taken to speak in his behalf. No man got up to say, "The President desires this; he thinks it necessary, expedient, and proper." But, sir, if any gentleman had risen to say this, it would not have answered the requisition of the constitution. Not at all. It is not a hint, an intimation, the suggestion of a friend, by which the executive duty in this respect is to be fulfilled. By no means. The President is to make a recommendation, a public recommendation, an official recommendation, a responsible recommendation; not to one House, but to both Houses; it is to be a recommendation to Congress. If, on receiving such recommendation, Congress fail to pay it proper respect, the fault is theirs. If, deeming the measure necessary and expedient, the President fail to recommend it, the fault is his; clearly, distinctly, and exclusively his. This, sir, is the constitution of the United States, or else I do not understand the constitution of the United States. Does not every man see how [JAN. 14, 1836. a question that cannot be settled by any precise rule. But "specific appropriation," that is to say, the designation of every object for which money is voted, as far as such designation is practicable, has been thought to be a most important republican principle. In times past, popular parties have claimed great merit from professing to carry this doctrine much farther, and to adhere to it much more strictly, than their adversaries. Mr. Jefferson, especially, was a great advocate for it, and held it to be indispensable to a safe and economical administration and disbursement of the public revenues. But what have the friends and admirers of Mr. Jeffer. son to say to this appropriation. Where do they find, in this proposed grant of three millions, designation of object, and particular and specific application of money? Have they forgotten, all forgotten, and wholly abandoned, even all pretence for specific appropriation? If not, how could they sanction such a vote as this? Let me perfectly unconstitutional it is that the President should ❘ recall its terms. They are, that "the sum of three millions of dollars be, and the same hereby is, appropriated, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended, in whole or in part, under the direction of the President of the United States, for the military and naval service, including fortifications and ordnance, and to increase the navy: provided such expenditure shall be rendered necessary for the defence of the country prior to the next meeting of Congress." communicate his opinions or wishes to Congress on such grave and important subjects, otherwise than by a direct and responsible recommendation; a public and open recommendation, equally addressed and equally known to all whose duty calls upon them to act on the subject? What would be the state of things if he might communicate his wishes or opinions privately to members of one House, and make no such communication to members of the other? Would not the two Houses be necessarily put in immediate collision? Would they stand on equal footing? Would they have equal information? What could ensue from such a manner of conducting the public business but quarrel, confusion, and conflict? A member rises in the House of Representatives, and moves a very large appropriation of money for military purposes. If he says he does it upon executive recommendation, where is his voucher? The President is not like the British King, whose ministers and secretaries are in the House of Commons, and who are authorized, in certain cases, to express the opinions and wishes of their sovereign. We have no King's servants; at least we have none known to the constitution. Congress can know the opinions of the President only as he officially communicates them. It would be a curious inquiry in either House, when a large appropriation is moved, if it were necessary to ask whether the mover represented the President, spoke his sentiments, or, in other words, whether what he proposed were "in accordance with the views of the Executive?" How could that be judged of? By the party he belongs to Party is not quite unique enough for that. By the airs he gives himself? Many might assume airs, if thereby | Under the authority of such a law, the President might they could give themselves such importance as to be esteemed authentic expositors of the executive will. Or is this will to be circulated in whispers? made known to meetings of party men? intimated through the press? or communicated in any other form, which still leaves the Executive completely irresponsible? So that while executive purposes or wishes pervade the ranks of party friends, influence their conduct, and unite their efforts, the open, direct, and constitutional responsibility is wholly avoided. Sir, this is not the constitution of the United States, nor can it be consistent with any constitution which professes to maintain separate departments in the Government. Here, then, sir, is abundant ground, in my judgment, for the vote of the Senate, and here I might rest it. But there is also another ground. The constitution declares that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. What is meant by "appropriations?" Does this language not mean that particular sums shall be assigned, by law, to particular objects? How far this pointing In the first place it is to be observed, that whether the money shall be used at all or not, is made to depend on the discretion of the President. This is sufficiently liberal. It carries confidence far enough. But, if there had been no other objections, if the objects of the appropriation had been sufficiently described, so that the President, if he expended the money at all, must have expended it for purposes authorized by the Legislature, and nothing had been left to his discretion but the question, whether an emergency had arisen in which the authority ought to be exercised, I might not have felt bound to reject the vote. There are some precedents which might favor such a contingent provision, though the practice is dangerous, and ought not to be followed except in cases of clear necessity. But the insurmountable objection to the proposed grant was, that it specified no objects. It was as gene. ral as language could make it. It embraced every expenditure that could be called either military or naval. It was to include "fortifications, ordnance, and increase of the navy;" but it was not confined to these. It embraced the whole general subject of military service. repair ships, build ships, buy ships, enlist seamen, and do any thing and every thing else touching the naval service, without restraint or control. He might repair such fortifications as he saw fit, and neglect the rest; arm such as he saw fit, and neglect the arming of others; or build new fortifications wherever he chose. And yet these unlimited powers over the fortifications and the navy constitute, by no means, the most dangerous part of the proposed authority; because, under that authority, his power to raise and employ land forces was equally absolute and uncontrolled. He might levy troops, imbody a new army, call out the militia in numbers to suit his own discretion, and employ them as he saw fit. Now, sir, does our legislation, under our constitution, furnish any precedent for all this? We make appropriations for the army, and we understand what we are doing, because it is "the army," that is to say, the army established by law. We make appropriations for the navy; they, too, are for "the navy," as provided for and established by law. We make ap -out and fixing the particular objects shall be carried, ispropriations for fortifications, but we say what fortifica tions, and we assign to each its intended amount of the whole sum. This is the usual course of Congress on such subjects; and why should it be departed from? Are we ready to say that the power of fixing the places for new fortifications, and the sum allotted to each; the power of ordering new ships to be built, and fixing the number of such new ships; the power of laying out money to raise men for the army; in short, every power, great and small, respecting the military and naval service, shall be vested in the President, without specification of object or purpose, to the entire exclusion of the exercise of all judgment on the part of Congress? For one, I am not prepared. The honorable member from Ohio, near me, has said that if the enemy had been on our shores he would not have agreed to this vote. And I say, if the proposition were now before us, and the guns of the enemy were battering against the walls of the Capitol, I would not agree to it. The people of this country have an interest, a property, an inheritance, in this instrument, against the value of which forty capitols do not weigh the twentieth part of one poor scruple. There can never be any necessity for such proceedings but a feigned and false necessity, a mere idle and hollow pretence of necessity; least of all can it be said that any such necessity actually existed on the 3d of March. There was no enemy on our shores; there were no guns pointed against the Capitol; we were in no war, nor was there a reasonable probability that we should have war, unless we made it Durselves. But whatever was the state of our foreign relations, is it not preposterous to say that it was necessary for Congress to adopt this measure, and yet not necessary for the President to recommend it? Why should we thus run in advance of all our own duties, and leave the President completely shielded from his own just responsibility? Why should there be nothing but grant, and trust, and confidence, on our side, and nothing but discretion and power on his? Sir, if there be any philosophy in history, if human blood still runs in buman veins, if man still conforms to the identity of his nature, the institutions which secure constitutional liberty can never stand long against this excessive personal confidence, against this devotion to men, in utter disregard both of principle and of experience, which seems to me to be strongly characteristic of our times. This vote came to us, sir, from the popular branch of the Legislature; and that such a vote should come from such a branch of the Legislature was among the circumstances which excited in me the greatest surprise and the deepest concern. Certainly, sir, certainly, I was not, on that account, the more inclined to concur. It was no argument with me that others seemed to be rushing, with such heedless, headlong trust, such impetuosity of confidence, into the arms of executive power. I held back the stronger, and would hold back the longer, for that very reason. I see, or think I see, it is either a true vision of the future, revealed by the history of the past, or, if it be an illusion, it is an illusion which appears to me in all the brightness and sunlight of broad noor, that it is in this career of personal confidence, along this beaten track of man-worship, marked, every furlong, by the fragments of other free Governments, that our own system is making progress towards its end. A personal popularity, honorably earned, at first, by military achievements, and sustained now by party, by patronage, and by an enthusiasm which looks for no ill, because it means no ill itself, seems to render men willing to gratify power, long before its demands are made, and to surfeit executive discretion, even in anticipation of its own appetite. Sir, if, on the 3d of March last, it had been the purpose of both Houses of Congress to create VOL, XII.-11 [SENATE. a military dictator, what formula had been better suited to their purpose than this vote of the House? It is true we might have given more money if we had had it to give. We might have emptied the treasury; but as to the form of the gift we could not have bettered it. Rome has no better models. When we give our money for any military purpose whatever, what remains to be done? If we leave it with one man to decide not only whether the military means of the country shall be used at all, but how they shall be used, and to what extent they shall be employed, what remains either for Congress or the people but to sit still and see how this dictatorial power will be exercised? On the 3d of March, sir, I had not forgotten-it was impossible that I should have forgotten the recommendation in the message at the opening of that session, that power should be vested in the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against France, at his discretion, in the recess of Congress. Happily this power was not granted. But suppose it had been, what would then have been the true condition of this Government? Why, sir, this condition is very shortly described. The whole war power would have been in the hands of the President; for no man can doubt a moment that reprisals would bring on immediate war; and the treasury, to the amount of this vote, in addition to all ordinary appropriations, would have been at his absolute disposal also. And all this in time of peace. I beseech sober men, sir, of all parties, I beseech all true lovers of constitutional liberty, to contemplate this state of things, and tell me whether such be a true republican administration of this Government. Whether particular consequences had ensued or not, is such an accumulation of power in the hands of the Executive according to the spirit of our system? Is it either wise or safe? Has it any warrant in the practice of former times? Or are gentlemen ready to establish the practice as an exam. ple for the benefit of those who are to come after us? But, sir, if the power to make reprisals, and this money from the treasury, had both been granted, is there not great reason to believe that we should have been now up to our ears in a hot war? I think there is great reason to believe this. It will be said, I know, that if we had armed the President with this power of war, and supplied him with this grant of money, France would have taken this for such a proof of spirit on our part that she would have paid the indemnity without further delay. This is the old story, and the old plea. Every one who desires more power than the constitution or the laws give him, always says, that if he had more power, he could do more good. Power is always claimed for the good of the people; and dictators are always made, when made at all, for the good of the people. For my part, sir, I was content, and am content, to show to France that we are prepared to maintain our just rights against her, by the exertion of our power, when need be, according to the forms of our own constitution; that, if we make war, we will make it constitutionally; and if we vote money, we will appropriate it constitutionally; and that we will trust all our interests, both in peace and in war, to what the in telligence and strength of the country may do for them, without breaking down or endangering the fabric of free institutions. Mr. President, it is the misfortune of the Senate to have differed with the President on many great questions during the last four or five years. I have regretted this state of things deeply, both on personal and on public account; but it has been unavoidable. It is no pleasant employment, it is no holiday business, to maintain opposition against power and against majorities, and to contend for stern and sturdy principle, against personal popularity, against a rushing and overwhelm ing confidence, that, by wave upon wave, and cataract after cataract, seems to be bearing away and destroying whatsoever would withstand it. How much longer we may be able to support this opposition in any degree, or whether we can possibly hold out till the public intelligence and the public patriotism shall be awakened to a due sense of the public danger, it is not for me to foresee or to foretell. I shall not despair to the last, if, in the mean time, we be true to our own principles. If there be a steadfast adherence to those principles, both here and elsewhere, if, one and all, they continue the rule of our conduct in the Senate, and the rallying point of those who think with us and support us out of the Senate, I am content to hope on, and to struggle on. While it remains a contest for the preservation of the constitution, for the security of the public liberty, for the ascendency of principle over men, I am willing to bear my part in it. If we can maintain the constitution, if we can preserve this security for liberty, if we can thus give to true principle its just superiority over party, over persons, over names, our labors will be richly rewarded. If we fail in all this, they are already among the living, who will write the history of this Government, from its commencement to its close. When Mr. WEBSTER had concluded, Mr. CUTHBERT observed that, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, the kingly power was abolished at Rome. The great dread at Rome was the dread of the kingly name, from which the Romans thought the greatest danger to the republic was to be apprehended. The danger to Rome, however, was not in the kingly name; for, so odious had the name become, that, in the very worst days of the republic, it could never have been revived. Here was the error committed by the gentleman from Massachusetts the dread of the kingly power, from which no danger could be apprehended in this Government. It was the patrician class-a moneyed aristocracy-a combination of their political leaders, seeking to establish an aristocratic Government, regardless of the welfare of the people, that was more to be dreaded than the power of any single man. There was the situation under which they were placed in that House. The administration was daily subject to the most violent attacks from these political leaders, who were men of established character, of intellectual acquirements, and acknowledged standing in society; yet the course of these leaders was not to be impugned, lest (said Mr. C.) we infringe the rules of order. ment. Here Mr. C. yielded the floor to a motion for adjournAnd the Senate adjourned to Monday. MONDAY, JANUARY 18. UNITED STATES AND FRANCE. The following message was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. DONELSON, his secretary. To the Senate and House of Representatives: [JAN. 18, 1836. precedent to the execution of a treaty unconditionally ratified, and to the payment of a debt acknowledged by all the branches of her Government to be due, that certain explanations shall be made, of which she dictates the terms. These terms are such as that Government has already been officially informed cannot be complied with; and, if persisted in, they must be considered as a deliberate refusal on the part of France to fulfil engagements binding by the laws of nations, and held sacred by the whole civilized world. The nature of the act which France requires from this Government is clearly set forth in the letter of the French minister, marked No. 4. "We will pay the money," says he, "when the Government of the United States is ready, on its part, to declare to us, by addressing its claim to us officially, in writing, that it regrets the misunderstanding which has arisen between the two countries; that this misunderstanding is founded on a mistake; that it never entered into its intention to call in question the good faith of the French Government, nor to take a menacing attitude towards France;" and he adds, "if the Government of the United States does not give this assurance, we shall be obliged to think that this misunderstanding is not the result of an error." In the letter marked No. 6, the French minister also remarks, "that the Government of the United States knows that upon itself depends henceforward the execution of the treaty of July 4, 1831." Gentlemen: In my message at the opening of your session I informed you that our chargé d'affaires at Paris had been instructed to ask for the final determination of the French Government, in relation to the payment of the indemnification secured by the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831, and that when advices of the result should be received it would be made the subject of a special communication. In execution of this design, I now transmit to you the papers numbered from one to thirteen, inclusive, containing, among other things, the correspondence on this subject between our chargé d'affaires and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, from which it Obliged, by the precise language thus used by the French minister, to view it as a peremptory refusal to execute the treaty, except on terms incompatible with the honor and independence of the United States, and persuaded that, on considering the correspondence now submitted to you, you can regard it in no other light, it becomes my duty to call your attention to such measures as the exigency of the case demands, if the claim of interfering in the communications between the different branches of our Government shall be persisted in. This pretension is rendered the more unreasonable by the fact that the substance of the required explanation has been repeatedly and voluntarily given, before it was in sisted on as a condition-a condition the more humiliating, because it is demanded as the equivalent of a pecuniary consideration. Does France desire only a declaration that we had no intention to obtain our rights by an address to her fears rather than to her justice? She has already had it, frankly and explicitly given by our minister accredited to her Government, his act ratified by me, and my confirmation of it officially communicated by him, in his letter to the French Minister of Foreigan Affairs of the 25th of April, 1835, and repeated by my published approval of that letter after the passage of the bill of indemnification. Does France want a degrading, servile repetition of this act, in terms which she shall dictate, and which will involve an acknowledgment of her assumed right to interfere in our domestic councils? She will never obtain it. The spirit of the American people, the dignity of the Legislature, and the firm resolve of their executive Government, forbid it. As the answer of the French minister to our chargé d'affaires at Paris contains an allusion to a letter addressed by him to the representative of France at this place, it now becomes proper to lay before you the correspondence had between that functionary and the Secretary of State, relative to that letter, and to accompany the same with such explanations as will enable you to understand the course of the Executive in regard to it. Recurring to the historical statement made at the commencement of your session, of the origin and progress of our difficulties with France, it will be recollected that, on the return of our minister to the United States, I caused my official approval of the explanations he had will be seen that France requires, as a condition | given to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to be made public. As the French Government had noticed the message without its being officially communicated, it was not doubted that, if they were disposed to pay the money due to us, they would notice any public explanation of the Government of the United States in the same way. But, contrary to these well-founded expectations, the French ministry did not take this fair opportunity to relieve themselves from their unfortunate position, and to do justice to the United States. Whilst, however, the Government of the United States was awaiting the movements of the French Government, in perfect confidence that the difficulty was at an end, the Secretary of State received a call from the French chargé d'affaires in Washington, who desired to read to him a letter he had received from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was asked whether he was instructed or directed to make any official communication, and replied that he was only authorized to read the let ter, and furnish a copy if requested. The substance of its contents, it is presumed, may be gathered from Nos. 4 and 6, herewith transmitted. It was an attempt to make known to the Government of the United States, privately, in what manner it could make explanations, apparently voluntary, but really dictated by France, acceptable to her, and thus obtain payment of the twentyfive millions of francs. No exception was taken to this mode of communication, which is often used to prepare the way for official intercourse, but the suggestions made in it were, in their substance, wholly inadmissible. Not being in the shape of an official communication to this Government, it did not admit of reply or official notice, nor could it safely be made the basis of any action by the Executive or the Legislature; and the Secretary of State did not think proper to ask a copy, because he could have no use for it. Copies of papers, marked Nos. 9, 10, and 11, show an attempt on the part of the French chargé d'affaires, many weeks afterwards, to place a copy of this paper among the archives of this Government, which, for obvious reasons, was not allowed to be done; but the assurance before given was repeated, that any official communication which he might be authorized to make in the accustomed form would receive a prompt and just consideration. The indiscretion of this attempt was made more manifest by the subsequent avowal of the French chargé d'affaires, that the object was to bring the letter before Congress and the American people. If foreign agents, on a subject of disagreement between their Government and this, wish to prefer an appeal to the American people, they will hereafter, it is hoped, better appreciate their own rights, and the respect due to others, than to attempt to use the Executive as the passive organ of their communications. It is due to the character of our institutions that the diplomatic intercourse of this Government should be conducted with the utmost directness and simplicity, and that, in all cases of importance, the communications received or made by the Executive should assume the accustomed official form. It is only by inssting on this form that foreign Powers can be held to full responsibility; that their communications can be officially replied to; or that the advice or interference of the Legislature can, with propriety, be invited by the President. This course is also best calculated, on the one hand, to shield that officer from unjust suspicions; and, on the other, to subject this portion of his acts to public scrutiny, and, if occasion shall require it, to constitutional animadversion. It was the more necessary to adhere to these principles in the instance in question, inasmuch as, in addition to other important interests, it very intimately concerned the national honor; a matter, in my judgment, much too sacred to be made the subject of private and unofficial negotiation. It will be perceived that this letter of the French [SENATE. Minister of Foreign Affairs was read to the Secretary of State on the 11th of September last. This was the first authentic indication of the specific views of the French Government received by the Government of the United States after the passage of the bill of indemnification. Inasmuch as the letter had been written before the official notice of my approval of Mr. Livingston's last explanation and remonstrance could have reached Paris, just ground of hope was left, as has been before stated, that the French Government, on receiving that information in the same manner the alleged offending message had reached them, would desist from their extraordinary demand, and pay the money at once. To give them an opportunity to do so, and, at all events, to elicit their final determination, and the ground they intended to occupy, the instructions were given to our chargé d'affaires which were adverted to at the commencement of the present session of Congress. The result, as you have seen, is a demand of an official written expression of regrets, and a direct explanation addressed to France, with a distinct intimation that this is a sine qua non. Mr. Barton having, in pursuance of his instructions, returned to the United States, and the chargé d'affaires of France having been recalled, all diplomatic intercourse between the two countries is suspended-a state of things originating in an unreasonable. susceptibility on the part of the French Government, and rendered necessary on our part by their refusal to perform engagements contained in a treaty, from the faithful performance of which by us they are to this day enjoying many important commercial advantages. It is time that this unequal position of affairs should cease, and that legislative action should be brought to sustain executive exertion in such measures as the case requires. While France persists in her refusal to comply with the terms of a treaty, the object of which was, by removing all causes of mutual complaint, to renew ancient feelings of friendship, and to unite the two nations in the bonds of amity, and of a mutually beneficial commerce, she cannot justly complain if we adopt such peaceful remedies as the law of nations and the circumstances of the case may authorize and demand. Of the nature of these remedies I have heretofore had occasion to speak; and, in reference to a particular contingency, to express my conviction that reprisals would be best adapted to the emergency then contemplated. Since that period, France, by all the departments of her Government, has acknowledged the validity of our claims and the obligations of the treaty, and has appropriated the moneys which are necessary to its execution; and though payment is withheld on grounds vitally important to our existence as an independent nation, it is not to be believed that she can have determined permanently to retain a position so utterly indefensible. altered state of the questions in controversy, and under all existing circumstances, it appears to me that, until such a determination shall have become evident, it will be proper and sufficient to retaliate her present refusal to comply with her engagements by prohibiting the introduction of French products and the entry of French vessels into our ports. Between this and the interdiction of all commercial intercourse, or other remedies, you, In the as the representatives of the people, must determine. I recommend the former, in the present posture of our The return of our chargé d'affaires is attended with public notices of naval preparations on the part of France, destined for our seas. Of the cause and intent of these armaments I have no authentic information, nor any other means of judging, except such as are common to yourselves and to the public; but whatever may be their object, we are not at liberty to regard them as unconnected with the measures which hostile movements on the part of France may compel us to pursue. They at least deserve to be met by adequate preparations on our part, and I therefore strongly urge large and speedy appropriations for the increase of the navy, and the completion of our coast defences. If this array of military force be really designed to affect the action of the Government and people of the United States on the questions now pending between the two nations, then indeed would it be dishonorable to pause a moment on the alternative which such a state of things would present to us. Come what may, the explanation which France demands can never be accorded; and no armament, however powerful and imposing, at a distance, or on our coast, will, I trust, deter us from discharging the high duties which we owe to our constituents, to our national character, and to the world. [JAN. 18, 1836. last, and of a letter addressed to this Department by the late minister of the Government of France, with the correspondence connected with that communication, which, together with a late correspondence between the Secretary of State and the French chargé d'affaires, and a recent correspondence between the chargé d'affaires of the United States at Paris and the Duke de Broglie, already transmitted to the President to be communicated to Congress with his special message relative thereto, are the only papers in the Department of State supposed to be called for by the resolutions of the Senate of the 12th instant. The House of Representatives, at the close of the last session of Congress, unanimously resolved that the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on by the United States. It is due to the welfare of the human race, not less than to our own interests and honor, that this resolution should, at all hazards, be adhered to. If, after so signal an example as that given by the American people during their long-protracted difficulties with France, of forbearance under accumulated wrongs, and of generous confidence in her ultimate return to justice, she shall now be permitted to withhold from us the tardy and imperfect indemnification which, after years of remonstrance and discussion, had at length been solemnly agreed on by the treaty of 1831, and to set at nought the obligation it imposes, the United States will not be the only sufferers. The efforts of humanity and religion to substitute the appeals of justice and the arbitrament of reason for the coercive measures usually resorted to by injured nations will receive little encouragement from such an issue. By the selection and enforcement | of such lawful and expedient measures as may be necessary to prevent a result so injurious to ourselves, and so fatal to the hopes of the philanthropist, we shall therefore not only preserve the pecuniary interests of our citizens, the independence of our Government, and the honor of our country, but do much, it may be hoped, to vindicate the faith of treaties, and to promote the general interests of peace, civilization, and improveANDREW JACKSON. ment. WASHINGTON, January 15, 1836. It will be seen by the correspondence with the chargé d'affaires of France, that a despatch to him from the Duke de Broglie was read to the Secretary, at the Department, in September last. It concluded with an authority to permit a copy to be taken if it was desired. That despatch being an argumentative answer to the last letter of Mr. Livingston to the French Government, and in affirmance of the right of France to expect explanations of the message of the President, which France had been distinctly and timely informed could not be given without a disregard by the Chief Magistrate of his constitutional obligations, no desire was expressed to obtain a copy: it being obviously improper to receive an argument in a form which admitted of no re ply, and necessarily unavailing to inquire how much or how little would satisfy France, when her right to any such explanation had been, beforehand, so distinctly and formally denied. All which is respectfully submitted. JOHN FORSYTH. The above messages and documents having been read, Mr. CLAY moved that the message, with the accompanying documents, be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Whereupon, Mr. BUCHANAN said that he had been so much gratified with the message which had just been read that he could not, and he thought he ought not, at this the very first moment, to refrain from expressing his entire approbation of its general tone and spirit. He had watched with intense anxiety the progress of our unfor tunate controversy with France. He had hoped, sincerely hoped, that the explanations which had been made by Mr. Livingston, and officially approved by the President of the United States, would have proved satisfactory to the French Government. In this he had found his hopes to be vain. After this effort had failed, he felt a degree of confidence, almost amounting to moral assurance, that the last message to Congress would have been hailed by France, as it was by the American people, as the olive branch which would have restored The following message was also received from the amity and good understanding between us and our an President of the United States: To the Senate of the United States: In compliance with the resolution of the Senate of the 12th instant, I transmit a report of the Secretary of State, with the papers therein referred to, which, with those accompanying the special message this day sent to Congress, are believed to contain all the information requested. The papers relative to the letter of the late minister of France have been added to those called for, that the subject may be fully understood. ANDREW JACKSON. WASHINGTON, January 18, 1836. Washington, January 13, 1836. To the President of the United States: cient ally. Even in this, he feared he was again doomed to be disappointed. The Government of France, unless they change their determination, will not consider this message as sufficient. We have the terms clearly prescribed by the Duke de Broglie, upon which, and upon which alone, the French Government will consent to comply with the treaty, and to pay the five millions of dollars to our injured fellow-citizens. Speculation is now at an end. The clouds and darkness which have hung over this question have vanished. It is now made clear as a sunbeam. The money will not be paid, says the organ of the French Government, unless the Gov ernment of the United States shall address its claim officially in writing to France, accompanied by what appeared to him, and he believed would appear to the whole American people, without distinction of party, to be a degrading apology. The striking peculiarity of the case, the one which he would undertake to say distinguished it from any other case which had arisen in |