by the exaggeration of what actually existed, or by the partial suppression of what actually existed, so as to give it another colour, or if he made his comments with any misstatement of fact, which he must have known to be a misstatement, if he exercised ordinary care, then he loses his privilege, and the occasion does not justify the publication, which would then be actionable."

Upon the question whether an alleged libel is a privileged communication or not, the proper course at the trial is this:-The Judge is bound to ask the jury whether the matter was published bona fide. If they come to the conclusion that it was, then it is for the Judge to say whether, under all the circumstances, it is or is not a privileged communication. (a) It is wrong to leave to the jury whether an alleged libel is contained in an official document and privileged communication. (b)

In an action for libel, the evidence adduced at the trial, in proof of the libel, was, that the defendant, with some others, while at work in his field, were talking of prayer meetings. Upon being told that the plaintiff, and others, were going to hold the next prayer meeting at his house, he stated that he had no objection to the others, but would not allow the plaintiff to come; and, upon being pressed to state his reasons, said that the plaintiff had been guilty of bestiality. Upon being asked, on a second occasion, to withdraw his words, he refused, and said he was not mistaken, and would go and take his oath of it, if they liked to go down with him before the Magistrates. The learned Judge left the question of bona fides to the jury, directing them that, if the defendant, through mistake, bona fide believed what he stated, the occasion would justify the statement. The jury having found for the

(a) Stace v. Griffith, L. R. 2 P. C. App. 428, per Ld. Chelmsford. (b) Ib.

plaintiff, upon motion for a new trial, the Court held that, there being intrinsic evidence for the Jury to decide upon, the case could not properly be withheld from their decision; second, that the question being whether the defendant honestly believed what he said to be true, not whether it was in fact true, the case was properly left to the jury, and their decision was final. (a)

This case was reversed in appeal, on the ground that the bona fides is made out when the privilege is ascertained. The truth of the words is assumed to support the privi lege, and the defendant is not called upon to prove it. (b)

In some cases the presumption of privilege is altogether conclusive, and the law will not allow any evidence to be adduced to remove or impeach it. The regular and established proceedings in Parliament and in Courts of Justice are of this character, and no action for libel can be supported upon any part of their contents. The reasons given for this absolute privilege are, first, that the safety and welfare of the community requires that all such public proceedings should be perfectly unrestrained and free, and only subject to the authority and discretion of the tribunals in which they take place: second, that such tribunals possess the power of expunging all defamatory matters, if irrelevant from the proceedings, and of obliging the offending party to make satisfaction. (c)

When a communication is not absolutely privileged, it is a sufficient answer in point of law to say that it was malicious, and made without reasonable and probable cause. (d)

The defendant, hearing that a tradesman had been

(a) M'Cullough v. M'Intee, 13 U. C. C. P. 438.

(b) S. C. 10 U. C. L. J. 238, (in E. & A.)

(c) Stanton v. Andrews, 5 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 221, et seq., per Sherwood, J. (d) Dawkins v. Ld. Paulet, L. R. 5 Q. B. 101, per Cockburn, C. J.

hoaxed by a letter written in his name, and ordering a certain article, wrote to the tradesman a letter to the effect that, in his opinion, the letter was written by the plaintiff. It turned out that it was not; but the jury found that the defendant sincerely believed that it was: Held that, even if the letter was a libel, it was a privileged communication. (a)

The defendant having published in his newspaper a report read at a vestry meeting, containing a statement to the effect that certain returns of the plaintiff, a medical man, to the Registrar under the Statute, were wilfully false, such report not having been published by the vestry, held that the publication of it was not privileged. (b)

A churchwarden having written to the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing him of having desecrated the church, by allowing books to be sold in it during service, and by turning the vestry room into a cooking apartment, the correspondence was published without the plaintiff's permission, in the defendant's newspaper, with comments on the plaintiff's conduct:-Held that this was a matter of public interest, which might be made the subject of public discussion, and that the publication was therefore not libellous, unless the language used was stronger than, in the opinion of the jury, the occasion justified. (c)

A charge against the plaintiff, of wrongfully taking the defendant's logs, sawing them into lumber, and selling it, was contained in a letter written by the defendant, to one M., an intimate friend of his, who was a near relative to the plaintiff, but in no way interested or concerned in

(a) Croft v. Stevens, 8 U. C. L. J. 280; 7 H. & N. 570.

(b) Popham v. Pickburn, 8 U. C. L. J. 335; 7 H. & N. 891; 31 L. J. (Ex.) 133. (c) Kelly v. Tinling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 699; 35 L. J. (Q. B.) 231.

business with either party, with the avowed object of defendant's availing himself of M.'s influence and good offices in his controversies with the plaintiff, and to warn the plaintiff and his mother against the consequences of law suits, and the alleged interested motives of his attor ney. M. being absent from the country, the letter was opened by his agents and relatives, and became public: -Held that this was not a privileged communication. (a) It seems the 67th section of 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, will apply to cases of libel. In Hughes v. Dinorben, (b) to prove that libels declared on were written by the defendant, certain documents, admitted to be in his handwriting, were used as standards of comparison. The plaintiff called several witnesses, and, to support and s'rengthen such evidence, he produced seven anonymous letters, generally relating to the same matters as the libels declared on. This evidence was admitted to prove malice, and the letters were also used as a comparison of the handwriting in dispute, and no objection was made by defendant's counsel:-Held that these seven anonymous letters were admissible—that they were relevant to the issue to shew malice; but that, if a proper objection had been made at the time of the trial, they could not have been received as evidence of handwriting.

Upon an indictment for libel, published at defendant's instance, in a newspaper, it appeared that the editor, who was not indicted, before inserting the libel, shewed it to the prosecutor, who did not express any wish to suppress the publication, but wrote a reply, which was also inserted-Held not such a defence for the parties indicted as to render a conviction illegal. (c)

(a) Connick v. Wilson, 2 Kerr, 496; Ib. 617; and see Andrews v. Wilson. 3 Kerr, 86.

(b) 32 L. T. Rep. 271.

(c) Reg. v. M'Elderry, 19 U. C: Q. B. 168. See, as to justification, Stewart v. Rowlands, 14 U. C. Č. P. 485; Hill v. Hogg, 4 Állen, 108.

On an application for criminal information for libel, the Court is placed in the position of a grand jury, and must have the same amount of information as would warrant a grand jury in returning a true bill. A grand jury would not be justified in returning a true bill unless the libel itself were laid before them. Therefore, the application for a criminal information must be rejected, unless the libel is filed with the affidavit on which the application is based. (a)

Under the Con. Stats. U. C., c. 103, a plea to an information for libel must allege the truth of all the matters charged. (b)

The use of the inuendo in an indictment for libel is to explain the evil meaning of the defendant when the words are apparently innocent and inoffensive, or ambiguous. The doctrine of taking words in their mildest sense is applied only when the words, in their natural import, are doubtful, and equally to be understood in one sense as in the other. (c) It is for the Court to say whether the inuendo is capable of bearing the meaning assigned by it, and for the jury to say whether that meaning was intended and proved. (d)

Riot. This offence is defined to be a tumultuous disturbance of the peace, by three persons or more assembling together, of their own authority, with an intent mutually to assist one another against any who shall oppose them in the execution of some enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards actually executing the same in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people, whether the act intended were of itself lawful or unlawful. (e)

(a) Ex parte Gugy, 8 L. C. R. 353.

(b) Reg. v. Moylan, 19 U. C. Q. B. 521.

(c) Somers v. Honse, Holt 39.

(d) Sturt v. Bragg, 10 Q. B. 908; Anonymous 29 U. C. Q. B., 462, per Wilson, J.

(e) Reg. v. Kelly, 6 U. C. C. P. 372, per Draper, C. J.