trustees." 94 Illinois, 415. The cases cited against this conclusion differ widely from the case at bar. The two most relied on were Minors v. Battison, 1 App. Cas. 428, in which the facts were very peculiar, and there was much diversity of opinion among the judges before whom it was successively brought; and Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303, in which the construction adopted was the only one consistent with the validity of the will under the statutes of New York. 2. From this view of the nature and duration of the estate of the trustees, it necessarily follows that by the terms of the fourth and fifth clauses of the will, devising and bequeathing to the testator's brother and nephew, respectively, "after the expiration of the trust estate vested in my executors and trustees," "one fourth part of all my estate, both real and personal," (after the payment of debts and legacies, which he charged upon the real estate,) no legal title in any specific part of the estate, and no right of possession, vested in either of them, until the trustees had divided the estate and conveyed to each of them one fourth of the estate or of the proceeds of its sale; but, on well settled principles, an equitable estate in fee in one fourth of the residue of the testator's whole property vested in the brother and in the nephew respectively from the death of Opinion of the Court. the testator. Cropley v. Cooper, 19 Wall. 167; McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 378, 380; Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & Fin. 583; Weston v. Weston, 125 Mass. 268; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 Illinois, 529; Scofield v. Olcott, 120 Illinois, 362. To the suggestion that the will violated the rule against perpetuities, which prohibits the tying up of property beyond a life or lives in being and twenty-one years afterwards, it is a sufficient answer that after twenty years from the death of the testator, and after the death of the widow and daughter, (if not before,) the title, legal and equitable, in the whole estate would be vested in persons capable of conveying it. Waldo v. Cummings, 45 Illinois, 421; Lunt v. Lunt, 108 Illinois, 307. 3. Nor is the estate of the residuary devisees affected by the nineteenth clause of the will, which is in these words: "It is my will that my trustees aforesaid shall pay the several gifts, legacies, annuities and charges herein to the persons named in this will, and that no creditors or assignees or purchasers shall be entitled to any part of the bounty or bounties intended to be given by me herein for the personal advantage of the persons named; and therefore it is my will that, if either of the devisees or legatees named in my will shall in any way or manner cease to be personally entitled to the legacy or devise made by me for his or her benefit, the share intended for such devisee or legatee shall go to his or her children, in the same manner as if such child or children had actually inherited the same, and, in the event of such person or persons having no children, then to my daughter and her heirs." The devise over in this clause cannot, indeed, by reason of the words "gifts, legacies, annuities and charges," and "bounty or bounties," in the preamble, be confined to the legacies and annuities given by the testator and charged on his real estate by clauses six to thirteen inclusive, and by clause eighteen. So to hold would be utterly to disregard the comprehensive and decisive words, "devisees or legatees," "legacy or devise," and "share intended for such devisee or legatee," by which the testator clearly manifests his intention that the devise over shall attach to the shares of his real estate devised |