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value of the remaining security is insufficient to pay the purchase-money due. 3. That in an action brought by A., either on the contract or mortgage, to subject the remaining premises to sale, to pay such purchasemoney, A. may join with B. in such action, as such purchasers, and subject the value of the fixtures purchased by them to the payment of any portion of the purchase-money that may remain due, after the application thereto of the proceeds of the sale of said remaining premises, according to the inverse order of time in which the purchases were made. Smith v. Altick, 24 Ohio St. 369.


Lease. The plaintiff had been negotiating with the defendant for a lease of a piece of ground, to be used as a strawberry garden. A few days after, he wrote the defendant enquiring whether he conld have the land on the terms offered. The defendant wrote back, "set your strawberries." Held, taken with the explanatory facts, to be a sufficient written memorandum to take the case out of the statute of frauds. Linsley v. Tibbals, 4 Conn. 522.


1. Acknowledgment.-Where the debtor, after the debt was barred by the statute, said to the creditor, "I will give you a ton of coal for the note," which offer was not accepted, it was held that it was a mere offer of compromise, and not such an acknowledgment as would take the case out of the statute of limitations. Currier v. Lockwood, 41 Conn. 349.

2. Where the debtor at another time said to the creditor, "Have you that note? I wish to settle it," the creditor replying, “It is in the hands of S and you can settle with him," to which the debtor rejoined, "The note is outlawed and good for nothing, and you can go ahead if you want to;" which declarations the court below held not to be sufficient evidence of a new promise, it was held that the court committed no error of law in so deciding. Ib.



Measure of damages.-This was an action ex delicto against an attorney for a breach of professional duty. It appeared that by his last will and testament, K., plaintiff's former husband, bequeathed to her among other things a bond and mortgage, executed by defendant for $3,000. That defendant agreed, if plaintiff | would procure for him a satisfaction of said mortgage, he would act as her attorney and counsel in settling up the estate; that plaintiff gave to defendent the satisfaction, and that thereafter defendant willfully and corruptly misconducted himself by accepting employment from the executor and others in controversies between them and plaintiff in matters relating to the estate, and by refusing to counsel and aid her in and about the settlement of the estate, and claimed damages to the amount of $20,000. The answer admitted the making of the agreement. Upon the trial evidence was given tending to show the rendition of services by the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the contract. There was no proof of the value of these services. There was also evidence of defendant's accepting employment, and conducting suits, in opposition to her, relating to the estate. The court charged substantially that the burden of proving the value of the services performed by defendant was upon him,

that every intendment was to be taken against him, and to sustain the defense they must be able to find evidence of the value of the services, if they were able to find such value they were to deduct the same from the amount received, and give a verdict for the difference. Defendant duly excepted. The jury rendered a verdict for the full amount of the mortgage, and interest; held, error; that the measure of damages was not the amount of the fee, but that the burden of proving the damages sustained was upon plaintiff, and not upon the defendant to prove how much of his fee he has actually earned.

In an action for the breach of a contract, where the injured party does not seek to rescind, but asks damages for the breach, he thus affirms the contract and concedes the defendant's right to retain the consideration paid, and the onus is upon him of proving the breach, and the amount of damages, and he can only recover the damages thus proved. Quinn v. Van Pelt. Opinion by Rapallo, J.


Limitations in receipt: evidence. This action was brought to recover the value of a quantity of goods delivered to defendant for transportation, consigned to a place beyond the terminus of its route. The shipper was given a receipt, which contained a stipulation that goods consigned to any place beyond the terminus of its road would be forwarded by a carrier or freightman willing to receive them unconditionally for transportation. Held, that the obligation was general, to forward, in the usual course of business, by any carrier so willing who was known to be safe and responsible. It appeared by the evidence that at the time direction was given by parol to forward by rail only. Held, that the evidence was incompetent, as it was in contradiction of the written agreement. Hinckley v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. Opinion by Folger, J.


Will: real estate: bill of peace. In an action for the construction of a doubtful or disputed claim in a will, the jurisdiction of a court of equity is incidental to that over trusts, and it only exists when the court is moved on behalf of an executor, trustee, or cestui que trust, and to insure a correct administration of the power conferred by a will.

An action brought for the determination of claims to real property under the provisions of the statutes (2 R. S., p. 312, as amended by chap. 50, Laws of 1848; chap. 116, Laws of 1854; chap. 511, Laws of 1855; chap. 173, Laws of 1860, and chap. 219, Laws of 1864, and Code, § 449), is not authorized against infant defendants.

The only change made by section 449 of the Code is, that now they may be prosecuted by action, which action must be in pursuance of the provisions of the Revised Statutes. The complaint must allege that the defendants unjustly claim title to the premises, and in the prayer for judgment or otherwise, it must notify the defendants that unless they appear and assert their claim, they will be forever barred.

A bill quia timet is a measure of precautionary justice, and a complaint to make out a case in the nature of such a bill must state facts showing wrongs or anticipated mischiefs which should be forestalled and prevented.

To sustain a complaint as a bill of peace, it must appear that a great number of persons are interested in

the questions in dispute, or that the action is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of actions, and it will not be sustained where, although the relative rights of the parties have not been adjudicated upon, yet they rest upon the legal construction of a written instrument, to which both parties look as the source of their rights, and the true meaning and intention of which can be readily pronounced by a court of law when the parties shall appear before it with an actual controversy. Bailey v. Briggs et al. Opinion by Folger, J.


1. Alteration of road.-This is an action for trespass. It appeared that two of the commissioners of highways of the town of B. in Suffolk county, made a record of an alteration of a road and laying out a new road for part of the distance across premises now owned by plaintiff; the record recited that the commissioners gave the old road in exchange, reserving the privilege to certain parties named, their heirs and assigns of carting up hay, subject to shutting gates. In laying out this road the commissioners intended to exercise the authority conferred by the provisions of the act of 1789 (chap. 14, Laws of 1783) relating to the "clearing, regulating and laying out of public highways in Suffolk, Kings, and Queens counties," which act provides that when a road has been laid out through any person's land the commissioners, or a majority of them, may agree with the owner to exchange said road for another road to be laid out through said lands, etc. Said record did not contain a recital of any agreement with or assent of the owners to the alteration, or to take the old road in exchange for the new one. At that time plaintiff's land was owned by infants. In this action the locus in quo was the new road described in said record. Held, that the fact that the owners of the land had agreed to the alteration, which was essential to give the commissioners jurisdiction not being shown by the record, it did not establish a legal highway; also held, that the record, being void, the commissioners' action in subsequently making a survey and description of said alleged highway, was void, and plaintiff was not precluded, by the omission to appeal, from contesting in this action the existence of a legal highway. Miller v. Brown. Opinion by Andrews, J.

2. Compensation. This was an equity suit brought to restrain the defendant from laying out and opening a street through plaintiff's lands, and from collecting an assessment of a portion of the expense thereof upon the remainder of his real estate. Defendant's proceedings were in accordance with the provisions of section 1, title 7, chapter 77, Laws of 1870, an act in relation to the city of Albany, which provides, that for the purpose of ascertaining the compensation to be paid by said city to the owners of lands taken for streets, etc., the common council shall nominate twelve freeholders, whose names on separate ballots are to be placed in a box from whence three are to be drawn, who are to be appointed commissioners. Plaintiff claimed that said provisions were violative of section 7, article 1 of the State constitution, providing that where private property shall be taken for public use, the compensation to be made therefor, when not made by the State, shall be ascertained by a jury or by not less than three commissioners, appointed by a court of record, and the proceedings thereunder were consequently void. Held, that under said constitutional provision when a law provides for ascertaining the compensation

by commissioners, their appointment must not only in form be made by the court, but its action must be left independent and untrammeled. The provisions of said act are unconstitutional, and the proceedings thereunder void; also that commissioners selected cannot be regarded as a jury, as it was determined by the Legislature in this case that the compensation should be ascertained by commissioners, and a jury therefore have nothing to do with the question. Menges v. City of Albany. Opinion by Grover, J.


Compensation of superintendent.—The supply bill of 1870 (chap. 492, Laws of 1870), among other things provided that companies transferring securities on deposit with the superintendent of the insurance department should pay to him one-fifth of one per cent on the amount transferred. Held, that the percentage was designed as a compensation to the superintendent for his services in effecting the transfer; and that prior to the act of 1872 (chap. 541, Laws of 1872), requiring all fees received by him to be paid into the treasury, he was entitled to the same (Grover and Andrews, JJ., dissenting. People v. Miller. Opinion by Johnson, J.


Repairs: measure of damages: duty of lessee.-This action was brought to recover a balance of rent alleged to be due upon a lease for one year. The answer set up, by way of counter-claim, an agreement in the lease on the part of the plaintiff, to put and keep the premises in good repair, and a breach of this covenant claiming damages on account thereof; held, that the defendant had a right to set up as a counter-claim the damages arising from the breach of the agreement as to repairs; also that the fact that defendant had paid the rent, except for the last quarter did not deprive him of the right to counter-claim his damages for the entire year, and, if in excess of the rent, he was entitled to a verdict for the excess.

The measure of damages in such case is the difference of the value of the use of the premises as they were, and as the plaintiff agreed to put them.

It seems that in case the requisite repairs are trifling, and the damages, if they are not made, large, the lessee should make the repairs and charge them to the lessor. (Grover, J.)

Where a lessee, knows his property will be injured if left upon the premises, by a failure of his lessor to repair, he has no right to run the risk, and if he does, and his property is injured he cannot recover of the lessor therefor. Cook v. Soule et al. Opinion by Grover,J.


Prize packages.-This action was brought to recover for goods sold and delivered. Defendants claimed that the goods were intended to be used in a lottery. It appeared that the goods sold consisted of a quantity of candies and silverware. The candies were put up by plaintiff in packages, known as prize candy packages, in some of which were tickets, each with the name of a piece of silverware upon it. Defendants intended to sell the packages for more than their value, the purchaser taking the chance of getting a package containing a ticket, in which case he was entitled to the article of silverware named in addition to the package. Held, that this was a lottery within the meaning of the statute, and the sale having been for the purpose of aiding in a lottery, was void (1 R. S. 668, § 38); the contract of sale was also void and plain

tiff could not recover. Hall v. Ruggles et al. Opinion by Folger, J.


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Good faith. This was an action for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. It appeared on the trial that defendant had taken in pawn certain stolen goods; that subsequently plaintiff went with a police officer to defendant's store and the latter identified her as the person from whom he received the goods. At that time she had not yet been arrested, which fact was not known to defendant. Plaintiff was then taken to the police office and detained there until the next day, and then, upon complaint of the owner of the goods was committed. Upon her examination defendant testified as a witness, that he could not positively swear that she pawned the goods; plaintiff was discharged. Defendant's counsel asked the court to charge in substance, that if the defendant accused the plaintiff in good faith the plaintiff could not recover. The court refused so to charge, except with the qualification, that defendant had reasonable grounds for believing plaintiff guilty. Held, error; that plaintiff could not maintain the action as one for false imprisonment, and that as defendant was not the prosecutor, and could only be made liable as such constructively, if he acted in good faith he could not be charged for the subsequent prosecution. Farman v. Feily. Opinion by Andrews, J.


Married woman: duress.-This action was brought upon a promissory note, which was signed by defendant M. R., who was a married woman, and which purported to charge her separate estate and stated that the consideration therefor was for the benefit of said estate. It appeared that the signature of M. R. to the note was obtained by duress, that the consideration was not for the benefit of her separate estate, and that the note was not given in the course of any separate business carried on by her. Held, that the note could not be enforced against her, even in the hands of a bona fide holder. That such an obligation is not governed by the law merchant. Loomis v. Ruck et al. Opinion by Rapallo, J.


Arrest and attachment. This was an action brought by plaintiff to recover back a sum of money, alleged to have been procured by fraud and withheld and appropriated by defendant, who was the treasurer and a director of plaintiff. An order of arrest and a warrant of attachment were both granted in the action. Defendant moved to vacate both. The warrant of attachment was vacated by the Special Term, and the order of arrest was sustained. Held, that these two provisional remedies are not so inconsistent in their nature that the allowance of both in the same action will make both void. Whether the court has discretion to confine the party to one of these remedies, in a case falling alike under the description of cases wherein the two are respectively allowed, quere. Chappel v. Skinner, 6 How. Pr. R. 338, distinguished. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Boody. Opinion by Johnson, J.

A verdict has been rendered against Mr. Sampson, late city editor of The London Times, who was sued by Mr. Rubery for libel in charging him with being guiltily implicated in the Arizona diamond fraud. The defendant is required to pay $2,500 damages.

THE GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW. An exchange says that a singular instance of the working of the German criminal law was brought out by a case which was tried before a jury the other day at Hamburg. The case in itself was very simple. A house in Hamburg was broken into, and a quantity of silver plate stolen from it. Some time after a pedlar, who had already been imprisoned several times for theft, was apprehended at Ratzeburg, and the stolen property was found upon him. Being accused of the robbery, and put upon his trial, the pedlar denied that he was guilty of the burglary, and accounted for his possession of the property by saying that he had stolen it from the real burglar, whom he had met while traveling upon the high road between Eutin and Schwartau; which, if true, would have reduced his crime to simple theft. Two questions were, therefore, put to the jury (1) whether the prisoner was guilty of burglary and theft, or (2) whether, according to his own statement, he had merely stolen the things from the real burglar. The jury pronounced him guilty of the burglary and theft, but only by seven votes against five; whereupon it seems, by the German law, the ultimate decision of the question devolved upon the court. They acquitted the prisoner upon this count, and the jury were then required to give their verdict upon the charge of simple theft contained in the second question, which remained still unanswered. The result was that the prisoner was declared guilty by more than seven votes, and condemned by the court to five years' imprisonment. But, of course, this last verdict could only have been obtained by the concurrence of several of the jurymen who had previously pronounced the prisoner guilty of the burglarious theft in Hamburg, but now found him guilty of stealing the property from the real burglar on the high road between Eutin and Schwartau. Obviously, however, only one of the two charges could have been true. The result would have been more singular still if the seven jurymen, who had pronounced the prisoner guilty on the first charge, had adhered to their verdict; for the decision of the majority which pronounced him guilty of the burglary having been set aside by the court, he must have been acquitted on the minor charge, and thus, notwithstanding his confession, would have escaped scot-free.


The Principles and Practice of Courts of Justice in England and the United States. By Conway Robinson. Vol. vii. Richmond: Woodhouse & Parham; Randolph & English, 1874.

Twenty years ago Mr. Robinson began the colossal undertaking of setting forth in the form of a treatise the principles of practice of the courts of this country and England. The work has been gradually pushed forward until the seventh volume has now appeared. The present volume is occupied with personal actions, and treats of the grounds and forms of defenses; and the answer to defenses. It is impossible to give a synopsis of the design of the author in the space which is allotted us. So far as we have examined we must admit that this treatise is the most extensive and complete ever attempted in modern times. It bids fair to rival the Pandects of Justinian. The author has received numerous letters from distinguished and able jurists on both sides of the Atlantic expressing words of commendation and encouragement. The work exhibits great learning and research, and the different

rules of practice in the various States and in England are noticed. By many the work will be regarded in the way of a legal curiosity-very much as the traveler regards the pyramids. But we doubt not that the members of the profession who are able to obtain a full set of "Robinson's Practice" will find it of genuine and continuous value.

A Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Warrants and Attachments, with Forms, and a reprint of all the reported cases bearing upon the subject: By Sidney J. Cowen, Attorney at Law; Albany & New York: Banks & Brothers, 1874.

The design of this volume in the language of Mr. Cowen is" to present in one volume all the law relating to Warrants and Attachments, and the practice under that law." The provisions of the Revised Statutes and of the Code are set forth; and about 250 reported cases are given in full. There are about eighty pages of original matter in the volume, which we think is hardly enough to entitle the book to the name of a "treatise." The general index only embraces the statutes and comments of Mr. Cowen. To the cases reported there is only an index of names of cases. The cases reported occupy about five-sixths of the volume, so that the book would be more properly named Cases on the Law of Warrants and Attachments with the statutes and notes." The book will doubtless prove a very convenient and valuable accessary to the profession.

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The following decisions were announced in the New York Court of Appeals on Tuesday, January 19, 1875: Judgments affirmed with costs- Carnes v. Platt; Atwell v. Brown; Normington v. Cook; Ayer v. Kobbee; Skinner v. Valentine; Coulter v. Richmond; McCoy v. O'Donnell; Nems v. The Mayor of Troy; The Ontario Bank v. The New Jersey Steamboat Co.; Bowman v. The Agricultural Ins. Co; Kincaid v. Dwindle; Poole v. Kermit.-Judgments reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Stillwell v. Carpenter; McGrath v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.; Dusenbury v. La Grange. Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed with costs - Van Schuylerv. Mulford. Judgment affirmed with costs payable out of the proceeds of the sales of premises - Mapes v. Snyder. Judgment reversed and a new trial ordered, unless plaintiffs stipulate to reduce the judgment by allowing thereon the sum of $545 and interest from 1862, and if so reduced judgment affirmed without costs to either party in this court - Bathgatt v. Haskins.- Judgment in favor of the Female Guardian Society reversed, and judgment of court below in other respects modified to meet such reversal in accordance with the opinion of Allen, J., as to the rights of the other parties, with costs of all the parties to be paid out of the fund, judgment to be settled by Allen, J. Lefevre v. Lefevre and others. Order of General Term affirmed, and judgment absolute for plaintiff on stipulation with costsKing v. Knapp. Order of General Term affirmed and judgment absolute for respondent on stipulation with costs - Tafft v. Wright. Order of General Term reversed and judgment of Special Term affirmed with costs-Shipsey v. The Bowery National Bank of New York.- Order of General Term affirmed and judgment absolute for respondent on stipulation for $624.41 and interest from December 24, 1871, with costs - Gilchrist v. The Brooklyn Grocers' Manf. Bank.- · Order of General Term

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Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

DEAR SIR- Will you permit the presentation to your readers of the following query: Code, § 183, says "it (the order of arrest) shall require the sheriff, etc., to return the order at a time and place therein mentioned to the plaintiff or attorney by whom it shall be subscribed or endorsed."

Rule No. 6, of the New Supreme Court Rules says: "The sheriff shall file with the clerk the order or process, etc., on which an arrest is made within ten days after the arrest."

Can these two enactments be reconciled-if not, is it not a pity that the late Convention of Judges required Rule 6 to be indorsed on the order of arrest before its delivery to the sheriff?



THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Your suggestions respecting the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in January 9 number, is very good. Would it not be better, however, that separate courts should be framed for different classes of cases? For example: 1st. For common-law cases. 2d. For cases in equity. 3d. For admiralty cases.

Or, divide the jurisdiction in some way and so often as may be necessary to keep pace with the business. Probably two courts would now be sufficient.

In this way we would have more learned judges, as their labors would be confined to a particular branch of the law, and the judges would become eminent and learned therein.

It is not every lawyer, or any lawyer, who is equally learned in law and equity and admiralty, and in the selection of judges special reference would be had to their peculiar fitness for the particular court in which they might be called to preside.

My judgment is that in the mode proposed we would get speedy justice — if that is what we want. J. M. G. FOND DU LAC, Wis., Jauuary 12, 1875. [The method of restricting appeals seems to be the most feasible and simple for relieving the Supreme Court. A division of the court will inevitably and practically be the production of several high courts of appeal; but there will be no court of last resort in the proper sense of the term. In the State of New York we have seen the disadvantages of two high courts of appeal the Commission of Appeals and the Court of Appeals. There is great difficulty in the two courts keeping posted as to the rulings of each other. And there is also great difficulty in maintaining unity in adjudication. Questions of law, of equity and of ad

miralty always have some things in common, and the danger is that if special courts of appeal be organized for each class of cases, these courts will differ on points which are common. To our mind the division of the Supreme Court would destroy the unity of our appellate jurisprudence, and would work tenfold more injury than a restriction of appeals. ED. A. L. J.]


The Psychological and Medico-Legal Journal for January, 1875, contains articles on the following subjects: Neurotic Origin of Disease, by Dr. F. D. Lent; The Philosophy of Suicide, by Dr. James J. O'Dea; The Study of Nervous Diseases, art. iii, by Dr. G. L. Teed. The Journal also contains an abstract of the proceedings of the New York Medico-Legal Society; and a review of Amos' Science of Law.

"Living Authors at the New York Bar, being a Catalogue of the Books they have Written and Edited," is the title of a pamphlet issued by McDivitt & Co., of New York. It appears that there are more than sixty lawyers at the New York bar or on the bench who are entitled to be called "authors." Among these may be noticed the Abbots, Blatchford, Bosworth, Curtis, Daly, Dwight, Eaton, Guernsey, Hoffman, Field, Redfield, Shearman and Whittaker.

The official edition of the Tilton-Beecher trial is to be published by Geo. W. Smith & Co., law booksellers and importers, No. 95 Nassau street, New York. This will undoubtedly be a publication much sought after. This trial will be of extraordinary professional as well as public interest. The eminence and ability of the counsel employed, the peculiar legal issues involved, the important questions of evidence, and the brilliant tactics employed in conducting the offense and defense-all will go to make up one of the most interesting and valuable records ever produced in a court of justice.

The Superior Court of Quebec, District of Richelieu, in Armstrong v. Bartle, 5 La Revue Legale, 217. decided that the proprietor of a journal which pulishes a correspondence for which a libel suit is brought against him, has no action against the author of the articles for indemnification.

The Hour says that "the Court of Chancery has just determined a question of vital importance to the community of pets, arising upon the will of a gentleman named Edmett. This benevolent testator bequeathed to Elizabeth Osborn, his "faithful servant," an annuity of £50, on condition that she took care of his "favorite dog." At the time of making his will Mr. Edmett had a dog named Romp; but this dog died; and was succeeded by Sambo, who is still alive. Upon these facts Vice Chancellor Hall decreed that Elizabeth Osborn should have the annuity for her life, without any condition in favor of the dog, although the Vice Chancellor expressed a hope that she would take care of him. Unless this judicial hope is strictly realized, we think that Sambo ought certainly to be allowed to appeal. Mrs. Osborn, who, during the testator's life-time, looked after both dogs, probably owed her annuity to the care she bestowed on them. Her "faithfulness," in the eyes of the testator, was no doubt composed in no small degree of kindness to Sambo and Romp. It is true that Romp was dead at the time of the bequest, but does not a will always

speak from the death of the testator? And must not Sambo be taken to have succeeded to all the rights of Romp, together with the plate of bones after dinner and the other privileges of the household dog? Moreover, it does not appear that Sambo was represented in the argument. The attorney-general, indeed, was a party to the suit, but we doubt whether so high a personage put in a word for poor Sambo, who would have been much better represented by the secretary to the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. There must be some doctrine of the Court of Chancery which can be adduced in Sambo's favor, or there is no justice for a canine suitor."

An Exchange says: In the American reports there are a number of criminal cases which discuss the order in which counsel shall addresss the jury, and the right of finai reply. In the German court which has just tried Count Von Arnim, they have this curious custom: The public prosecutor makes immediate reply to each of the separate speeches for the defence. Such an officer must needs be ready orator to encounter in every detail the powerful talent which a rich and distinguished prisoner could summon to his aid. Thus, among Von Arnim's counsel was Herr Von Holtzendorff, the famous professor of law at Munich, who spoke for two hours with great vigor and acumen; and also Herr Dockhorn, whose rare talents had led to his being brought all the way from Posen to take part in this great trial. Herr Dockhorn must have been a hard man to grapple with in off-hand debate; for, in describing the commencement of his speech, it is said he "got into the saddle like a Cossack breaking forth in the rear of heavy professional artillery." When Hannibal bivouacked with his army under the walls of Rome, the senate sent a messenger to inform him that the ground on which he had pitched his tent, had been that day sold at auction. With the same sublime assurance, Herr Dockhorn commenced his speech, as follows: "The professor having dug the trenches with wonderful effect, I am going to burn some of the outlying forts of the public prosecutor. The moment those forts are down, we shall perceive that the main points of the charge, which I may compare to the citadel, are nothing but painted side-scenes, and have no reality at all." Herr Tessendorf, the public prosecutor, seems to have done himself great credit by the self-possession and disciplined logic with which he met those great antagonists.

A curious illustration of the variety of questions, which come before courts of justice may be found in Harrie v. Railroad Company, 31 Law Times, N. S., 424, where Vice Chancellor Malins was called upon to decide what constitutes a "house." The plaintiff was the lessee of two semi-detached villas under one continuous roof. The party wall between them was only carried up to the ceilings of the bedrooms, so that the space between these ceilings and the roof formed one continuous room. This party wall was so ineffective that if one of the villas were to be pulled down, the other villa would become uninhabitable. Each villa had its own garden. A railway company, under the provisions of the Land Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845, required to take a portion of the garden of one of the villas. And it was held that the two villas constituted one house within the meaning of § 92 of the Act, and that, therefore, the company must take both.

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