that I wish to form to the front, on the right of the head of the column; then I give the word "By the Right, Front Form." The one movement is as easy as the other; but the latter entails this result, or disadvantage as it is considered by the advocates of our present cavalry system, that all the fours have been shuffled from Right to Left; that which stood on the right flank now holding the left, and all the others being proportionately transposed. But, why not? So long as men and horses are there, what does it matter in what relative position they stand? So, if I give my line the word "Fours Left," I form the resulting column with equal indifference to the right or the left of its former head; and so too, from a column of Fours formed no matter how, I form to a flank by the word "Fours Right" or "Fours Left," as the exigency of the moment may require.

With reference to the diminution of Front from Fours to Files and single Files (or, as I prefer to call them, Twos and Ones-for the word File has become complicated with the idea of a front-rank man and his rear-rank follower), and from Twos to Ones, I establish this rule. Whether the column be Right or Left in front, the advance is made from the right of the section to be diminished. At the word "Advance by Twos," that which happens to find itself the righthand Two of each Four advances, followed by the left-hand Two; so, on the word " Advance by Ones," the right-hand man advances. To effect the corresponding increase of front I should teach the rearward members of each Two or Four to incline, in ordinary cases, to the left of their leader, but not to fear, when circumstances demanded it, to form to his right. If from a column ofno matter what-I wish to form to the front direct, I give to the sections composing it the same words which I have indicated in the case of Fours; if I wish to show front to a flank, I give the word "Right Form" or "Left Form," as the nature of the case may dictate; and if, marching through narrow ways, I hear a "holla back," I give the word "About"each section, be it Four, Two, or

single horsemen, scrambles round on its own centre as best it may, and on reaching open ground I form my line direct by such of the above-mentioned processes as seems most convenient to me.

It will be observed that, in the course of these movements, the order of the several Fours is constantly being transposed, from Right to Left of the line and back again; and that the Twos composing each Four, and the individuals composing each Two, are perpetually being similarly shuffled. But the members of no Two are ever separated, nor the Twos composing any one Four. So long as this is the case I say-there are the men and the horses; the Fours are together, the Twos together; they can go about, or break to a flank by Fours, Twos, Ones; and if they can do this, who cares whether Tom rides on the right of Jack or vice versâ?

Now I take two divisions, which I designate the First and Second, and place one behind the other at half a horse's length distance; and this I call a Troop. If I give my troop the word "Fours Right" or "Fours Left," each division breaks to the indicated flank by Fours, and the two move off side by side in parallel columns; altogether, upon a front of eight. At the word " Fours Right" or "Fours Left" addressed to this column, each division fronts to the flank indicated, and the line is restored,-with such division to the front as chance may direct. If from the same double column of Fours I wish to form line to the Front, I give the same command which I would address to a division acting singly. If the word is "To the Right," the division which finds itself to the right forms as front rank, and at the same time moves slightly up (as in the "Formation to the Front" of the Cavalry Regulations) to clear the head of the other division; the latter forms as rear rank. If the word is "To the Left," the process is reversed. The principle guiding this movement is not, I think, complicated. simply comes to this-that division which can forms first; that which can't, forms last.

It

I allow diminution of front from

such a double column to be effected in one way only. The Commanding officer gives the word "Single Rank.' The leader of that division which finds itself forming the right-hand one of the two columns of Fours, gives the word "-th Division_advance," and leads it forward. The left column stands fast; and when its head is at a distance from the rear of the other column sufficient to prevent amalgamation, follows. Further diminution of front may now be effected as from a division acting singly. But this rule is to be observed. When once disunited as above shown, the two divisions become distinct bodies, and are to be handled as independent troops. Nothing unites them again but the Commanding-officer's word to "Double the Ranks," which order, if addressed to divisions marching by twos or ones, is to be preceded by an increase of front to Fours; on the receipt of which command the leader of the rearmost division leads up his column on the left of its predecessor. Squadrons, i. e. two troops united and without interval, I propose to abolish altogether. It is not necessary to go into further detail. If the unit of the system-the troop will work, it is an easy matter to combine several units into a whole. I should propose to form a regiment of three troops of about fifty men each; and to distinguish the troops by giving to them respectively a Red, a White, and a Black flag like a lance-pennon, carried on an ordinary lance slung to the left arm of the horseman.

This system, if it worked in the field as it does on paper, would give the power of acting either in single or double rank. To encounter a hostile cavalry on an open plain, I should form double rank. But in an enclosed country I should use the single rank, closed up in compact order where the ground permitted, but otherwise riding with any amount of looseness consistent with keeping the members of each Four within hail of each other, and the whole within hail of the Division Leader. Under the latter circumstances my ideal regiment should resolve itself into six clumps of five-and-twenty fox-hunters a piece; each clump

under the guidance of a division leader, each two division leaders receiving the directions of a troop leader, and the whole under the brigadiership of the Commandingofficer. And if said fox-hunters would dress and ride like fox-hunters, and not like bad imitations of an original which, for the purposes we are now treating of, is the worst conceivable-the regular dragoon,—and if they would carry a firearm capable of coping in point of range with the infantry weapon,-I think they might tie regular cavalry to the apronstrings of its infantry, and constitute themselves a thorn in the side of even the latter.

Everything has its weak side, and even my parental eye cannot be blind to the weak side of mine. How would it work in action, when men are falling out of the ranks, and the Fours find themselves reduced to Threes, Twos, or Ones?

I attack this difficulty as follows: whether with prospect of success or not, others may decide. I forbid that any unbroken Four or Two should be disintegrated to supply the deficiencies of others; and leave the broken ones to hold as far as possible the place of the original sections which they represent. A Four reduced to a number not less than Three can "go about" as well as ever. When reduced to a Two or One, it no longer has this power; therefore, when the line goes about, it must ride to the Front clear of the line (or rein back, if belonging to the rear rank), turn to the right-about, and resume its place :-as prescribed for the Standard and his Coverer, p. 116 of the Cavalry Regulations. I should permit men of their own accord to amalgamate broken sections which find themselves in immediate proximity; and when at last reduced to a rearrangement, should effect it as follows:-"Twos to the front." Each Two belonging to an incomplete Four rides to the Front, leaving, if it be part of a "Three,' the "odd" man behind, and forms on the right flank of the division. The moment the Twos have cleared the front, the word is given Ones to the Front." Each solitary One rides out and forms on the right again of

the re-formed Twos. The line effaces gaps by closing in on its left flank. A "telling off by Fours" from the left, confined to the broken fragments on the right flank, completes the operation. No intact Four is broken, nor any intact Two. To effect the same purpose the broken parts of the Rear-rank rein back. I began this paper with mention of Colonel Conolly's system. I may finish with it. His general object, like mine, is to render Inversion more generally the rule of movement than it is at present. He forms his squadron (for he adheres to that body) in single rank; tells it off into four divisions, and tells off the men of each division by Files alone, thereby relinquishing the power of moving by Threes or Fours. I have been unable to gather from the necessarily brief details furnished by him whether he permits Inversion to be practised with regard to bodies smaller than the division. However this may be, there are features in the system admitting of no misapprehension, against which, I think, serious objections may be urged.

Having no movements by ThreesI use the word Three as a generic term including Fours as well-Colonel Conolly's squadron, if desirous of moving to a flank or a front smaller than a division, can do it by no process but that of trailing itself out by Files, thereby covering an extent greater than its front in line, and consequently entailing loss of time in re-forming. It can reverse its front on no ground which is not spacious enough to admit of the wheel of a division of, we may suppose, nine or twelve men. Imagine such a squadron drawn up in a narrow lane, and required suddenly to show a front to its former rear: how would it do it? These objections might be trifling in the estimation of a French cuirassier, who never contemplated moving on

ground which did not admit of the wheel of a division; but they are not trifling when considered with reference to their effect on the movements of cavalry through the narrow roads and lanes of England.

Finally, Colonel Conolly's squadron is to be formed in single rank. This formation, I grant, is the right one, as regards the attack upon Infantry or Artillery. A front-rank horse shot in a charge probably trips up his rear-rank follower; and the fear inspired on the part of the rearrank of being thrown down, and on the part of the front rank of being tumbled over, can in no wise contribute to the energy of either. But when the question regards the encounter of cavalry with cavalry, the case in my opinion is different. The loose, broken appearance which a single rank assumes under slight disorder inevitably induced by an advance at speed, would afford a strong encouragement to its densely-massed opponents to push-if at nothing else-at all events at the gaps in the array; and a sharp dash at a gap, even though prompted by motives the reverse of valorous, might by the influence of example draw on the body of a squadron into a rush which it would be difficult to withstand.

I must request the reader to take notice that I lay no sort of claim to infallibility; that I do not even assert that I feel assured in my own mind that my own views are right. I confine myself to the statement that they seem to me to contain in principle an approach to what is right. As for any desire to see them rashly put into practice, I can safely say that if Heaven were so far to dement the Horse - Guards as to lead them straightway to reorganise the British Cavalry on my system, and make me Inspector-General, the most frightened man in the British service would be myself.

PLAUSIBILITY is a wonderful and valuable gift. For immediate effect it is almost as powerful as truth, which it always attempts to simulate-as cogent as sound reason, of which it is a clever imitation. It does not, indeed, impose upon us for any long period, because, like other shams, it is certain to be detected at last; but it may be so employed as to produce a favourable impression, and even lead to momentary conviction. Which of us has not been victimised, more than once, by some cunning and seemingly artless tale of distress, so plausibly narrated that our bowels of compassion were stirred within us, and our pursestrings readily unloosed? Yet let that tale which, when poured into our ears, seemed so utterly beyond the taint of suspicion, be recalled to memory and leisurely considered the probability is that we shall then detect in it some inconsistency or contradiction, quite sufficient to throw great doubt upon the veracity of the narrator, but unmarked by us while under the influence of the pathetic spell. Also, if a stranger should happen to go into a court of law when a pleader of renown is opening a case divested of technicalities, the chances are that he will be won over by the eloquence, art, and ingenuity of the speaker; and, if he does not think fit to tarry for the reply, will return home fully impressed with the notion that the arguments which he has just heard are so convincing and conclusive that there is actually no room for refutation.

The present Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Gladstone, is a consummate master of plausibility. His financial speeches are really wonderful efforts of rhetoric. He arranges his matter so dexterously, he shifts so deftly from subject to subject, and interlards his discourse with so many axioms apparently sound and solid, riveting the attention of the audience as much by his manner as his matter, that immediate discussion of any of his schemes is felt to be profitless and absurd. With the voice of the

declaimer sounding in our ears, we cannot duly weigh the accuracy of his facts, or test the solidity of his arguments. The music of the rhapsody must die away before we can give proper attention to the meaning and construction of the words. But Mr Gladstone is plausible even beyond this mark, which, had he been an orator of ancient times, would have made him the pride of the agora or the forum. His speeches are so well contrived, that even to the second audience-that is, the reading public-they convey some idea of his wonderful power, and exercise that degree of influence towards effecting persuasion which none but great orators can attain. We use no fantastic simile when we liken one of his financial speeches to a sheet of frozen water. Look at it well, survey it round the margin, and there is not visible a single crack or fissure. But, for all that, you will do well to pause, and consider, and feel your way, before you venture on the ice. It is not all of the same thickness. There are many parts of that seemingly solid, but really treacherous surface, which will not bear the weight of so substantial a personage as our worthy father, Mr Bull.

It is our purpose, in the present paper, to follow Mr Gladstone through some of his plausibilities, with the view of demonstrating that his present financial scheme, taken in connection with the French commercial treaty (from which it is inseparable), is not only unwise and unfair, but in sume respects very injurious to the general interests of the country. The opinions which we have formed, upon an attentive perusal and reperusal of his speech-which we admit to be a masterpiece of art-are clear and decided. In this matter we are not influenced, in the slightest degree, by party considerations. We do not wish to see the present Ministry displaced. We are content with the knowledge that the Opposition is so strong that the Palmerston Cabinet dare not deviate much from the path of duty and

sound British policy without experiencing a fatal reverse; and had Mr Gladstone presented us with another budget, the details of which he has more than shadowed outevidently denoting that at one time he contemplated its adoption-we should have been content, under the circumstances, to have acceded to it, even though it involved further augmentation of that grievous impost the income-tax, of the ultimate extinction of which there seems no likelihood whatever. But this Budget differs, in one remarkable respect, from any other which has ever yet been brought forward by a British minister of finance. It is based on, and tabled along with, a Treaty of Commerce with France, a power of whose pacific intentions we have so little certainty, that the great deficit apparent on the estimated revenue of the approaching financial year, as compared with the expenditure, is solely owing to the necessity of increasing our armaments for simple purposes of defence. Now, we say that, however sincere may be the desire of the Emperor of the French for the adoption of a new and improved commercial system within his own dominions, it it not for the honour of this country to be entering into treaties, or to be making concessions, at such a time. We have the misfortune-if misfortune it be -to repose no faith in his sincerity. We regard this Treaty as an attempt to strike up a political, not a commercial alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Britain, or at least to have the Treaty paraded as such before the eyes of the rest of Europe. We believe that the Emperor thinks, probably on the assurance of Mr Cobden, that if he can but entangle us in a commercial treaty, so framed that the incometax shall be maintained at a war rate in time of peace, owing to concessions of revenue made for his especial advantage, the "nation of shopkeepers" will consent to his extension of the boundaries of France, to the absorption this year of Savoy, with the possible addition of a descent on Central Italy, and other slight contingent spoliations of duchies, provinces, and so forth, adjacent

to his present eastern frontier, about which there is no immediate hurry. We desire to guard ourselves against the imputation of being opposed to friendly relations with France. We are fully impressed with the convic tion that nothing could be more desirable for the peace of Europe, and for the interests of civilisation, than a cordial understanding and frank interchange between the two great powers of the West. But the antecedent conditions to that should have been-which, we are sorry to say, the present Ministry have neither the discernment, the courage, nor the patriotism to require that France, whose real rights and territory are menaced by no European power, must renounce all schemes of conquest or aggrandisement, respect boundaries and treaties, abandon "ideas" and "inexorable logic of facts," and give a pledge to that effect by such a sweeping reduction of her armament by sea and land, already too great for her resources, as may convince us that she is thoroughly in earnest. It was in the power of the Palmerston Ministry to have insisted upon such conditions as an indispensable preliminary to entering into any treaty. They had not the courage to do so; and the consequence is, that while we are compelled to keep up a war establishment, we are asked, in an oleaginous way, to sacrifice a large portion of our ordinary customs' revenue in favour of France, and, besides that, to pay a larger amount of income-tax than before! And that in a year when, by the lapsing of the long annuities, no less a sum than two millions and upwards was taken from the public expenditure!

We wish to argue this matter quietly, and without any degree of excitement; but we must needs say, that, supposing it possible that old Noll Cromwell (whose British spirit we revere, whatever we may think of his behaviour in other respects) could have been present at the Cabinet meeting when such a degradation was proposed, the chances are that he would have cleared the apartment in as summary a manner as he once dispersed the House of Commons.

But degradation or not-let us