WE observe that, within the last week or two, the tone of the ministerial journals with regard to our "august ally," the Emperor of the French, has undergone a marked alteration. But a little while ago we were taught to regard him as a dark mysterious plotter, whose designs no man could fathom, and upon whose word no reliance could be placed. His sayings, despatches, and letters, were not to be interpreted by the rules of ordinary significance, but were to be searched and sifted for hidden meanings, equivoques, and innuendoes. His apparent policy was a mere mask assumed to cover ulterior designs. His attitude towards this country was represented as more than suspicious, and no credence was to be given to his protestations of cordial amity. He was exhibited not only as an intriguer, but as the greatest master of intrigue that had ever appeared on the political stage. Now, however, it would appear as if the eyes of the ministerial journalists had been touched with fairy ointment, so entirely changed is the nature of their vision. The Emperor of the French is now both to be applauded and trusted. He has given proof of his sincerity and rectitude in two ways-he means to plunder the Pope, and he is going to inaugurate free trade. By declaring against priests and protection he is considered to have effaced any stigma attachable to him for past transgressions. For who can doubt the piety of the man who proposes to make free with the patrimony of St Peter, or the friendly feeling of the potentate who is will ing to take our coal and iron in exchange for the vintages of the sunny south? With regard to the first step, the Times remarks, "The French Emperor has taken his course, and it is one which will help to reconcile him with that great body of liberalminded and reflecting men who have watched with anxiety and regret his recent policy." With regard to the second, the same journal says, "We gladly admit that in this proposition the Emperor of the French gives to England and to Europe the very best

security for the continuance of peace.

All honour to the Emperor of the French for the bold inauguration of this great social revolution !' So then we may stop the volunteer movement, send back our rifles, discontinue our fortifications, dismantle our ships, and subside into our former state of indolent quiescence; all because Napoleon III. has written to the Pope that he must cede his territory, and has intimated his willingness to make a change in the national tariff !

It is well known that the ministe rial journals express with tolerable accuracy the views which are entertained by the Ministry for the time, and that they rarely go much in advance of what is a settled policy. It was therefore not without some alarm that we perused these almost unqualified eulogies, lavished upon a man whom the same journals but a few weeks ago entreated us to distrust. We became apprehensive that the Palmerston Ministry had either fallen, or was about to fall, into a snare purposely set for them by the cleverest man in Europe, whose career, if it is carefully considered, demonstrates that he is ready to sacrifice everything for his own personal aggrandisement, and to throw honour and obligation to the winds whenever adherence to these would interfere with his immediate object. The tone of the Queen's speech delivered at the opening of the Session has somewhat reassured us, for it is generally condemnatory of foreign interference in the settlement of the affairs of Italy. So far well. But we have no kind of assurance that the Emperor of the French participates in that view, or that he will act in accordance with it. On the contrary, there are grounds, as we shall presently show, for holding that he does meditate interference; and that being the case, we confess that we are suspicious lest, under the guise of establishing more intimate relations with this country, he should be striving to entangle us in the meshes of his continental policy.

We need hardly say that we

should regard a rupture with France as a great national calamity. There is not, we conscientiously believe, a single man in this country who thinks otherwise. We, every one of us, detest war, for higher and holier reasons than the mere expenditure of blood and treasure; and the attempted creation of a Peace Society, which has crumbled like a preposterous effigy of unbaked clay, was an exhibition of the supremest folly. We are not aggressive. We do not seek to poach upon any preserve of our neighbours-we only wish to be quite ready to repel any attempt at poaching on our own domains. We desire to stand well with France politically and commercially; but we object to identify our policy with hers, and to enter blindfold into engagements which it may not be either for our honour or for our interest to fulfil. We are glad, for many reasons, to think that there is a prospect of commercial reciprocity with France. We believe that both countries would gain thereby, through augmented interchange and consumption; and if those in Britain who have always maintained the doctrine of free trade shall point to this, when the treaty is completed, as a triumphant vindication of their views, we certainly shall not appear in the character of challengers. What we contended for, from the first, was reciprocity; and we shall but be too happy to have entire reciprocity with France. We reserve, however, our opinion as to details. We are not sure that we quite understand the terms of the proposed arrangement; and we cannot comprehend why, in a matter of this kind, there should be a formal treaty. If it is desirable to lower the duties on French wine and articles of Parisian manufacture, which duties are levied, as we have often been told, for purposes of revenue and not of protection, that could have been very easily effected by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, without forcing us into a regular contract. Also, as we shall presently have occasion to observe, the arrangement seems to us, as announced, rather one-sided; inasmuch as we are to lower our duties immediately, whereas the French duties are to

be maintained for a very considerable period. But commercial arrangements are not political arrangements. Because a man agrees to take our produce at a certain price, and we agree to take his on corresponding terms, we do not necessarily pledge ourselves to back and bear out each other in every imaginable transaction. Every man who is engaged in large commercial business knows quite well that he has an occasional rogue to deal with-one whom he cannot avoid employing, or whom it would be folly to discard (for roguery is often combined with a good deal of talent); but he never trusts him, and is excessively particular in sifting the items of his accounts. In like manner we may negotiate commercially with France or any other foreign State, without contracting any closer political alliance than exists, and that is just what we ought to do on the present occasion. But we cannot accept free trade (or any approach to it, for the present commercial treaty is not full and unreserved free trade), as a thorough and satisfactory pledge for continued amity, nor should we take it as a bribe to forward the views and aid the councils of France in disposing of any of the difficult questions which the unsettled state of the Continent presents.

It is, we are perfectly convinced, the interest of the Emperor of the French to stand well with us at the present time, because it so happens that he is placed in antagonism with almost every other great European power. He finds that he cannot carry into effect the compact made with Austria after the battle of Solferino, though that compact has been ratified by a subsequent treaty. The idea, which was originally his, of a federal government for Italy, of which the Pope was to be the head, and Austria a member in respect of her Venetian territory, is to be abandoned as impracticable. The Italians themselves are against it; and in truth it is difficult to imagine a more preposterous chimera. Sardinia has got Lombardy, it is true, and that may be considered as a fait accompli, but the great difficulty and even danger to the tranquillity of Europe lies be

yond. What is to be done with the Duchies? How are the Legations to be disposed of? If the solution were left to the Italians, we doubt not that they would decide in favour of annexation to Sardinia, which probably would be the wisest course, in so far as their material interests are concerned. But the Emperor of the French, we doubt not, thinks that Sardinia, having gained Lombardy, is quite sufficiently aggrandised. The possession of Central Italy also would make her too powerful as a neighbour; and France would lose that hold on the peninsula which she is evidently anxious to maintain. In a former article we expressed our opinion that the real object of the Emperor of the French was to found a kingdom of Central Italy, and to bestow the crown on his cousin, Prince Napoleon, the son-in-law of the King of Sardinia. We still adhere to that opinion; and his late extraordinary letter to the Pope, advising him to surrender the Legations, has tended very much to strengthen it. A glance at the map will show that Parma, Modena, and Tuscany combined would not form a compact kingdom. They extend only along the west coast of Italy, whereas the Pontifical States run up on the east as far as Ferrara and the Po. The population of the three Duchies is about three millions-that of the Pontifical States nearly the same. Combine them, and you have a compact territory with six millions of souls-a more powerful State than was Sardinia before it received the accession of Lombardy. Then again consider the political advantages to France in having a central kingdom, under a French head, established there. It could check Sardinia, in the event of that State becoming too independent. It would isolate Naples by cutting off communication with Austria which presently exists through the Pontifical States. It might, whenever opportunity afforded, be enlarged by the conquest of Venetia, thus driving the Austrians entirely out of Italy, and giving France the virtual command of the Adriatic. So enlarged, it would be easy to crush Naples, and perhaps found a French dynasty there also, by the restoration

of the heir of Murat. Such, we are convinced, are the political aspirations of Napoleon III.; and to win the moral support of Britain, he will have recourse to every method of cajolement, and offer all concessions. He has tried the same game with Austria, but has failed. He evidently hoped that Austria, left unaided as she was during the struggle of 1859, would embrace his alliance, and forward his projects. But Austria would do nothing of the kind. The young Emperor would not abandon the cause of the Dukes, and he would not consent to the partition of the Papal territories. We think that, in taking that course, he showed considerable magnanimity; and the result, as we are credibly informed, has been that the relations between Austria and Russia, which were interrupted since the Crimean war, have been resumed. Russia cannot afford to be even a passive spectator of revolution, or the overthrow of hereditary dynasties. She must look to what is called "the cause of the sovereigns," a matter which in this country of ours meets with little sympathy or respect. We in Britain have no fear that revolution shall occur at home; and we think that, whenever there are symptoms of revolution abroad, that must be owing to the mismanagement and incapacity of the rulers. That it is so, in some cases, may be freely admitted. But in others there is no room for such a charge; and really, when we calmly consider the aspect of foreign affairs, we cannot wonder that the sovereigns of Europe should be alarmed at the attitude which France is now assuming, and should be driven into common concert to oppose her ambitious designs. We have said France, but we ought rather to have said the present Emperor of the French. France, as a free State, exists no longer. It is a despotism of a purely oriental kind. In a free State men have liberty of speech; they may challenge and discuss at will, and with impunity, the measures of their rulers; they may employ that grand engine, the press, for the dissemination of their opinions, without "warnings," or the risk of suppression and fine; they have popular chambers in which

the voice of the nation can be heard. Nothing of that kind now exists in France. The journals exist by suf ferance-they dare not say a word contrary to the Imperial will. There is absolutely no Parliament. In private, it is not safe for any man to utter his real sentiments in presence of a stranger. In the lecture-room the professor must be on his guard, lest he utter sentiments corresponding to the old Athenian hatred of tyrants; the student must refrain from applause, if mention is made of the names of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Can a Can a country be called free, when the voice of the most gifted of its sons is silenced by threats of despotic persecution? Could old Béranger rise from his grave, he would shrink into it again, disgusted by the pusillanimity of those who should have been his successors, but who, like the poets of the Augustan era, are fain to get rid of the memory of their former asserted principles, and to content themselves with crumbs shed from the table of the successful aspirant for the diadem. It is impossible to believe, it would be monstrous to credit, that the man who has thus subjugated France can have any regard for the freedom of other nations. His interference with other states must necessarily have a selfish motive; and that motive clearly is the desire of strengthening and aggrandising his own dynasty. He never had, and he never can hope to have, a better opportunity for effecting this, than is presented to him just

now.

Central Italy is without a fixed government. The people of Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Legations, have denounced their allegiance to their former sovereigns, and are now in a state of suspended revolt. This cannot last long. Provisional governments are mere makeshifts, very costly, and very hurtful to all kinds of industry. The sooner that the future destiny of these States is settled the better; and that would have been the proper work for the Congress, about which so much has been said, but which seems now to be indefinitely postponed, and, we veuture to predict, never will be summoned to meet, at least with

the will and cordial approbation of France.

There is, however, a distinction which must be kept in view. The Dukes have fled-have abandoned their territory, though they have not formally abdicated; and provisional governments have been appointed. These, according to the recent practice in similar cases, must be recognised as legal and bonâ fide gov ernments by other powers, for the mere size of a State should make no difference as to its treatment. We did not hesitate, after Louis Philippe had quitted France, to recognise as potential the provisional government of which Alphonse de Lamartine was the head, and why should we act otherwise now? According to the ordinary rule, the people of those three states, situated as they are, might do exactly as they pleased in the matter of the sovereignty. They might resolve to remain separate, or they might unitethey might offer the crown to the King of Sardinia or to any one else, or they might establish a dictatorship or a republic. They have, indeed, in a sort of fashion, offered it to King Victor Emmanuel, who, doubtless, would have accepted, had the Emperor of the French been pleased to vouchsafe his sanction. But he has not given that sanction; and we are waiting for a Congress which, most probably, never will be held. As for the Grand Dukes, their restoration, we opine, may be regarded as desperate. Austria cannot help them, and France will not. Without a Congress, there is not the remotest chance for them; and we think it extremely unlikely that a Congress would resolve on their restoration. England, at all events, would hardly be a party to such a measure.

Such is the position of the Duchies; but the Legations stand on a different footing. There is rebellion indeed in the Papal States, but the Pope has not abandoned his territory, or yielded one iota of his authority. He protests that he can put that rebellion down, and insists on his right, at all events, to make the attempt. That right it would be very difficult to deny. We are no admirers of the Pontiff, or of the fabric of which he

is the head. We deny altogether his spiritual jurisdiction and asserted supremacy, and we are well aware of the many evils inseparably connected with Romanism. But we cannot forget that the Pope is also a temporal Sovereign. As such, he has certain rights and claims which we must not ignore, because he happens at the same time to be a priest. We must not let our Protestant feelings carry us too far in a matter such as this; for, after all, the Pope is a Christian, which the Sultan is not; and if we did not hesitate to exclaim against the proposed robbery of Giant Pagan, we cannot consistently approve of the spoliation of Giant Pope. We cannot help expressing our opinion, that the recent letter from the Emperor to the Pope, desiring him to surrender his territory, was a most barefaced, impudent, and insulting document, considering the quarter from which it came. Why, it is scarce ten years ago since this very man, the eldest son of the Church, as he is absurdly called-sent an army to put down the Revolutionists then triumphant in Rome, and to bring back the Pope, who had taken refuge at Gaeta; and ever since Rome has been occupied by the French. What has led to such a mighty change of sentiment-such a singular alteration of policy? It is worth while considering that, for it is the key to the whole mystery. Why did he interfere for the Pope in 1849 We reply, because Rome had then declared herself to be a republic, a form of government which is not more obnoxious to the Czar of Muscovy than to the Emperor of the French. To recognise a republic then and there, would have been to forfeit future chances. It was far better policy to restore the Pope and to garrison Rome; because his weakness, and the predominance of French arms in the capital, could at any time allow the protector to seize upon that which he was protecting-to give the "eldest son" the opportunity of seizing on the possessions of the father! Why does he desire the Pontiff now, in that fine oracular style of his, laying the blame on "the inexorable logic of events," to strip and denude? Simply because it is his

interest to have the Legations, in addition to the Duchies, in order to found a French kingdom of Central Italy, which, being established, will, as we have already said, enable him to command the whole peninsula, and give him the command not only of the Adriatic, but of the Mediterranean.

There are, no doubt, great difficulties in the way of such a consummation. No Congress would consent to such a thing, and therefore we lean to the opinion that there will be no Congress. The majority would be against France. Russia, Austria, Prussia, and even Britain, never could consent to a French Central Italy; so we are convinced that the European diplomatists will not be called on to assemble this year at Paris. The matter can be easier managed by a coup-de-main. Austria is at present deplorably weak; and, if rumour is to be credited, France is doing her best to give her occupation in Hungary. Russia certainly will not move alone. Victor Emmanuel of Sardinia, who ought to have the Duchies, and to whom the population incline, dares not stir in opposi tion to the will of his anything but celestial tyrant. As for England, the Emperor of the French has probably been persuaded by the eminent free-trader, to whose magically persuading powers Lord Granville has just borne such glowing testimony, that her acquiescence or indifference is to be purchased by the exchange of cheap claret and trashy filigree for iron and coal (the wine duty here to be lowered immediately, but the French duties to be maintained for A YEAR AND A HALF, giving ample time for the accomplishment of any feat of political jugglery), and we are to be addressed in the language of Constance :

"Do, child, go to it' grandam, child;

Give grandam kingdom, and it' grandam
will

Give it a plum, a cherry, and a fig:
There's a good grandam."

We deem it absolutely necessary to call the attention of the country to these matters, for the Emperor of the French is bidding very high for the support of the Radical and Peace party, and has already, it