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soon as the condition is performed. Thus, where the condition is that the amount of the order is due one on account of whose labor it is drawn, and that sum is in fact then due him, performance of the condition and payment of the debt are simultaneous and instantaneous, although the fact that the amount was then due the laborer is not ascertained till some time after. It is the fact and not the ascertainment of it that constitutes the performance of the condition and makes the payment absolute. Waite v. Vose, 62 Me. 184.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

Filling blanks.-A person delivering to another a paper bearing his signature with blanks unfilled therein, which he must necessarily expect will be filled to make it a complete instrument, gives implied authority to the person receiving it to fill the blanks; and if they are filled fraudulently the maker will be liable thereon to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Thus, a person who negligently delivers to another a blank note, having the name of the payee and the words "or order" therein, intending that it shall be used for a specified purpose, will be liable thereon if the blanks are wrongfully filled, and the note then transferred to a bona fide holder for value, without notice of the fraud. Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194.

SUBTERRANEAN WATER.

Diversion by well.-The defendant having dug his well on his own land, in good faith, for the obtaining of water for his own domestic uses, is not liable for any damage which incidentally resulted to the plaintiff by reason of thereby diverting the water which had been accustomed to percolate or flow, in an unknown subterranean current, into the plaintiff's spring. Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175.

TELEGRAPH COMPANY.

Limitation of liability.- A rule adopted by a telegraph company, that it will receive and send messages by night at half its usual rates "on condition that the company shall not be liable for errors or delay in the transmission or delivery, or for the non-delivery of such messages, from whatever cause occurring, and shall only be bound in such case to return the amount paid by the sender," is against public policy; and is, therefore, void, even when assented to by the sender. Bartlett v. W. U. Tel. Co., 62 Me. 209.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A TONNAGE TAX ON VESSELS-POWERS OF CITIES.

In Cannon v. City of New Orleans, the Supreme Court recently decided an important question relative to the power of cities to impose a tax on vessels using their ports. An ordinance of the city of New Orleans demanded of all steamboats which should moor or land in any part of the port of New Orleans a sum measured by the tonnage of the vessel. This was held a tonnage tax within the meaning of the federal constitution, and therefore void. Miller, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "In saying this we do not understand that this principle interposes any hindrance to the recovery from any vessel landing at a wharf or pier owned by an individual or by a municipal or other corporation, a just compensation for the use of such property. It is a doctrine too well settled, and a practice too common and too essential to the interests of commerce and navigation to admit of a doubt, that for the use of such structures, erected by

individual enterprise, and recognized everywhere as private property, a reasonable compensation can be exacted. And it may be safely admitted also that it is within the power of the State to regulate this compensation, so as to prevent extortion, a power which is often very properly delegated to the local municipal authority.

"Nor do we see any reason why, when a city or other municipality is the owner of such structures, built by its own money, to assist vessels landing within its limits in the pursuit of their business, the city should not be allowed to exact and receive this reasonable compensation as well as individuals. But in the exercise of this right care must be had that it is not made to cover a violation of the federal constitution in the point under consideration."

The learned judge referred to the fact that the prohibition in the constitution is "that no State shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty of tonnage," and suggested that "if hardships arise in the enforcement of this principle, and the just necessities of a local commerce require a tax which is otherwise forbidden," congress should be appealed to for its

consent.

CONTINUATION OF CONTRACTS MADE DURING MILITARY OCCUPATION.

The general principle is, that the contracts of the conqueror touching things in conquered territory lose their efficacy when his dominion ceases. But in New Orleans v. New York Mail Steamship Co., decided recently in the Supreme Court of the United States, a contract, made during the war of the rebellion in New Orleans, was held not to have ceased on the evacuation of that city by the federal forces. The contract was made under the following circumstances: During the military occupation of New Orleans by the United States army, the city was governed by a mayor, board of finance and a board of street landings, appointed by the commanding general of the department. In July, 1865, the mayor, with the consent of the boards so appointed, executed to the New York Mail Steamship Company a lease of certain water-front property in the city for the term of ten years. The principal question in the case was, whether the lease terminated when the city government was surrendered by the military authorities to the mayor and council elected under the city charter. The court (Swayne, J., delivering the opinion) held, that the lease continued, notwithstanding the change in the municipal government of New Orleans. The city took the place of the United States, and succeeded to all their rights under the contract, and all their liabilities. Judge Swayne said: "In cases of military occupation, the conquering power has a right to displace the pre-existing authority, and to assume, to such extent as it may deem proper, the exercise by itself of all the powers and functions of government. It may appoint all the necessary officers, and clothe them with designated powers, larger or smaller, according to its pleasure. It may prescribe the revenues to be paid, and apply them to its own use or otherwise. It may do any thing necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases, save those which are found in the laws and usages of war. These principles have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject. They have been repeatedly recognized and applied by this court.

Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Litensdorfer v. Webb, 20 id. 176; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129." And the lease in question being for the benefit and improvement of the city, as well as for the advantage of the company, and being a fair and reasonable exercise of the power vested in the military mayor and two boards, it was a valid and continuing contract, binding upon the municipal government which succeeded the military occupation.

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BOOK NOTICES.

The Code of Procedure of the State of New York, with Art. VI of the Constitution; also, The Rules of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, and the Special Rules of the several Courts of the City of New York, as amended to February, 1875. Albany, N. Y.: John D. Parsons, Jr., 1875.

This "diamond" edition of the New York Code and Rules presents in the smallest practicable space about all that is requisite for the general guidance of the practitioner in this State. The amendments have all been incorporated into the present edition, and the work, as it now issues, contains the Code of Procedure, the judiciary article of the constitution, the rules of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, and the special rules of the Supreme Court for New York city, of the superior court, the court of common pleas and the marine court of New York city-all brought down to the present time. The rules are briefly but carefully annotated, the later decisions being more particularly referred to. The different portions of the book are furnished with appropriate indexes; the recent amendments have been placed in italics so far as possible; and nothing has been omitted to render the compilation accurate and complete throughout. The style in which the little work is presented shows, also, that no pains have been spared to secure beauty as well as utility. Unquestionably this is the most full and perfect compilation of the kind which has yet appeared, and no practicing lawyer in this State can afford to be without it.

Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of Indiana. By James Black. Vol. XLV. Indianapolis: Journal Company, Printers and Binders, 1874.

The present volume of Indiana reports contains the usual number of cases of general interest and value. Among the more noticeable cases are to be found the following: Onison v. Heritage, page 73, holds, that where a wife has abandoned her husband without cause, and lived apart from him, he is not liable to a person who, with notice of the abandonment, furnished her necessary support during the separation, though she afterward returned to her husbaud, and he received her and lived with her as his wife. The court, in this case, refers to a passage in 2 Kent's Com. 147, which is as follows: "The fact of the elopement and separation is sufficient to put persons on inquiry, and whoever gives the wife credit afterward, gives it at his peril. The husband is not liable, unless he receives his wife back again." The court construes this language to mean only that the husband, by receiving the wife back, would be liable for necessaries furnished after that time, and not during her absence. In Parkinson v. Finch, page 122, it was held, that a person who signs a note, purporting to be negotiable and payable at a bank in Indiana, is not thereby estopped, in an action brought by a bona fide purchaser for value and before maturity, from asserting and proving that there was no such bank as the one described in the note. In Carpenter v. Car

penter, adm'r, page 142, it was held, that where an infant has exchanged property with an adult, he is not bound, on disaffirming the bargain, to tender back the property received before suing for the value or the possession of the property given to the adult. In Richter v. Koster, page 440, it was held, that where the defendant in an action for malicious prosecution had been before the grand jury in obedience to a subpoena, and had testified to what he believed to be the truth in reference to an offense charged against plaintiff, malice could not be inferred therefrom. The case of Grove v. City of Fort Wayne, page 429, is well considered, and decides, that where a city has power to abate a nuisance, consisting of the cornice of a building projecting over the sidewalk in a dangerous manner, and fails to do so on notice, it will be liable to a person injured by such nuisance. The volume is a valuable acquisition to the library of the Indiana lawyer, and will be of much service throughout the country.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

The following decisions were handed down in the New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, February 16, 1875:

Judgment affirmed with costs - The Trustees of the town of Brookhaven v. Strong: Knapp v. Harkness; Union National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Wheeler; Alexander v. Cullom; Boardman v. Gaillard; Hawes v. Robinson; Reed v. Keese; Fisk v. Fisk; Crane v. Genin; Parmenter v. Roth; Parmenter v. Roth; Perry v. Simpson. -Judgment affirment - Bielchofsky v. People.- Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event - Howland v. Woodruff; Carroll v. Carroll; Culham v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.; Bookstaver v. Jayne.-Judgment of Supreme and county courts reversed, and new trial ordered in the county court, costs to abide event-O'Neal v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.- Order of general term dismissing appeal from order of special term reversed, with costs and procceding remitted for hearing, and order of general term reversing order of special term affirmed with costs - In the matter of the application of the N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. to acquire lands, etc., v. Armstrong; Same v. Jones; Same v. Graham.- Motion to dismiss appeal denied, with $10 costs The Chapman Slate Co. v. Sutcliff.dismissed without costs-Krom v. Levy.dismissed with costs-Arthur v. Griswold.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Appeal Appeal

THE STATUTE REVISION COMMISSION. HUDSON, N. Y., February 10, 1875. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: DEAR SIR-Why does not Governor Tilden honor himself and do justice to the profession by the appointment of Mr. David Dudley Field to fill one of the existing vacancies in the commission engaged upon statute revision? No man in the State is so well fitted by learning, cast of mind and great experience to satisfactorily and promptly perform the duties of the place as he. He would bring to the task energy that knows no bounds, a capacity for organization that is unsurpassed, and a facility, discretion and sound judgment, born of a long and varied professional career, and of years of labor in the peculiar department of codification.

Without some action of this character the State is

in danger of either entirely losing the benefit of the work already accomplished or of seeing its completion indefinitely postponed. One of the ex-commissioners of revision remarked to me but yesterday, that an officer high in the State government had expressed to him a belief that the commission would be abolished during the present session of the legislature unless some marked change in policy and action be developed, and the same gentleman further said, that he believes the work can readily be finished in two or three years at the most if prosecuted with energy and judgment. This latter statement is refreshing in view of Mr. Throop's recent insinuation that it cannot be completed before 1879 or 1880. It is possible that Mr. Field would decline the place, and it certainly could elicit no surprise if he did so. No man has performed more of thankless service for the State than he. For while we see State after State incorporating his leading ideas in their jurisprudence and acknowledging their obligations to him, New York has evidently forgotten that his brain ever shaped a sentence of codified law, and many of the fruits of his years of unrequitted toil lie unnoticed at our doors. The appointment would confer upon him no greater honor than he has already earned, while his acceptance would develop a rare degree of magnanimity and give an earnest to the people and the bar of a speedy and thorough performance of the work in hand. No one can appreciate more fully than our worthy governor, who is a finished and learned lawyer, the importance of the new revision, and no one is more thoroughly conversant than he with Mr. Field's rare attainments and commanding abilities. It is to be devoutly hoped that the work will not be abandoned at this stage because of any nonperformance of duty on his part.

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Speaking of Lord Erskine, Lord Campbell said: "As an advocate in the forum I hold him to be without an equal in ancient or modern times," but Lord Brougham seems to have been of the opinion that the brother, Harry Erskine, was almost if not not altogether, the equal of Thomas. In his autobiography (vol. 1, p. 166) Lord Brougham said: "If I were to name the most consummate exhibition of forensic talent that I ever witnessed, whether in the skillful conduct of the argument, the felicity of the copious illustrations, the cogency of the reasoning, or the dexterous appeal to the prejudices of the court, I should without hesitation at once point to his (Harry Erskine's) address on Maitland's case; and were my friend Sunderdale alive, to him I should appeal, for he heard it with me, and came away declaring that his brother Thomas (Lord Erskine) never surpassed-nay, he thought, never equaled it." The Scotch bar at the commencement of this century was peculiarly rich in professional learning and forensic eloquence. Beside Erskine, Adam Gillies, William Tait, Robert Blair and a half dozen other men of the highest repute as advocates, there was Charles Hope, on whose brilliant qualities as an advocate Lord Brougham dwelt with great fervor. He spoke of his eloquence as "seldom equaled, perhaps never surpassed," and he quotes the opinions of Laing (the historian) and Gillies, both opposed to Hope, that his "declamation excelled all they had ever heard," though "they had often heard all the great speakers in parliament; and these men were very far

from prizing, as of any value, mere declamation unaccompanied with argument or statement." Even Pitt and Fox expressed great admiration at one of his speeches, and at one which Brougham and Horner and others of his friends who heard it, thought to be a failure. It is to be sincerely regretted that the Scotch bar has not found a Plutarch.

The Pennsylvania Constitutional Commission has concluded its labors for the present, and their report has been sent to the legislature. This Commission consists of a few able and eminent men, such as Chief Justice Agnew and Senator Wallace, and their action has been prompt and harmonious. The amendments which have been perfected by the commission are aimed principally at the judicary article, which is considered to be more defective than any other portion of the Pennsylvania constitution. The Legal Intelligencer commends the course of the commission in confining itself to the judiciary article, and in not attempting "to make radical changes in what may be termed the new ideas embodied in the new constitution."

The London Law Times, in commenting on the reception of the testimony of atheists in courts of justice, remarks that " Although to the Christian mind a natural antipathy may present itself as to what belief and credit should be accorded to atheists, it is certain that it is in the interests of justice, and for the benefit of the community, that such persons should be able to give evidence. It is no improbability to suppose the escape of a murderer from justice because the only person who can supply a necessary but missing link chances to be an atheist; and, although in the United States, where such evidence has long been receivable, the testimony of an atheist is, as a rule, subject to comments of discredit because he is an atheist, yet it is quite possible for an atheist to speak the truth, and, moreover, to be a person on whom implicit reliance may be placed, for, as Lord Bacon remarks, atheism leaves man to sense, to philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all which may be guides to an outward and moral virtue, though religion were not. Essay on Superstition. And Bentham observes, on the same subject, that the rebel to religion may still bear allegiance to the laws of honor, to those laws to which every thinking man, in proportion as he deserves that title, will ever pay obedience. 'Having regard to 32 and 33 Vict. chapter 68, we have no hesitation in expressing our opinion that a magistrate, although actuated, we are sure, by the very best intentions, improperly excludes the evidence of the atheist in a case before him." The statement that an atheist may testify in the United States is not strictly correct. In New York the statute reads: "Every person believing in the existence of a Supreme Being who will punish false swearing, shall be admitted to be sworn, if otherwise competent."

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At a meeting of the Law Amendment Society in London, Thomas Webster, Q. C., read a paper on the subject of 'Societies and Associations for the Amendment, Codification of, and Instruction in Law." Among other things, Mr. Webster suggested that different societies and associations should be brought into co-operative action for the assimilation of the laws of all nations, for the extinction of the conflict of the laws, and for the establishment and maintenance of a systematic course of legal instruction for the community generally.-Of Mr. Justice Keating, recently

resigned, it is said that he belongs to that laborious school of puisne judges, without whose watchful care the English law would never have been a law at all; and that it is the highest compliment that can be paid to him to wish that his successor may be like him. The English judges are much talked about lately. The Law Times says: A baseless rumor last week found its way into print to the effect that Baron Bramwell and Mr. Justice Mellor intended to retire from the bench. In legal circles this was considered not altogether improbable, but it is a positive relief to learn that the rumor is wholly unfounded. It cannot be concealed that the most recent elevations have not strengthened the bench, and for Such losses as Mr. Justice Willes, Mr. Justice Byles, and Baron Martin to be succeeded by the resignation of the two learned judges above named, would be an unmixed calamity. It is really alarming to think what will happen to the court of exchequer when Baron Bramwell does resign.

Manchester, England, has given a reception to Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, on the occasion of which an address was made to the distinguished judge. The London Law Journal adds to a statement of the proceedings: "The address says that his lordship worthily represents the impartiality, the dignity, and the learning of English justice. The public could not be blind to his lordship's judicial merits; for, thanks to the elaborate and excellent law reports of the press, our judges administer justice, not only in open court, but before the whole nation. Yet the public cannot know so well as the profession how excellent a judge Sir A. Cockburn is. His mind is imbued with the principles of the law, and his expositions are original, exact, and luminous. He is ever mindful of the dignified bearing that befits his position; but his is not the stiff dignity of hauteur, but is that rare dignity which is allied to kindly courtesy. Thank God that, in our time, it is no praise to tell an English judge that he is impartial; but this we may say, that no judge was ever more anxious than Sir A. Cockburn to do justice."

The portrait of Judge Peckham, which has heretofore been mentioned in this journal and which is still on exhibition in Albany, will shortly be transferred to the Court of Appeals chamber. It is expected that before the Court of Appeals takes its recess the portrait will be presented to the State, through the court, by Judge John H. Reynolds, of the Commission of Appeals, Judge Reynolds being chairman of the committee appointed by the bar to procure the portrait. A portrait of Reverdy Johnson has also been on exhibition in Albany. Mr. Johnson's picture was painted by the artist of Judge Peckham's portrait — Jareb B. Flagg, of New York. The portrait of Mr. Johnson, like that of Judge Peckham, was taken from a photograph of the original. Mr. Flagg met Mr. Johnson at Philadelphia and spent an evening with him, and without further sittings and with nothing but the photograph he produced the magnificent portrait of the distinguished jurist. In addition to these interesting works of art, we may mention the portrait of Mr. E. O. Perrin, the clerk of the Court of Appeals, painted by Mr. Flagg, which has also been on exhibition at the same gallery with the portraits of Johnson and Peckham, and which is a faithful and artistic likeness of Mr. Perrin.

It is proposed to repeal the celebrated Potter railroad law of Wisconsin, the constitutionality of which has been brought before the United States Supreme Court. The Solicitors' Journal, in speaking of the excess of business in the United States Supreme Court, refers with approbation to the plan of limiting appeals, and continues: "The lesson to be drawn from the state of things in the United States, is the absolute necessity of strong intermediate courts of appeal to prevent the highest appellate court from being overwhelmed with business of a trivial character. In the measure introduced last year the illadvised provision of the judicature act practically limiting the suitor to a single appeal was modified to the extent of allowing a second appeal in certain specified events. In spite of Lord Selborne's expressed opinion that it was not proposed last year, any more than in the previous year, that there should be an intermediate and a final court of appeal, it is impossible to doubt that the effect of the provisions of last year's bill would be to bring about this result, though in a limited and inadequate degree. Lord Cairns hinted last session that perhaps the house might think proper to extend the application of the principle; and it is to be hoped that with the result of American experience before them, the framers of the bill to be shortly brought in will be induced themselves to propose the establishment of an effective system of double appeal."

In the Alabama claims commission, Franklin Knight, of Norwich, Conn., prosecutes a claim for $16,045, of which $10,000 is for the loss of the "honors and emoluments" of the office of the consul of Shanting, China, to which he had been appointed, and whither he was proceeding, when the vessel upon which he sailed, the Union Jack, was captured and destroyed by the Alabama, May 3, 1863. It is stated that Mr. Sergeant Ballantine, of London, has been retained on behalf of the Guicowar of Baroda, who is to be tried at Bombay on or about February 15th. The fees given to the learned sergeant amount, it is said, to 10,000 guineas, or about $50,000.- Prince Gortschakoff has replied to England's refusal to participate in the international code conference at St. Petersburg. He says that the way will always be open to England to give in her adhesion to the resolutions which may be adopted by the conference, whether she joins it or not. The moderate tone of the reply is attributed to the mediation of the German ambassador at St. Petersburg.

Judge Cooley is engaged upon, and will shortly publish, a new treatise on the subject of taxation. Since, as was said by Woodward, J., in Philadelphia v. Tryon, 35 Penn. St. 404, "Every man holds his property subject to the taxing power" of the State, the questions "what is taxation" and "for what purposes may property be lawfully taxed" are of the utmost importance, as they are sometimes of the utmost difficulty. The author of "Constitutional Limitations" cannot fail to do justice to the subject. Hon. Chas. Matteson was elected associate-justice of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, to fill the vacancy caused by the promotion of Judge Durfee. Henry G. Freeman, a distinguished member of the Pennsylvania bar, died in Philadelphia on Sunday, the 14th inst., in the eightysixth year of his age. He was admitted to the practice of the legal profession in the year 1809, and was at the time of his decease the oldest member of the Philadelphia bar, excepting Horace Binney.

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All communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication.

Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, FEBRUARY 27, 1875.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A very important case has recently been tried before Judge Van Brunt and a jury in New York, relative to the liability of railroad companies for theft committed on a passenger. It appeared that the plaintiff took passage at Bangor, Me., for Quincy, Ill., having a through ticket covering the line of the New York, New Haven and Hartford railroad. On the arrival of the train at Forty-second street, New York, it was broken up and the cars, two by two, were drawn to the Twenty-seventh street depot by horses. Before the car in which plaintiff rode arrived at the depot several men, not passengers, got into the car, some of whom pushed him against the stove, and pulled his hat over his eyes, while others robbed him of bonds valued at $16,000. The plaintiff claims that the company was negligent in not furnishing sufficient protection to him as a passenger. The judge thought the question was a new and important one, and submitted the question to the jury whether the company was guilty of negligence in not better protecting, from violence, the passengers traveling over the road. The jury found in favor of plaintiff for the full value of the bonds with interest. As bearing upon this question, we may notice the very elaborate case of First National Bank v. Railroad Company, 5 Am. Rep. 655; S. C., 20 Ohio St. 259, where it was held that a carrier of passengers is not liable for the negligent destruction of money kept in the custody of the passenger and carried by him, without notice to the carrier, for a purpose unconnected with the journey. In that case, Scott, J., who delivered the opinion, said: "We do not call in question the right of a passenger to carry about his person, for the mere purposes of transportation, large sums of money, or small parcels of great value, without communicating that fact to the carrier, or paying any thing for their transportation. But he can only do so at his own risk, in so far as the acts of third persons, or even ordinary negligence on the part of the carrier or his servants is concerned."

The English government, at last accounts, was about to introduce a bill into parliament for the appointment of a public prosecutor. England is the only country in Europe without such an officer, not even excepting Ireland and Scotland, for in Ireland the attorney-general, and in Scotland the lord VOL. 11.- No. 9.

advocate, are public prosecutors. In a few cases prosecutions in England are now conducted by departments of the government; the treasury prosecutes in some murder cases and in such cases as the blowing up of the House of Detention by the Fenians; the post-office prosecutes when letters are stolen by employees, and the attorney-general prosecutes persons accused of coining or uttering counterfeit money. But the greater number of prosecutions in England are left to the parties injured by the commission of the offense for which the offender is arraigned. This is to be changed by the new bill; and prosecutors are to be appointed to act under the attorney-general. All expenses incurred in the prosecutions conducted by a public prosecutor are to be a charge on the finances of the government. One section of the bill provides that no private individual shall proceed with a criminal prosecution without the sanction of a public prosecutor. The bill will evoke much discussion, still, in some form or other, it is likely to pass the present parlia

ment.

The Canadian government has introduced into the senate a bill amending the copyright act of 1868. That act only granted copyrights to British subjects; but the new act is designed to throw open the privilege to all persons whose works are published or produced in Canada. It provides that, pending the publication or republication in Canada of a literary, scientific or artistical work, the author may obtain an interim copyright, which shall secure his rights for three months. This is to be followed by the full copyright on publication or republication. If the author fails to obtain his copyright according to the provisions of the act, or fails to bring out his work within three months after obtaining the interim copyright, and any other person has undertaken the republication of such work, or has imported foreign reprints of them, such other person shall have the privilege of disposing, by sale or otherwise, of the number of copies thus actually reproduced or being produced or imported. The bill is a most generous concession to the demands of authors of all nationalities.

The unanimous report of the senate judiciary committee in reference to the act of June 22, 1874, conferring additional jurisdiction on the courts in the District of Columbia, has been followed by the report of the sub-committee of the house judiciary

committee. It is rather remarkable that the two reports disagree almost entirely as to the scope and meaning of this so-called "Press-Gag Law." But if the law is not repealed or modified, the reports of the judiciary committees of congress will doubtless have some influence on the conclusion to which the courts will arrive when questions under the law shall come up for adjudication, although it is not competent for these committees or for congress

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