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fendant did not dispute the liability of $400 on produce, and paid this amount, and received a writing declaring that it was received in full satisfaction for the loss, and "canceling $1,500 on said policy." Held, that the writing was not a technical release, and the payment formed no consideration for the discharge of the defendant from liability as to the barn, and that it did not preclude plaintiff from recovering the insurance thereon.

It appeared that prior to the insurance by plaintiff, he conveyed the premises insured to his wife upon the consideration, and under a parol agreement, that upon acquiring the legal title she should grant and convey back, by a proper instrument, to the husband a life estate in the land. The husband remained in possession, and received the proceeds of the lands, but no conveyance was executed to him by the wife. Held, that the husband had an insurable interest in the property.

The policy of insurance contained a condition which provided that "if the insured premises be held in trust, or be a leasehold or other interest not absolute, it must be so represented to the company." Plaintiff's application did not specify or refer to the fact that he had a leasehold interest. In the action upon the policy no reference to this condition was made in the pleadings, on the trial, or in the referee's report. Held, that the point could not be taken by defendant upon appeal to this court. Redfield v. The Holland Purchase Ins. Co. Opinion by Andrews, J.


Contributory: alighting from car while in motion: when contributory negligence question of law. This action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been received through defendant's negligence. It appeared that plaintiff, who is an infant twelve years old, in the care of her parents, was a paying passenger upon defendant's cars. As the train approached the station where plaintiff was to alight, the name of the station was called by the conductor, and the train stopped. It was evening and dark. Plaintiff arose with her parents to leave, but before they got out the cars had started, and were moving slowly by the station. Plaintiff and her parents knowing this passed out on the platform of the car while the train was moving, and after it had passed the platform of the station plaintiff's father took her under his arm and stepped from the car, and she was injured. Held (Church, Ch. J., and Andrews, J., dissenting), that as matter of law plaintiff was chargeable with contributory negligence.

Also held, that where a passenger upon a railroad receives an injury in attempting to alight from a car while in motion, while it cannot be held, as matter of law, that this act, under all circumstances, constitutes contributory negligence, it is not in every case a question of fact for a jury. Where the facts are undisputed, the question of contributory negligence may become one of law. Morrison by Guardian v. Erie R. Co. Opinion by Folger, J.


Unknown owner: service by publication.--In an action for the partition of real estate, some of the necessary parties to the action were unknown and were proceeded against by publication under the Code, the summons as published being in the usual form. Judgment was perfected and a sale of the premises was decreed. One L. became the purchaser upon said sale. He re

fused to complete his purchase upon the ground that the proceedings were irregular and defective. Held, that L. was not bound to complete his purchase; that unknown owners in actions for partition are to be brought in by publication of notices substantially in the form and in the manner prescribed by the Revised Statutes (2 R. S. 186, § 124, as amended by chap. 277, Laws of 1842), which are made applicable to partition suits (§ 4, chap. 277, Laws of 1842; Code, § 448), and that sections 135 and 137 of the Code are not applicable.

Also held, that the publication of the summons in the ordinary form is not a substantial compliance with said provisions of the Revised Statutes as they require the published notice to specify the nature of the action, whether in partition or not, and this is substantial. Sanford et al. v. White et al. Opinion by Church, Ch. J. Affirmed in same case, 1 N. Y. Sup. 647.


Joinder of causes of action.—This action is brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff as tenant from the unlawful acts of defendant as landlord. The complaint contained five counts. The first sets forth a lease by plaintiff of defendant of certain apartments, with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, and alleged a breach of the covenant. The fifth count alleged that defendant, by means of false keys, in plaintiff's absence obtained an entrance to said apartments, broke open a trunk of plaintiff's, and removed his goods therefrom, and from said apartments "willfully, maliciously and feloniously." Tho complaint was demurred to on the ground that several causes of action were improperly joined. Held, that the two causes of action could not be joined. Keep v. Kaufman. Opinion by Rapallo, J.


Indorsers: discharge of: agreement of bank to carry a note. This action was brought upon a promissory note indorsed by defendants, M. and H., and received and discounted by plaintiff. Defendants' answer contained a denial of the protest of the note, and alleged payment, an agreement to extend the time of payment, and the release of one of the makers of the note. It appeared upon the trial and the court found that the note was unpaid and had been duly protested, and judgment was ordered for $572.05. The court also found at defendants' request, that at the maturity of the note one of the makers went to plaintiff's banking office, with his check, intending to pay the same, but that at the entrance he met plaintiff's president, who requested him to have his check certifled and to pay therewith a debt for an overdraft, held by the plaintiff against said makers, this was done and the note in suit was allowed to remain unpaid. Held, that the indorsers of the note were not discharged thereby.

The bank agreed with the maker to carry the note for a time. Held, that such an agreement by a bank is not an agreement to suspend the right of action upon and to extend the time of payment of the note itself, but simply that it will from time to time, according to the mode of discounting paper, discount a like note, which it will accept in place of the one held, if presented when the latter becomes due and the discount is paid, and, if the parties to the note fail to present a new note when the one held becomes due, the latter becomes payable according to its terms, and all the parties thereto liable at once for its payment;

that an indorser therefore is not discharged by such an agreement.

Upon an appeal from the report of a referee, where the appeal is based upon exceptions to conclusions of law from the facts found, it must be assumed that the findings of fact are correct, and the respondent cannot raise the question that there is no evidence to sustain them. Second Nat. Bank of Oswego v. Poucher et al. Opinion by Grover, J.


The Court of Chancery has just determined a question of vital importance to the community of pets, arising upon the will of a gentleman named Edmett. This benevolent testator bequeathed to Elizabeth Osborn, his "faithful servant," an annuity of 501., on condition that she took care of his "favorite dog." At the time of making his will Mr. Edmett had a dog called Romp; but this dog died, and was succeeded by Sambo who is still alive. Upon these facts Vice-Chancellor Hall decreed that Elizabeth Osborn should have the annuity for her life, without any condition in favor of the dog, although the Vice-Chancellor expressed a hope that she would take care of him. Unless this judicial hope is strictly realized, we think that Sambo ought certainly to be allowed to appeal. Mrs. Osborn, who, during the testator's life-time, looked after both dogs, probably owed her annuity to the care she bestowed on them. Her "faithfulness," in the eyes of the testator, was no doubt composed in no small degree of kindness to Sambo and Romp. It is true that Romp was dead at the time of the bequest, but does not a will always speak from the death of the testator? And must not Sambo be taken to have succeeded to all the rights of Romp, together with the plate of bones after dinner and the other privileges of the household dog? Moreover, it does not appear that Sambo was represented in the argument. The Attorney-General, indeed, was a party to the suit, but we doubt whether so high a personage put in a word for poor Sambo, who would have been much better represented by the secretary to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. There must be some doctrine of the Court of Chancery which can be adduced in Sambo's favor, or there is no justice for a canine suitor.-Hour.


Reports of Cases Decided by the English Courts; with notes and references to kindred cases and authorities, by Nathaniel C. Moak. Vol. VII. Albany, Wm. Gould & Son, 1874.

Moak's English Reports have the advantage over the originals of obviating the inconvenience of parts and numbers, and of some excellent notes and references to American authorities added by the editor. At the same time they contain all the cases that an American lawyer would be likely to find useful, and cost less than the Law Reports. Among the notes added by the editor is a short one to Hill v. Crock, 1, as to when a devise to "children" does not mean illegitimate children. We notice, however, that all the cases mentioned in the note are English, and are cited in the arguments; one to Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. First National Bank of New Orleans, 56, as to when a draft or order on a particular fund operates as an assignment; one to Cooper v. Cooper, 391, as to when a gift to chil

dren operates as an advancement; a very full and valuable note to In re Stanton Iron and Steel Company, 581, as to corporate elections-and one to Sackville v. Smyth, 734, as to when the heir or devisee has a right to require personal representatives to pay a lien upon the realty, and when the heir or devisee is required to discharge the same.

The 74th Pennsylvania State Reports (20th P. F. Smith) contains some interesting matter and covers the period between July, 1873, and February, 1874. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania are uniformily well considered, and are received with great respect. They are also well reported, which is next in importance to their being well considered, and which is often of the first importance so far as relates to the reputation of the court and the weight of its decisions outside of the State. Mr. Smith is painstaking, not only in the minor but important matter of proof-reading, but also in the more serious matter of ascertaining clearly and stating accurately what the court has decided. It is so easy for a careless man or a hasty reader to be misled as to the real points of a decision that we do not wonder that the average American head-note is a synopsis rather of the language of the judge, or of some general and familiar propositions of law than of the judgment of the court. Mr. Smith does not err in this direction, and while his head-notes are rather too sententious, they are correct and intelligible. Even their sententiousness is, we apprehend, the result of a long prevailing style both of the reporters and the judges of Pennsylvania. Good reporters are not numerous and should be cherished when found.

Among the cases of interest in the volume, we note two or three. American Life Ins. Co. v. 1sett (p. 176) was an action on a life policy, the assured having taken his own life, and the allegation being that he was insane, the court charged: "If the assured was not conscious of the act he was committing, but acted under an insane impulse or delusion sufficient to impair his understanding or will, or if his reasoning was so far overthrown by his mental condition that he was incapable of exercising his judgment in regard to the consequences, the defendants are liable." Held, correct. In Wier's appeal, p. 230, the erection of a powder house within a few hundred feet of several houses was restrained to prevent irreparable damage. It having been suggested that the building ought not to be restrained as the business would be " useful." Sharswood, J., remarked: The present chief justice in his opinion at nisi prius in Rhodes v. Dunbar, 7 P. F. Smith, 275, enumerates twenty-nine kinds of such useful establishments which have been declared public nuisance." In Pittsburgh, Alleghany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, p. 421, two children, one five and the other eleven years old, got on the front platform of a horsecar and rode. In attempting to get off, against the remonstrances of the driver, the younger was injured. Held, that the driver was negligent in allowing them to ride on the platform, and the company was liable. We believe there is a statute in Pennsylvania requiring the reports to be entitled "Pennsylvania State Reports," and to be numbered in one series. Why do the judges and the profession persist in always citing them by the reporter's name and the number of his series? It is in conformity neither with the intent of the law, with convenience nor with good taste.



Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In your issue of December 26 (page 415), a Minneapo- | lis correspondent attempts to show that taxation of land and of a mortgage upon the land is not double taxation. He says, at "first glance" it may appear obnoxious to that objection, and then, as if determined to get as far as possible from first-glance impressions of the matter, he leads us through a very techical illustration and argument; but when he reaches the quod demonstravit instead of leaving us on the terræ firma of good common sense, we find ourselves floating in the thinnest of thin air.

His position fairly stated, is that when B purchases a farm of A for $1,000 and gives A a note and mortgage to secure the purchase price, and thereupon the government taxes two thousand dollars, where, before, it had taxed but one, it is not double taxation, because B has used his credit which has a purchasing power in this instance of $1,000. It is the farm and this credit which makes the two thousand dollars' worth of property where five minutes before the sale was made, there was but one thousand. To say the least of it this seems to be a suspiciously hasty way of creating taxable property. B perhaps had not a dollar's worth of taxable property before, but now by the mere act of making the purchase, and not because he is worth a dollar more than he was before, he is taxed upon $1,000.

Mr. Young says that this credit stands in lieu of the $1,000 in money, which, if it had been paid would have been justly taxable in the hands of the seller. The latter proposition is true and correct; and for the plain, simple reason that the man did not have the money, and has not got it, he should not be taxed for it. The only question involved is, whether B is or is not worth $1,000 more than he was. If he is not, he is unjustly taxed for that which he has not got. If he is, then we have a means of wealth opened up to every man who is capable of making a contract of purchase. All we have got to do, is simply to buy ourselves rich, and the beauty of the thing is, it takes no money to do it. This beats the famous plan of issuing to every man all the greenbacks he wants.

But let us examine this credit theory a little further. Your correspondent says that when "B shall from the proceeds of his farm or otherwise create a fund to take the place of the credit with which he made his purchase, then such credit will be retired, and the tax will be levied upon the money which is substituted therefor." Now it is very plain that when B shall have created the fund to pay off the mortgage, his credit will have vastly appreciated. If it was good for $1,000 when he was worth nothing, it will probably be good for several thousand by the time he has created that fund. Not simply because he is worth $1,000 more than he was, but also because he has shown that he is a thrifty, industrious, money making man. When he was worth nothing his credit was taxed at $1,000, but now when it has vastly enhanced in value and purchasing power, it is not taxed at all! If consistency is a jewel, such a rule of law would not be very highly ornamented.

But perhaps your correspondent will say that although B's credit is greater than it was, still he is no longer using it, or to use his former expression, it is "retired," and therefore it should not be taxed. But this is no answer. In taxing my property the law

never inquires whether I am using it or not. I am taxed just the same whether I use it or not.

But let us suppose that A has to foreclose his mortgage and take back the property, and meanwhile B has paid no tax upon the land. During this time A has paid taxes upon his mortgage, and now he must pay taxes upon the land for the very same time. If this is not double taxation the words have no meaning.

The important point in the illustration put by your correspondent, which he seems to have overlooked, is this: It is not B's credit that is taxed, for he has none, but it is a credit based upon, arising out of, and issuing from the land itself. It is taxed as land for its full value, and then it is again taxed for its full value as a credit. This is double taxation. It is the most odious and indefensible kind of double taxation, because it relieves the rich man at the expense of the poor man. It exhibits the government, deliberately taking the burden from the strong man's shoulder and placing it upon the back of the weak man. The man who is worth $100,000 can much better pay a double tax upon that sum, than the man who is worth nothing at all can pay a tax on $1,000.

I should like to pursue the subject further, but the length of this article admonishes me that I have already reached the limit of your forbearance, if indeed I have not already exceeded it. E. J. HODGSON.

RED WING, MINN., January 1, 1875.

[The difficulty with our correspondent, and with many others who have discussed this question is, we apprehend, as to the definition of the term "property." So far as the assessment of taxes is concerned, the word is used to indicate that which in a commercial sense possesses value. The fact that no new value is created by the giving of a note or mortgage has no bearing on the question. It is property in the hands of the holder. While it may be true in a politico-economical view, that to tax property purchased on credit, and also the credit itself to their full value in the hands of both debtor and creditor is unjust, it by no means follows that credits are not property, nor that they should escape taxation. ED. A. L. J. 1


DEAR SIR. - I read in one of the newspaper reports: "Judge D. said he had considered this question very carefully, and consulted other judges, before granting the attachment, and had not changed his opinion." Now, the language of the constitution being, "No judge or justice shall sit at a general term of any court, or in the Court of Appeals, in review of a decision made by him, or by any court of which he was at the time a sitting member"-it is proper to inquire whether the very common practice of "consulting with other judges" is not so much within the mischief protected against, as that the "consulted judges" are disqualified from reviewing a "decision made," as much (and perhaps more) by them as by the judge who consults them; they, moreover, acting as "sitting members" of the court at the time, whether they literally sit or not! In my own opinion, such complicity is more prejudicial to an impartial review than literal authorship of the decision; it being unpleasant always to overrule a brother judge, and more so if the revising authority has counseled the error. Besides which there would be occasion for bad feeling.




Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The charter of the city of Buffalo contains the following provision, viz.: "Goods and chattels in the possession of the person opposite to whose name the taxes are set down, or upon the lands for which such taxes are assessed, shall be deemed to belong to such person; and no claim of property made thereto by any other person shall be available to prevent a sale." By this provision the legislature authorizes the city to take and sell the property of one man to pay the taxes of another. But the legislature itself has not the power to do this, and surely it cannot confer such a power on —? a corporation. Is it reason? is it law? is it F. P. M.

[We should suppose not, and would advise all people owning property to keep it out of Buffalo. Perhaps it was that Charter that induced Vanderbilt to take his depot out of Buffalo.-ED. A. L. J.]

COURT OF APPEALS-LIST OF CAUSES. List of the first fifty causes on the Court of Appeals calendar for January term, 1875. The court will convene promptly on Tuesday, the 19th inst. at 10 A. M., that day being a motion day.

No reservation will be made of the first eight causes except on good cause, shown by affidavit. E. O. PERRIN, Clerk.

ALBANY, January 7, 1875.


1. Kerrains v. The People.

2. Harris v. The People.

3. Mahoney v. The People.
4. Myers v. The People.
5. Gardener v. The People.
6. Doud v. Holmes.

7. Knapp v. Harkness.

8. Flower v. Lance.

9. Morgan v. Crocker. 10. Fisk v. Fisk.

11. Scholy v. Mumford. 12. Penny v. Simpson. 13. Morse v. Brockett. 14. Morse v. Brockett.

15. Brockett v. Morse.

16. Plonk v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.

17. The Niagara Falls Susp. Co. v. Bachman. 18. Smith v. Volkening.

19. Turner v. Reges.

20. Elmore v. Jacques.

21. Ten Eyck v. Craig.

22. Brundage v. Brundage.

23. Ross v. Roberts.

24. Maximilian v. The Mayor.

25. Fisk v. Fisk.

26. Smith v. Velie.

27. Hartnett v. Wandell.

28. English v. Breman.

29. Thomson v. Tracey.

30. Hackley v. Draper.

31. Mitchell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R.Co.

32. Van Vechten v. Keaton.

33. Rice v. Harbeson.

34. Gould v. Allison.

35. People v. Mallory.

36. Greene v. The Mayor, etc.

37. People ex rel. Broadway & Seventh Avenue R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, etc.

38. People ex rel. Dry Dock, etc., R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, etc.

39. People ex rel. Bleecker Street, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Commissioners, etc.

40. People ex rel. Stemmler v. McGuire.
41. People ex rel. Town of Floyd v. Hopkins.

42. Carroll v. Carroll.

43. People ex rel. Harper v. Commissioners, etc. 44. People ex rel. Mann v. Mott & or's.

45. People v. Chalmers.

46. Starbird v. Barrons.

47. Duncan v. Berlin.

48. Larned v. Hudson.

49. Albro v. Figuera.

50. Rein Miller v. Skidmore.


Sir John B. Karslake, the eminent English lawyer, has become blind through over work. But an operation having been performed upon his eyes, it is hoped that he may ultimately recover his sight. The claimant's wife is plucky, an English exchange says: "The Tichborne Claimant's wife, on being summoned before the Lymington magistrates for poor rates on Saturday, refused to pay any claims as Orton's wife, but stated that she would meet all legal claims on her as Lady Tichborne. A distress was granted, but it is to be held over for a few days."- JUDICIAL SERVICES.- In the last financial year the pensions for judicial services in Great Britain amounted to £58,681 3s. 3d., and in Ire-THE NEW IRISH LAW OFFIland to £17,258 188. 8d.


The Right Hon. John Thomas Ball, LL. D., of Merton, in the county of Dublin, Queen's Advocate in Ireland, and Attorney-General, who has just been nominated Lord Chancellor of Ireland, is the son of the late Major Benjamin Marcus Ball, of the 40th Foot. He was born in the year 1815, and was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, where he took his Bachelor's degree with high honors in 1836. He was called to the Irish Bar in Michaelmas Term, 1840, and has been a bencher of the King's Inns, Dublin, since 1853. In 1850 he obtained the honor of silk, was successfully SolicitorGeneral and Attorney-General for Ireland during Mr. Disraeli's administration in 1866. He has been one of the Parliamentary representatives of the University of Dublin since the year 1868. He was created an Honorary Doctor of Laws at Oxford in 1870, and was sworn a Privy Councillor in 1868. Dr. Ball married, in 1852, Catherine, daughter of the Rev. Charles R. Elrington. Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Dublin. Mr. Henry Ormsby, Q. C., the present Solicitor-General, who now succeeds Dr. Ball in the Attorney-Generalship, is a member of a good Irish family, very many of whose members have been graduated at Trinity College, and is a year or two older than the new Lord Chancellor. He was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, where he took his Bachelor's degree in 1834-two years previous to his lordshipand was called to the Irish Bar, in Michaelmas Term, 1835. He was nominated a Queen's Counsel in 1858, and was appointed Solicitor-General in 1868 under Mr. Disraeli, and resumed his post on the return of his party to place and power last spring. Mr. Ormsby has never held a seat in the House of Commons. The Hon. David Robert Plunket, Q. C., who succeeds Mr. H. Ormsby as Solicitor-General, is the fourth, but third surviving, son of John Span, third Lord Plunket, by Charlotte, third daughter of the late Right Hon. Charles Kendal Bushe, and consequently a grandson of the first Lord Plunket, the great orator and lawyer. who held the Great Seal in Ireland from 1830 to 1834, and again from 1835 to 1841. He was born on the 3d Dec. 1838, and was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, where he took his Bachelor's degree in 1859. He was called to the Irish Bar in 1862, and in 1868 was appointed 'Law Adviser to the Castle at Dublin," a post which is often a stepping-stone to more important legal promotion. He was nominated "one of Her Majesty's Counsel in Ireland learned in the law," in 1868. He has represented the University of Dublin in the Conservative interest since 1870, when he succeeded to the vacancy caused by the retirement of Mr. Anthony Lefroy.

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effect. This delay arose from the apprehension that the stipulation of the second rule-"not to permit or

THE "THREE RULES" ARBITRATION - INTERNA- suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or



The following is a translation of the letter this year addressed by the Hon. William Beach Lawrence to M. Rolin Jacquemyns, the Secretary-General of the Institute of International Law:

August 15, 1874.

Secretary-Gen'l of the Institute of International Law:
which I addressed to you last year, but which did not
reach you until after the close of the session of the
Institute,* I took occasion to speak of some matters to
which I desired to call the attention of that body.
These subjects remain very much in the same state
that they then were, and although they do not relate
to the branch of international law which is specially
assigned to me, I will take the liberty of again alluding
to them.

To the "three rules" of the treaty of Washington, including the interpretation which the tribunal at Geneva gave to them, I consider myself authorized to refer, inasmuch as the views which, on account of the great respect that I entertain for the Arbiters, I then expressed with hesitation, have been confirmed by the debates in the English Parliament, by diplomatic correspondence with other governments exchanged before any communication was addressed to them by the two parties, as well as by the notes, which have passed between the English and American ministers.

In the discussion in the House of Commons it was assumed that the interpretation given to these rules by the Tribunal at Geneva, and which would impose upon a neutral State the duty of guaranteeing the property of one belligerent against the acts of the other, accomplished in violation of its own neutrality, never was contemplated by either of the contracting parties. In some of the speeches it was, however, admitted that England, inasmuch as her normal condition was belligerent, while that of the United States was neutral, would derive advantages from the rules which would amply compensate her for the indemnities awarded by the commissioners to the United States. No one expected that if the interpretation of the Tribunal was recognized, the rules would obtain the assent of the continental powers of Europe.

As to the United States, since the matter of the "indirect claims " was disposed fof, no mention has been made of the "three rules" in the public debates of Congress, whilst the public journals, regarding the rules as no longer having any vitality, have abstained from speaking of them. Nor can we hesitate to express a decided opinion, formed from all the sources of information open to us, that if these rules were now presented, as an original proposition, they would not obtain the constitutional assent of the senate.

We have before us the correspondence recently presented to Parliament, and which, beginning soon after the conclusion of the treaty, goes down to February of the present year. From that correspondence it would appear that the provision of the treaty which requires the communication of the rules to other powers, asking their adoption of them, had not then been carried into

This note will be found in 8 Albany Law Journal, 230.— ED. A. L. J.

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waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men might be interpreted, contrary to the acknowledged practice of the two contracting parties, especially in the Franco-German war,* as a general prohibition of the sale of munitions of war by neutrals to belligerents.

The two parties were agreed that the rules should not be presented to foreign powers for their acceptance without an explanation, which would prevent such a conclusion and which would restrain their operation to those acts which are done for the service of a vessel cruising or carrying on war, or intending to cruise or carry on war, against another belligerent; and that they should not extend to cases where military supplies or arms are exported for the use of a belligerent power from neutral ports or waters in the ordinary course of commerce. To formalize a new clause, in a manner acceptable to England and America, has not been practicable.

The correspondence, which was interrupted in January, 1872, was only resumed in June, 1873, and then without result. A dispatch of Earl Granville in which, alluding to the proposition of Mr. Fish to submit the "three rules" to the maritime powers, he refers to the embarrassments which resulted from the presentation to the commission of the "indirect claims " and to the difficult position in which the representatives of England and of the United States would be placed, if they should submit to other States a series of rules as to the meaning of which they entirely differed. Earl Granville, furthermore, insists in that dispatch that whilst the English government is not at all disposed, as it appears especially from the debates in parliament, to accept all the decisions of the Tribunal at Geneva, the presentation of the "three rules" to the "great powers" would probably be considered as an acceptance of its interpretation of them and inevitably induce the rejection of the rules by all these powers.

The last dispatch of the series recently published is of the date of the 18th of February last, and relates to a conversation between Earl Granville and General Schenck. The latter insisted that the "three rules should be at once submitted to the great powers, saying that while he was not instructed or authorized to discuss or determine the form of any identic note to be agreed upon for presenting the "three rules" to the other powers, yet it seemed to him that they ought to be submitted without gloss or comment by the two governments, and without accepting or insisting on any construction or interpretation of them given by others.

Earl Granville closes the discussion by informing Sir Edward Thornton that "he did not, in the present circumstances, think it desirable to protract the conversation" with General Schenck.

We have been informed from an authentic source that. at the session of the Reichsrath, which followed the sale to France of munitions of war, taken from American arsenals, it was proposed in the commission of foreign affairs, to suppress the appropriations for the mission to the United States. This was prevented by the intervention of Prince Bismarck, who, avowing that a casus belli existed, said, as it was unworthy of great nations to utter menaces without giving effect to them, Germany had no alternative but war or silence, and that, as it was not consistent with his policy to go to war with America, he requested that nothing further should be done in the matter.

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