importance and utility should be impaired. But what was the system in France under Buonaparte? Why, a censorship was established, the functions of which were not confined to politics merely, but extended to every description of writing. This censorship was, indeed, often exercised in making a total alteration in the sentiments of a writer, and that, too, in the discussion of moral and philosophical subjects-in disquisitions upon topics unconnected with politics. But such was the rigour of the system uniformly pursued by him, whose whole object was the gratification of his own will, in the establishment of a complete military despotism, and in rendering man a mere machine. Thanks, how ever, to the manly perseverance of this country, and the distinguished valour of its allies, that abominable system is put down-put down, too, by efforts on our part to which every quar ter of the world bore honourable testimony for what was the quarter which had not been, in the course of the war, the scene of some glorious achievement for Great Britain?"

As to the general merits of the treaty under consideration, he called upon their lordships to compare it fully with any treaty recorded in our nistory. In former arrangements, at the conclusion of a war, it had often been represented, that this country neglect ed to keep what she had acquired; but in this instance he rather apprehended, that however some might suppose we had kept too much, it could hardly be alleged that we had kept too little. It had also been objected to former arrangements, that the interests of our allies were sacrificed and our own obligations deserted; but " all Europe" said he, "bear testimony to our good faith and generosity on the present oc

casion."

Lord Grenville proposed an amend

ment on the address brought forward by the Earl of Liverpool, one exactly similar to which was proposed in the other house by Lord Milton. In the speeches pronounced by these noblemen, the right of interfering with the internal arrangements of France, exercised by the allied powers of Europe, was distinctly recognised. "It is my firm conviction," said Lord Grenville, with that manly openness which characterizes his parliamentary eloquence,

that not only the happiness, but the safety of Britain, depended on the interposition of foreign powers with the internal affairs of France, which appears to some among us so unjustifiable in itself, and so perilous when viewed as a precedent." His lordship then begged the House to advert to the Revolution of 1688, the principles of which would amply justify any steps this government might take with regard to France, in order to prevent the possibility of a speedy renewal of hostilities. "Did not our great deliverer," said he, "with no vested right, and no claim to the crown but the people's will, land upon the British shores with a foreign army? He thought that not only the interest of this country, but the safety of Europe, depended upon his measures. He came to drive away an odious tyrant and the pensioners of France. He claimed to be, in his own words, vindex securitatis Europa, assertor libertatis Britanniæ; and it was for some time a matter of doubt, whether it would not be necessary for him to do that which of late had been so severely reprobated, namely, to call in the aid of a foreign army for the final establishment of the li berties of the country. In the present case, as the war was necessary, it was just, and the conqueror had a right, by the law of nations, to impose upon the conquered such terms as would prevent the recurrence of the evil, for

come to be known by the name of the Christian Treaty.* The language in which this treaty is conveyed, is indeed, as this gentleman admitted, inoffensive. But, according to him, the harmless, and even unmeaning appearance of it, ought to have excited the suspicion of the reflective. "There was nothing," he contended, " in their peculiar situation or character, there was nothing in the circumstances of the times, that at all required that those sovereigns should put themselves ostentatiously forward as the defenders of that Christianity which no danger menaced, or of those principles which all good men must be ready to sustain. These sovereigns were not suspected of any inclination to depart from Christianity. There was no charge or impeachment preferred against their character or views, which called upon them either with a view to their own vindication, or to what was passing in the world, to enter into a treaty, containing stipulations such as had seldom been heard of from the earliest times, such at least as had not been published since the time of the Crusades, such certainly as had no parallel in modern Europe. For the principles avowed in this treaty he expressed his deference; they were material to the happiness of all states and kingdoms, yet he saw no necessity for any public pledge upon the subject, either from the sovereigns alluded to, or from any other Christian prince. But notwithstanding the principles which this treaty declared a disposition to hold sacred, there was something so singular in its language as to call for observation, and to warrant no little jealousy. After profess ing at the outset a resolution in the administration of their respective states, and in their relations with every other government, to take as their sole guide the precepts of their holy religion, namely, the precepts of justice, chris

200

tian charity, and peace, the contracting parties pledge themselves in the very first article of the treaty 'on all occasions and in all places, to lend each other aid and assistance;' and that they will lead their subjects and armies in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect religion, peace and justice. Was there nothing to excite suspicion in such language? When sov reigns spoke of leading armies to protect religion, peace, and justice, was there no ground for alarm? He feared that there was much reason to apprehend the conse quences of this treaty, notwithstanding the sacred principles which it professed to revere. He feared that something more was meant than what immediately met the eye. He could not think that this treaty referred to objects wholly spiritual. Why were they to engage to lead their armies to support the Christian religion, when no power had menaced it? Such a treaty appeared to him very extraordinary, when it was remembered, that but a few weeks before the parties to it had concluded, not only a treaty of peace among themselves, but one which was to secure the repose of all Europe. He always thought there was something suspicious in what a French writer had called les abouchemens des rois. When crowned heads met, the result of their united councils was not always favourable to the interests of humanity. It was not the first time that Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had laid their heads together. On a former occasion, after professing vast regard for truth, religion, and justice, they had taken a course which had t brought much misery on their own subjects, for whose welfare they affected the greatest concern, but they had made a war against an unoffending country, which had found little reason to felicitate themselves on finding their

1

2

conquerors pre-eminently distinguished by those feelings which Christianity should inspire. The war against Poland, and the subsequent partition of that devoted country, had been prefaced by language very similar to that which this treaty contained, and the proclamation of the empress Catherine which wound up that fatal tragedy (for fatal that unprincipled partition had proved, and fatal it would prove, to the peace of Europe all justice was rendered,) had almost the same words.”

The circumstance of this treaty having been entered into by these great military sovereigns, without the concurrence of England, was enlarged up. on by Mr Brougham, as affording additional room for doubt; and he expressed his suspicion that the whole was meant to be the forerunner of some crusade against the Ottoman Porte.

Lord Castlereagh explained, that at the time of its being concluded, a draft of the treaty had been put into his hands by the ministers of the contracting parties, and that the nonconcurrence of England had been occasioned merely by the forms of diplomacy. The abouchemens des rois, stigmatized by Mr Brougham, had, as he believed, been attended with the most salutary efforts in the course of the late momentous struggles upon the continent of Europe. The brotherly dispositions manifested by those great sovereigns, were not, he contended, to be wantonly branded with the name of hypocrisy, nor was there any thing soapparently absurd in some strong expressons of regard for the Christian faith, on the part of those who had just been employed in combating a sanguinary power, whose schemes of conquest and rapine had been so eminently assisted by the diffusion of a spirit of immoray and irreligion. "Whether the instrument," said he, " was necessary

or not, was another question; but he must say, that if that spirit which it breathed was one which sincerely animated the emperor of Russia, and for himself he could not entertain a doubt upon the subject, there was nothing upon which he should more sincerely congratulate Europe and the world. If the Emperor of Russia chose to found his glory upon such a basis, posterity would do justice to the noble determination. Having already done so much for mankind by his arms, to what better purpose could he apply his great influence, in the councils of the sovereigns of Europe, than to secure for it a long and beneficial peace? It was the only glory which was now left him to acquire, after the great personal glory which he had already acquired. With respect to the document itself, Lord Castelreagh opposed its production upon a parliamenary ground, as it was contrary to the practice of parliament to call for the production of treaties to which this country was no party.

Mr Brougham's motion was lost by a majority of 104 to 30.

On the 12th of February, the most important business of the Lower House commenced. The House having formed itself into a Committee of Supply, the Chancellor of the Exchequer rose, and offered, in a very long and interesting speech, a variety of observations calculated to explain the vote of credit, which it was his intention to propose. "His object," he said, " was in the first place to provide for the payment of different exchequer bills outstanding, and which, in the ordinary course, should now be provided for. The first was a sum of 11 millions of exchequer bills, which remained of a sum of 12 millions and a half, voted in November 1814; also another of 4 millions and a half of exchequer bills which were now become due, and

come to be known by the name of the Christian Treaty.* The language in which this treaty is conveyed, is indeed, as this gentleman admitted, inoffensive. But, accor ing to him, the harmless, and even unmeaning appearance of it, ought to have excited the suspicion of the reflective. "There was nothing," he contended," in their peculiar situation or character, there was nothing in the circumstances of the times, that at all required that those sovereigns should put themselves ostentatiously forward as the defenders of that Christianity which no danger menaced, or of those principles which all good men must be ready to sustain. These sovereigns were not suspected of any inclination to depart from Christianity. There was no charge or impeachment preferred against their character or views, which called upon them either with a view to their own vindication, or to what was passing in the world, to enter into a treaty, containing stipulations such as had seldom been heard of from the earliest times, such at least as had not been published since the time of the Crusades, such certainly as had no parallel in modern Europe. For the principles avowed in this treaty he expressed his deference; they were material to the happiness of all states and kingdoms, yet he saw no necessity for any public pledge upon the subject, either from the sovereigns alluded to, or from any other Christian prince. But notwithstanding the principles which this treaty declared a disposition to hold sacred, there was something so singular in its language as to call for observation, and to warrant no little jealousy. After professing at the outset a resolution in the administration of their respective states, and in their relations with every other government, to take as their sole guide the precepts of their holy religion, namely, the precepts of justice, chris

A

迎

a

tian charity, and peace, the contracting parties pledge themselves in the very first article of the treaty 'on all occasions and in all places, to lend each other aid and assistance;' and that they will lead their subjects and armies in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are animated, to protect religion, peace and justice. Was there nothing to excite suspicion in such language? When sov reigns spoke of leading armies to protect religion, i peace, and justice, was there no ground for alarm? He feared that there was much reason to apprehend the conse quences of this treaty, notwithstanding the sacred principles which it professed to revere. He feared that something more was meant than what immediately met the eye. He could not think that this treaty referred to objects wholly spiritual. Why were they to engage to lead their armies to support the Christian religion, when no power had menaced it? Such a treaty appeared to him very extraordinary, when it was remembered, that but a few weeks before the parties to it had concluded, not only a treaty of peace among themselves, but one which was to secure the repose of all Europe. He always thought there was something suspicious in what a French writer had called les abouchemens des rois.' When crowned heads met, the result of their united councils was not always favourable to the interests of humanity. It was not the first time that Austria, Russia, and Prussia, had laid their heads together. On a former occasion, after professing vast regard for truth, religion, and justice, they had taken a course which had brought much misery on their own subjects, for whose welfare they affected the greatest concern, but they had made a war against an unoffending country, which had found little reason to felicitate themselves on finding their