there to be owner has power (subject to any rights appearing on the register to be vested in any other person) absolutely to dispose of the ship or share standing in his name; and to give effectual receipts for any money therefor paid or advanced by way of consideration (o).

§ 1112. The entry in the registry contains (1) the name of the ship, and of the port to which she belongs; (2) the details as to her tonnage, build and description, specified by the act; (3) the particulars as to the time and place of her building, and in case of a foreign ship a statement of her foreign name, and (if she was condemned) of the time, place, and court of condemnation; (4) the names and descriptions of her registered owner or owners, and, if, there are more than one, the proportions in which they are interested (p).

§ 1113. Upon the completion of the registry, the registrar is required to grant a "Certificate of Registry" in the statutory form, which embraces the particulars entered in the register, along with the name of the master of the ship (q).

§ 1114. On the death or bankruptcy of a registered owner the person or persons coming in his place may be registered, on producing evidence of their right in terms of the act (r); and there is a similar power as to shares transmitted by marriage (s).

§ 1115. Registration of an appropriate instrument in the form prescribed by the Merchant Shipping Act is also essential to the completion of the real right of a purchaser (1), or mortgagee (u), in any ship or share of a ship; and the rights of competing mortgagees are determined by priority of registration, not by priority in date of their respective instruments (x). These rules, however, do not affect the personal right which a party, holding an obligation to transfer an interest in a ship or share, has to sue the registered owner to execute the writings necessary for having the right made real by registration (y).

8 42.

There are also provisions for recording the conveyance, trans

(p) Same act,

(0) 17 and 18 Vict., c. 104 (Merchant Shipping Act), ? 53. (9) Same act, § 44. (r) Same act, ?? 58, 59, 60. (8) Ib. (t) Same act, ? 55, et seq.-Under the corresponding rules of a previous statute (8 and 9 Vict., c. 89, 2 34) it was held, that where a coasting vessel under fifteen tons burden had been registered, the owner might transfer the right without a written instrument, and without an entry in the register, because the vessel was not one of those requiring to be registered by the act 8 and 9 Vict., c. 88, 22 13, 14; Benyon v. Cresswell, 1848, 12 Ad. and Ell. N. S., 899. (u) Same act, 2 66, et seq.

(x) Same act, 69. (y) See Boyd's Ex. v. Martin's Ex., 1847, 9 D., 1234. This decision was pronounced in regard to the corresponding provisions of the act 3 and

mission, and extinction of mortgages (2). The certificate of registry does not, by statute, contain any evidence of them.

§ 1116. It is also enacted that, if any change takes place in the registered ownership of a vessel, a memorandum of the change shall be indorsed on the certificate of registry. If the change takes place when the ship is at her port of registry, the memorandum is indorsed by the registrar there; and if it occurs when the ship is absent from her port of registry, the indorsation is made by the registrar of that port on the first return of the ship; or, if she previously arrives at any other port where there is a British registrar, such registrar on being advised by the registrar of the port of registry of the change having taken place, is required to indorse a like memorandum thereof on the certificate of registry (a).

Whenever the master of a ship is changed, a memorandum of the change must be indorsed on the certificate of registry. If it is made in consequence of the sentence of a Naval Court, the indorsation must be made and subscribed by the presiding officer of such court; and if it takes place from any other cause, the indorsation must be made and subscribed by the registrar, or (if there is no registrar) by the British consular officer of the place where the change is made. The officers of customs at any port may refuse to admit. any person to act as master, unless his name is indorsed on the certificate as the last appointed master (b).

§ 1117. It is enacted that every register and every certificate of registry of any British ship, purporting to be signed by the registrar or other proper officer, shall be received in evidence as prima facie proof of all the matters contained or recited in such register, when the register is produced, and of all the matters contained in or indorsed on such certificate of registry, and purporting to be authenticated by the signature of a registrar, when such certificate is produced (c). There is a similar provision as to certified copies of the register.

§ 1118. As already seen, every person registered as owner is vested with the absolute right to dispose of the shares standing in his name (d). It follows that the shares thus appearing to be the property of any registered owner form on his bankruptcy part of the estate to which his creditors have right. Accordingly, in a case

4 Will. IV, c. 55, 2 31.

a Sa me act, 2 45.

(z) 17 and 18 Vict., c. 104, 22 68, 73, et seq. (b) Same act, ? 46.

(c) Same act, 107.

(d) Same act,

43.

arising on the corresponding provisions of a previous statute (e), (which were not so clear as to the right of the registered owner), where the vessels belonging to a shipping company, instead of being registered in the company's name, were entered in the names of the partners, as owners respectively of certain shares; and where, on the bankruptcy of one of the partners, the trustee on his estate claimed the shares standing in his name, and the other partners maintained that they were to be regarded as company property under the deed of copartnery, which provided that, notwithstanding the registrations, each of the partners should be held as equally interested in each and all of the vessels, the Court sustained the claim of the trustee (ƒ). In another case, arising on the same statute, where shares registered in the name of one partner of a company were averred to be company property by the trustee on the sequestrated estate of another partner, the Court held it incompetent to prove prout de jure that they were company property; and accordingly, they disregarded a proof which had been allowed before answer in the inferior court, and which seems to have supported the trustee's allegation (g). This decision, however, did not touch the question whether the latent right of the company (which was of the nature of a trust) could be proved by the writ or oath of the partner registered as owner. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 seems to save all such questions, both under the clause which provides that the register and certificate of registry shall be received merely as prima facie proof of the matters which they contain (h), and under the proviso that the rule which entitles no more than thirty-two individuals to be registered as owners at one time, "shall not affect the beneficial title of any number of persons or of any company represented by or claiming under or through any registered owner or joint owner" (i). Accordingly, it is thought that any latent right of the nature referred to may be proved by writ or oath of the registered owner, if it resolves into an averment of trust in him (k). If, however, it involves fraud or collusion, it seems to' be provable prout de jure (1).2 It is also thought that such evidence

(e) 3 and 4 Will. IV, c. 55, ? 32. Tr., 1844, 6 D., 1174.

(ƒ) M'Arthur v. M'Brair and Johnston's (g) Ord v. Barton, 1846, 8 D., 1011. From the way in which this case arose the whole question as to the right to the shares was not before the Court. See also, in support of the text, Yallop, 1808, 15 Vesey, 60. (h) 17 and 18 Vict., c. 104, 107. (k) See supra, 2 674, et seq.

(i) Same act, 37.

(1) See supra, 578, et seq. Would parole be admitted to prove that the registered owner was a fictitious party, and that the real owners were aliens, and therefore not entitled to hold shares? In Scott v. Miller, 1828,

2 A certificate of registry was held such prima facie evidence of the title of the holders

is admissible to prove that the name of a party appearing as owner has been entered in the register without his authority (m), or without the authority of another person, who is the true owner (n).

§ 1119. Registration is indispensable to the active title of owner; the Court not recognising as owners those who have failed to comply with the statutory requirements (o). But action by unregistered owners to recover from their agent sums received by him is competent, because an agent may not challenge his principal's title (p).

§ 1120. Registration is not essential to the passive title of ownership; an unregistered owner being liable for sums expended upon the ship on his order, or that of any one having his authority (q).

§ 1121. There was considerable difference of opinion as to the extent to which registration under the former acts created liability for repairs or furnishings to the ship. In one case in this country where a person, registered as owner, contended that he had only a right in security, he was held liable for furnishings ordered in London by the master, who he alleged was the true owner; and it was laid down as fixed law, that a registered owner is liable for such debts (r). More recently, where Cockburn's Trustees, of whom his son Isaac was one, were registered owners of certain ships; and where Isaac and another son acquired right to the ships under an

7 S., 56; 5 Mur., 236; 11 S., 21, S. C., parole of such an averment was admitted. This case, however, arose under an act which did not make the entry in the register prima facie proof of ownership. (m) Under the former registry acts, the entry in the register was not prima facie proof of ownership, when the authority was disputed; see Fraser v. Hopkins, 1809, 2 Taunt., 5-Smith v. Fuge, 1813, 3 Camp., 456-Reusse v. Meyers, 1813, ib., 475-Tinkler v. Walpole, 1811, 14 East., 226-Tead v. Martin, 1814, 4 Camp., 90. (n) It will be a difficult question how far such proof can affect third parties. (0) See this illustrated in regard to the former registration acts in Walker v. Pollock, 1825, 3 S., 625—Tod, &c. v. Boag, &c., 1825, 3 S., 622—See also per curiam in Scott v. Miller, supra. (p) So held under the former registry acts

in Lumsden v. Allen, 1823, 2 S., 585-Dixon v. Hamond, 1819, 2 Barn. and Ald., 310. See also Walker v. Pollock, supra. (q) So held under the former registry acts in Pearse v. Turner, 1829, 7 S., 412-Ritchie v. Lang, 1829, ib.-Inglis v. Lane, 1833, 12 S., 67. (r) Leslie v. Curtis, 1836, 14 S., 994.

that they obtained unconditional recal of arrestments used by creditors of the former owners, though it was pleaded by the arresters that the transference was fraudulent and collusive; Duffus and Lawson v. Mackay, 1857, 19 D., 430; and in Schultze v. Robinson and Niven, 1861, 24 D., 120, an unregistered bill of sale, executed in Prussia, was held to transfer the property in a vessel, to the effect of defeating arrestments used by creditors of the former owner. But see Bell v. Gow, 1862, 1 Macph., 183, where an arrestment was held effectual,-although at the time the ship stood registered in name of the debtor's infant son, and not of the debtor himself,-the transfer in favour of the son having been subsequently reduced.

arrangement with the trustees, but without being registered; on these brothers becoming bankrupt and the ships being sold under venditions in the names of the trustees, action was sustained against the trustees for furnishings which had been made on Isaac's order before the sale (s). This case was decided on the grounds that there was no proof of the trustees having ceased to be beneficially interested in the ships, and that, as the orders had been given by one who was likely to have acted for the trustees, the furnishings must be held to have been made on the credit of the trustees and not of that person individually. The general question, therefore, was not decided; and Lord Moncreiff observed that the decisions, both in this country and in England, at one time gave more force to the registry than the Courts had recently approved of.

§ 1122. In England it was at one time held that registered ownership created liability for repairs or furnishings (†). But the later decisions (none of which have been pronounced in regard to the act of 1854) settled that the question in each case was, On whose credit were the repairs or furnishings made? and that this the jury had to determine on the evidence before them, without being obliged to give effect to the registration, unless they believed that the furnishings were made on the credit and actual or implied authority of the person registered as owner (u). These decisions proceed on the fair principle that a person contracting on the credit of certain parties should not have action against others on whose credit he did not reckon, and who did not derive profit from the contract. The same principle seems to apply under the existing statute, with this difference, that as the register is now prima facie proof of ownership, the registered owner might have to bear the burden of proving that the furnishings were not made on his authority or credit.3

25.

§ 1123. When any registered ship is so altered as not to corre

(s) Hay v. Cockburn's Tr., 1850, 12 D., 1298. (t) Westerdell v. Dale, 1797, 7 Durf. and East, 306-Rich v. Coe, 1777, 2 Cowp., 636-Abbot on Shipping (9th ed.), (u) Young v. Brander, 1806, 8 East, 10-M'Iver v. Humble, 1812, 16 ib., 169-Baker v. Buckle, 1822, 7 Moore, 349-Jennings v. Griffiths, 1822, 1 Ry. and Moo., 42-Curling v. Robertson, 1844, 8 Scott's New Ca., 12-Abbot on Shipping (9th ed.), 25, 26.

3 It has been held in England that the register of a ship is not conclusive evidence of the liability of the person appearing thereon as owner for the acts of the master done within the scope of his general authority. The owner of a ship, then at sea, transferred it to the defendant by absolute bill of sale (the bill of sale being, however, intended only as a collateral security for a loan), which was duly registered. The defendant was