tains abundance of excellent hints and of Harrow at the Harrow dinner last week excellent humour, and some little curious expressed the hope that it may be acquired detail besides. Among the pedigree-maker's for the Vaughan Library at Harrow. difficulties occurs sometimes the unlooked for From MIST'S WEEKLY JOURNAL. SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1727. change of name, as when a Huguenot family Two Hundred Years Ago. FRIDAY of last week will dwell in the tions offered at the same sale were two Romneys, portraits of Mary Macdonnell Chichester and Catherine Chichester for which respectively 4,400 and 4,000 guineas were given, and Reynolds's Squire Musters which also brought 4,000 guineas. ARING, which there seems no reason to ON July 27 at Sotheby's will be sold the well-known letter about the Eton and Harrow cricket match of 1805 written by Byron to Charles Gordon from Burgage Manor, Southwell. It now belongs to Mr. S. P. Stevens of Dover, and the Headmaster We have Advice, that Admiral Hofier was, on the 8th of May, between Cape Nicholas and Cape Maze, with the Superbe, Dunkirk, Diamond, and Nottingham Man of War, &c. and in good Health. The Church at Woolwich being in Danger of falling, a new one is building on a better Foundation. They go forward in building the Hunting Seat in Richmond Park, to which a Stop was put on his late Majesty's Death. We hear, that the famous Fawkes defigns Briftol Fair, where befides his ingenious to go from his Booth in Moor Fields to Magick by Dxeterity of Hand, and his inimitable Pofture-Mafter, he has lately, for the greater Diverfion of the Publick, purchas'd a moft curious and amazing Machine, in which is heard a fine Confort of Mufick on various Inftruments, as the Organ, Bafs-Viol, Trumpet, French Horn, and all other Wind Mufick. With a fine moving Picture, fhewing the proper Motions of each Perfon performing on the feveral Inftruments. And another moving Picture difcovering the City and Bay of Gibraltar, with a Fleet of Ships under Sail, Troops of Soldiers marching and counter-marching. Also a Dog playing a Duck in a River, and diving after her as tho' really alive. whether he goes on Foot or Horfeback or is to be carried thro' the Air by fome of his familiar Dæmons, we can't fay. But Here Roger may come, without danger or Fear, And the lofty Gibraltar both view, and draw near; Nar need Sifly, his Darling,e'er doubt but he'll be As fafe as tho' clafp'd in the Arms of Therefore all hie away to the fam'd Bristol And the conjuring Fawkes you'll be fure Literary and Historical arbitrary action roused Victor Amedeo to Notes. THE GRANATIERI DI SARDEGNA. THE TALE OF A FAMOUS REGIMENT. THE (See ante p. 21.) war of the League of Augsburg illustrates the chief difficulties under which the Dukes of Savoy laboured. It has been said that owing to his geographical position the Duke of Savoy could not be an honest man. This epigram, like most of its kind, just misses the point, as the Duke's policy could always be foretold by a skilful observer. Master of a small state situated between the mighty powers of France and the Empire, the Duke could never afford to be neutral. Charles II had tried such a policy in the time of Francis I and Charles V with the result that, left without allies, he was ignored, his country overrun by both sides and his duchy reduced to the sole town of Nice. His successors understood that in the collisions between the two mighty ones they must take one side or the other if they were to avoid annihilation; and their command of the Alpine passes made their alliance of some value. The Lord of Savoy and Piedmont could never acquiesce in French dominion over Milan, which would have reduced his state to a mere enclave in French territory, to be absorbed at leisure; neither could he willingly see the Empire's power strongly established in Italy, which of course meant danger to Piedmont and checked his designs for territorial aggrandisement in Italy. He was therefore compelled to attach himself to the least dangerous of the two great powers; and when the equilibrium tended to be upset, desert his ally in order to restore it. In 1701 the War of the Spanish Succession broke out. Victor Amedeo, caught in a vice between Louis XIV's power and that of Louis' allies, the Spaniards, who ruled Milan, had perforce to send his troops to join the French on the Oglio, but he was sorely straining at the leash. No one knew this better than Louis himself; and, having become suspicious of his ally, he gave orders in 1703 for all Piedmontese Battalions with the French Army, including a strong de tachment of the Guards, to be disarmed and treated as prisoners of war. This desperate resistance; and he called his people to arms. Though reinforced by a few Imperial troops he could do nothing against French numerical superiority beyond trying to hold out in his fortresses until the Allies could spare enough troops from other theatres of war to relieve him. to In 1704 the French assailed Piedmont in earnest while the Austrians were kept off by a strong covering force on the Oglio in Lombardy. Vercelli, the Duke's strongest fortress, was surrendered by its pusillanimous commander after a resistance of barely forty-one days; and both active service Battalions of the Guards became prisoners of war. At the outset of hostilities, therefore, the regiment was reduced depôt troops and recruits, strengthened by a few escaped prisoners. This remnant took part in the splendid defence of Verrua, which, though a small fortress, held out until April, 1705, a very important gain of time. Towards the end of that year, however, the Duke was compelled to withdraw into his last stronghold, Turin, where he was at once shut in. The lateness of the season, nevertheless, compelled the French to raise the siege; and Victor Amedeo was thus given a respite wherein to prepare for the critical year, 1706. The Allies on their side had decided to make a great effort for his relief. Prince Eugene was in command in Italy; and Marlborough himself at one time intended to join his colleague. When this proved impossible he did his best to provide the Prince with adequate means; and it was due to his efforts that the 8,000 Brandenburghers, the best troops among the continental Allies, were sent to Italy. In May, 1706, 44,000 French under La Feuillade closed on the capital. The town was well fortified and the garrison 16,000 strong. Before he was completely cut off Victor Amedeo had broken through with the whole of his cavalry and every man who could be spared from the defence of the city, a soldier-like decision which was to have a decisive effect on the campaign. La Feuillade wasted time in vain efforts to capture his foe, who knew the country well and continually harassed the French communications. Prominent in this partisan warfare was Parella, now an old man but still full of vigour. The defence of Turin had been entrusted to the Austrian general Daun; and no better choice could have been made. I have no time to describe the siege in detail and I will content myself therefore with mentioning a few of the chief actions in which the Guards took part. The Regiment formed Daun's reserve, but detachments took their turn in manning the ramparts and the Grenadiers were constantly in action either in sorties or in counter attacks. La Feuillade had decided to take the bull by the horns and attack the citadel, hoping, no doubt correctly, that its fall would decide the fate of the city. But Daun's artillery was powerful and well served; he made excellent use of his mines; and his Grenadiers did much damage to the enemy in continual sorties. storming columns rushed both counter-guards and the lunette. The defenders' supports tried to evict the assailants and disjointed fighting began on the whole front of the attack. Meanwhile the decisive factor had come into action: Daun had arrived in the citadel. He saw at a glance that his men were frittering away their strength by isolated fighting at many points; he gave orders to suspend all other attacks and to concentrate all efforts against the lunette. A column of Grenadiers, led by those of the Guards, was immediately launched against the French. The enemy, however, stood their ground with great determination and the fight swayed to and fro for five hours in the darkness lighted up by burning carcases. The French were fascines and yielding at last when a spark reached the reserve powder barrels, which the counter attacking Grenadiers had brought up to the Almost lunette to feed their firing line. every man inside the work was killed or wounded. Appalled by the destruction both sides halted; the fight died down and the lunette was left evacuated by both sides, the counter-guards remaining in the hands of the French. La Feuillade sent off a messenbut Daun was not the man to allow the ger to Versailles to announce his success; enemy to keep an inch of conquered territory as long as he had a man available. At the foot of The front of the citadel attacked by the French consisted of the two bastions of S. Maurice and of Beato Amedeo, with their continuous ditch. The curtain between the two bastions was protected by the lunette "del Saluto. Each bastion was protected in addition by a counter-guard, a sort of advanced redoubt and ditch, which had to be captured before the bastion could be assailed. In front of the counter-guards and the lunette ran another continuous ditch and beyond the ditch, at the head of the outer glacis ran a covered way, i.e., a sunk road along which troops could move and deploy under cover from the enemy's fire and which could, at need, be manned and used as yet another advanced defence. By July 22 only the extreme outworks had been captured. On Aug. 6 a general attack was made on the covered way. A whole night's fighting resulted in the retention by the French of its salients; the counterattack of the Grenadiers having regained the re-entrants. Owing to the narrowness of the terrain the brunt of this hard struggle had fallen entirely on the heads of the two columns of the defenders which carried out the counter attack, that is to say on the Grenadiers of the Guards. An attack was feared for Aug. 25, King Louis' birthday. The day before a mine blew up the French siege battery, and the Grenadiers sallied forth. Gabions were overturned, guns spiked and the siege works generally so badly damaged before the French could rally and drive the sallying party back again, that the assault did not take place. Smarting under this blow la Feuillade, who was about to be relieved of his command by the Duc d'Orléans, prepared a general attack. During the night of Aug. 27 strong The empty lunette was re-occupied and used as Guards and of the regiment of Saluzzo a point d'appui; the Grenadiers of the attacked the counter-guard of S. Maurice while other troops assailed that of Beato Amedeo. This time the first fight was short and sharp, the French garrison was thrown out neck and crop; and their supports crumbled away before the defenders' fire. contested works remained once more in the hands of the defenders. The While the siege was thus being pressed the situation on the Oglio was changing. Prince Eugene had received his reinforcements and had begun his great march along the south side of the Po. Outmanoeuvred at every point his opponent the Duc d'Orléans gave up all attempts to stop him and fell back on la Feuillade in the hope that the joint French armies might be able to compass the fall of Turin before Eugene could effect its relief. Thus on the morrow of la Feuillade's great attack the French were reinforced by Orleans and 13,000 men. During the night of Aug. 31 a mine blew up the counterscarp of the lunette, and a furious bombardment paved the way for the French Army's supreme effort. Thirty Grenadier companies led the way, 5,000 picked troops were in support and behind these as reserve every other available man, Once more the counter-guards, one of which was defended by the Guards, were rushed, but the defenders succeeded in clinging to the gorge of the lunette. The Guardsmen rallied and counter-attacked, but the enemy was too strong; his supports were brought up and the counter-attack failed, though some of the Guardsmen maintained a precarious footing inside the counter-guard of S. Maurice. Daun, however, refused to admit defeat and called up his last reserves, the Regiment of Guards and the Austrians of Maximilian Stahremberg. This was the first occasion during the siege that the whole Guards regiment went into action as a unit. Drums beating and colours flying the regiment issued from the bastion of S. Maurice. A line of skirmishers covered their deployment into line with a well directed fire, while the ramparts of the citadel became crowded with spectators watching the the issue of the fight. The slow deployment was at last complete, the officers placed themselves at the head of their commands and the whole line moved steadily forward at the double, abandoning for the occasion the formal, slow pas de charge. The French, however, resisted with equal bravery; the Guardsmen fell in heaps round their officers, but after two hours mélée the counter-guard remained once more in the defenders' hands. Ten officers of the Guards had fallen, the losses of the rank and file are unknown. This success shook the French; Maximilian Stahremberg's men re-captured the lunette, and other troops the counter-guard of Beato Amedeo. But Orleans in his turn threw in his last reserves, and the dense attacking waves were sweeping up to the shattered works; but Daun never lost his head and gave orders to fire his last mines. Shat tered by the explosion the attackers reeled; and, before they could recover, out rushed the remnants of the garrison's Grenadiers in a desperate sally. This blow was enough for the shaken enemy; the whole attack broke up and ebbed away in rout; and some of the Guardsmen, who had followed up the Grenadiers, brought back into the citadel a piece of the defenders' artillery. The grand attack had failed but Duan was at his last gasp. The Grenadiers were reduced to 400, the defences were untenable, the ammunition was exhausted. But the On Sept. garrison's trials were nearly over. 2, the pre-arranged fire signals were seen on the hill of Superga and the defenders knew that the relieving army had crossed the frontier into Piedmont. Prince Eugene had already reached the Duke of Savoy's headquarters. He had only been able to bring 25,000 men with him, but the Duke's troops, which included 5,000 excellent cavalry, made him slightly superior numerically to the French and gave him a considerable advantage in the all important arm, viz.: cavalry. It is probably this factor which induced the French commanders to make their fatal decision to await the attack in their entrenchments, leaving to the Allies full freedom of manoeuvre. Thus was the Duke's bold policy of withdrawing all his mobile troops from Turin fully rewarded. Eugene promptly took advantage of the French error. Aiming at decisive results he marched right round the south of Turin and fell upon the French from the west, choosing as his objective the besiegers' sector_between the rivers Dora and Stura, which could only be reinforced with difficulty. On the morning of Sept. 7 at 8 o'clock the great battle began. From the height of the bastion "della Consolata" Daun watched its progress and behind him was gathered every available man. Towards 11 o'clock he saw the French right give way before the second attack of the Brandenburghers and the Duke in person move up his cavalry ready to pour through the gap made by the infantry. The time for action had come and he gave the word. As usual the Guards were at the head of the sallying troops, their rightful place by precedence, and now also by merit. This time their task was not heavy. The French were already giving way when Daun's blow struck them in the rear. There was little resistance and the victory was complete. Marshal Marsin with 3,000 of his men lay dead on the field; Orleans was wounded and in headlong flight; the prisoners were over 10,000. At 3 o'clock the Guards were recalled from the pursuit to form up for escort duty, and at their head the victorious generals made their entrance into the relieved capital. The regiment had lost during the siege 70 per cent. of its effectives-a loss, that is, nearly twice as great as that of any other regiment engaged. F. R. RADICE, (To be continued.) CHARLES WREN HOSKYNS. (1812-1876). overcome PRACTICAL farmers used not to have any great respect for the theorist, and Charles Wren Hoskyns found that his neighbours in Warwickshire regarded him as no exception to the invariable rule. Only by the help of his unfailing sense of humour was he able to the prejudices of his neighbours, and, a matter of more difficulty, to combat the obstinate reluctance of his labourers to carry out his instructions, which were so obviously opposed to all their experience of practical working. His book, Talpa, or the Chronicles of a Clay Farm' tells of these difficulties in delightful style, and of the humoursome methods he took to overcome them. The When he took a derelict farm in hand, and began to drain a waterlogged meadow, he found that the workman had begun to put in the tiles and fill up the drain in sections, although he had explicitly said that the whole drain was to be laid open first. man naturally replied that he had forty years' experience of that kind of work, and Hoskyns was obliged to make him look through a levelling telescope before he could be convinced of his error. The workman had never done this, and was astonished at the result: as a consequence he saved his face by pretending to be convinced. Again, when he caused the earth dug out of the drain to be scattered on the land, Hoskyns was subjected to all kinds of witticisms, the point of which disappeared when the condition of the field was seen in the following spring. All this and many other things are related in Talpa,' which has become a classic of its kind. But although this is the best known of his writings, Hoskyns produced a fair number of other pamphlets, essays and addresses. Some of these appeared in the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society and similar periodical publications, while others were first given as lectures. The majority dealt with farming, or with land tenure, while one little book was a History of Agriculture.' This is, how ever, little more than a pamphlet, and is not so well-informed as are the more practical writings. A singularity of Hoskyns's is his habit of repeating himself in his different publications. He does so almost in identical words in essays issued at odd times. For instance, in the 'Occasional Essays' the opening part of Agriculture' is identical with the opening part of the Annual Address to the Warwickshire Society,' and this kind of verbal repetition can be exemplified in other places. In this essay (Agriculture') Hoskyns says that the Britons were ignorant of the use of the flail, and that it has been said that the harrow was unknown to the Saxons. This idea is derived from there being no remaining paintings and illuminations of that time, in which the harrow is shown. He doubts the truth of the assumption, because the Romans used the harrow, and it must have been used by them during their occupation of Britain. He thinks that it may not have been so common as the plough, assuming that it is more difficult to construct and that more iron is needed in making it. But, of course, harrows of wood, i.e., with teeth of ash, were used until quite recent times, and so there is even less doubt of its use than he suggests. The lamp of knowledge was kept alight by the monkish farmers during the Middle Ages, says Hoskyns, in phrases which recur throughout his writings; but even his measured praise of the ecclesiastical institutions requires more careful consideration in the light of the evidence derived from widely scattered sources, which has been accumulated by G. C. Coulton and made accessible in his recently published Medieval Village,' Hoskyns suggests that the international organisation of the Church of that time, its connexion with Rome, which was the fount of whatever remained of ancient culture, and the academical employments of the monk, enabled it to retain, in some minute measure, the learning embodied in the georgical writings of Greece and Rome, which, although offering but a small degree of practical knowledge of agriculture,_was, nevertheless, all the theory available. There is no doubt in Hoskyns's mind that this academical knowledge, in spite of its limited nature, had some good influence on monkish farming. Hoskyns's claim to remembrance is not, however, as a historian, but in his practical work, and his theories based upon that work. As an indication of the far-seeing type of his mind his essay on Agricultural Statistics,' first published in the Royal Agricultural Society's Journal some ten years before official statistics began to be collected, and afterwards reprinted, may be cited. He was |