present state of the taste for wine in this country he considered to be the result of the long prevalence of the existing financial system; but he held that you could not alter it essentially, except in the course of years." Mr Gladstone then objected to any reduction of the wine-duty 1st, Because it would occasion a loss to the revenue which could not for a long time be compensated by increased consumption; and, 2d, Because the advocates of the reduction of the wine-duties were 66 competitors with a host of persons recommending reduction upon other articles as important-nay, in some cases more important--upon the whole, to the comfort of the community. If you said we must sacrifice £1,000,000 for some years upon wine, you must be prepared to confront those who told you-and told you truly-that with that £1,000,000 a-year you might effect a great reform in the duties upon tea; you might effect something very near a reconstruction of your Customs' tariff generally." Accordingly, in bringing forward his budget on 18th April 1853, Mr Gladstone declined making any reduction on the wine-duties, but proposed an immediate reduction on tea, from 2s. 2 d. to 1s. 10d., with a prospective reduction, making the duty, from and after April 1856, 1s. on the pound of tea.

Now, lest it should be said that Mr Gladstone's objections to the scheme of Mr Oliveira were mainly directed against the proposal of the latter, that the wine-duty should be reduced to 1s. per gallon, and that he might have been more favourably disposed if a lesser reduction had been suggested, let us quote his own words from the financial statement of the year. Having announced generally that the Government had determined to make no change in those duties, he said that one plan which might have been adopted but for the conviction of the Ministry that the existing duties should be retained, would be "to reduce the duty to a low uniform duty of 18. 6d. or 2s., or, at most, say 2s. 6d. the gallon. Now, you cannot do that unless you are prepared to sacrifice an amount of revenue for the first year of at the

very least £700,000, besides an additional difficulty in regard to the drawback on stocks in hand, with respect to which it is possible that the Government might form a sturdy resolution, in which the House of Commons might afterwards be induced not to concur. But, whether that be so or not, a loss to the revenue of £700,000 more on the article of wine is very serious; and the importance of the change in connection with its cost will not, we think, advantageously bear a comparison with other objects that the Government have in view."

It is worth noting that Mr Oliveira distinctly expressed his opinion that it should be "a sine qua non, in granting the reduction of duty on foreign wines, that the countries so favoured should, at the same time, admit British manufactured goods at a corresponding low duty;" but that view was sternly repudiated by the Chamber of Commerce of Manchester, who held it to be a violation of the principles of free-trade; and also by the late Mr Porter, who gave his opinion thus :-" In dealing with our own tariff, I would never ask if a foreign Government would do it. I would do that which I thought for the best interests of this country, and have them do the best they could for the interests of their own country." That is unquestionably the cardinal doctrine of free-trade, from which this treaty of commerce with France is a gross departure; and Mr Cobden, who negotiated it, the Ministry who have adopted it, and the members of the Manchester Chamber who have approved of it, are, one and all, renegades from their political faith, and now fall back upon the reciprocity doctrine, which was that maintained by the Protectionists. The doctrine, however, is one thing, the practical application is another; and in making this bargain with France, we must needs say that our neophytes have exhibited much more zeal than discretion. That the conversion is of recent date the following extracts will show. In July last Lord John Russell was pleased to observe, in his own sententious way:"I should be very loth to enter into any sort of correspondence which

upon wine. Now, we consider that the Government is in some degree pledged to reduce the duties on tea and sugar, by removing the additional tax on those articles which was levied on account of the war, before it makes any other kind of remission; and no member of the Government is so strongly bound, in honour and on principle, to adhere to that pledge as Mr Gladstone, who, in 1853, proposed that after April 1856 the duty upon tea should be 1s. per lb. In his Budget of that year he gave tea the decided preference to wine-in his present Budget he takes exactly the opposite view. Plausible as he is, he cannot invent arguments to excuse this change of opinion. Why should he? We all know perfectly well how the matter stands. Let him face the difficulty like a man, and plead the sic volo sic jubeo of our guileless and disinterested ally.

One other observation we must make before we conclude. The Budget, taken as a whole, is defective; for it does not provide for the raising of sufficient revenue to meet the expenditure. This is a point of real importance; for, if the estimated expenditure for the following year should happen to be as large as that of 1860, there will be a new deficit which can only be met by a further augmentation of the income-tax. Mr Gladstone has included in his revenue account a quarter of a million received from Spain, being payment of an old debt, and also takes as revenue £1,400,000 of malt and hop credits which are to be called up. Further, he has thrown into the revenue of the year no less than three millions of income-tax, which, by existing arrangements, would form part of the revenue of the succeeding year. Moreover, he has postponed payment of £1,000,000 of Exchequer bonds. Therefore, in 1861, Mr Gladstone, or whoever may be then Chancellor of the Exchequer, must, supposing that our expenditure is not materially lessened, be prepared to face an additional deficit of more than five millions and a hall Can there be any stronger arguinent than is against the proposed

remissions of excise and customs" duties ?

We are told that, the treaty haring been concluded, though sub ject to the approval of Parliament, we should allow it to come into operation, even though we may ob ject to its details, lest we should rouse an angry feeling among our neighbours. We protest against any such doctrine as unconstitutional and unworthy; for if that were once accepted, Ministers would be omnipotent, and the functions of a free Parliament curtailed. But have the men who hold this language really considered what are the true sentiments of the French people; or, rather, that most important section of them, the manufacturers, in rogard to this treaty? If the newspaper accounts are to be trusted, they are vehemently opposed to its tendency and its provisions. They prophesy that the introduction of British manufactures into France, even though fenced by an import duty of 30 and 25 per cent, will be their ruín; and they have even gone the length of representing to their Emperor that the inevitable result of this treaty must be a war, for the purpose of relieving them from their engagements. Whether they are right or wrong in their anticipations of the effect which this treaty will have upon the industrial interests of France, we cannot take upon us to say; but there can be no doubt that the treaty, as a whole, is hateful to the French manufac turers, the only class who sincerely desire-or hitherto have done soto cultivate friendly relations with this country. It is on account of the intensity of that feeling that the introduction of British manufactures into France has been postponed for nineteen months at least such is the reason assigned by the French diplomatists, who, it may be, are secretly of opinion that, if they contrive to get a sufficient supply of our coal, especially of that kind which is adapted for purposes of naval war. fare, in the interim, there is not much likelihood that France will be inundated by British manufactures. In our relations with foreign states, we

have now recognised the principle of taking into account the will of the nations, as well as the wish of their rulers. From all we can see or learn, the will of the French nation is against this treaty. No doubt there have been pamphlets issued by economical writers in its support; but these meet with no attention, and make no proselytes. The grand fact remains that the French manufacturers loathe the treaty, and say that they would rather risk a war with Great Britain than see it brought into full operation.

This appears to us to be a very serious matter indeed. The French are a jealous and highly irritable people; and it is a vast misfortune that their present constitution is such, that we have no means of ascertaining what is the aggregate general opinion. Had there been a free Chamber of Deputies, representing agricultural, manufacturing, and trading interests, their resolutions would have been an excellent guide. But there is nothing of the kind. We have to deal solely with a dark inscrutable man, upon whose good faith it is impossible to place any reliance. Mr Bright and his disciples profess to have the utmost confidence in his probity; but, on the contrary, the transactions of the last twelve months bear damning evidence to the contrary. What have become of the stipulations of Villafranca --where is the Treaty of Zurich-what is this we hear about the bargain

for the cession of Savoy, in case Sardinia should acquire Lombardy, and the annexation of Nice, if Venetia could be wrested from the Austrians? Let us not be duped. The only great permanent and pacific interest in France is opposed-rightfully or wrongfully, we need not inquire-to this treaty of commerce. It is the commercial voice, in spite of despotism and suppression of journals, which speaks; and we are bound to listen to it. We do not require to push our trade with France in the face of remonstrance; and if we try to do so, we alienate from our side, and from the cause of tranquillity and peace, the only class of Frenchmen who are our real well-wishers, and whose interest is the maintenance of peace. One day or other, the Empire will end-not possibly without convulsion, but end it will. Such a nation as the French will not endure the burden long. But, while the present system lasts, it is of the last importance that we should not mistake the will of the Emperor for the wish of the nation. We must not let it be supposed that, for any political ends, we have ratified a bargain with the Prince, which we would not have submitted to the free discussion of the people. We are against the treaty altogether. We say, Let it die, perish as waste paper, and let each country adjust its own tariff according to its exigencies. If the Freetraders object to this course, we refer them to their own publications.

THE generation whose attention was awakened to public events during the second quarter of the present century, beheld a man standing solitary and high above the most eminent of the time. He was not only above rivalry, but above envy. His fame, not associated with any party nor any measure, was the common property of Englishmen. His words on grave or on light matters were received like the utterances of an oracle. He lived altogether in public, yet familiarity with his presence seemed to increase instead of diminishing the respect of the multitude. Leaders of parties about to close in desperate strife, would pause at his word like knights in a tournament obeying the truncheon of their marshal. When there was doubt or change in the councils of the State, his wisdom was the unfailing resort of the Crown. Breathing this atmosphere of deference, which to most men would have been enervating or intoxicating, but was to him healthful as native air, he passed onward through old age to his honoured grave. The generation that knew him

only in this high and unquestioned position was accustomed to consider it as the meed of his military greatness alone. They saw him fill no great political office-they heard his name associated in the politics of the past only with obsolete prejudices, which had yielded to opposition but not to conviction. Even his military greatness they generally took for granted, believing in the glories of Salamanca, Vittoria, and Waterloo, but trusting in his fame with a faithful rather than a discriminating spirit. It is the object of these volumes not only to place his claims as a general on a clear and just foundation, but to set forth the opinion firmly held by both his biographers, that he was no less eminent as a statesman than as a soldier, and that the great qualities which carried him so triumphantly through his long and desperate struggle with the armies of France, had likewise conspicuously upheld him in the councils of England and of Europe.

It is not easy to conceive conditions more favourable to the execution of this design than those under

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