their fate than sympathising with the movement. They had not the sagacity to see the result, or they had not the fortitude to resist the pressure of immediate circumstances. They went, therefore, to their doom; and we are wont to regard them with little compassion in the ruin which overtook them. There may still have been, rightly considered, something to bespeak our pity and forbearance, even in the failures of these unhappy men; and there may have been, inwardly, little real difference between the traitorous enemy and the loyal ally. We judge by outward appearances-by palpable results; and as we have disgraced and destroyed the one, we are bound to honour and to enrich the other.

That the services rendered to the British Government by the native princes and chiefs were of the most substantial character, and tended largely to the re-establishment of our authority, is all that we really have to consider, when we take account of their claims to liberal recognition and reward. How largely we are beholden to them we purpose to show, and, having shown, to demonstrate that the charge of ingratitude which has been raised in some quarters against the British Government is altogether unfounded. Honours and rewards have been meted out to our allies with no niggardly hand. But it would not appear, from the manner in which the subject is from time to time alluded to in Parliament, that there is any very clear understanding of the manner in which the national gratitude has manifested itself towards the fidelity which saved us from destruction. If, therefore, we can bring together, in a small space, the information illustrative of this subject, scattered over many books and papers, accessible or not accessible to the public, we shall do some service. We observe that papers have been called for and have been ordered to be laid on the table of the House of Lords. We have little doubt that, when the return is made, the papers will be printed; but this is necessarily a work of time, and, except when they bear upon passing politics, parliamentary papers are read only by the very few. Such, in the pre

sent time, is public impatience, and such is not official reticence, that papers a few weeks old are held to be stale and weary. History was once an affair of "auld lang syne "it is now an affair of yesterday. Whether we gain more than we lose by this promptitude of publication, appears to us to be somewhat doubtful. Our impression is, that its tendency is to beget only what are known in trade as "quick returns and small profits." People may think that they get the truth, and that the fresher it is the better-that it is a fine thing to hold in one's hand important diplomatic correspondence with the first bloom upon it-the revelations of the Foreign Office only two days old. But this greed for red-hot official news overleaps itself. If it were to be gorged with the real thing, it would be wholly impossible to govern the country. The cry, therefore, of "Give, give!" can only be met by the manufacture of an article expressly to be given. Under such a pressure official correspondence must be written expressly for Parliament. There is no help for it. We are, under such circumstances, simply unjust to the great servants of the State, when we charge them with drifting into an irresponsible kind of demi-official or private correspondence, containing, as it were, the key to the cipher in which the public correspondence is written. If the custom be a dangerous one, we have to thank Parliament for originating it. The continual cry of "Egad! I'll have it out!" is to be met in no other way, without detriment to the real interests of the State.

We ask pardon for this digression. All we had purposed to say is, that whilst Blue Books are being published, full of what purports to be the very latest European history, we cannot expect much attention to be bestowed upon a volume of official Indian correspondence ranging over the last three years. Therefore, if we had now before us several hundred folio pages devoted to this matter of our account-current with the native princes and chiefs of India, we should still run small chance of being anticipated, in men's minds, by the official publication. But the book is not yet a fact, and therefore we have still less

hesitation in saying what we know about the matter, confident that the official revelations, when they come, will prove the accuracy of our statements.

Where shall we begin? Up in the far north. It is commonly said that the Punjab conquered Delhi, and therefore that it saved India. Without the military resources which Sir John Lawrence was able to pour down, at the critical time, upon the rebellious city, Delhi would not have fallen when it did. But, if we had had a troublesome enemy between Delhi and the Punjab, could that timely assistance have been rendered to our beleaguering force-if the Punjab troops had been compelled to fight their way down; or even if the occupants of the intervening country had refused to assist them with carriage, with supplies, with moneyhow would it have fared with them? If the great chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej states had risen in that conjuncture, they might have brought sore distress upon our advancing columns. But their loyalty was never doubted. They had been justly treated and wisely handled for half a century. Such men as Ochterlony, Murray, and George Clerk, had taught them to believe in Englishmen, and understand their own true interests. But for the protection of the British Government they would have been swallowed up by Runjeet Singh; and, never unmindful of this, they had clung to us (with one exceptional case of disloyalty to be mentioned presently) through evil report and good report-and now, when trouble beset us, were ready to prove their loyalty in the face of the world.

The Maharajah of Puteealah is the first in honour and in power of the Cis-Sutlej chiefs. His territory on three sides adjoins our own districts, and the ample resources at his command would have enabled him, in that conjuncture, to work us grievous annoyance. His loyalty, however, was not questioned. The Puteealah chiefs had always been true to their engagements; and the Maharajah never hesitated for a moment as to the course it became him to pura The events which had ocMeerut and Delhi were no

cur

sooner known to him than he placed himself at the head of his disposable troops and marched down upon Umballah. Openly espousing the cause of the British Government, he flung himself, with his whole heart, into the work before him; and great as was the good that he did, greater still was the evil he averted. Had he, in such a crisis, hung backhad he even yielded a grudging, hesitating support, the whole country above Delhi, through which sinister reports were then freely circulating, would have risen against us. As it was, the attitude he assumed allayed the apprehensions and gave assurance to the minds of wavering chiefs and an excited people. "His support at such a crisis," it was said in the official despatches of the day,

was worth a brigade of English troops to us, and served more to tranquillise the people than a hundred official disclaimers would have done."

Eager as was the Maharajah to march down at the head of his men to Delhi, and to give stern practical refusal to the invitation he had re-, ceived from the Mogul, it was considered to be sound policy to restrain him, as his presence in the country above was more serviceable than with the besieging army. Occupying Umballah, Thaneysur, and Kurnaul, and keeping open the road between the last-named place and the arsenal at Phillour, he not only rendered essential service to the British Government by holding an important tract of country, but he was able to cooperate with Van Cortlandt in his successful attacks on the mutineers, and to detach a portion of his force, under a trusted commander, to take part in the attack upon Delhi. His money was as freely at our disposal as his troops. He contributed five lakhs of rupees to the Punjab loana very appreciable service at such a time-and would have doubled the amount had it been required from him.

Equally true to his engagementsequally prompt to aid the British Government in the hour of need, was the Rajah of Jheend. His resources were not great, but he placed them freely at our disposal. At the head of his little contingent of eight hun

dred men-a well-equipped force of all arms, he moved at once upon Kurnaul. Thence he sent a detachment to secure the bridge of boats at Bhagput, and thus enabled our troops from Meerut to cross the Jumna, and to form a junction with the column under General Barnard, then marching down upon Delhi. With that force went the Rajah and his contingent or rather, it should be said, in advance of it-and were soon hotly engaged with the enemy under the walls of the imperial city. "The Jheend men with me," wrote Hodson, on the 10th of June, "fought like excellent soldiers." Escorting into camp the artillery captured at Budlee-Serai, the Rajah received the thanks of the British commander, and a present of a nine-pounder gun. He went through all the dangers and privations of the siege, and if his troops were not uniformly successful, his exertions, at all events, were unstinted, and his loyalty unquestioned. During some part of the operations against Delhi, he was beneficially employed in the surrounding country, putting down disturbances, keeping open our communications, and collecting supplies for our camp-but he rejoined the British army in time to take part in the assault and capture of the city; and he deserves especial honour as the only native chief who was personally concerned in that glorious achievement.

The Rajah of Nabha was at that time a youth between seventeen and eighteen years of age. His father, who was still alive, had been dethroned eleven years before, for a palpable breach of his engagements to the British Government at the time of the first Sikh war. The son had no disposition to incur the penalties which had been inflicted on the father. Summoned, on the first outbreak of the rebellion, to march upon Loodheanah, and to occupy that station, he promptly obeyed. Having placed all his existing resources freely at the disposal of the paramount state, he raised new levies to afford us further support. When escorts were wanted he supplied them; when carriage was wanted he supplied it; thus enabling our siege-train and ordnance stores to pass down to

Delhi. When money was wanted, his treasury was emptied to supply our need. When opportunity was offered, his troops were turned out to give battle to the enemy. More remote from the scene of action, he had not the same means of displaying his loyalty by active service; but he did all that lay in his power, and fairly earned his reward.

The good deeds of these true-hearted Cis-Sutlej chiefs did not long remain unrewarded. Early in the succeeding year, the Government of India took into consideration the best means of testifying its hearty appreciation of the loyalty of its Sikh allies. There is nothing so welcome as territory to such men. But to give away territory is to give the right to rule over so many thousands of human beings, and, in all cases of territorial grants, the welfare of the people has, therefore, to be considered by the paramount state. We are not of the number of those who look upon all native rule as misgovernment of the worst kind, and conceive that, in all cases, the greatest blessing we can confer on a population is its transfer to European management. Still, we think that the Government of India is right in maintaining the principle and the practice of not allowing territory that has once been under British administration to pass back again under native rule. In some cases, a distinct pledge has been given to the people that no such_restoration shall ever take place. But fortunately the British Government had it in their power largely to reward the loyal Cis-Sutlej chiefs without bestowing upon them territory which had been under the management of our European officers. There were disloyal as well as loyal chiefs in Upper India. The marvel is that there were not many more of the former. Among these disloyal chiefs, rightly punished for their offences, was the Nawab of Jhujjur. The Jagheer, which he held before the mutiny, had been granted to his grandfather by Lord Lake, for services in the Mahratta war; but his loyalty to the government from which he derived his greatness was not proof against the allurements of the House of Delhi. He cast in his

lot with the Mogul; was beaten, captured, tried, and hanged. His territory was, therefore, at the disposal of the British Government. With other confiscated lands, it formed a fund wherefrom rich gifts might be drawn, for the reward of loyal chiefs and the encouragement of their successors, from generation to generation. On the Maharajah of Puteealah was bestowed a large slice of the Jhujjur territory, yielding annual revenue of some two lakhs of rupees, or £20,000, with certain proprietary rights in some villages much coveted by him; and, rather as an honorary distinction than for its substantial value, a house in the city of Delhi, formerly belong ing to Zeermul Mehul, the favourite wife of the old Mogul. To the Rajah of Jheend was given the confiscated Dadree territory, of annual value of one lakh, or £10,000, and a house in Delhi, formerly occupied by one of the princes of the imperial family. To the Rajah of Nabha, another slice of the Jhujjur territory, yielding a revenue of a lakh of rupees per annum. And to all, honorary distinctions in the appreciable shape of increased titles and salutes. Bis dat qui cito dat. These rewards were promptly bestowed. And, at a later period, when the Governor-General met these loyal Cis-Sutlej chiefs face to face in Durbar, he gave them the fullest assurance that they and their descendants should possess their lands, from generation to generation in perpetuity, with right, in the event of failure of direct heirs, to name their successors. They were anxious, we believe, to have sunnuds, or grants, under the sign-manual of the Queen herself. But there are heavy considerations which render it doubtful policy to comply with such a request as this; not the least of which is the fact that, if such an exceptional guarantee were given to these chiefs, the value of the security held by others would be deteriorated, at least in their own estimation, and the authority of the viceroy impaired.

Perhaps even more remarkable than the bearing of these Cis-Sutlej

chiefs were the loyalty and good service of the Rajah of Kupoorthulla. The former were bound, in some measure, to the British Government by ties of gratitude. Our policy, so far as their interests were concerned, had been generally of a conservative character. Under British protection they had maintained their possessions in security. We had neither suffered others to absorb them nor absorbed them ourselves. But the Rajah of Kupoorthulla had suffered grievously under the displeasure of the British Government. He was the representative of the great Sikh Alloowalla family, the power and importance of which had at one time been little inferior to those of Runjeet himself. In 1806, when Lord Lake's army pursued Holkar's flying battalions into the Punjab, the British authorities negotiated with Runjeet Singh and Futteh Singh, the Alloowalla, conjointly. At a later period the power of the great Lahore chief eclipsed that of his rival, but on the death of Runjeet, the Alloowalla family, then represented by Sindar Nehal Singh, were in possession of extensive tracts of country on both sides of the Sutlej, yielding in all an annual revenue of some twelve lakhs of rupees. On the outbreak of the first Sikh war, in 1845, the Alloowalla chief had no power to control his soldiery, and they fought against us at the battle of Aliwal. But whether the heart of the chief himself was with his excited countrymen, or whether he would fain have been true to his engagements with the British Government, is not very apparent. But, partly as the result of this failure, and partly as the consequence of the subsequent annexation of the Punjab to the British dominions, the Alloowalla revenues* were reduced, by different processes, which we need not particularise, from twelve lakhs of rupees to little more than one, at which amount they stood, when the breaking-out of the Sepoy mutiny suddenly convulsed the country.

At this time the head of the family was Rundheer Singh-a young man,

held in good esteem by the British authorities in the Punjab. He was no longer the Alloowalla Sirdar, for the village of Alloo, from which the family-name was derived, had been "resumed," with other possessions, on the death of his father, by the British authorities. He was now called the Kupoorthulla Rajah, and as such he will take his place in history. There was no reason why, on the breaking-out of the Sepoy war, he should have considered himself bound to make any great exertions to support the Government whose introduction into the Punjab had so shorn him of wealth and power. He was not bound by treaty to supply a single man to fight on our side; for, among the sources of his decay was the payment of a large sum of money annually to the British Government, in lieu of the contingent which his forefathers had been bound by treaty to furnish. But, when the crisis came, he gave all that he could give with an unstinting hand. His troops were at once placed at the command of the British Government, and, in the most trying season of the year, he abandoned all the luxuries of his home at Kupoorthulla, to place himself at their head. He would fain have sent a part of his force to Delhi, but the British authorities assured him that they would be more serviceable nearer home.

The services of the Rajah of Kupoorthulla in the Punjabee country have already been recorded in the pages of this Journal.* We need but allude here in the briefest terms to the material assistance rendered by him to the British Government, both at Julhudur and Sealkote to the manner in which he and his brother, Bekrana Singh, when the spirit of mutiny had displayed itself at the former place, went through the streets of the city, assuring the minds of the townspeople, upon whom a great panic had descended. How he detached a body of his cavalry in pursuit of the mutineers; and how generally, by his presence in that critical conjuncture, he largely contributed to, if he

did not by himself maintain, the security of the station, including the treasury and the jail, both of which were in peril of being emptied out by the mutineers; how, in July 1857, when mutiny broke out at Sealkote, he detached a force of all arms to Hushiarpore, for the protection of that station, where they remained till November; how other detachments of his little army escorted the wives and children of our officers and soldiers from Jhullundur to Lahore; and how, uncontaminated by bad example around them, the soldiery of our ally behaved on all occasions in the most exemplary manner,—are already matters of history. Throughout the most trying period of that momentous year, 1857, the Rajah, his brother, and all his officials, vied with each other in good works; and it is not ungrudgingly admitted by the British authorities, that the safety of the Jhullundur Doab, during that period, is to be attributed, under Providence, to their exertions.

The Cis-Sutlej chiefs did well; they proved themselves to be faithful allies and stanch friends of the British Government. But they were bound by treaty to bring into the field all their troops to our assistance. The Kupoorthulla Rajah, on the other hand, was exempted, by the payment of an equivalent in money, from all such obligations. When, therefore, he brought his forces to our aid, he might have fairly claimed to be released from the money-payment. But he paid his tribute punctually, though he involved himself in further debt to enable him to do so; for he said that the British Government, in such a crisis, wanted money even more than himself.

The British Government, however, could not accept both his services and his money. They refunded, therefore, to him a year's tribute; and, in recognition of his good deeds, they permanently reduced his payments by the sum of 25,000 rupees a-year; they gave him a khillut, or gift of honour, of 15,000 rupees; bestowed on him a salute of eleven

for 1858.