Argument for Defendants in Error. By way of reply to the supplemental petition the defendants answered that they never in any manner acknowledged the notes sued on to be binding and subsisting obligations; that neither the notes nor the deed of trust gave plaintiffs any option as to the maturity of the notes; that if plaintiffs had any option whatever it related only to the property described in the deed of trust; and that no part of the interest on the notes was paid within ninety days after the same became due, whereupon the notes, both as to principal and interest, became due more than four years before the institution of this suit; consequently, it was insisted, all right of action on them was barred by limitations. A jury having been properly waived the case was heard by the court, which found that the notes sued on were barred by the statute of limitations of four years; that the new promise, dated February 3, 1888, applied only to the extent of $1000 from January 1, 1889, and no more; and to that extent was binding on defendants. Judgment was accordingly rendered for the plaintiff against the defendant for $1090, with interest from the date of the judgment, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. Mr. Henry Wise Garnett for plaintiff in error. Mr. Martin F. Morris for defendants in error. I. The findings of the court are conclusive in this case. Those findings are either general or special. On the part of the defendants, it is respectfully submitted that the findings are merely general findings of the issues in favor of the defendants, except to the extent of $1000; and general findings of a trial court are not and cannot be the subject of review here. The issues made by the parties were three: 1st. The general issue, which need not be regarded here. 2d. The plea of limitations. 3d. The question of a new promise. The finding of the court upon the second and third issues was "that the notes sued on were barred by the statute of limitations of four years," and "that the new promise, dated February 3, Argument for Defendants in Error. 1888, applied only to the extent of $1000 from January 1, 1889, and no more." These certainly are general findings. They are not determinations of any special facts tending to determine the issues, but general determinations of the issues themselves; and, if they are general findings, the uniform and repeated decisions of this court are to the effect that they cannot be reviewed here, except on the rulings of the court made in the progress of the trial. Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall. 125; Cooper v. Omohundro, 19 Wall. 65; Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S. 1; Martinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U. S. 670; Santa Anna v. Frank, 113 U. S. 339. And as there are no bills of exceptions, and no rulings of the court during the trial in any way excepted to, there is no review possible in any aspect of the case. II. But whether the findings are general or special, they are conclusive of the facts found. Only in the case of special findings can the court review the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment. Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237; Dickinson v. Planters' Bank, 16 Wall. 250; Boardman v. Toffey, 117 U. S. 271. Now, if these findings are special findings of fact, and they are to be taken as conclusively true, it cannot reasonably be contended that the judgment was not what it ought to have been. It is too plain for argument that the judgment could not have been otherwise than as it is. III. We can scarcely suppose that this court will go behind the findings in this case, whether those findings are general or special. There is nothing on which to base a review of the correctness of those findings. The testimony in the case is not given; nor is there any statement of its purport. There are no exceptions to rulings of the court in the progress of the trial, and it nowhere appears what those rulings were. But even if we supposed, in opposition to the plain statement of the record, that there was no testimony or evidence in the case, and that the case was submitted upon the pleadings alone and the exhibits which are made part of them, the findings of the court even then are right and proper. It is very evident that the whole alleged indebtedness, under the Opinion of the Court. special terms of the collateral agreement, had become due and payable when the first default of interest occurred, especially as the notes themselves by their terms were payable "on or before" a certain specified time- that is, at any time at the option of the maker. The holder could have brought suit for the whole indebtedness when that default occurred; and the courts of Texas have uniformly held that the statute begins to run from the time when the plaintiff could sue. Walling v. Wheeler, 39 Texas, 480. And as to the alleged acknowledgment and new promise contained in a letter written by the defendants, under date of February 3, 1888, if that letter is to be taken as proved merely by being made an exhibit to a pleading, and if there was no other proof on the subject, it is evident that the court was entirely right in restricting the effect of this letter to the sum of one thousand dollars. It would be a most violent construction that would torture this letter into an admission of indebtedness and a willingness to pay to a greater extent than that; for, under the decisions of the courts of Texas, (Coles v. Kelsey, 2 Texas, 541; S. C. 47 Am. Dec. 661, is the leading case on the subject), which are in entire harmony and conformity with the doctrine of this court upon the subject, an acknowledgment of debt, in order to amount to a new promise, must express willingness to pay, and certainly an expression of willingness to pay $1000 is neither an expression nor an implication of willingness to pay more than $1000. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. Although the record recites that the case was heard upon the pleadings and evidence, it does not appear that any oral testimony was introduced. No bill of exceptions was signed, and the finding by the court was general, stating only its conclusions of law. The defendant, therefore, contends that there is nothing before this court for review. This position cannot be sustained. The notes, upon which the action is based, and the deed of trust filed with and made Opinion of the Court. a part of the supplemental petition their execution not having been denied by the defendants under oath are to be taken, without proof, as genuine instruments notwithstanding the general denial in the original answer of all and singular the allegations of the petition. 1 Sayles's Texas Civil Statutes, Art. 1265, and authorities cited in 2 Peticolas's Index-Digest of Texas Civil Cases, p. 1024. We have seen that the notes matured, respectively, on the first days of November, 1885, 1886 and 1887. As this action was brought within less than four years after November 1, 1885, the defence of limitation — although it was stipulated in each note that on default in the payment of interest at maturity the principal was to become due and collectible is without foundation as to any of the notes, unless the principal of each note became due, without regard to the wishes of the payee or holder, either immediately upon default in paying interest, or after the expiration of ninety days from such default. Whether that view be sound or not depends upon the terms of the note and the deed of trust, and could not be affected by the testimony of witnesses. In refusing judgment for the entire amount of the notes, less the admitted credits, the court below necessarily proceeded on the ground that, independently of any option upon the part of the plaintiff, the notes became absolutely due and collectible at one or the other of the dates just mentioned, and consequently the action on them was barred. If this is error, it is one apparent on the record, and need not have been presented by a bill of exceptions. Balt. & Potomac Railroad v. Trustees 6th Presby. Church, 91 U. S. 127; Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669, 675; Young v. Martin, 8 Wall. 354, 357; Clinton v. Missouri Pacific Railway, 122 U. S. 469, 474. We are of the opinion that the court erred in not rendering judgment for the full amount of the notes, less the sums admitted in the petition to have been paid. Walling v. Wheeler, 39 Texas, 480, is cited by the defendants in support of the opposite view. But that case only announces the general rule that limitation begins to run from the time the plaintiff could sue. A leading case in the Supreme Court of Texas on this sub ure to Opinion of the Court. ject is Harrison Machine Works v. Reigor, 64 Texas, 89. That was an action upon promissory notes, payable at different dates, each containing an agreement to the effect that "a failpay that note when due should mature both notes." The note first falling due was not paid at maturity, and more than four years elapsed without suit. The question was presented whether limitation on the note last falling due commenced upon default in the payment of the one first maturing. It was held that it did, the court saying: "That the effect of the agreement was to authorize suit or give a right of action upon the last note at the same time that it could be commenced upon the first cannot be doubted. By the express terms of our statute of limitation it commences to run from the time when the cause of action accrues. It is immaterial from what cause a note becomes due so far as the right of the holder to enforce it by suit is concerned. If the holder of a note may, at his option, treat the claim as due at a later date than the maker has agreed that it shall mature, and thus prescribe a different date at which it shall be barred, the evidence for its enforcement may be preserved, whilst that for its resistance may be destroyed, and thus the purpose of the statute be wholly defeated." After referring to Hemp v. Garland, 4 Q. B. 519, as sustaining that view, but recognizing the fact that that case had been somewhat criticised on the ground that the facts brought it within the principle that no one is bound to take advantage of a forfeiture, Wood on Limitations, 296, the court proceeds: "Admitting this to be a correct view, it cannot affect the present case. Here no option was left to the creditor; he was forced to treat the debt as due. It is true he was not obliged to bring suit upon it upon default in payment of the first note; neither is any creditor compelled to sue upon a claim so soon as it becomes due. But the statute was put in motion without consulting his wishes, by the very terms of the contract, which neither party had any right to change without the consent of the other. When suit is left to the option of the creditor, and he fails to bring his action for the whole debt upon the non-payment of one instalment, the debtor may possibly be authorized to construe this as an ex |