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the judgment of the court below), that the costs were not recoverable. inasmuch as they could not be considered as the natural consequence of the defendants' default, the contracts between H. and the plaintiffs, and between the plaintiffs and the defendants having been separate and independent. Mors la Blanch v. Wilson, Law Rep. 8 C. P. 227 (Lush, J., dissenting), disapproved. Baxendale v. London, Chatham and Dover Railway Company, L. R. 10 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 35.


Water: natural and artificial stream: riparian owner. - A natural stream was divided immemorially, but by artificial means, into two branches; one branch ran down to the river Irwell; the other passed into a farmyard, where it supplied a watering trough, and the overflow from the trough was formerly diffused over the surface, and discharged itself by percolation. In 1847, W., the owner of the land on which the watering trough stood, and thence down to the Irwell, connected the watering trough with reservoirs which he constructed adjacent to, and for the use of, a mill, on the Irwell. In 1865 W. became owner of all the rest of the land through which this branch flowed. In 1867 he conveyed the mill, with all water rights, to the plaintiff. In an action brought by the plaintiff against a riparian owner on the stream above the point of division, for obstructing the flow of the water, held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action. Holker v. Porritt, L. R. 10 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 59.


Contract: action by executor: breach of contract causing testator's death: damage to personal estate. - Where a passenger on a railway was injured by an accident, and after an interval died in consequence, held, that his executrix might recover in an action for breach of contract agaiust the railway company the damage to his personal estate arising in his life-time from medical expenses and loss occasioned by his inability to attend to business. Bradshaw v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, L. R. 10 C. P. 189.


Implied contract of: act done by one person at another's request injurious to a third party.-The plaintiffs were in possession of certain trucks, which were claimed by the defendant, and also by the proprietors of the K. P. Colliery. A correspondence took place between the plaintiffs and the defendant, in which the plaintiffs asked for an indemity if they should deliver up the trucks to the defendant. The defendant, without giving any answer as to the indemnity, wrote requiring the plaintiffs to send the trucks back to him, which they thereupon did. The K. P. Colliery proprietors then brought an action against the plaintiffs for conversion of the trucks, and their claim proving well founded, the plaintiffs were obliged to pay a sum of money, in settlement of the action, which they sought to recover from the defendant upon a contract of indemnity. Held, following the doctrine laid down in Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & L. 57, and Toplis v. Grane, 5 Bing. N. C. 636, that there was, under the circumstances of the case, evidence of an implied promise to indemnify. The principle upon which in such cases a contract of indemnity is implied is not confined to cases of principal and agent, or employer and employed. Dugdale v. Lovering, L. R. 10 C. P. 196.


Collision between railway carriages: identification of passenger with his driver: joint wrong-doers.-The plaintiff, one of the traveling inspectors of the carriage and wagon department of the L. and N. W. Railway Company, was traveling under a pass from them, in one of their carriages, on a journey from Leeds to Manchester. Near C. station, and on the line of the defendants, over which the L. and N. W. Railway had running powers, the train in which the plaintiff was traveling came into collision with a number of loaded wagons which were being shunted from a siding by the defendants, and he was injured. There was evidence of negligence on the part of the driver of the plaintiff's train in traveling at too great a speed, so as to be unable to stop when he came in sight of the danger signal, which had been hoisted by the defendants. The jury found that the accident was caused by the joint negligence of the defendants and the L. aud N. W. Railway Company. Held, approving of the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115, that the plaintiff was so far identified with the L. and N. W. Railway Company that he could not recover. Semble, that the evidence did not support the finding of the jury with regard to the defendants, but showed that the L. and N. W. Railway were solely responsible for the accident. Armstrong v. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., L. R. 10 Ex. 47.


Reports of Cases Decided by the English Courts; with Notes and References to kindred cases and authorities. By Nathaniel C. Moak, Counselor at Law. Vol. VIII. Albany, N. Y.: William Gould & Son, 1875.

N the present volume of the English Reports we

I notice cases im

portance that the editor has appended notes to them: Harding v. Headington, p. 307, L. R., 9 Q. B. 157, presents the question whether a person is responsible in law for bad motives, provided he do a perfectly legal act. It appeared that by the general turnpike act (3 Geo. 4, ch. 126, § 41), it was provided that "if any person shall, with horse, carriage, etc., pass from any turnpike road over any land near to or adjoining thereto (not being a highway, and such person not being the owner or occupier, etc., of such land), with intent to evade the payment of tolls, * ** or if any person shall do any other act with intent to evade tolls whereby the same shall be evaded, every such person shall forfeit a sum not exceeding £5." The respondent being the occupier of a farm adjacent to a turnpike road, made a gap in the hedge a few feet on one side of a toll-gate at which tolls were taken, and formed a semi-circular road for a few yards over his farm with a gap into the turnpike road a few feet on the other side of the gate. He then, with a horse and carriage, having passed more than one hundred yards along the turnpike road, with the intention to avoid paying the toll, passed through one gap over the road on his own land and back again by the other gap into the turnpike road, and then passed more than one hundred yards along the turnpike road. Held, that the respondent came within the exception in section 41, and was not liable to a penalty for evading the toll. It appears by Mr. Moak's note to this case that the owner of lands in New York adjoining a turnpike gate may construct a road around it and by traveling over his own lands enter the turnpike at a point be

yond the gate. Auburn v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 444. The owner, however, would not be justified in allowing others to pass over the cut-off. Aikin v. Western, 20 N. Y. 370.

In Oulton v. Radcliffe, p. 483, L. R., 9 C. P. 189, a writ❘ was issued out of the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, which is a superior court, for a cause of action cognizable by that court, but which arose beyond its jurisdiction. The service was upon the defendant's attorney, beyond the jurisdiction, and he gave an undertaking to appear and did appear for the defendant. Held, that the irregularity in the service was cured by the appearance. Mr. Moak, in the note to this case, cites authorities showing that the rule is similar in New York and in the United States courts. To Magee v. Lavell, p. 423, L. R., 9 C. P. 107, the editor has appended an elaborate and valuable note relating to the question whether amounts inserted in agreements or bonds are liquidated damages or penalties. We observe several other notes of importance and value. The present volume is one of great interest; and the selections appear to have been made with Mr. Moak's well-known care and discrimination.


THE following circular was issued May 31 by the department of justice at Washington:


'Assuming the duties of attorney-general of the United States, I find that the appropriation for the expenses of the courts for the present fiscal year is nearly exhausted. I find, also, that in some of the judicial districts the expenses have been extravagant, without necessity and without honesty. Severer economy and stricter accountability must be enforced at all hazards. It is known to the attorney-general that in many instances a large number of witnesses have been kept for many days in attendance upon the courts and paid for such attendance, whose testimony was not of the slightest value, and who, in many cases, did not testify at all, but were mere lazy loungers about the court for the sake of the fees; that exorbi

sons, and also when, where and how the mileage charged was earned. The attorney-general respectfully calls the attention of the circuit and district judges of the United States to the act of February 22, 1875, relating to fees and costs, and asks the especial aid of the courts in compelling a strict enforcement of that statute. The attorney-general will hereafter require a duplicate of every account certified by the judge, under the act of February 22, 1875, and which is forwarded for audit and payment, to be filed with the clerk of the court. When such account is certified, evidence that the same is so filed must accompany the account.



SUPREME Court Reporting.

NEW YORK, June 2, 1875.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal: DEAR SIR-The Justices' resolution that "such only of said opinions be reported at large as the public interest may appear to require," is much to be regretted and is open to strong objections upon the score of principle and public policy. But there is one unhappy result which affects the convenience of the judges themselves. The publication of all the opinions keeps down appeals upon the points covered by them; whereas their non-publication encourages appeals upon questions erroneously supposed to be " open and gives the courts more trouble and suitors more expense. It is to be hoped that there will be "memoranda," at least, of every case decided, so that counsel can be kept upon the track of adjudications. The system of reporting which you have inaugurated - so perfect as to make the application of sic vos non vobis almost a reproach in your case - will have to be kept up in some way, or the profession at large will "know the reason why."


HE following decisions were handed down in the

tant and unnecessary charges for the arrest, transporta-Twin Court of Appeals on Tuesday, June 1,

tion and keeping of prisoners, for jurors, and for mileage, have frequently been made, and that in other respects extravagance has prevailed which cannot be tolerated. Hereafter the district attorneys will be held responsible for the number of witnesses who attend the courts, and marshals will subpoena such witnesses only as the district attorney may, in writing, direct. The order of the district attorney directing the marshal to subpoena witnesses must state the names of witnesses and the time when their attendance is required. Each marshal must keep a record of the names of all witnesses who attend, and the exact dates when they attend, and he must obtain a certificate from the clerk of the court stating the day on which each witness testifies. Such certificate of the clerk and direction of the district attorney, relating to witnesses, must accompany the marshal's accounts when sent for audit. The records above required must be kept, by the various district attorneys and marshals, in a book for the inspection of a special agent of this department. Marshals must, in like manner, keep a record of the names of all persons paid as jurors, or paid for the arrest, transportation or keeping of prisoners, and the exact date of the service of such per


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Judgment affirmed with costs-Converse v. Alling, Marsden v. Cornell. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event, unless plaintiff stipulates to reduce the recovery by deducting from the judgment $1,887.86 and interest from June 6th, 1872, to the 18th of March, 1874, amounting in the aggregate to $2,056.44, and if so modified and reduced, judgment affirmed without costs to either party in this court-Jones v. Barlow.-Judgment affirmed -Weyman v. The People, The People v. Lenahan, Shufflin v. The People.--Order affirmed with costs-The People ex rel. Ward v. Asten, The People ex rel. Doyle v. Green, The People ex rel. Youngblood v. Asten. Order of General Term modified by remanding proceedings for retrial at Special Term, costs to abide event. In the matter of the petition of Keteltas to vacate an assessment; in the matter of the petition of Burke to vacate an assessment, etc. v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York. Appeal dismissed with costs-King v. Galvin.Motion for re-argument denied, with $10 costs-Gillespie v. Zittleson.



HE maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas" was once discarded by Erle, J., in the English courts. He said: "The maxim is mere verbiage. A party may damage property where the law permits, and may not where the law prohibits, so that the maxim can never be applied till the law is ascertained, and when it has been the maxim is superfluous." But the learned judge must admit that the rule is as stated in the maxim. There are exceptions of course.—Mr. Justice Kemp, for thirteen years a judge of the High Court, Calcutta, and after forty-four years' service in India, has left Calcutta on leave for England.- - The

London Law Times says it is not expedient that legal procedure should be made extravagantly costly, but if fees to counsel go on increasing in amount as they have done in recent years, poor men will find it impossible to fight their rich competitors with any thing like a chance of success.

The Central Law Journal, in giving an account of the farewell dinner to Judge McKean, tendered by the Salt Lake City bar, admits that the surroundings in Utah were "well calculated to overturn the judicial temperament of any judge, and to excite in his mind the hallucination that he is filling the role of a general of cavalry." We are of the opinion of the Journal that Judge McKean possessed this hallucination, an opinion which the following extract from his speech at the dinner strengthens: "My legal comrades, we have been trying to march together over a rough, crooked, ungraded road, in the midst of dense darkness. If I have sometimes stumbled, you have been groping near me, and you have felt, even when you could not always see, the unprecedented obstacles in my way. You, too, have sometimes stumbled. At last, some one has blundered,' and I have fallen. But unlike martial combatants who rush on and leave their fallen comrades, you pause; you reach out to me your helping hands as I rise to my feet; you offer me cooling draughts from your canteens; you fan away the fetid breath of slander, and you speak to me words of kindness. Thanks, my faithful friends, thanks. My stunned senses will soon rally. The blow staggers me; it shall not slay me." Further on Judge McKean tells his auditors "the dense darkness of Utah is breaking away! Look, the day-star is mounting up the sky, and the saffron tints of the morning are fringing the mountain peaks!"

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An English contemporary says it appears that the lights of the law are not all to be found within the profession. A civilian judge of the Madras High Court has recently been compelled by the state of his health to come to Europe on leave of absence, and the Madras Jurist takes advantage of the opportunity to set forth his merits in the following eloquent strains: "He is one of the worthies of that grand old race of civilians now fast disappearing, who not only formed for a century and more the hereditary aristocracy of India, but who, by their masterly government and wonderful development of this great empire, have contributed so much to the glory and renown of England among surrounding nations. But even as one of that splendid service Mr. Justice Holloway stands wellnigh alone, as a rare combination of giant talent, grand disinterestedness, and an almost savage uprightness of character. It would be presumptuous in us to comment on his wonderful capacity as a judge.


Every branch of law was at his fingers' ends, backed by a master brain, and an eloquent tongue. * It would be a public calamity if he were to retire. Who is to replace him? But fortunately there is every hope of his returning to us with renewed vigor, after the waters of Carlsbad have effected the cure which his physicians confidently predict. Mr. Justice Holloway is but forty-seven years of age and of giant frame and iron constitution, equal even to the requirements of his marvelous intellect. We hope that February next will see him once more seated on the bench of our High Court, and that our pages will again be illuminated with a learning that takes in the wisdom of our forefathers as well as the advancing ideas of modern

legal science and judicial knowledge."—— Mr. Lindley, Q. C., who has been appointed justice of the English Court of Common Pleas to fill the vacancy caused by the transfer of Justice Huddleston to the Court of Exchequer, is the son of Dr. Lindley, for many years Professor of Botany at University College, London, and Examiner in Botany in the University of London. He was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in Michaelmas Term, 1850. In 1860 he published the first edition of his well-known work on the "Law of Partnership," and his subsequent career as a junior was one of advancing success. In 1872 he was made a Queen's Counsel, and he has since practiced in the court of Vice-Chancellor Wickens and Vice-Chancellor Hall.

The London Law Times, in speaking of a case to which we recently referred, says: "That the rejection of goods as not up to sample does not oblige the purchaser to return them, is a legal principle which is no less sound than important. It was, however, so far as we are aware, quite bare of direct authority, until it came to be distinctly settled by the case of Grimoldby v. Wells, which was a County Court appeal recently heard by the Court of Common Pleas. The facts were these: The plaintiff had sold the defendant tares by sample, and delivered the bulk eight days after the bargain was struck; the cart of the plaintiff conveying the bulk one-half of the way to the defendant's barn, and the cart of the defendant conveying it the other half. The defendant, inspecting the tares on the day of delivery, found, as the fact was, that the bulk was not up to sample, and at once indicated to the plaintiff, both by letter and by word of mouth, his intention to reject them, saying that the tares were bad, that he would not have nor pay for them, but that the plaintiff might deal with them as he pleased. The tares still remaining in the defendant's barn, the plaintiff sued for the price of them. The County Court judge, in a considered and written judgment, ruled that the facts proved a constructive acceptance within the statute of frauds (see Morton v. Tibbet, 15 Q. B. 428), and also held that the defendant was bound in law to return the tares to the plaintiff, the judge being of opinion that Couston v. Chapman, L. R., 2 Sc. App. 250, was 'conclusive' to that effect. The Court of Common Pleas, however (Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, and Justices Brett and Denman), has unanimously reversed the judgment of the County Court. It appeared that the principle supposed to be established by Couston v. Chapman, that should the vendor not acquiesce in goods being returned as unequal to sample, the purchaser should place them on neutral ground,' was not warranted by the judgments of the noble lords who decided that case. And it further appeared that in

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Lucy v. Monflet, 29 L. J. 100, Ex., both Baron Martin and Baron Bramwell had made observations which pointed strongly in the defendant's favor. 'It is,' says Baron Martin, 'the duty of a vendor, who has notice sent to him by his customer that an article is not according to warranty, to take it away, or to come to some arrangement with the purchaser.' 'A vendee,' said Baron Bramwell, 'is not bound to return goods sent to him which are not according to warranty.' No wonder, therefore, where there was so strong indirect authority for the defendant, and no direct authority against him, that the court should give judgment in his favor. As Lord Chief Justice Coleridge pointed out, it would be hard, indeed, that a vendor, by sending to a purchaser that which he had no right to send him, should thereby impose on the purchaser the duty of sending it back.' But it is singular indeed that a legal proposition which so widely affects commercial transactions should have remained so long unestablished by direct authority."

Judge Grover, of the New York Court of Appeals, is still confined by a painful and lingering illness at his residence in Angelica.-District Attorney Bliss has prepared a statement to Solicitor-General Phillips giving the reasons why Lawrence, the alleged silk smuggler, whose case we have several times referred to, should be tried on other charges than those for which he was extradited. Mr. Bliss shows that the treaty with Great Britain contains no express limitation as to the crime for which a man may be tried after extradition, and claims that neither the law nor custom prohibits the trial of an extradited person for a crime other than that on which extradition was had. A correspondent writes us as follows: Mr. Evarts, in his introductory to his Tilton-Beecher summing up, refers to Cicero as "easily at the head of all ancient and easily transcending all modern reputations in our profession;" as having "gained the credit of being the greatest lawyer among orators and the greatest orator among lawyers;" and as being "represented by his works on the shelves of every scholar though he be not a lawyer, and of every lawyer though he be not a scholar." All this does very well as rhetorical antithesis; but lest our law graduates should lose breath at such a hopeless forestalling of possible fame, and reproach the ancients as having mounted the sky and pulled the ladder up after them, we recommend the following, the closing sentence in the preface to Maddock's Chancery: "In an English court of justice, the veriest dolt that ever stammered a sentence would be more attended to with a case in point than Cicero, with all his eloquence, unsupported by authorities; and it is fit it should be so, for how, otherwise, can law be, what it ought to be, a certain rule of conduct."

Law lectures were delivered at Gresham College, Great Britain, recently by Dr. Abdy. In the Latin lectures the lecturer treated of the Roman law "De Nautis Cauponibus et Stabularis," Digest IV, 9. In the English lectures the subject was the English law relating to land carriers of goods, the lecturer at the same time briefly restating in English the Roman law on the same subject. At the conclusion of the courses the professor intimated that he intended, in the ensuing Trinity Term, to lecture in Latin upon the Roman law of partnership, and in English, after making some closing remarks on the subject of his lectures of the present term, to treat of the laws of land carriers of passengers, and then to touch a few salient points of

the law of carriers of goods by water.— -The Legal Chronicle states that, in a recent issue of the Philadelphia Ledger, there was a letter suggesting that it would add to the dignity of our courts if the judges wore robes as they do in England, which suggestion the Ledger did not think would work well in 66 warm weather." In response to this, one of the Ledger's correspondents sends the original autograph of the petition to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, sigued by the members of the bar in 1791, asking to have the practice of wearing “bands" and "gowns" abolished. This ancient and interesting paper, signed by men whose names subsequently became historical, reads as follows:

"To the Honorable, the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the State of New Jersey:

"The petition of the subscribers, counselors at the bar of said court, most respectfully sheweth: That the wearing of bands and bar gowns is found to be very troublesome and inconvenient, and is also deemed by your petitioners altogether useless. Your petitioners, therefore, pray that the rule of this court, made for that purpose, may be vacated.

"And they are in duty bound, etc. "TRENTON, May 11, 1791.

"Andrew D. Woodruff, Jos. Taylor, Fra. Davenport, Casper Smith, Joseph Bloomfield, Rich. Howell, Aaron Ogden, John Lawrence, Abm. Ogden, Elisha Boudinot, James Linn, Richard Stockton, Fred. Frelinghuysen, Andrew Kirkpatrick, W. Griffith."

In the suit of Jasper K. Herbert against Gen. B. F. Butler to recover $10,000, being half of a fee obtained by Butler in a case in which he was retained, as alleged, by the agency of the plaintiff, Judge Benedict, in the United States District Court, ordered the jury to bring in a verdict for the defendant, and remarked that if the case had gone to them in the ordinary course, and any other verdict had been brought in, he would have had to set it aside.-The question as to validity of the election of the two boards of directors of the Central Vermont Railroad Company has been submitted to the consideration of Judges Redfield and Paine, of Boston, and other prominent counsel. After a full examination of all the facts and papers, they have given an elaborate opinion sustaining the action of the old board and the sale of the stock of the company, leaving the old board the legally constituted board of directors.-The decision in the Tweed case was not handed down in the Court of Appeals on Tuesday, owing to Judge Andrews being informed of the death of a relative. The United States Attorney-General on Tuesday designated the following as heads of the bureaus of the Department of Justice: Bureau of the Supreme Court - Assistant-AttorneyGeneral - not yet appointed.—Bureau of the Court of Claims-Assistant-Attorney-General, Thomas Simons.-Bureau of Legal Investigations-Alex. J. Bentley. Bureau of Official Correspondence - A. R. Dutton. -Bureau of the Chief Clerk-A. J. Falls, the Chief Clerk, having resigned to take effect on the 30th inst., no assignment is made.- Bureau of Criminal Law-Edward R. French.—Mr. H. Boardman Smith, of Elmira, delivered a lecture before the students at the Female College recently on the subject of the Administration of Estates. It is claimed to be the first time that a legal topic has ever been discussed before the students of an institution devoted to the education of women, and is the first of a series of lectures on specified topics, to be delivered by prominent men at the college.

All communications intended for publication in the LAW opinions of Judges Nelson and Morrill; but the latJOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication.

Communications on business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

The weekly edition of the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL is now 8,800 copies.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JUNE 12, 1875.


THE HE late Chief Justice of Utah struck the key-note of his misfortune when he said, at the bar dinner, "I came to Utah, pushed to the front of an irrepressible conflict from which I would have recoiled, had not my sense of duty been stronger than my sense of prudence." No one has ever seriously charged Judge McKean with a dishonest act, nor with a swerving from the strict line of his duty as he understood it. The trouble was all along that he supposed he was sent to Utah on a crusade rather than as an impartial minister of the law. He has lived up to this conviction; he has fought valiantly, if not wisely, with the weapons that were in his hands; he has been defeated at every point, not by the Mormons, but by the better sense of the people. Of such as he is, warriors are made and martyrs but not judges. Great reforms have seldom or never been brought about by judicial action, and it can only remain as a wonder that a man, usually so capable and clear headed, should have so wofully mistaken his mission.

The constitutionality of the Civil Rights bill has been sustained, during the week, by two judges of the United States District Court Judge Nelson of Minnesota and Judge Morrill of Texas. The former seems to have deliberately prepared himself for an emergency, for, on being interrogated by the grand jury as to the constitutionality of the aforesaid act, he straightway pulled from his pocket a written opinion which is described as being "very elaborate." Judge Morrill, having more "native internal proneness" than his brother, expressed his opinion by fining the manager of a theater $500 for refusing a brace of colored women a seat in the parquet; and when the Galveston News printed an editorial on the ruling, which all concur in describing as "mild in expression and entirely shorn of personalities," the learned judge decided that "he could not suffer congress and the United States court to go into contempt by remaining silent." So he ordered the News man to show cause why he should not be committed. The conviction is very general that the Civil Rights bill is entirely nugatory, and we are quite sure that this conviction will not be seriously weakened by the VOL. 11.- No. 24.

ter will find that by his ill-advised, hot-headed and illegal procedure, he has brought the United States court, which is embodied in him, into altogether greater contempt than could a dozen newspapers.

Mr. Montgomery H. Throop has just contributed to the New York Evening Post three very interesting articles, entitled "Studies upon an Illuminated Medieval Manuscript," and the Post makes it the occasion of a fine editorial on "Professional Diversions," which is worth the reading of every lawyer. The Post says: "The concurrent pursuit of some department of observation, not in the direct line of the necessities of a professional man, always conduces to the integrity and health of his mind. In the words of a great orator, 'it calms, elevates, and restores the jaded powers, clears the intellect, cools the judgment and raises the moral tone; it makes life less a drudgery, and more a liberty and a joy,' for the lawyer or the physician to turn aside from professional reward and anxiety for some precious moments every day, and be in them a devout and happy scholar and 'freeman of the universe.'” There is here a lesson which lawyers need, but which many of them never learn the lesson of moderation, discretion and forbearance in work. The average American lawyer seems to cut loose from most other human interests so soon as he gets into full practice, and to live only in an atmosphere of law. The burdened mind loses its memory and alacrity and originality, and in the majority of cases he dies with the harness on at the mid-day of life. Non quam multa, sed quam multum, the pregnant words of Seneca should be inscribed upon every office door.

England seems to be a better field for libel suits than is this country, for while here our libellers usually escape with at most nominal damages, an English publisher was recently mulct in the sum of £50 for unintentionally imputing bankruptcy to a man. In that case the plaintiff was a stationer, and the defendant the publisher of the Bookseller newspaper, which circulated among stationers. Through the negligence of a compositor, the plaintiff's name and particulars of his dissolution of partnership, which ought to have appeared in a column headed "Dissolution of Partnership," appeared in a column headed "First Meeting under the New Bankruptcy Act." The defendant inserted detailed apologies in three newspapers. The inuendo of the declaration was that the plaintiff was bankrupt. At the trial the judge ruled that the publication might be a libel and the jury found that it was. On appeal the Common Pleas refused a new trial, Chief Justice Coleridge remarking that "to many careless readers it is likely enough that it appeared that the plaintiff had become bankrupt."

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