SENATE.] Slavery in the District of Columbia. person. The words in the resolution were, that he should cause it to be done. A duty had been imposed on him in another case, which would measurably qualify him for this. He had designated the Secretary of the Senate, because he believed that gentleman had the intelligence and the economy, with his knowledge of the subject, to secure to them the publication of the work in a style that would make it useful and valuable. Any calculation as to the expense must be uncertain. The country ought to have that document in its hands. This was the residence of the Government, and many of these documents were the acts of General Washington, and could not now be found in print. Mr. WRIGHT enumerated various documents that would be embraced by the resolution, and among others the reports from committees in relation to the District of Columbia, many of which would be useless at this time, and it was the same way with many of the laws. He thought the resolution ought to go to the committee, to report such only as were useful to Congress. Mr. BLACK would cheerfuly vote for the resolution if he could see the benefit of it. He would ask if the resolution did not embrace reports made and bills reported that had never been passed into laws; and if so, whether any estimate has been made of the number of volumes it would make. He remembered they got into a difficulty a year or two ago in ordering printing in a case similar to this, which had been swelled to some one hundred and fifty volumes. Under this resolution he should consider laws, merely drawn up and never passed, were to form a part of the work, and there was no estimating what it would cost. That would rest entirely on whoever superintended it. He knew of no such projects in the several States. He was entirely opposed to this whole project. He thought the lesson they had received about two years since in printing documents, was enough to put them on their guard. Mr. KING, of Georgia, then moved to refer the resolution to the Committee on the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, with instructions to ascertain and report the documents that would be required under the resolution to be printed, and the probable expense of executing the resolution. He was himself inclined to believe that the printing required to be done by the resolution would exceed twenty volumes as it was. He Mr. BENTON spoke against these resolutions for printing, by which tens and hundreds of thousands went out of the treasury, without any appropriation made by law, but by mere resolutions, read once and passed, and then charged upon the contingent fund. specified many instances, and objected to these resolutions as being against the positive rules of the Senate, which he read, and which required the resolutions which took money out of the contingent fund to undergo all the forms of a bill; to be introduced on notice and leave; to be read three times, &c., and clearly discriminated them from the mere motions to do the current business of the Senate. These responsibilities (said Mr. B.) have heretofore been attached to our oppo. nents, but we are so near a majority now that some responsibility begins to attach to us. Mr. SOUTHARD meant to pursue this subject till the Senate would say, by a direct vote, that they either would or would not sanction the publication. He was disposed to adopt the course suggested by the Senator from Georgia, [Mr. KING.] He had had no idea he was offering a resolution of such magnitude, in which was involved hundreds of thousands of dollars, capitulations at midnight, and the labor of the Secretary of the Senate. He hoped the Secretary would survive it. His sympathies were aroused for our poor Secretary. But, seriously, if he (the Secretary) had to cause this printing to be done, [FEB. 15, 1836. very little labor would devolve on him. The expense of printing the documents comprising a history of all the old States of the confederacy had been referred to. He thought the printing of the documents relating to this little ten miles square would hardly be confounded with that work. Did not the imagination of Senators carry them beyond the true state of the case? He had no idea when he offered this simple resolution that it would have engendered a discussion about squandering millions of the money of the country. If the committee had made an inquiry on the subject, and embraced these documents in their report, and asked the printing of them as a part of their report, it would then have become perfectly legal, and the objections to its legality would be entirely removed. The responsibility did not rest on the one side or the other of the Senate; it rested on all. He hoped the motion of the Senator from Georgia [Mr. KING] would prevail. Mr. KING'S amendment was then agreed to. ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. The Senate proceeded to consider the petition from the Society of Friends in Pennsylvania, praying for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Mr. TALLMADGE said he was one of those who believed that all discussion on this exciting subject was ill-judged as well as ill-timed. Under other circumstances, he would be the last to take part in it. But, said he, from the shape in which the question is now presented, and from the manner in which it is pressed upon our consideration, I am unwilling to record my vote without a brief explanation of the views which govern me. I regret, Mr. President, the necessity of the discussion, because its natural tendency is to increase the agitation. The interests of the whole country require that it should cease. Excitement is the food on which abolition feeds: take this away, and it will die for want of sustenance. No one can view with more sincere regret nor with greater repugnance than I do the attempts of the abolitionists to disturb the peace and quiet of the country. Their efforts, however well intended on the part of some, are fraught with mischief, and on the part of others are characterized by a spirit of fanaticism which, if persisted in, may lead to consequences the most fatal to the peace and harmony of the Union. This spirit seems to be a part of the ultraism of the age; it is the same spirit that has shown itself in various excitements, which have, more or less, agitated the country within a few years past. I would by no means deny to many engaged in this ultraism of the day, honesty of purpose in the prosecution of their designs. There are others to whom I would not extend even this charity. But be their purposes what they may, they are equally productive of the most mischiev ous and injurious consequences. Their efforts, instead of alleviating the condition of the slave, tend to make it worse. The owners, feeling that their rights are invaded by these nefarious attempts to incite the slave to bloodshed and to murder, throw around them greater securities, and limit their indulgences within narrower bounds, than they were before accustomed to do. I do not say that it is the design of the great body of the abolitionists to excite the slaves to rebellion, and thereby produce all the horrors of a civil and servile war. But the tendency of their measures is to such results. And I have known instances where these awful consequences have been depicted; and the abolitionist has been asked if he could look upon them with composure, and without emotion, when he has answered, that he was pursuing what he believed his duty, and he left the consequences to God! Who can listen, without horror, to such foregone conclusions? What philanthropist can wish to see the blood of the master and the slave commingled in these desperate feuds? What patriot can wish to see the peace of the Union disturbed by the invasion of rights secured by the constitution, and which should be held inviolate as long as that sacred instrument stands? In the hasty view which I have taken of this matter, I believe I speak the almost unanimous opinions of the North; I feel very sure that I do not mistake the public sentiment of the State of New York on this subject. And it is for the interests of the North, as well as the South, that these agitations should cease. It is to me a matter of deep regret that these petitions should be sent here. They have been sent, more or less, for years past. Congress has received them, but always refused any action upon them. They have either been laid on the table, or referred to a committee, and there been suffered to sleep, never again to be disturbed. There has been, heretofore, an almost entire unanimity in Congress in relation to them. Scarcely an individual in either House could be found who was willing, by agitating this question, to disturb the compromises of the constitution. After this course had been pursued for a series of years, it was to have been hoped that Congress would no longer be troubled with such unprofitable applications. In this, those who entertained this hope have been disappointed. The attack has been renewed, the petitions are again presented, and the question recurs, what shall be done with them? This brings us to the immediate subject of debate. The petition under consideration is from the Society of Friends. I take great pleasure in saying that this peaceable and quiet people are not abolitionists, in the modern acceptation of the term. An opposition to slavery is one of the principles of their society, and they have, from almost time immemorial, been in the habit of bearing their annual testimony against it. I am persuaded, from an intimate acquaintance with many of them, that they would deprecate any results, such as every man, conversant with the subject, believes would follow from the interference of Congress with it. They seem content to bear their testimony against slavery by presenting their petition here. They seem to look upon it as a religious duty. Having, in this way, discharged that duty, they leave to Congress to discharge its duty, in such manner as in its wisdom shall seem meet and proper. The language of this petition, it is conceded on all hands, is unexceptionable. There can be no objection, therefore, to receiving it on that account. What, then, is the question which we are called upon to decide? It is, shall the petition be received? I regret that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] has felt it his duty to make this motion. It were much better, in my judgment, that the petition should take the ordinary course; the course which has heretofore been pursued with them. The petition, however, has been presented; the motion has been made, and it becomes our duty to consider it. Although I regret the motion of the Senator from South Carolina, and think it unwise and ill-judged, still I most cheerfully accord to him, what I claim for myself in all my action here, purity of motive and honesty of purpose. At the same time, I cannot persuade myself that he has given to this subject that careful examination and reflection which its im importance demands. It shall be my task, then, to examine the principle of the question before us. It involves two important considerations, namely: the right of the citizen to petition, and the obligation on Congress to receive his petition. To my mind the right and the obligation are correlative. As to the right of petition. This has been deemed the inalienable right of every American citizen. Before [SENATE. the adoption of the constitution, he held it as a birthright from his English ancestors. Like the right of personal liberty, the right of personal security, and the right of private property, he has been in the habit of looking on the right of petition as an inherent and inalienable right. Centuries have elapsed since this right was first asserted as one of the privileges of English freemen. The contest was long and bloody between the prerogatives of the Crown and the immunities of the subject. These rights, which were deemed natural, inherent, and inalienable, were asserted and reasserted, affirmed and reaffirmed, by various statutes in different reigns, and were finally imbodied with the right of petition, in the far-famed "Declaration of Rights," which ended the dynasty of the Stuarts, and consummated the glorious revolution of 1688. By this it was established that every person had the right to petition the King oг the Parliament for a redress of grievances; a right, not conferred, but confirmed, at that eventful period, and which has continued to the present day, unquestioned and unquestionable. The Americans, as colonists of Great Britain, were entitled to these rights and privileges, and exercised them with that fearless independence that became the descendants of Englishmen. Many of the colonies at a very early day asserted them, by the most solemn legislative declarations; subsequently, but as early as 1765, "a convention of delegates from nine of the colonies assembled at New York, and made and published a declaration of rights, in which they insisted that the people of the colonies were entitled to all the inherent rights and liberties of English subjects." But these rights and privileges were more solemnly established by the first continental Congress in 1774. This Congress adopted a declaration of rights, as their English ancestors had done before them, for the purpose of "asserting and vindicating their rights and liberties." They declared, amongst other things, "That the inhabitants of the English colonies in North America, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English constitution, and the several charters or compacts, have the following rights: "That they are entitled to life, liberty, and property; and they have never ceded to any sovereign power whatever a right to dispose of either without their consent. "That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were, at the time of their emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immunities, of free and natural born subjects within the realin of England. "That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost, any of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are, entitled to the exercise and enjoyment of all such of them as their local and other circumstances enable them to exercise and enjoy. "That they have a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and petition the King; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and commitments for the same, are illegal. "All and each of which the aforesaid deputier, in behalf of themselves and their constituents, do cham, demand, and insist on, as their indubitable rights and liberties, which cannot be legally taken from them, altered, or abridged, by any power whatever, without their own consent, by their representatives in their several Legislatures." I have selected from this declaration some of the "great and fundamental principles of American liberty," so far as they are applicable to the question under consideration. It will be perceived that the right of petition is ranked with the right of life, liberty, and prop SENATE.] Slavery in the District of Columbia. erty-neither of which can be taken away, altered, or abridged, without consent, by any power whatever. The declaration of rights, in the reign of James II, which led to the Revolution of 1688, was but the prototype of the declaration of rights by the continental Congress, which resulted in the Revolution of 1776. After the declaration of independence, and when the people of the several States began to adopt constitutions for their own separate government, this declaration of the old Congress formed the basis of the bills of rights which were adopted by most of the States. In this way the people of the respective States became entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities, which they enjoyed at the time of the continental Congress in 1774, when they were thus solemnly promulgated to the world, and continued to enjoy them to the time of the adoption of the constitution of the United States, and the organization of the Government under it in 1789. One of these rights and privileges, as we have seen, was the right of petition. Has it been taken away, altered, or abridged, by the adoption of the constitution? No, sir; so far from it that it would be deemed one of the fundamental principles of a republican Government, and to result from the very nature of our institutions. This would seem to follow, even if we could find no traces of this right during our revolutionary struggle. But when it is seen in every step of our progress, from colonial infancy to revolutionary manhood, and until the final establishment of our independence as a nation, who can doubt its existence at this time, and who can doubt the propriety of its exercise by every citizen of this republic? So well was the right of petition understood by the people of the several States, and that it was a right which no power under heaven could take from them, that it never entered into the thoughts of those wise and pure patriots who formed the constitution to provide for it in that sacred instrument. These men were familiar with our colonial history. Many of them, probably most of them, had assisted, in some mode or other, either in the old Congress or in their respective States, to declare, in a solemn manner, those rights and privileges as belonging to every citizen, and which could not be taken from him. Well might they suppose, then, that there was no necessity for protecting such a right in the constitution. No one dreamed that it could ever be infringed upon, and no provision was made in relation to it. But the people were jealous of their rights. The union of independent sovereignties, for certain purposes, in one general Government, was, at best, an experiment; and the wisest could not foresee the extent of power which might be attempted to be exercised. Many objections were made by different States to the ratification of the constitution of the United States; and so scrupulous were many of them that they would not simply ratify, but they accompanied their ratification by a declaration, or bill of rights, with which the constitution could not interfere, and also with certain proposed amendments, expressing the hope that the necessary measures would be forthwith taken, under the constitution, to have them adopted. The convention of the State of New York set forth the rights of the citizens at large, and with great particularity. Amongst others was the right to life, liberty, and property; and "that the people have a right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their common good, or to instruct their representatives; and that every person has the right to petition or apply to the Legislature for redress of grievances." The convention of New York also proposed many amendments to the constitution; and "declaring that the rights aforesaid (the right to petition, &c.) cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the constitution, and in confidence that the amendment which shall have [FEB. 15, 1836. been proposed to the said constitution will receive an early and mature consideration," did assent to and ratify the said constitution. This convention sat at Poughkeepsie, the place of my present residence, and was composed of some of the most distinguished men of that or any other age-men who, in the cabinet or in the field, would not suffer in comparison with the sages and heroes of ancient or modern times; and I should feel that I was doing injustice, both to the place and to their memories, were I to pass over in silence so much assembled talent and wisdom; and if I did not attempt to maintain, at this time and on this occasion, a principle which they deemed of such vital importance to every American citi zen. The constitution was thus ratified by the people of the several States, with these declarations of rights as a kind of condition or as part of the ratification. What was the next step in putting into operation the new Government, and guarding the rights of a people jealous of their liberties? At the first session of the first Congress, in conformity to the wishes of the people, as expressed by their several conventions, Mr. Madison introduced certain propositions by way of amendments to the constitution. No one understood better than he what the constitution meant, what pow. ers were granted by it to the general Government, and what rights were reserved to the people. He was aware of the jealousy that existed against it, and, on introducing his amendments, he said, "there is a great number of our constituents who are dissatisfied with it; among whom are many respectable for their talents and patriotism, and respectable for the jealousy they have for their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive?" He did not deem these amendments as essential in themselves; most of them being merely declaratory of the rights of the people, as they existed without them; but, said he, it would be "highly politic for the tranquillity of the public mind, and the stability of the Government, that we should offer something in the form I have proposed, to be incorporated in the system of Government, as a declaration of the rights of the people." Let it be remembered that Mr. Madison's propositions, as introduced, were the same in substance, and almost the same in language, with the amendments which were adopted, and which now form part of the constitution. Neither Mr. Madison, nor the convention of New York, supposed that an amendment, in regard to the right of petition, was necessary to grant to the people any new right, but merely to remove the jealousies against the new Government, by declaring, in that shape, a right which equally existed without such declaration. It is a remarkable fact, that so entirely were most of these amendments deemed mere declara. tions of rights, and not as granting any rights to the people which they did not already possess, but rather affirming and guarantying those with which they had never parted, that Mr. Madison incorporated the most of them from the declaration of rights by the New York convention, which accompanied the ratification of the constitution, and said, at the time of introducing them, that he offered them "as the declaration of the rights of the people." What, then, is the amendment of the constitution in relation to the right of petition? It is this: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances;" or, divested of other matter, "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Such is the amendment, and such its history; from all which it most clearly appears that the right of petition belonged to the people at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and which could not be "abridged or violated;" that the amendment gave no new right, but was a mere declaration or recognition of a right which existed equally without it. As to the obligation on Congress to receive the petition. What is that obligation? If it has been shown that the citizen has the right to petition, and which, I apprehend, cannot be doubted, then it follows that an obligation rests on Congress to receive such petition; for it is in vain to grant the right on the one hand, without incurring the obligation on the other: it being always understood that the petition be couched in respectful language towards the body to which it is presented, otherwise it would be rejected on the principle of selfpreservation and self-protection which belongs to every legislative body. It is objected, however, that not to receive the peti tion does not contravene that provision of the constitution which says, "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." To reject the petition, says the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. CALHOUN,] is not to make a law abridging the right, &c. But let me ask, let me put it to the candor and common sense of every man who hears me to say, wherein consists the difference between refusing to receive the petition, or making a law by which the citizen is prohibited from presenting it? Let any one point out the distinction-show me its practical operation. In both cases the right of petition is equally denied; and it matters little to the citizens by what means you have arrived at such a result. It is in vain to tell them you have made no law prohibiting the people from assembling and petitioning the Government for a redress of grievances, if, when their petition is presented, you refuse to receive it. I have already shown that the right of petition existed prior to the constitution, that it was parted with on its adoption, that it was perfect without any amendment of the constitution, and that such amendment was merely for greater caution and to satisfy the jealousy of the people, and was considered as a mere declaration of an existing right. The language of the amendinent is the language of prohibition to Congress, and not the granting of a right; because Congress had no power to grant it. The people had never parted with it, but merely, in this way, prohibited Congress from interfering with a right which already existed. There was no necessity of such a prohibition. If this amendment had never been adopted, there is no doubt of the perfect right of the citizen to petition, and the duty of Congress to receive his petition. How, then, can the amendment, which was intended, not to make the right more perfect, but more secure, be interposed to defeat if not to destroy it? How can we say to the citizen, true, you have a right to petition, and Congress cannot abridge that right; but inasmuch as we have made no law prohibiting its exercise, we have the right to refuse to receive your petition? The result is the same in either case. It is a denial of the right. And however much such reasoning may accord with the metaphysics of those who advance it, the practical common sense of the whole nation will reject it. If Congress should pass a law that petitions on the subject of slavery should not be received, it is manifest that, under such a law, such a petition as the one now under consideration would be rejected. But all will agree such a law would be unconstitutional, because Congress is prohibited from making it; and Congress was so prohibited, because it was the right of the citizen, with which no power could interfere, but with his consent. Would it not, then, be equally unconstitutional to reject the petition, when there is no law on [SENATE the subject? In short, if it be the constitutional right of the citizen to petition, it is equally the duty of Congress to receive his petition. But it is said by the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. CALHOUN,] they must petition for a redress of grievances; and that they are not aggrieved by the existence of slavery in the Dictrict of Columbia, and therefore have no right to petition. I will not stop to inquire how far a citizen of one of the States of this Union may be interested in what he deems the prosperity of this District; nor how that prosperity may be best pro. moted; nor how far the condition of the inhabitants of this District may have a moral influence on the whole Union; but I will test the matter of grievances in another way. Grievances, so far as the right of petition is concerned, are to be judged of by the petitioner himself. No power can prescribe rules by which he is to judge of them, and to which his petition must conform. You cannot lay him on the bed of Procrustes, and stretch out or lop off his views, in order to conform them to your standard. He must have his own standard, and with which no one must interfere, else his petition is not for the redress of those grievances which he feels. His grievances may be imaginary, or they may be real. In either case, the right of petition is the same, though they may seem to others to be imaginary, still to the petitioner they appear real.. Of this he must be the sole judge, so far as the right to ask redress is concerned; but, so far as redress ought to be granted, that is to be judged of by those to whom the petition is addressed. They have the sole power of determining whether his grievances are real, and such as ought to be redressed. As they cannot lay down to him the rules by which he is to be governed in asking, so neither can he prescribe to them regulations by which the redress is to be granted. If the right of citizens be not such as I have described them, where is the propriety of permitting them peaceably to assemble and consult of their grievances, if, on such consultation they are not to be the judges of them, so far as the right to petition for redress is concerned? 'The right to petition is a right which exists at the time of making the petition, and before it is presented. If the right existed before it is presented, then Congress cannot refuse to receive it when it is presented. After it is received, then the petitioner can no longer determine as to his grievances, which may have been imaginary, but Congress is left to judge whether they are real. If not, they will reject his prayer, but not his petition. Let us illustrate this right by some examples. Let us suppose that the citizens of South Carolina should petition Congress to pay off the debt of the District. Would this be a grievance, whether real or imaginary, for a redress of which they would have a right to petition? On the other hand, suppose the citizens of any State should petition Congress on this subject, by way of remonstrance against the appropriation of the funds of the Government to any such purpose. In either case, would Congress refuse to receive the petition? Certainly not. And, at the same time, it will be perceived that the grievances for which redress is asked are of a diametrically opposite character; and if the prayer of the petition be granted in the one case, it must be denied in the other. Again, suppose some of the numerous and respectable citizens of the North, who are opposed to the abolitionists, should petition Congress not to interfere with the question of slavery in the District of Columbia; would not their petition be received? There can be no doubt of it. A petition of that character was presented, a few days since, by the Senator from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BUCHANAN,] and received without objection, and ordered to be printed. But, when one is presented SENATE.] Slavery in the District of Columbia. [FEB. 15, 1836 on the other side, we are gravely told that it is out of order, and cannot be received. Wherein consists the difference, in principle, so far as the reception of the These two petitions were to abolish slavery in the States; they were presented in 1790. No question was raised about this District, because the seat of Govern petitions is concerned? I can see none. And this illus- | ment had not yet been removed here. But, in regard tration also shows that the petitioners must be the sole judges of their grievances; for they are the antipodes of each other; and if their grievances are redressed in one case, they must go unredressed in the other. It is objected, by the same Senator, that Congress has no constitutional power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, therefore, the petition ought not to be received. This conclusion is drawn from assumed premises. I do not intend, on this occasion, to enter into the constitutional argument; I have sufficient grounds for the vote I shall give, without reference to that question. I will simply remark, in passing, that if it be seriously contended, as it seems to be, that Congress has not the power, then there are, at least, two sides to the question. It is, to say the least of it, a matter on which public opinion is divided. Shall we, then, undertake to reject petitions on this, or any other subject, where there is such a diversity of opinion as to the constitutional power of Congress to entertain them. Shall we undertake to settle, on the very threshold, on the question of receiving a petition, some of the most important powers of this Government? To what would it lead? How may cases are there, where there exists a diversity of opinion as to the constitutional power of Congress over the subject-matter? On all such subjects, would you refuse to receive petitions because, forsooth, we are unable to think alike on constitutional questions? Would not the Senator from South Carolina receive a petition for the establishment of a national bank? I trust he would, appreciating, as he does, the importance of such an institution; and still the constitutionality of such a bank has been contested from the very organization of the Government down to the present time. Would the Senator refuse to receive a peti. tion for a protective tariff? I take it for granted he would, on the same principle that he objects to this, namely, its unconstitutionality in his judgment; and yet the constitutionality of such a measure is deemed by many better settled than the Senator himself can possibly believe to be settled the constitutionality of a national bank. Examples might be multiplied, to any desired extent, to show the utter absurdity of the position, that a petition should not be received, when any man or set of men believe that Congress have no constitutional power to grant its prayer. The petitioner is presumed not always to be the best judge of such powers of Government. He should be presumed to pray for none other than a constitutional redress of grievances. He judges, in the first instance, as to his own grievances. Congress receives his petition, and deterinines, first, whether they require redress; and, second, whether it has the constitutional power to redress them; and whether it has or has not, the petitioner is to be presumed to have asked for nothing else. If he mistakes the constitutional power of Congress, it were better that his petition should be respectfully and kindly received, and the prayer rejected, because Congress has not the power to grant it. Such was the case with the petition of the society of Quakers in Pennsylvania and other States, and also with that of Benjamin Franklin, as president of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, presented to the first Congress. They were received and duly considered, and Congress adopted the following resolution in relation to them. "That Congress have no authority to interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them, within any of the States, it remaining with the several States alone to provide any regulations therein, which humanity and true policy may require." to the States, there could not be a more palpable case of the want of constitutional power than those petitions presented; and yet, neither Mr. Madison, nor other distinguished men of that Congress, thought of not receiving them, although they were, each of them, from a source well capable of judging in such matters. But I do not deem it necessary to discuss, on this occasion, the constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. I regret that the constitution is not so explicit as to put at rest all doubt on this subject. I wish the power had been expressly reserved by the States of Virginia and Maryland in their cession, so that Congress could not interfere, any further than to keep pace with those States in their legislation in relation to this matter. On the ground of expediency, aside from any constitutional power, I have no hesitation in saying that Congress ought not to interfere in any other way. If the proposition were now, for the first time, to introduce slavery into the country, I trust there would scarcely be a difference of opinion on the subject; but no such proposition is or can be presented. If slavery be an evil, as it is deemed one by a large portion of this Union, it is an evil entailed upon us; we did not bring it upon ourselves. When we assumed the rank of independent States, we found it here. It was intimately interwoven and incorporated with our institutions. When we adopted the constitution, which forms the basis of our happy Union, we recognised slavery as an existing institution in the country, and it formed one of those compromises without which we could have never presented ourselves to the world as one independent nation. Those compromises are sacred. They must not, they cannot be interfered with without a violation, not only of public faith, but of private rights. Those States where slavery exists must judge of the time and manner of abolishing it, if it be abolished. They are best capable of judging of it, and until Virginia and Maryland, which ceded this District, move in this matter, I am unwilling to take the responsibility of meddling with it contrary to their wishes, and in opposition to the people of the District itself. The efforts which are now made, in reference to this District, are deemed by the slaveholding States as mere precursors of the assaults which are intended for themselves. No sincere lover of his country can look upon them without serious apprehension of danger to the peace and quiet of those States, and to the Union itself. Entertaining these views, I am ready to receive this petition, and equally ready to reject its prayer. By receiving it we shall discharge our duty to the very respectable persons who have sent it here, and by rejecting its prayer we shall discharge our duty to ourselves and to the country. In the former case we deny no right belonging to the citizen-in the latter we do but exercise a right belonging to ourselves. When we have received the petition, we have granted to the citizen his constitutional right. He can ask no more of us as a matter of right. Then commences our duty-a duty to consider the grievance complained of, if it be one. When our minds, from previous reflection and mature deliberation, are made up adverse to the views of the petitioners, then forthwith to reject the prayer is giving to it due consideration, and all that can be required at our hands. The object of referring petitions to a committee is that they may be duly considered; but if we are ready to pronounce upon them the moment they are received, it is no disrespect to the petitioner that the prayer of his petition be forthwith rejected; and the promptness with which it is done may satisfy him that |