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the evil spirit, and that it is the duty of the nearest relative to avenge the death, by taking the life of the person they consider as the cause. Thus, as Englishmen are considered to have supernatural qualities, and the power of controlling the evil spirits, it frequently happens that a settler is fixed upon as the cause of the death, and deliberately murdered. At the time I now speak of, the unfortunate victim was a farmer, who, besides leaving a wife and family, had so large a connection upon the island that the Governor was obliged to interfere, and sent, demanding that the murderer should be given up. This, as may be supposed, was refused, and threats being made use of, the whole tribe flew to arms, and things began to wear a disagreeable aspect. The place where we joined our ship was the nearest anchorage to the village of the hostile party, where we heard they were assembling in great numbers. We waited a day in the expectation that they might seek an interview; but none of them appearing, the Governor at last started with an escort of the ship's company and marines. The village lay about five miles inland, a walk by no means agreeable when, independent of the almost impassable nature of the road, going as it did straight on over or through any natural difficulty, we had the pleasant anticipation of being fired at with poisoned arrows from the thick brushwood which surrounded us. Nothing of the kind took place: we reached the village in safety, and were conducted to a large house, where we found the king and his braves assembled, having evidently been informed of our approach. They were all painted and feathered in the most warlike manner, and received us with great dignity. When we were seated in a semicircle before the chief, refreshments were offered, but declined, the Governor telling them we would not eat unless they showed themselves friendly.

At this they whispered together, looking much pleased, and saying it

was "good." After thus preparing them, the Governor made a speech, pointing out the wickedness of killing a man who had done them no harm, and attempting to prove that it was quite right to punish the person who had been the murderer. They all paid great attention, but did not seem to have the slightset idea of the sense of the argument; and when simply required to give the man up, looked intensely surprised, some even laughing aloud, the chief himself saying we might catch him if we could, but that he would not give him up.

This was not satisfactory, so the Governor made a second speech, offering great treasures in acknowledgment of their loyalty, provided they did as he required. At this their eyes brightened, and they announced that they would trade or barter for him. So the bargain was made, and next morning fixed as the time when the poor wretch was to be given up by his treacherous friends.

True to their promise, they brought him down, having deceived him into the idea that they were going to fight us. When he found the true object of their journey, I could not help admiring the cool way in which he accepted his fate, merely saying it was "good" when the Governor sentenced him to be hung forthwith.

The tribe showed more astonishment than he did, and for some minutes the agitation was so great that we were apprehensive of an attack. Upon the judicious display of sundry blankets, &c. &c., the excitement subsided; and after covering the man with grease and goosedown, they howled over him until his sentence was executed, when they marched off with their payment, evincing great satisfaction at the liberality of the Governor.

We stayed two days at anchor off the gap, in case of anything transpiring; but all remaining quiet, we at last weighed anchor and ran down to Victoria again, where we found the flag-ship had arrived during our absence.

FLEETS AND NAVIES-ENGLAND.

PART IV.

A STANDING navy-a force which shall give the nation the power of at once meeting the first onset of a war, of preparing against surprise, of resisting, repelling, or anticipating a sudden attack-such must be the navy of England. This is no theory, no mere idea-it is a fact which the circumstances of our times, the circumstances of our position, present as a stern reality, an unavoidable necessity.

The only danger England could fear would be immediate. The defence should be immediate also; the present system provides no such defence. The intent of reserves is to draw forth the resources of a country, as the reinforcements of a war, or the bases of a protracted struggle. A navy which must be a defence, and would be a power, must command present means to combat present danger. An army may suffer a first, a second defeat, and yet recover itself one blow may be the destruction of a navy. The destruction, or even the defeat of its navy, to a nation which based its position on maritime strength, would be political annihilation. It is, therefore, a principle of life to a maritime power to assure itself immunity from such a blow. Have we such immunity and, not having it, are we safe?

It is not necessary to prove that such a blow is threatened, that it is imminent or even probable, according to the existing political status; it is enough for us to know that it is possible. Our defence must provide for what can be, not what may be.

Is the danger of such a blow possible? That is our question. Our great maritime rival lies within a hundred miles of our shores. She is nearly equal to us in ships-more than equal, when the necessary distribution of our own fleet is considered more than equal in the means of preparation. We mean not to challenge her intent, we would merely indicate her power of hostility. France may not be hostile, yet

we know that there lies deep in her bosom, deep in the hearts of her people as well as in the designs of her rulers and councillors, a desire to combat our maritime supremacy. We know that this desire has manifested itself in an extraordinary growth of naval strength. We know that, were such a desire to develop into intent, or be drawn into action by the force of events, she possesses a power of manning and equipping her fleets on the instant. We know from the experience of last year that she has a faculty of secret preparation, and could concentrate her ships and her resources on the shores of the Channel as secretly as she placed her armies en route for the Alps and Genoa, and still not be arming. We know that the menace of war must come from her, and that it would not come until she was prepared. We know, also, that any such interim betwixt menace and war would be spent by us in vain suggestions and delusions of peace; that we should expend all our energies in diplomatic notes, parliamentary debates, newspaper leaders, and a general fussiness. We know, also, from our political position, that our forces must be divided-that we must always have in the Mediterranean, for the protection of our colonies, of our Indian route, and our general policy and commerce, a fleet which would give us the command of that sea, and which could not quit that station whilst any French ships remained. We know also that our rivals would be bound by no such obligation; that, with such an object in view, they would leave Algeria and Toulon to take care of themselves; and we should awake some morning to find ourselves before empty ports, with the conviction that the ships we sought were probably near our own shores, and that we must follow. A stern chase is ever a long one, and our fleet might arrive to share and not avert disaster.

With this knowledge, it were mere delusion to say or think that the danger of such a blow is not possible. Independent of all political considerations, all diplomatic relations, all national feelings which may exist at present, it is a possibility. There is the power, whenever the will may arise, to propel it.

What are the means to ward the blow the present means? We have more ships have we the same power of manning or concentrating them?

The Austrians, on Christmas-day 1858, thought themselves at peace with the nations of Europe. On the New-Year's day they found themselves involved in the preliminaries of war. The same thing might occur to us. Where is our preparation for it? We might assemble a Channel fleet of ten sail of the line. With such force we could not go forth to meet or anticipate attack. The standing reserves, we are informed, could in three days be assembled to man another ten sail. This might be. But certainly it would require a longer time-a week, a fortnight ere these reserves could be organised as ships' companies, and the ships equipped for service. Might we hope for such a breathing-time after a declaration of war? We think not. The present policy of France and her ruler warrants no such conclusion. When the blow is threatened, the army will be ready to strike. Were such delay granted, would a force constituted with the present elements be such as should be sent forth to uphold the honour of England's flag and the glory of England's might?

We may be accused of repetition, of verbiage, in thus recurring so often to the one subject. But this danger is the text of our defence. It must be the preface to any proposition regarding it.

This defence, we believe, cannot be perfect, cannot be sufficient, cannot be national, unless it include a naval force permanent and ready, equal to cope with any danger which can threaten it, and which shall have inherent in itself a principle of preparation instant and immediate as the danger. This can only be effected by the existence in the State of a standing navy, which shall number seamen

enough in the ports of England to furnish a fleet of twenty sail (inclusive of Channel squadron), and a proportionate number of frigates, afford the seamen crew of the gunboats, and still leave a nucleus for the organisation of the two reserves. This would require at least ten thousand seamen, besides boys and marinesthe force decided on by the first Commission; and this, according to the doctrines of peace agitators and political economists, would be a standing war establishment.

Yet how are we to define a war or peace establishment? It can only be done by defining the national need and requirement. If what be generally called a peace establishment is only equal to furnishing our stations, and would leave the country defenceless, or only half defended, at the opening of a war, of what use is the navy to the country as a defence? of what import as an assertion of the maritime supremacy which gives it a standing as a great power? The only rational establishment is that which, whilst it serves the purposes of peace, is equal also to the requirements of war. None other can assure the safety or the greatness of the empire.

Were the danger we should meet more remote or less ready; did its thunderbolts require longer time in forging, or take longer space in hurling, we might fairly rest on our strength and our resources. As it is, we must stand in our strength, or risk surprise in our weakness. It is not a question of mere expenditure; it is a question of safety. We debate, we squabble, we calculate nicely over measures of defence, and yet yearly vote willingly, and without question, thousands on some vain scheme, some illusory plan, which in a short time goes out like an exhausted wick. Thus are we now bestowing our thoughts and energies on the supply of our last and most uncertain resources, whilst we overlook the need of a present defence. We cast our bread on the waters, in the hope that after many days it may return again unto us, and we leave our dough at home unkneaded. The thought of the thousands and millions which have been expended in experiments, in reductions, in aid of politi

cal manœuvres, would make a patriot of the old time weep; it will cause even one of the present day, cold and heartless as we are, to mourn in spirit at the sacrifice of patriotism to party, of the national weal to parliamentary majorities. In these days it is hard to fix a crime on public perpetrators; but we know that somewhere, on Governments or governors, there lies the deep and heavy sin of having allowed the physical and moral supremacy of England's navy to decline to a doubt, and be overshadowed by the cloud of a danger.

It rests with this age to repair the error; it is its duty, and a sacred one too, to transmit to the next generation a naval supremacy and naval might as intact and undoubted as that which it received in heritage.

This can only be effected now by the creation of such a material force of ships as was considered the old stand-point of our navy, and the institution of a standing body of seamen which shall suffice to man a powerful fleet at the onset of a war, and leave a nucleus to amalgamate and organise our standing and volunteer reserves. How is this to be done, or rather how is the man-power part to be achieved? There have been several schemes; but there is only one which seems feasible or practical, and that was propounded by Sir C. Napier. His plan is to keep a Channel fleet of ten or twelve sail efficiently manned with more than the proportion of able seamen, and with reduced detachments of marines. In case of war these crews are to be divided, and one-half sent to an equal number of new ships, and the complements of all to be filled by boys from the ordinary ships, and the embarkation of marines from their barracks. Thus he supposes that the country would possess the power of equipping immediately a force double that of the Channel fleet. Though this plan would insure a system which would be better than any which now exists, yet it challenges objections. We can have no faith in a Channel fleet, nor would the seaman. It offers no surety of permanence. It would melt away like a snow-wreath in a thaw to suit

some party purpose, and the country be none the wiser. The seaman knows well how often this has been done, and believes, consequently, that it may be done again, and would hesitate to make himself a party to an engagement the permanence of which would depend on a Channel fleet. Again, the ships thus manned, would, if called upon to issue forth to instant battle (and that would be the sole aim and object of the plan), go with very crude elements. The crews would be all broken up, the organisation disturbed; and though the system would still exist in each ship, it requires more time than theorists would believe to bring men of the sailor and soldier class into the order or routine which would insure the proper handling of the vessel, or the fighting of her guns; and excellence in these respects, it is undoubted, would be more essential to success than it has ever been in any stage of naval warfare. In this plan we see the influence of the prejudice of the old school (and pardonable enough it is in those of the past age), which could not allow any home for the sailor save a ship, or suppose that he could possibly elsewhere, under any circumstances, be trained, nurtured, and disciplined as a British seaman.

But it begins to appear from the facts of the last war, and from the experiences of those who know the seaman best, that a fixed and permanent home is beginning to have great attraction for him to have a great hold on him. He is no longer such a nomade, and would readily acknowledge the ties and responsibilities which bind other citizens. We believe, therefore, that a standing navy, such as we have contemplated, could only be accomplished by association with a home; in fact, by making an established and permanent home the principle and basis of any treaty betwixt the seaman and the State. Let him see barracks erected and established which are to be his home, to which he is to return on every disembarkation, which he is to own and look upon as his abidingplace; let him see in their character and institution permanence, and he will, we believe, give in his adherence, and the State will, after a

time, not only have no difficulty, but have the choice and preference in the man market.

It is strange enough that all the propositions to popularise the service have met none of the objections which the seaman himself may have directly, or the evils which may act indirectly upon his nature and temperament. The increase of provisions, the grant of clothing, and the issue of mess traps and bedding gratuitously, were undoubtedly great boons, but they met no grievance. There was no complaint on these points, and therefore it cannot be expected that these advantages alone would suffice to give popularity to the service.

The main obstacles which have stood betwixt the State and the seaman supply, which the country affords, were not affected or overthrown by these arrangements. It has been stated before, and it must be repeated here, that the chief obstacle was a want of faith in any regulation or law promulgated by the Government. The confusion created in the mind of the sailor by the multiplicity of circulars, each one contradicting the other, each upsetting some previous arrangement, was in its manifestation ridiculous, were it not that in effect it was too serious. We have seen two old salts going away after the public reading on the quarter-deck of some circular, one saying to the other "I say, Bill, what was it all about?" "I'm blessed if I know," would be the answer; "something about our pay or provisions, I s'pose, but I've se❜ed so many alterations that I never knows what I'm to get, or what my old woman is to get, or what I'm to do, or where I'm to go. I wish them Lords would know their own minds, that a fellow might have some knowledgeableness about hisself."

Auy one who traced the alterations in the systems of treatment, and the different changes in discipline, must have seen that they did not produce an effect due to their intrinsic merit. They did not inspire confidence in the seaman, or make the service popular. They were generally coupled with some ungracious condition, contained some suspicious element, or were issued at some time or in some way

which gave them the appearance of lures and baits; so that they were sel dom understood or believed in. Nor did they grapple with any of the prejudices or the objections which the mariner class entertained against the navy.

These were, first, a distrust of the State and its offers, a doubt of their sincerity and good intent, and, in a minor degree, the want of uniformity in the routine and exercises of ships (which has at last been established), the tediousness of the punishments, the uncertainty of leave, the want of a little ready money when in port, the excess of the drills, the want of distinction in classes, the lack of some certain home during the outfitting, the casual stay in English ports, the paying-off, and the intervals of services. The recklessness to which he is driven, the discomfort which he endures from his having no home to resort to, may not seem evils to the sailor whilst he is revelling in the grog-shops and the brothels, but he feels them in the after-consequences, and attaches the painful impression they leave behind to the service, and not to his own vices. A barrackhome would remove all these objections. The erection of barracks at the principal ports, which would, in fact, be the centre of the naval system, where its organisation would be commenced and developed, which would be the depot for its supply, and the headquarters for its recruitment, and the home for its unemployed, would exhibit an earnestness of purpose, a promise of permanence, which would renew confidence in the mind of the seaman, and assure the character of a standing navy, besides obliterating all the other disadvantages which are now associated in his mind with life in a man-of-war.

This suggestion of barracks was evidently an unpopular one with the great naval hierarchy. All the questions asked on the subject by the Commission were put in such a style as to show in what way it was expected they would be answered. One officer only, in his evidence-Captain Mends, a man sailor born, sailor bred, and who had made the character of the seaman and the weal of the service his life-study-insisted strongly

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