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IT T must be conceded that lawyers are not popularly esteemed as models of politeness. In vulgar estimation judges are deemed severe and arrogant, lawyers unduly inquisitive, harsh and overbearing. The popular idea of cross-examination is something like that of a sort of Spanish inquisition, where the lawyers put on the screws, and the judge sits, like the grand inquisitor, simply to see how much torture the victim can stand; and to be sure that he is not untimely done to death. In this there is an unwilling tribute of admiration to a class of men whose wits are so sharp and whose training is so effective that common sense and truth are powerless before their arts. We are reminded of these ideas by Sir Arthur Helps in his posthumous work, "Social Pressure," to which we have before referred. We quote the following dialogue:

“Sir Arthur.—This gives me a fair opportunity of saying what I have long wished to say in Ellesmere's presence, but thought it would be rude to do so; and that is, as to the general treatment of witnesses by counsel. If a man has the misfortune to see or hear of any transaction which is brought into court, he is really liable to undergo peine forte et dure in that abode of misery, the 'witness-box.' Most men of a certain age have committed some folly, met with some misfortune, or have done or said something which it is exceedingly unpleasant for them to recount again. Even women may not, during all their lives, have acted wisely; and in fact, there remain no unterrifiable witnesses but children. Suppose it were a case of the collision of carriages, and some statesman who happened to be passing by at the time of the collision, were examined as a witness, the cross-examination might run thus: 'Did you not, sir, in the year 18—, vow and declare that if there was any thing in the world you admired, any thing to which you were ready to bow, it was the English church? And did you not, in the year 18-, say all you could to injure that church?' The wretched statesman would then begin to explain, how he did not exactly say what the counsel makes him to have said, either on the first or the second occasion; and by repeated crossexamination he would be made to appear a mass of bewildered inconsistency. Then the counsel breaks forth with becoming indignation. It does not seem, sir, that you have ever known on which side you were, or on which side anybody else was; and yet you are perfectly certain that the defendants' carriage was on the near side of the road when the plaintiff's carriage dashed up against it.'

Ellesmere. This is farcical.

Milverton.- Not a bit more than many cross-examinations I have read. What does it signify to the case whether a witness has lived happily with his

wife?' Yet that is the sort of thing which you lawyers bring up.

Ellesmere.-We must attend to what is in our briefs; and surely the character of a witness is an important point, as regards his credibility?

Sir Arthur.-Yes, but it should only be the character ad hoc. Your cross-examination has no right to travel into all the circumstances of a man's life, which cannot, except by a great stretch of fancy, be made to apply to the bearings of the case.

Milverton. It remains for jurymen and judges to put this evil down; and it is not one of the least important of their functions."

We are glad at least to see that Sir Arthur does not recommend this reform as the "function" of the newspapers. The Springfield Republican would agree with all he says except this. The author is doubtless right in recommending legal reforms to legal tribunals. But he, in common with the rest of mankind, exaggerates and misrepresents the matter complained of. If witnesses would lay aside two things, when they come upon the stand, there would be no trouble; first, their panic fears of the terrors of cross-examination, and second, their desire to advocate the side on which they are subpoenaed. It is truly laughable to read the newspapers now-a-days upon the subject of Mr. Beecher's cross-examination by Mr. Fullerton, as if either of these eminent gentlemen were afraid of the other. Each is quite capable of taking care of himself, and so far as we can opine it is simply a question of physical endurance between them, as it was in the talking match between two men out west, where the combatants talked all day and all night, and when the wearied auditors woke up in the morning, they found one of the contestants dead and the other whispering in his ear!

We think we may reasonably say, that, with very few exceptions, the misunderstandings between counsel and witnesses are brought about solely by the disposition of the latter to take sides and their desire to protect themselves, forgetting that their own counsel will do that for them. It is often very hard work to get a direct answer out of a perfectly honest and intelligent witness. It is often very difficult to induce a perfectly honest and intelligent witness to admit that he does not know a thing of his own knowledge. In these encounters, counsel sometimes lose their temper, and say rough things, and witnesses become exasperated and go away and talk about the brutality of lawyers. Still we think these encounters as not of very frequent occurrence. We think, in spite of every thing, that lawyers are the most patient and forbearing class of men on the face of the earth. With a strain upon their nervous forces unequaled in any other walk of life, except, possibly, the physician's, the coolness, forbearance, and courtesy which characterize them in their intercourse with the public and

with each other, are quite admirable. Take the Beecher-Tilton trial as an example. None but trained lawyers could live under such severe and long-continued mental tension, and none others could so signally preserve their equanimity. But the public never think of giving them any applause for it. The newspapers will often compliment a presiding judge for these qualities, as if he were entitled to special credit for them. The umpire of a prize-fight does not suffer when one of the boxers is knocked down; it is the latter, and not the judge, who deserves credit for not losing his temper. Indeed, if we were called on to specify the most striking characteristic of our profession, we should say it is magnanimity. A lawyer admires a good hit even if it is himself who is hit. As a general thing, lawyers despise an unfair advantage, and love fair play. The public are not trained to this, and if a lawyer gets the advantage of the witness, the witness is angry, and the public sympathize with him, and unite in denouncing the lawyers. Now, if the newspapers and the unthinking public could have their way, we should have a state of things that would remind one of the frogs who wanted a king. Just let the Springfield Republican philosopher introduce the French judicial system, and they would see how well off they now are. Let them suffer awhile under the inquisitorial, browbeating, unfeeling questioning of the French courts, and they would call loudly for their old king.

This leads us to speak, for a moment, of the conduct of our judges toward suitors and witnesses. A calm consideration will convince a candid mind that the superiority is with the Anglo-Saxon race. We have heretofore spoken of the patience of our judges. Of course they ought to be patient, but after all it is a wonder that they are. They rarely suffer a witness to be unduly or discourteously questioned, and their own bearing toward those who come before them is generally distinguished for its urbanity and consideration. This is so true, that the public recently read, with a shock, some remarks attributed to a distinguished judge of this State on pronouncing sentence against a notorious criminal who had occupied and abused positions of public trust. The judge so far forgot himself in his zeal for the public welfare, as to rebuke the prisoner for having sat through the trial "unblushing." This is eminently French, and it is a great pity the Springfield Republican man was not present to applaud it. Not a lawyer in the country who did not pronounce it an outrage; not a newspaper to find a word of fault with it. Such is the difference between these self-constituted guardians of the public, and the men whom they abuse.

All such fault-finding as that which finds utterance in Sir Arthur Help's laughable but extravagant picture, is the result of the natural dissatisfied disposition of mankind. They love to pick flaws in


their choicest institutions. As the poet says, " never is, but always to be, blest." Our judicial system is certainly not perfect, nor ever will be. As to the conduct of the officers of justice, it certainly is not always Chesterfieldian nor ever will be. Still, it is better than when Coke browbeat Raleigh, and Jeffries abused Baxter. The times are changed and we are changed with them. Lawyers are certainly not behind their times. If their public bearing is contrasted in point of decency, fairness or politeness, with the common licentious abuse of the press, the recognized exponent of public opinion, we think they will not suffer by the comparison.


THE Annual Congress of this Association will be

held at The Hague the first week in September and especial preparations are being made to render the occasion conspicuous, not only for the philanthropic desires and able opinions expressed, but for the practical results initiated. The Association is the product of very recent times, and is the outgrowth of a sentiment and conviction that the time has come for the better settlement of the principles of the law of nations, both public and private. It was founded in October, 1873, at Brussels, by a number of jurists and publicists interested in matters pertaining to International Law, who formed themselves into an "Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations." The correspondence which preceded the formation of the Association, and which resulted in procuring an 'organized effort on the part of the leading jurists of both continents, was published in this journal. So remarkable and rapid has been the growth of this Association that it now numbers among its officers and members a great array of the most liberal and distinguished publicists and jurists of Europe and America. Its Honorary President is Count Frederic Sclopis, of Turin, President of the Geneva Court of Arbitration. Its President is David Dudley Field, of New York, who was a pioneer in the movement toward international codification as well as municipal codification, and who has rendered greater practical service to codification in general than any other jurist. Among the Vice-Presidents of the Association best known to our readers are Right Hon. Montague Bernard and Sir Travers Twiss, of England; Dr. Bluntschli, of Germany; Prof. Aug. Pierantoni, of Naples; Dr. Martens, of St. Petersburg; Ex-President Emelio Castelar, of Spain; Charles Francis Adams and Reverdy Johnson, of the United States. Its General Secretary is James B. Miles, of Boston, who has rendered very efficient service in propagating the designs of the Association. Among the Council of the Association

are Prof. Shelden Amos, Judge Charles A. Peabody, Dr. J. P. Thompson, Emory Washburn and Prof. Theodore Woolsey. Its Treasurer is Sir John Lubbock. Certainly no society ever had for its aims more humane and magnificent results or more able and distinguished supporters. Its objects are to arouse public sentiment and attention to the importance of abolishing those conflicts and disagreements which exist in public and private international law, and of securing uniformity and assimilation in matters susceptible thereto. Public international law is in such a condition of uncertainty that the Association deem it important to bring out the views of jurists competent to treat the subject, for the purpose of comparing opinions and plans and reaching some more certain basis. The rules of warfare, the laws relating to maritime prize and extradition of criminals, the methods of securing a general resort to arbitration among nations, and similar questions, will be the subject of elaborate discussion at the September Congress.

But the several branches of private international law will receive the greater amount of attention, and the following subjects have been selected for very complete discussion: "Bills of Exchange," "Foreign Judgments," " Copyright, ""Patent Law" and Trade-marks." At the last annual conference the consideration of the existing law in different countries on these questions, and the best plan for adopting some systematic mode of obviating the conflicts existing in regard thereto, was intrusted to a special committee. This committee has found it advisable to address jurists, bankers, and commercial bodies in different countries, with the object of obtaining an expression of the opinions of those most likely to be well informed in reference to the defects in the laws relating to bills of exchange and the remedies which are available. Among the questions propounded by the special committee are these: "Do you consider it desirable to adopt one universal form of bill of exchange, and one uniform system of laws regulating the rights and liabilities of parties to a bill of exchange? Having regard to the great diversity of custom at present leading to great complications, do you consider that days of grace should be abolished entirely, or, if not, that a uniform term should be established, and if so, what term?" A large number of other similar and important questions are presented for answer; and it is hoped that all the required information will be forthcoming.

The Association has adopted the true method of procuring reforms in international law - the method of appealing directly to the public, to those most practically interested in the reforms. And it is to be hoped that the work, so auspiciously and wisely inaugurated, will receive the encouragement which it merits. The questions with which the Association deals are of the most profound and far-reaching

nature; and the results which a proper solution of these questions will produce will be of the highest benefit to mankind. We believe that the Association has a great future before it.



Sloan v. Lewis, the Supreme Court of the United States held, that in estimating the amount of indebtedness of a bankrupt to the petitioning creditor, accrued interest is to be included. Waite, C. J., delivered the opinion, which is as follows:

"This action was commenced by an assignee in bank

ruptcy in a State court to set aside certain conveylaw, as is alleged. The proceedings in bankruptcy,

ances made by the bankrupt, in fraud of the bankrupt

under which the assignee was appointed, were involuntary, and one of the defenses in the action is, that the adjudication of bankruptcy was void, because the record shows that the debt owing to the petitioning creditor was less than $250, and, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction in the premises. This defense presents the only federal question there is in the case. If this is decided against the plaintiff in error, our jurisdiction is at an end, and we need not look further into the record.

"The principal of the debt owing to the petitioner as described in the petition, is a few cents less than $250; but, by adding the interest to the time of filing the petition, the indebtedness is increased to an amount far in excess of the requisite sum. The bankrupt act (§ 39) provides for an adjudication of involuntary bankruptcy upon the petition of one or more creditors, the aggregate of whose debts provable under the act amounts to at least $250. It becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain what constitutes a debt that may be proved. The plaintiff in error contends that it is limited to the principal of a sum of money owing, while the assignee claims that it includes the principal and all accrued interest. To determine this question, we must look, in the first place, to the act itself. If the intention of congress is manifest from what there appears, we need not go further. Section 19 provides, 'that all debts due and payable from the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, and all debts then existing but not payable until a future day, a rebate of interest being made when no interest is payable by the terms of the contract, may be proved against the estate of the bankrupt.' And again, ‘all demands against the bankrupt, for or on account of any goods or chattels wrongfully taken or withheld by him, may be proved and allowed as debts to the amount of the value of the property so taken or withheld, with interest.'

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There is certainly nothing here which in express terms excludes interest from the provable debt. On the contrary, there is the strongest implication in favor of including it. The object is to ascertain the total amount of the indebtedness of the bankrupt at the time of the commencement of the proceedings, and also the amount of this indebtedness owing to each one of the separate creditors. Accrued interest

is as much a part of this indebtedness as the principal. It participates in dividends when declared precisely the same as the principal. One has no preference over the other, and for all the purposes of the settlement of the estate the bankrupt owes one as much as he does

the other. Creditors prove their debts in order that they may participate in the management and distribution of the estate. Their influence in the management and their share on the distribution depend upon the amount of their several debts which have been proven. Hence, in order to fix the equitable representative value of a debt not due, provision is made for a rebate of interest. But if interest is to be rebated on debts not due, why not, upon the same principle, add it to such as are past due?

"The provision for adding interest to the value of goods wrongfully taken and converted is equally significant. Certainly no good reason can be given for withholding interest in cases arising upon contract and allowing it in cases of tort, and because it is expressly given in the last and no provision is made for it in the first, the conclusion is irresistible that it was expected to follow the contract as part of the obligation.

"We are all, therefore, clearly of the opinion that accrued interest constitutes part of a debt provable against the estate of the bankrupt; and if it does, it is necessarily part of a debt which may be used to uphold involuntary proceedings. It is only necessary, upon this point of jurisdiction, that the petitioning creditors should have owing to them from the debtor they wish to pursue, debts provable under the act to the required amount. The English cases referred to in the argument, in our opinion, have no application here. They are predicated upon the English statutes and the established practice under them. Our statute is different in its provisions, and requires, as we think, a different practice.

"This is conclusive of the case. The petition filed in the bankrupt proceedings distinctly averred that the debts due the petitioner exceeded the sum of $250, and, if interest is added, the particular indebtedness specified amounts to more than that sum. The court found this allegation true. That finding is conclusive in a collateral action. We have so decided in Michael v. Post at the present term. Where the record shows jurisdiction, an adjudication of bankruptcy can only be assailed by a direct proceeding in a competent court. Evidence, therefore, to show that payments had been made which reduced the indebtedness below the required amount was inadmissible under any form of pleading in an action like this; but it is especially so in this case, because there is no averment in the pleadings contradicting the record. The sole objection is, that upon the face of the record the error is apparent. A record cannot be impeached without previous notice by proper form of pleading."

The judgment is affirmed.


It is a general rule of law, tort a creditor by taking or acquiring from his debtor a security of a higher nature in legal operation than the one he already possesses, merges and extinguishes his legal remedies upon the minor security or cause of action, that is to say, the taking a bond or covenant or the acquiring a judgment for a simple contract debt merges and extinguishes the simple contract. The presumption is, that such was intended by the parties, where a security of a higher nature is received. In such a case, the remedy on the one is co-extensive with that on the other, that is to say, they are both between the same parties, and the simple contract becomes in its entirety a spe

cialty. But taking a security of a higher nature will not per se extinguish an inferior security, unless both are between the same identical parties; consequently, receiving the higher security of a third party will not of itself operate to extinguish the simple contract debt. There is no presumption that the specialty of a third person was received in satisfaction of the simple contract debt; the presumption is that it was received as collateral security only. When it is said that a higher security will not extinguish an inferior one, unless both are between the same identical parties, one would infer that, where there are several jointly liable, to operate as an extinguishment of the joint liability, the bond or specialty should be executed by all jointly, or by all severally. But it has been held by numerous decisions, that the individual bond or specialty of one partner, given for a simple contract debt due from the partners to the creditor, and accepted by him, is by operation of law a release of the other partner, and an extinction of the simple contract debt. Tom v. Goodrich, 2 Johns. 214; cited in Sluby v. Champlain, 4 id. 468; Frisbie v. Larned, 21 Wend. 453; Patterson v. Brewster, 4 Edw. Ch. 355; United States v. Astley, 3 Washb. 512; Williams v. Hodgson, 2 Harris & Johns. 474; Moale v. Hollinson, 11 Gill. & Johns. 11; Spear v. Gillet, 1 Dev. Eq. 468, per Ruffin, J.; Ward v. Motter, 2 Rob.(Va.) 567; Weaver v. Tapscott, 9 Leigh, 424; Niday v. Harvey, 9 Gratt. 466; Jacobs v. McBee, 2 McMullan, 348, cited in Watson v. Owens, 1 Rich. 111; Union Bank v. Hodges, 11 id. 739, per Wardlaw, J.; Doniphan v. Gill, 1 B. Mon. 200; Settle v. Davidson, 7 Mo. 604; Anderson v. Levan, 1 Watts & Serg. 339; Hoskinson v. Elliott, 62 Penn. 393, arguendo per Williams, J.; Bennett v. Cadwell, 70 id. 402, per Williams, J.; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 460; Parsons on Partnership, 106, 107; 1 Lindley on Partnership, 455, 456; Owen v. Homan, 3 Mac. & Gor. 407-409, per Lord Chancellor Truro. And see Dispatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manufac. Co., 12 N. H. 234. But this is denied and the contrary held: Nicholson v. Leavitt, 4 Sandf. 308; United States v. Lyman, 1 Mason, 506; Spear v. Gillett, 1 Dev. Eq. 469, Henderson, Ch. J.; Huton v. Child, 4 Dev. 463; Ansell v. Baker, 15 Adol. & Ellis, N. S., 20; Sharpe v. Gibbs, 16 Com. Bench, N. S., 527; Boaler v. Mayor, 19 id. 527; Ex parte Bates, 3 Deacon's Bankr. Rep. 358; overruling dicta in Bell v. Banks, 3 Man. & Granger, 258, and King v. House, 13 M. & W. 496. And see Collier v. Leech, 29 Penn. 404.

And the bond of an ostensible partner, taken for a partnership debt, extinguishes the claim, as against a secret partner, who may afterward be discovered. Ward v. Motter, Spear v. Gillet, Anderson v. Levan, cited above. Contra, Chamberlain v. Madden, 7 Rich. 395.

In Wallace v. Fairman, 4 Watts, 379, and in Day v. Leal, 14 Johns. 404, it appeared from the face of the

specialty, or from contemporaneous instruments, that the parties did not design that the specialty should operate as an extinguishment, but intended it as a concurrent or additional security, and the court treated the specialty according to that intention. In the latter case, one partner gave a bond to secure a debt of the firm and his individual indebtedness. Per curiam. "It is very evident that it was not intended, by the giving of the bond, to change the nature of the debt. It was not between the same parties; nor was it for this debt alone, nor for the exact amount of the notes in question. It was, therefore, only intended as collateral security."

It is a general rule of law, that a specialty executed by one partner in the name of the firm and for a partnership debt, but without authority, is not binding on the other partners, but becomes the individual specialty of the partner who executed it. That, in such a case, the specialty operates to release the other partners and to extinguish their liability, on the simple contract partnership indebtedness, is a proposition held or recognized in the following cases: Clement v. Brush, 3 Johns. Cas. 180; Williams v. Hodgson, supra; Waugh v. Carriger, 1 Yerg. 31; Nunnely v. Doherty, id. 26; Spear v. Gillet, 1 Dev. Eq. 460, per Ruffin, J.; Wharton v. Woodburn, 4 Dev. & Bat. 509; Bangoree v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 14; Morris v. Jones, Harr. 428; Sale v. Dinsman, 3 Leigh, 602; Salt v. Calland, 7 id. 602; Niday v. Harney, 9 Gratt. 467; Blanchard v. Pasteurs, 2 Hayw. (N. C.) 393; McNaughton v. Partridge, 11 Ohio, 223. But this is denied and the contrary held: Fleming v. Lawhorn, Dudley, 360; Pierce v. Camron, 7 Rich. 114; Spear v. Gillet, supra, per Henderson, Ch. J.; Horton v. Child, 4 Dev. 462; Donaphan v. Gill, supra; Fronebarger v. Henry, 6 Jones' Law, 548; Hoskinson v. Elliott, 62 Penn. 402; Dispatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Manufac. Co., supra. And a new promise by the other partner to pay the partnership debt so extinguished would be void for want of a consideration. Waugh v. Carriger, supra.

In Bond v. Atkin, 6 Watts & Serg. 168, Sergeant, J., said: "While the bond of one of the partners is taken for an antecedent partnership debt, it may be considered as payment and extinguishment of such debt, or only a collateral security, according to the nature of the transaction and the circumstances attending it. Wallace v. Fairman, supra. But where there is no antecedent debt, but the bond of one partner is taken at the time money is loaned to the partnership, and as the consideration for loaning the money, it can hardly be treated as a collateral security. It must be considered as all one transaction, and the bond as the only security contemplated; unless, perhaps, there were strong and positive evidence to show an express agreement to the contrary by all parties. If so, then in this case the bond was the only debt." The rule thus stated may be the true one, and may be correctly applied to a case where one partner executes the specialty in his own name, but is not applicable to the facts of that case, where the specialty was executed in the name of the firm, without authority; and in Hoskinson v. Elliott, supra, in which the facts were essentially similar, the court held that there was no presumption that the bond was received in satisfaction and extinguishment of the partnership liability, the bond, being executed in the name of the firm, negatived any such presumption. The former case is not cited in the latter, but they are contradictory decisions.

In Maddin v. Edmonson, 10 Mo. 643, it was held, that a bond given by one of two persons for a joint liability will not extinguish the simple contract debt, unless given at the time the liability accrued, or accepted in satisfaction of the simple contract, and that is a question for the jury to determine.

Notwithstanding the cases above cited from the New York Reports, the question, whether a specialty executed by one partner in his own name for a partnership debt, will per se extinguish the simple contract partnership indebtedness, cannot be considered as settled in this State, for there is hardly one of them that is a direct decision on the point, or entitled to be considered an authority. Tom v. Goodrich, supra, is

cited in subsequent cases as a decision in point, and approved, but that case hardly deserves to be considered an authority, for the court based their decision on different grounds, and the language used by the judges in reference to the question was unnecessary to the decision of the case. There, Barber, one of the firm of Goodrich and others, executed his individual bonds to the United States for duties on goods imported on account of the partnership, and as their property, and the plaintiff became surety in the bonds. Barber died, and the plaintiff, being compelled to pay the bonds, brought an action against Goodrich and the other partners for money loaned out and expended for their use. Tompkins, J., said: "The law does not imply a promise by all the persons who may be benefited, in consequence of payment by a surety, but only by the person whose debt is thereby discharged." Kent, C. J., said: "The plaintiff executed the bond as his surety, and cannot charge any other person as principal. There is no privity between the parties but what arises from the bond. * * We can only look to the principal and surety in the bond to the United States, and to the obligations resulting from that relation, because the money was paid, by the plaintiff, in discharge of that bond, and in exoneration of the personal representatives of George Barber, who alone were legally responsible for that debt. It may be that George Barber had received a full indemnity from his partners when he gave the bond. We cannot, in this action, unravel the accounts between George Barber and his partners; and to push the implied assumpsits beyond the party to the bond may lead to great difficulties and produce injustice." In placing their decision upon the ground that the law would not imply a promise by all persons who may be benefited, in consequence of payment by a surety, it was unnecessary for the court to say, as it did, that the liability of the defendants to the United States was extinguished by the bond, for assuming that their liability still subsisted and that they were benefited by the payment of the same, yet the law would not imply a promise by them to indemnify a surety on a bond to which they were not parties. See the case distinguished in Fleming v. Lawhorn, supra. The plaintiff's remedy was in equity. See Weaver v. Tapscott, supra. In a case in which the facts were nearly the same, the surety recovered at law. Wharton v. Woodburn, supra. And the separate bond of one of several joint importers will not operate as an extínguishment of the liability of the others. 13 Pet. 486; overruling Tom v. Goodrich and United States v. Astley, supra.

In Frisbie v. Larned, supra, one partner gave a bond and warrant of attorney to confess judgment to the plaintiffs for a partnership debt and his individual debt, on which judgment was entered. Cowen, J., said, that the bond itself being a security of a higher nature extinguished the partnership debt; citing Tom v. Goodrich and Clement v. Brush, supra. But the point decided was, that the judgment confessed satisfied and extinguished that debt.

In Patterson v. Brewster, supra, the persons who gave the bond and mortgage were the agents and trustees of the defendants, who were members of a joint-stock association. The court held, that where an association is formed for the purpose of purchasing, etc., real estate, and its trustees effect sales and buy in their own names, individually, and so give their own bonds and mortgages, a seller cannot follow the associates

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