votes cast was duly made by said board and entered in full upon the journal of their proceedings for that day, and signed by the acting chairman and clerk of the board, and that the regularity of each of said returns or statements of the election inspectors of the various precincts and all thereof in said county was duly and properly determined by said board."

We are of the opinion that consideration of the questions presented by this record is foreclosed by our previous decisions.

In Feek v. Bloomingdale Township Board, 82 Mich. 393, Chief Justice CHAMPLIN, writing for the court, said:

"I do not see that the section [12] vests judicial power in the board of supervisors. The preceding section (11) makes them a canvassing board for the purpose of tabulating the votes and ascertaining and declaring the result. * * * There is no judicial action or determination, but their action under this section is wholly administrative. It is not every exercise of discretion in administrative affairs that makes such action judicial. Wherever a trust or confidence involving the exercise of discretion is reposed, it must be exercised, but, because it involves investigation, inquiry, and the exercise of discretion and choice, it is not necessarily the exercise of judicial powers. The law does not authorize them to reject any return made to them. On the contrary, they are to tabulate all the returns made."

In Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. 687, it was said:

"Section 13 of the act in question provides for action by the board when the result of the county canvass shall show that a majority of the votes cast is in the affirmative. Unless we are to hold that the validity of the local option law is subject to attack by every citizen in the county in succession, and liable to be held valid one day and invalid the next, as the testimony in individual cases varies, we must conclude that the determination of the board is final. Such is the rule in county-seat cases, and this statute cited (section 13) implies as much in this case, while section 14 explicitly states that the resolution of prohibition is conclusive upon the regularity of the prior proceedings. The jurisdiction being shown by a valid record, a valid canvass, followed by the adoption of pro

hibition, must be held conclusive upon all. Pinkerton v. Staninger, 101 Mich. 273."

In Pinkerton v. Staninger, cited in support of the court's conclusion in Thomas v. Abbott, supra, it was said:

"It has been settled by the repeated decisions of this court that the decision of the supervisors in canvassing and determining the vote upon the question of the removal of the county seat is conclusive, and that no judicial review of their action is provided by law."

In the absence of anything in the record impugning the regularity of the proceedings of the board or the accuracy of their canvass of the votes before them, their determination must be considered final, and the application for the writ of mandamus is denied, with costs to respondent.

GRANT, MONTGOMERY, OSTRANDER, and HOOKER, JJ., concurred.

STENDER v. KERREOS.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASES - TERMINATION NOTICE -SUFFICIENCY.

A lease provided that at the end of a term the lessees should have the privilege of a renewal for an indefinite period upon the same terms and conditions, with the provision that, if the lessor desired to rebuild, he could, after the expiration of the original term, terminate the lease upon giving 60 days' notice in writing of such intention. Complainant, an assignee of the lessor, 60 days before the expiration of the original term, notified the lessees of his intention to terminate the lease at that time, and that said notice was given

"in accordance with a provision contained" in the lease. Held, that, the provision in the lease referred to in the notice should be construed as a part thereof, and, considered in the light of surrounding circumstances, was sufficient. OSTRANDER, GRANT, and BROOKE, JJ., dissenting.

Case made from Wayne; Rohnert, J. Submitted November 17, 1908. (Docket No. 121.) Decided May 25, 1909.

Summary proceedings by Hugo H. Stender against John Kerreos and others for the possession of leased premises. There was judgment for complainant on a verdict directed by the court, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Trevor & Bumps, for appellants.

E. W. Mulford, for appellee.

BLAIR, C. J. In my opinion the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed, for the reason that the notice given to the lessees was sufficient to terminate the lease. I do not think that the sufficiency of the notice in question should be determined solely, "upon this point, by what appears in the lease and in the notice and not by evidence aliunde." The lease does not purport to prescribe the exact terms of the notice, and any form of language which would express the reason for the notice would be sufficient. The object of the notice was not only to express to the lessees the intention of the lessor to terminate the lease and the ground therefor, but also to convey to the minds of the lessees such intention and the basis therefor. Any form of notice which should apprise the lessees that the ground of the notice was the wish to rebuild would be sufficient. In determining the meaning of the notice, therefore, reference may properly be had to the existing facts known to both parties at the time the notice was given. The testimony showed that defendant Lavagnino's subtenancy was with the consent of Mrs.

Cady, that the complainant knew of the leasehold rights of the defendants when he purchased the property of Mrs. Cady, and had personally received and receipted for the rent up to August 1, 1907. The notice required the defendants to surrender possession "on or before the first day of August, A. D. 1907, for the reason that I intend to terminate your tenancy and repossess the whole of such premises on the date above mentioned." On the 1st day of August, 1907, the defendants' fixed term and all further rights in the premises terminated, unless by that day they exercised their privilege to fix a further term and complainant had failed 60 days prior to that time to cut off their right to fix such further term by giving them notice of termination of that right. The notice stated the reason (and the only reason) why it was given, as follows: "This notice is given in accordance with a provision contained in a certain lease," etc. It is to be observed that the notice is given specifically in accordance with a provision not generally in accordance with the provisions of the lease. The only provision providing for the giving of a notice is the provision that:

"On and after three years from said August 1, 1904, the said party of the first part shall have the privilege of entering and occupying said premises and terminating said lease, in case she wishes to rebuild upon said premises, upon giving said parties of the second part sixty (60) days' notice in writing of such intention; but, during the three years comprising the term of this lease, the said party of the first part to have no such right to terminate said lease."

The provision for notice was a part of the clause giving to the lessees the privilege of a renewal and was a limitation of that privilege. The notice given confirmed the right of the lessees to occupy the premises till the end of the original term and manifestly applied solely to their right to a renewal. The notice conformed to the provision therefor in the length of time given, and, since the lessees could not fail to understand that the provision of the lease

referred to in the notice was the one explicitly providing for notice, the notice should be construed as though the reference to the provision made it a part of the notice. This conclusion appears to me to be justified by a reasonable interpretation of the written instruments in the light of the surrounding facts, and is also sustained by authority.

A contrary conclusion was reached in Matter of Coatsworth, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 295, cited in the brief for defendants as setting forth "the logic and the law of our contention in this particular." The lease contained the following language:

"And the said parties of the first part further covenant and agree to and with the party of the second part, his executors, administrators and assigns, that in case they do not give the party of the second part, his executors, administrators or assigns, at least six months' notice in writing before the 1st day of April, 1862, of their election to take possession of said demised premises at the expiration of this lease and to pay for said buildings, vaults and sidewalks at such appraised value, that then and in that event they will renew and continue this present demise and lease, and such omission to give said notice shall be deemed and taken to be a renewal and continuance of this demise and lease for five years from the said first day of April, 1862, upon the same terms and conditions herein before expressed, except that the rent for said renewed and continued term shall be $700 per annum, payable in the same way as the last five years' rents above provided for. And they also covenant and agree as aforesaid that so often as they shall fail to give said six months' notice before the termination of such renewed term, they will renew the said demise and lease, and such failure shall be deemed a renewal thereof for five years from the termination thereof, on the same terms and conditions as the said first renewal and continuance."

The notice contained the following:

* *

"Sirs: You will take notice that we, as owners of premises, hereby elect to take possession of the said demised premises pursuant to the provisions of