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recovering substantial damages for the defendant's breach of covenant (in not repairing) while he remained owner of the reversion. Upon the whole, we think that the decision of the common pleas in the present case, although no doubt it at first bears rather a harsh aspect, will be found consistent with the principles of justice, as well as law. The plaintiffs had, in the present case, a right to re-enter on the premises and forfeit the interest of the sub-tenant, which right they neglected to avail themselves of. Having chosen not to make use of this right, they had no legal claim to create a new remedy for themselves; and having elected themselves to perform the defendant's duty, they could not then demand satisfaction, when they had neglected the proper means of setting themselves right which were offered them by the law.

In the very recent case of Merony v. Ferguson, in the Queen's Bench, in Ireland, a somewhat similar question arose. The action there was brought on a covenant to repair in a lease; the evidence went to show that the premises had fallen into disrepair, but that after the action was brought considerable sums of money were spent by the defendant in repairing them. The action was brought before the end of the term for which the premises were leased. The jury found for the defendant. Mr. Justice Barry, who tried the case, certified that, in his opinion, the verdict was against the weight of evidence, but that, "according to the rule laid down by the cases as to the measure of damages when the action is brought before the end of the term, a verdict for the plaintiff could only have been for nominal damages." On the new trial motion the defendant relied on a series of authorities, among others, Watts v. Judd (5 M. & Gr. 598), and Young v. Harris (2 C. & J. 14), to show a new trial will not be granted, on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of evidence, if merely nominal damages can be obtained. The plaintiffs relied on Macnamara v. Vincent (2 Ir. Ch. R. 504) to show that they were entitled to substantial damages. The court, however, acquiesced in the view set out in the report of Mr. Justice Barry, that nominal damages only could have been recovered, but held that this action differed in its nature from a new action for the recovery of a sum of money, and granted a new trial. Although this decision seems to differ from Young v. Harris, and that class of cases, it appears to be in accordance with the English authorities on the subject of the measure of damages in cases of this nature.


Evidence of partnership.-This action was brought to recover an account for goods sold and delivered. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were co-partners, doing business under the firm name of N. M. & Co., that they sold and delivered the goods to defendants, who were co-partners. Defendant T. alone appeared and answered; he denied any information as to plaintiffs' partnership, and therefore denied the same. He admitted the defendants' partnership and the purchase by them of the goods from plaintiffs, and for a further answer alleged the dissolution of the defendants' co-partnership, defendant S. buying out the stock and continuing the business; that he also agreed to assume and pay all the partnership debts, including plaintiffs'. That plaintiffs being aware of these facts, agreed with S. to accept, and did accept and receive $25 in money, and the individual promissory note of S. for the balance of

the debt in discharge thereof. At the commencement of the trial, the counsel for defendant T. claimed to have the affirmative of the issue, and that he was entitled to the opening and closing speech to the jury. The court decided that plaintiffs had the affirmative, and were entitled to open and close the case. Defendant's counsel excepted. Proof was given by defendants, tending to prove the allegations of the answer; held, that the defendants had the affirmative of the issue, and were entitled to open and close the proof and the denial thereof was error; that the denial of plaintiffs' partnership was immaterial, as, if the affirmative defense failed, they were entitled to judgment, whether partners or not, and that the ruling was reviewable on appeal from the judgment. Also held, that the settlement of the debt by plaintiffs with defendant S. canceled their debt against the firm, and discharged the other partners. Millard et al. v. Thorn. Opinion by Grover, J.


Grand larceny.-The plaintiff in error was indicted for grand larceny. It appeared upon the trial that the prosecutor stepped into a drinking saloon and asked the bar-tender, the plaintiff in error, for a glass of soda water, which was furnished to him, and he handed plaintiff in error a fifty dollar bill to take out the price, ten cents. The latter took the bill and threw a few coppers upon the counter, and upon change being demanded of him, he came from behind the counter, seized the prosecutor by the neck and ejected him from the bar-room. Neither the bill nor change were ever returned, the plaintiff in error appropriating the same to his own use. The court charged the jury in substance, that the prosecutor did not part with his property in the bill, he gave it for the sole and only purpose of having it changed, the ten cents taken out and the balance delivered to him, and that if the prisoner when he took the bill intended to convert it to his own use and deprive the complainant of it, they could convict of larceny. The prisoner's counsel excepted. The jury rendered a verdict of guilty. Held, no error; that the prosecutor did not part with the possession or property in the bill, but until the change was returned to him the delivery was incomplete, and in legal contemplation the bill remained under his control and in his possession. Hildebrand v. People. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.


Appointment of commissioners.-This was a case submitted under section 372 of the Code. It appeared that defendants were appointed commissioners of excise of the city of Schenectady, within ten days after the passage and under the provisions of chapter 175, Laws of 1870, an act "regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors." On April 1, 1873, the plaintiffs were appointed commissioners by the mayor alone. Defendants claimed that such appointments were invalid and on that account cla med to hold over. Held, that under said act of 1870, in the appointment of commissioners of excise, the same methods are to be pursued in subsequent as upon the first appointments under the act, i. e., in all cities but New York and Brooklyn the appointments are to be made by the mayor of the city alone, and in New York and Brooklyn by the mayor and board of aldermen in the manner directed. People v. Gates et al. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.


Re-insurance.-This action was brought to recover the amount of three insurance policies of $5,000 each,

upon the life of one H., issued by the Craftsman's Life Assurance Company, and payable within four years from date in case of the death of H. to plaintiffs. Defendant entered into an agreement with said insurer to re-insure it on all risks or outstanding policies, and to assume all such policies and pay to the holders all such sums as the insurer the C. L. A. Co., might become liable to pay. Prior to this agreement the C. L. A. Co. had effected two policies of re-insurance on the life of H., each for $5,000. H. died and the C. L. A. Co. collected said two policies of re-insurance; held, that plaintiff's could maintain an action on the agreement; and that defendant's liability was not affected by the fact of the collection of its re-insurance by the C. L. A. Co. Glen et al. v. Hope Mutual Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Johnson, J.


Explosion: tenant.-This action was brought to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff from the explosion of a boiler in the kitchen of a house, sub-let by her of the defendant's lessee. Plaintiff, when the explosion occurred, was engaged in cooking in the kitchen. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that the explosion might have been avoided if the boiler had been supplied with a safety valve. There was no evidence that defendant knew or had reason to suspect that the boiler was improperly constructed, or, that any danger was to be apprehended from the use of the boiler for the purpose intended. The complaint was dismissed; held, no error, that the facts did not establish any liability on the part of the defendant. Jaffe v. Harteau. Opinion by Grover, J.


EMPOSIA, KANSAS, December 21, 1874.

Editor Albany Law Journal:

DEAR SIR-In your issue of the 7th ult., in referring to the recent discussion in relation to the authorship of the so-called Shakespeare's dramatic productions, you say the fact has been suggested "that Shakespeare's law is generally sound." And in your issue of one week later, in the article entitled "Law and Novels," you say "the blunders of dramatists and novelists in legal matters have always been proverbial. Shakespeare alone is sound in his law; and there are some skeptical persons who hold that Lord Bacon, and not William Shakespeare, is the author whose law in the dramatic mould is unimpeachable."

Let us for a few moments examine with those "skeptical persons" the celebrated "scene in a court of justice," in Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice," with a view of discovering if the great and learned lawyer, Lord Chancellor Bacon, did not for once at least mistake the law, and do his enviable reputation for legal learning great injustice.

If the law, as laid down by Portia, the character who acts as judge in the matter of the difference between Shylock, the Jew, plaintiff, v. Antonio, the merchant, defendant, and who is represented by the author as being most sound and learned in her exposition of the law, is now, or ever has been, good law, in Venice or any place else, we will concede the authorship of Shakespeare's dramatic works to Lord Bacon without further ado. But, if the law as there laid down should prove upon investigation to be most unsound, and such law as novelists and dramatists are proverbial for giving, then must we conclude that the claim set up for Lord Bacon by his friends to the authorship of the

dramatic works in question is most pretentious and unfounded in fact; and that William Shakespeare, and not Lord Bacon, is the true author.

That Shakespeare's law is generally sound is no argument in favor of Lord Bacon, for Shakespeare is generally sound upon whatever science or subject he introduces into his plays.

It is now and has been a rule of law so long that "memory of man runneth not to the contrary," that "where the law granteth any thing to any one, that also is granted without which the thing itself cannot be." Or in other words, every statute carries with it so much of collateral right and remedy as will make its provisions effectual. This rule is so obviously true that no one will dispute it.

The excellent and wise expounder of the law, who with the learned doctor of laws, Bellario, had "turned over many books" in looking up and satisfying herself of the law in the case, and who was also furnished with Bellario's opinion, after taking her seat on the judges' bench, says to the plaintiff, Shylock—

"Of a strange nature is the suit you follow ;
Yet in such rule that the Venitian law
Cannot impugn you as you do proceed."

The bond in question in this case had been duly exe.. cuted and delivered by Antonio to Shylock, and was conditioned for the payment of a certain sum of money at a certain time and place therein stated, and upon the failure of the obligor (Antonio) to comply with the conditions of the bond, he was to forfeit to (Shylock) the obligee a pound of his flesh to be cut off and taken in what part of his body the obligee should choose. After examining the bond the judge says:

"Why this bond is forfeit;

And lawfully by this the Jew may claim
A pound of flesh to be by him cut off
Nearest the merchant's heart."

And at the demand of the plaintiff, Shylock, the court gives him judgment on his bond as follows:

"A pound of that same merchant's flesh is thine : The court awards it, and the law doth give it. And you must cut this flesh from off his breast: The law allows it, and the court awards it." And when the plaintiff proceeds to enforce and collect this his judgment, the court says to him:

"This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood;
The words expressly are, a pound of flesh;
Then take thy bond, take thou thy pound of flesh,
But, in the cutting of it, if thou dost shed
One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods
Are by the laws of Venice, confiscate
Unto the State of Venice."

And when Shylock starts to leave the court-room after the court has explained to him the penalty and forfeiture he will incur in attempting to enforce his judgment, the court says to him:

"Tarry, Jew

The law hath yet another hold on you;
It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
If it be proved against an alien,
That by direct and indirect attempts
He seeks the life of any citizen,
The party 'gainst the which he doth contrive
Shall seize one-half his goods; the other half
Comes to the privy coffers of the State;
And the offender's life lies in the mercy
Of the duke only, 'gainst all other voice.
In which predicament, I say thou standest;
For it appears by manifest proceeding,

That indirectly and directly too,

Thou hast contrived against the very life
Of the defendant, and thou hast incurred
The danger formerly by me rehearsed."

Now we gather from what is above quoted these facts: That the taking of the bond was lawful, for the reason that the Venitian law was such that it could not impugn the Jew as he did proceed, and lawfully by it he might claim the pound of flesh. That it was forfeit, for the court so adjudged it. That a valid judgment was rendered upon it, granting to the Jew his pound of flesh, and adjudging the law to be such that it would give it him, and the court awarded it to him. Now we conclude that the law as laid down by Bacon in this play of the "Merchant of Venice," is not, nor ever was, good law. We think the following would be good law, drawn from what is quoted:

1. The right to take the pound of flesh carried with it the right to shed blood, if such shedding was necessary in carrying into effect the law and the intention of the parties.

2. Such a shedding of blood would not be a "shedding of Christian blood" within the meaning of any penal statute.

In no case could a defendant ever commit a felony and forfeit life and estate for the doing of a lawful act, unless the act was made criminal after the doing of it.

It may be said the law in this case was made to fit the play; that begs the question and is an unanswerable argument.

If dramatists and novelists are allowed such license, then they ought not be accused of blundering when they misstate the law. We sincerely believe Lord Bacon never wrote such law-Shakespeare did.

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[It is unnecessary to state that we only affirmed that Shakespeare's law is "generally sound." We by no means contend that Shakespeare made no mistakes in his law, or that his jurisprudence was perfect. Had he illustrated a perfect jurisprudence, he would have done what no judge or jurist has done in his time, and what no lawyer ever expects to do. With regard to this particular case, that of Shylock and Antonio, without pretending to decide whether it is good law or not, we may say that there are many considerations which must be taken into account. For instance, the scene is laid in Venice, and we are not to assume without positive proof that the Venitian law was similar to the common law of England. The criticism which is usually made on this case is, that the grant of flesh implied whatever was requisite to obtaining the flesh, so that the right to shed blood would be incident to the right to take the flesh. But it will be seen that the contract was finally decided to be in violation of a statute forbidding machination against life. It is evident from the spirit of the play that the judge regarded the contract as void, even civilly, and he doubtless adopted the legal fiction of so strictly construing the contract, as that, without nominally declaring it void, he practically nullified it. This case may then be an evidence of Shakespeare's legal ingenuity. The question whether Shakespeare was a good lawyer has too many aspects to be discussed here. But in considering Shakespeare's law, we must always take into account the conditions of time, place and circumstance, and how much is intended for dramatic effect. -ED. A. L. J.]


Who are never likely to "take the will for the deed?" Lawyers.

Twisden, J., and Lord C. J. Wilmot are reported to have ascribed to Lord Hobart the saying so often repeated in the books, that "A statute is like a tyrant; when he comes, he makes all void. But the common law is like a nursing father; it makes only void that part where the fault is and preserves the rest." 1 Mod. 35, 36; 2 Wils. 351.

It is said that the only instance recorded of a judge's venturing to use an oath upon the bench is to be found in the Year Book, 2 Henry V, cited in 11 Rep. 53, where a bond imposing a general restrain of trade was sued on, and Hull, J., flew into a passion, and said that the bond was void and that, “by God, if the plaintiff was here he should go to prison till he paid a fine to the king."

Lord Brougham, in his "Life and Times," says of Sydney Smith, that on one occasion he was high sheriff's chaplain and had to preach the Assize sermon, and startled the bar by announcing as his text, “And a certain lawyer stood up and tempted him." "But I am bound to say," adds Brougham, "that the sermon was excellent and much to the purpose." We presume, however, that it was not Smith who, in the prayer at the commencement of the term, prayed the Almighty "to overrule the decisions of this court."

It may be that the larger portion of our books of reports are occupied by grave discussions of trifling and ludicrous questions. One has a suspicion of it when he finds a solemn decision that an indictment for fraudulently selling goat's hair is bad without a venue; and that charcoal is not firewood; or the still more solemn (because more contested) decisions of the highest tribunal of an ancient commonwealth that a dead hog is a swine, and that three small boys may sleep in one bed. Cun. Rep. 94; Sayer, 4; 15 Mass. R. 170, 205.

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Contract not void: performance. The defendant, thinking it necessary, in securing the benefit of certain real estate which he had attached in the State of New York, to pay off a mortgage of $2,000 upon the property, proposed to plaintiff that if he would advance the sum required and superintend the litigation, paying his own expenses, he would give him half the net avails of the suit, but that if nothing was recovered, the expenses of the litigation should be shared equally. The plaintiff accepted the proposition, went twice to the State of New York with the money, paying his own expenses, and consulted the attorney in charge of the suit, who concluded that it was not necessary to

raise the mortgage, soon after which the defense of the suit was abandoned, judgment rendered in favor of the present defendant and the amount of the judgment paid over to him. Held, in a suit brought to recover half of the net avails of the judgment -1. That as the contract was to be performed in the State of New York, it was governed by the law of that State. 2. That it was not void by the law of that State as a champertous contract. 3. That the plaintiff was to be regarded as having sufficiently performed his part of the contract, its literal performance having been excused. Richardson v. Rowland, 41 Conn. 565.


Deliberation in homicide.-By the statute of 1846 all murder perpetrated by "any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditate killing," is made murder in the first degree. Held that, under this statute, a deliberate intent to take life must be proved; and that a state of intoxication, or any other fact tending to prove that the prisoner was incapable of deliberation, might be shown in his defense, and might be considered by the jury. State v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 136.


Deposits.-A widow with a considerable estate and no children deposited in a savings bank $250 in her own name as trustee for W. W. was a boy thirteen years of age, whose parents were near neighbors and friends, and who was accustomed to do errands for her, being almost daily at her house for the purpose, she often giving him presents in return. Shortly after making the deposit she told the boy's parents that she had deposited that amount in the savings bank for their son, and again alluding to it remarked that W. would need it for his education. She kept the bank book herself, and two years thereafter drew out a part of the money and a year later the balance with accrued interest, signing receipts in her own name, and appropriating the money to her own use. She died four years later, leaving a will in which no allusion was made to the deposit and nothing was given to W. It was found by the court below that at the time she made the deposit she intended to make a gift of the sum to W. to take effect either then or at some future time. Held, that she made a complete gift at the time of the deposit and could not afterward revoke it. Minor v. Rogers, 41 Conn. 512.


Church pew.-A husband held not liable for the rent of a church pew hired and occupied by his wife without his assent. St. John's Parish v. Bronson, 41 Conn. 75.


Rights of boarders.— Action against defendants upon their liability as inn keepers for the loss of money brought by plaintiff to their inn. Plaintiff was not a neighbor or friend of defendants, but a traveler, residing at a distant place, who sought their inn for temporary lodging and entertainment. On coming thereto he asked one of the defendants whether they took boarders, and being answered in the affirmative inquired and was told the price of board by the week, and was thereupon received into the house. His intention, not communicated to defendants, was to remain only three or four days. Held, that there was no error in a refusal to instruct the jury that "if plaintiff was stopping at the hotel under an agreement to board by the week he was not a guest but a boarder, and the common-law liability of an inn keeper for the property

of his guest did not apply." Jalie v. Cardinal, Sup. Ct. of Wis., 1874.


1. Education. - Where a father had directed his child, in attendance upon a public school in this State, to pursue only certain studies selected by the father from those required or permitted by law to be taught in such school, and actually taught therein, and had forbidden the child to pursue a certain other study, and this fact was known to the teacher of the school, such teacher was not authorized to inflict corporal punishment upon the child for the purpose of compelling it to pursue the study so forbidden by the father. Morrow v. Wood, Sup. Ct. Wis., 1874.


Note by agent.-A promissory note was signed “B. F. Fisher, agent," and nothing on its face indicated who the principal was. Hetd, that demand of payment on Fisher personally was sufficient, and that a demand on his principal was not necessary. Hall v. Bradbury, 41 Conn. 32.


Contract of sale.-During the pendency of an election for President of the United States, for which office H. G. and U. S. G. were opposing candidates, the defendant in error agreed to sell and the plaintiff in error agreed to buy, a lot of hogs at the price of nine cents per pound, to be paid for when H. G. should be elected. The market price of hogs at the date of the contract was less than four and a half cents per pound. In pursuance of the contract, the hogs were delivered by the defendant in error to the plaintiff in error, who converted them to his own use. The election having resulted in the defeat of H. G., the defendant in error brought suit against the plaintiff in error and recovered the market value of the hogs. Held: 1. That the transaction was a wager. 2. That the hogs were delivered

by the person losing the wager to the person winning,

within the meaning of the second section of the act of March 12, 1831. S. & C. 664; Lucas v. Harper, 24 Ohio St. 328.


Judge Story, whose judgment in all matters connected with the profession is exceedingly valuable, thus summed up the duties of a reporter. He said: "In respect to the duty of a reporter I have always supposed that he was not a mere writer of a journal of what occurred, or of a record of all that occurred or of the manner and time in which it occurred. This duty appears to me to involve the exercise of a sound discretion as to reporting a case; to abridge arguments; to state facts; to give the opinions of the court substantially as they are delivered. As to the order in which this is to be done, I have supposed it was a matter strictly of his own taste and discretion, taking care only that all that he states is true and correct, and that the arrangement is such as will most readily put the profession in possession of the whole merits of the case, in the clearest and most intelligible form. In regard to the statement of facts, I have always thought the best method to be, where it could be conveniently done, to give facts at the beginning of the case, so that the reader might at once understand its true posture. If the court state the facts, the true course is to copy that very statement, because it is the ground of the opinion, and to remove it from the place in the opinion which it occupied (taking notice that it is so removed

and used), and then proceed to give the rest of the opinion in its proper order, after the argument. Upon any other plan, either the reporter must make a statement of facts of his own, which it seems to me would be improper, or repeat the statement of facts of the court, which would be wholly useless, and burthen the volume with mere repetitions. This course has been constantly adopted by the reporter of my Circuit Court reports, and I have always approved it. I believe that it is adopted by all the best reporters, both in England and America. If I were a reporter, I should think it my duty to adopt it unless expressly prohibited from so doing. Whenever it is not done, there is (to be sure) a much easier labor for the reporter, but his reports always wear a slovenly air. As to the correction of verbal and grammatical errors in an opinion, I can only say for myself that I have always been grateful for the kindness of any reporter of my opinions for doing me this favor. Verbal and grammatical errors will occasionally occur in the most accurate writers. I have found some in my own manuscript opinions, after very careful perusal, and have not detected them until I saw them in print. I think it would be a disgrace to all concerned to copy gross, material and verbal errors and misrecitals, because every one must know that they would at once be corrected, if seen. They mar the sense and they pain the author. So the occasional change of the collocation of words often improves and clears the sense. If a reporter do no more than acts of this sort, removing mere blemishes, he does all judges a great favor. I do not believe any good reporter in England or America ever hesitated to do so. This is my opinion. Other persons may think differently from me, but I have supposed this a part of the appropriate discretion of a fair and accomplished reporter. You will find that Lord Coke thought very much as I do on this subject, if you will look on the fourth page of his report on Calvin's case (7 Co. Rep. 4), where he states the duty of a reporter. Douglass, in his preface to his reports (pp. 12, 13), adopts an equally correct method. Yet whoever excelled him as a reporter." We regret that the learned judge did not give the profession his opinion of the requirements of a good head-note.


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Ship: exemption of "thieves:" " 'barratry:" "damage to goods which can be insured against."-The plaintiffs shipped at Liverpool, on board defendants' ship for New York, a box of diamonds under a bill of lading by which were excepted, inter alia, "pirates, robbeas, thieves, vermin, barratry of master and mariners, *." The box was stolen during the voyage or on the ship's arrival in port, before the time for delivery; but there was no evidence to show whether it was stolen by one of the crew or by a passenger, or, after her arrival, by some person from the shore. Held, first, that "thieves" must be interpreted as in a policy of insurance, and only applied to thieves external to the ship; and, assuming theft by one of the crew to be "barratry," secondly, that it lay on the defendants, the shipowners, to bring the loss within one of the exceptions, by showing by whom the theft had been committed; and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to recover for the loss. The bill of lading also contained a clause: "the shipowner is not to be liable for any damage to any goods which is capable of being covered by insurance." Held, that "damage" would

include damage to the goods amounting to a total loss or destruction of them, but did not apply to the case of the abstraction of the goods. Taylor v. Liverpool and Great Western Steam Company, Law Rep., 9 Q. B. 546.


Evidence of scienter.-In order to fix the defendant with knowledge of the ferocious nature of a dog of which he was the owner and which had bitten the plaintiff, two persons who had upon previous occasions (one of them twice) been attacked by it were called to prove that they had gone to the defendant's public house and made complaint, to two persons who were behind the bar serving customers, and that one of them had also complained to the bar-maid. There was, however, no evidence that these complaints were communicated to the defendant; nor was it shown that either of the two men spoken to had the general management of the defendant's business or had the care of the dog. Held, by Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Keating, J. (Brett, J., dissenting), that there was evidence of scienter to go to the jury. Applebee v. Percy, Law Rep., 9 C. P., 647.


Covenant to repair: breach: measure of damages.In 1807 a lease was granted to F., containing a general covenant to repair, a covenant to repair within three months after notice, and a proviso for re-entry for breach. The plaintiffs, the assignees of the lessee, in 1868, granted an underlease to the defendant with similar covenants, except that the notice was to be a two months' notice. In September, 1872, the premises being out of repair, the reversioner served on the premises a notice to repair pursuant to the terms of the lease of 1807. The defendant not having complied with this, the plaintiffs, on the 20th of March, 1873, served him with a notice "to repair the premises in accordance with the terms of his lease;" and being threatened by the reversioner with proceedings to enforce a forfeiture, they entered and did the required repairs themselves, and before the expiration of two months after their notice brought an action against the defendant upon the covenants in his lease. Held, that they were not entitled to recover substantial damages on the general covenant, the premises not being out of repair at the commencement of the action; nor could they sue on the special covenant, the action being brought too soon, as the defendant, being no party to the lease of 1807, was not bound by the earlier notice of September, 1872. Williams v. Williams, Law Rep., 9 C. P. 659.


Agreement not to be performed within a year: contract for support of illegitimate children: annuity: executed consideration-The defendant, who was the father of seven illegitimate children of the plaintiff, agreed with her verbally to pay her £300 per annum, by equal quarterly installments, for so long as she should maintain and educate the children. At the time of the making of the promise the eldest child was about fourteen years old. For several years the plaintiff maintained and educated the children, and the defendant paid the agreed sums. At Michaelmas, 1870, he discontinued his payments. The plaintiff continued to maintain and educate the children and in May, 1873, brought an action for two and a half years' arrears. Held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer, that, the consideration being executed, she

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