Opinion of the Court. The former opinion was withdrawn, the mandate was set aside, a new opinion was delivered, (14 S. W. Rep. 493,) and an order entered declaring that there was no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court, and that that judgment was affirmed, with damages. In the second opinion, which was delivered October 7, 1890, it was held that all that was decided in Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louisville, 81 Kentucky, 189, was that, in order to authorize a city government to subject real estate situated within its corporate limits to taxation for city or municipal purposes only, there must be actual or presumed benefits to such property by the extension of the city government over it; that the Court of Appeals had often distinguished between the power of a city to tax real estate situated within its limits for city or municipal purposes only, and for such district purposes as the legislature might authorize; that the legislature might create a city boundary, or designate any other boundary, without reference to existing civil or political districts, into taxing districts, for local purposes; that the city of Henderson having voted a tax in reference to aiding in building the beforenamed connecting railroad in Indiana, was a taxing district; that the same state of things existed in regard to the tax for school purposes; that after such taxes were voted by the taxing district, the owner of real estate situated therein could not be heard to say that his property was not benefited by the enterprise for which the tax was voted; that although the jurisdiction of the city of Henderson extended to low-water mark on the Indiana shore of the river, she could not tax the property of the bridge company for city or municipal purposes, but as a taxing district she could tax such property; and that the bridge taxed, which was realty, and extended across the Ohio River, was used for profit, and could be benefited by the city and taxed by it as a taxing district. The court then proceeded to consider the question whether the contract entered into between the city and the bridge company, contained in the ordinance of the city accepted by the bridge company on the 11th of February, 1882, amounted to a contract right to tax the property of the bridge company to Opinion of the Court. low-water mark on the Indiana shore, the provision of that ordinance in section 4 being as follows: "Sec. 4. That nothing herein shall be construed as waiving the right of the city of Henderson to levy and collect taxes on the approaches to said bridge, or any building erected by said bridge company within the corporate limits of said city, the bridge itself and all appurtenances thereto within the limits of said city." The court remarked that the bridge company obtained from the city the right to construct its bridge and approaches on or over the centre of Fourth Street, and of the line thereof extended to low-water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio River, and such approaches, avenues, piers, trestles, abutments, toll-houses and other appurtenances as should be necessary in the erection, and for the business, of a bridge over the Ohio River, from a point in the city to some convenient point on the Indiana side of the river; and, also, that the right to use the land between Water Street in the city and low-water mark on the Kentucky side of the river, extending 100 feet below, and 300 feet above, the centre of Fourth Street extended to the river, was granted to the bridge company for erecting such wharves, elevators and other buildings as should be deemed necessary for the successful operation of the enterprise; and that, in consideration of such grant, section 4 in regard to taxes was inserted in the ordinance. The court then remarked that the bridge company maintained that section 4 of the ordinance meant only to reserve the right to tax such property of the bridge company as was theretofore subject to taxation by the city government, and that, as that part of the bridge which was situated over the water of the river was not theretofore subject to taxation, the reservation related to that part of the bridge which the city previously had the right to tax. But the view taken by the court was that the contract was well considered and prudently drafted by men skilled in that kind of work; that it was not to be presumed that they engaged in a mere nudum pactum, but meant to set forth a business transaction; that the bridge company desired rights and privileges which it did not possess, and could not possess without the consent of the city; that the city already had. the right to tax the approaches Opinion of the Court. to the bridge, and it had made no concessions which could possibly be construed as waiving that right; that the right to tax referred to in section 4 was the right to tax "the bridge itself; that the bridge, as distinguished from its abutments and approaches, was that part which was over the water; that the city, in its municipal capacity, according to the decision in Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louisville, 81 Kentucky, 189, had no right to tax that part of the bridge which was over the water; that the city had the right, if such right was asserted and agreed to, to claim that the bridge should be taxed in consideration of the privileges granted to the bridge company; that it must be presumed that that claim of right was asserted and agreed to, and was expressed in section 4 of the ordinance by the term "not waiving the right;" that if the contract did not mean that, it meant nothing; that it was not to be supposed that the contracting parties meant only to reserve a right which they had already, and about which there was no dispute; and that, as the right to tax the bridge to the Indiana shore might be obtained legitimately by contract, and the city granted to the bridge company rights and privileges essential. to its enterprise, it was reasonable to suppose that the city would contract for the right thus to tax the bridge company in consideration of granting such rights and privileges. This opinion was delivered as the opinion of the court by Judge Bennett. Judge Pryor dissented from it. Chief Justice Holt delivered a separate opinion, holding that the legislature, by authorizing the imposition and collection of the railroad and school taxes upon the real estate within the city limits, created a taxing district; that the power to collect such taxes, therefore, was conferred upon the city as such taxing district; that the property of the bridge company, being within such district, was liable for such taxes; that, as to the municipal taxes proper, the property of the bridge company was within. the corporate limits, and received such benefits from the municipal government as to render it both legally and justly liable. for such municipal taxes; and that upon those grounds he concurred in affirming the judgment of the lower court. The bridge company and the railroad company sued out a Opinion of the Court. writ of error from this court, to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The bridge company assigns for error (1) that the Court of Appeals erred in overruling its claim that the acceptance of its charter and the construction of its bridge amounted in law to a contract between it and Kentucky, that no part of its bridge, north of low-water mark on the Kentucky shore of the river, ever should be subjected to taxation by the city for municipal or any other purpose; (2) that the court erred in overruling the claim of the bridge company that the tax ordinances of the city were null and void so far as they assessed for taxes the bridge structure north of low-water mark on the Kentucky shore of the river, because those ordinances impaired the obligations of the charter contract of the bridge company with Kentucky, and were repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and (3) that it erred in overruling the claim of the bridge company that its bridge was exempt from the taxation in question, because it spanned the Ohio River, a navigable stream and interstate river, and was solely a means of interstate commerce, erected under authority from the United States and receiving no protection from the city. The bridge company and the railroad company both of them assign for error that the court erred in overruling their claim that the tax ordinances of the city impaired the obligations of the contract of February 27, 1884, between the bridge company and the railroad company, and were void, because repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The city of Henderson now makes a motion to dismiss the writ of error, for want of jurisdiction in this court, on the ground that no Federal question was actually decided by the state court. Although a Federal question may have been raised in the state court, yet if the case was decided in that court on grounds not involving a Federal question, but broad enough to sustain the decision, this court will refuse to entertain jurisdiction. Kreiger v. Shelby Railroad Co., 125 U. S. 39, 46; De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216, 234; Ilale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 554, 564, 565; Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U. S. 380, 386, 387; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U. S. 300, 306, 307. Opinion of the Court. The opinion of the state court is based wholly upon the ground that the proper interpretation of the ordinance of February, 1882, was that the bridge company voluntarily agreed that the bridge should be liable to taxation. This does not involve a Federal question, and is broad enough to dispose of the case, without reference to any Federal question. This court cannot review the construction which was given to the ordinance as a contract, by the state court. There is nothing in the suggestion that the taxation of the bridge is a regulation of commerce among the States, or is the taxation of any agency of the Federal government. The case of Louisville Bridge Co. v. City of Louisville, 81 Kentucky, 189, was not decided until May, 1883, more than a year after the ordinance of the city of Henderson was accepted by the bridge company, in February, 1882. The contract of February, 1884, between the bridge company and the railroad company, was made more than two years after the ordinance of February, 1882, came into existence. Neither the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the present case, nor that of Chief Justice Holt, nor that of the Circuit Court of the State, puts the decision upon any Federal question; and on this writ of error to the state court, we are bound by its interpretation of the contract contained in the ordinance, in view of the constitution and laws of Kentucky, and cannot review that question. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented. VOL. CXLI-44 Writ of error dismissed. |