Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of ReligionPsychology Press, 1996 - 159 pages In Arguing for Atheism, Robin Le Poidevin addresses the question of whether theism - the view that there is a personal, transcendent creator of the universe - solves the deepest mysteries of existence. Philosophical defences of theism have often been based on the idea that it explains things which atheistic approaches cannot: for example, why the universe exists, and how there can be objective moral values. The main contention of Arguing for Atheism is that the reverse is true: that in fact theism fails to explain many things it claims to. Such an interpretation has been argued for recently by 'radical theologians'; Arguing for Atheism is therefore, a philosophical contribution to one of the key religious issues of our times. Designed as a text for university courses in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this book's accessible style and numerous explanations of important philosophical concepts and positions will also make it attractive to the general reader. |
Contents
Must the universe have a cause? | 3 |
Is God necessary? | 17 |
The modal ontological argument | 24 |
Summary | 31 |
Does the universe have a purpose? | 59 |
Is there a problem of evil? | 88 |
Human freedom from the divine perspective | 95 |
Other editions - View all
Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion Robin Le Poidevin Limited preview - 1996 |
Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion Robin Le Poidevin Limited preview - 2003 |
Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion Robin Le Poidevin Limited preview - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
actual world adopt agents analogy analytically false analytically true Anselm answer anthropic principle argued B-theory begins to exist behaviour believe Big Bang Carnap causal explanation causal reductionism cause chance Chapter closed time model compatibilism compatibilist conceived conception contingent creator death Don Cupitt emotions entities everything that begins example fact fictional object framework future G-type gene greater human freedom hypothesis idea incompatibilist internal question justification laws of nature make-believe means merely meta-ethical metaphysical modal argument modal cosmological argument modal ontological argument modal realism moral explanation moral properties moral values mysteries natural properties necessarily exists necessarily true necessary truths notion occurring outcome Oxford philosophy of religion positivism possible worlds present problem of evil proposition reality reason reductionism reject religious seems selfish gene sense simply statements suffering suggestion suppose talk teleological argument teleological explanation theism theistic theological things universe exists University Press