our Legislature exceeded its authority in introducing them into the 12 Vic., c. 19. The mistake probably arose from a desire more fully to explain that the word jurisdiction used in the Treaty was to extend over the several States in the same sense in which it was used when applied to the United States. (a) In this case it was strongly contended that these words were necessary in the Statute-that the jurisdiction of the United States, and that of the several States, are separate and independent of each other, and that the omission of these words necessarily and intentionally restricted the operation of the Ashburton Treaty to offences committed solely within the jurisdiction of the United States, and that when the offence was committed within the limits of any one of the States, it was not covered by the Treaty. The Court, in holding as already shown, declared that the surrender of persons for imputed crimes can only be made by the supreme executive authority of independent nations, and that in the United States it existed in the supreme Federal Legislature of the nation, and thus, as the object of the Treaty could only be attained by the national power, it did not reside in any one of the United States. (b) In the Treaty and the Statutes, the words jurisdiction and territories are used concurrently and correlatively, and these general designations necessarily had reference to the aggregate dominions and territories of the high contracting parties-the General Governments of eachthe United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with its Dependencies and Colonies on the one part, and the Federated General Government of the United States, with its State Governments, on the other, as aggregate (a) See Reg. v. Bennet H. Young. The St. Alban's Raid, 169, per Smith, J. (b) 167-9 per Smith, J. territories over which their respective general public authority prevailed. (a) The Act also makes two alterations in the rules of procedure. The evidence produced before the Magistrate was not to be "sufficient to sustain the charge according to the laws of this Province," but "such as, according to the laws of this Province, would justify the apprehension and committal for trial of the person accused,” etc. The language of Robinson, C.J., in the Anderson case,(b) shews that, according to the proper construction of the Treaty, the former expression has the same meaning as the latter; and as the Statute used the former only, probably it was amended so as not to conflict with the Treaty in this respect. The Chief Justice says: "It will be observed that in one part of the treaty, as recited in the statute, the evidence of criminality is required to be such as would justify the apprehension of the party and his commitment for trial, if the offence had been committed in the country where he is found; while in another part the evidence is required to be such as shall be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge. It would seem that nothing can turn upon this variation of expression but we must look upon the same thing as intended by both; for in the treaty, as recited in the commencement of the statute, it is declared to have been agreed by the two powers that offenders charged with certain offences flying from one country into the territories of the other, should be delivered up to justice, 'provided that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and (a) Reg. v. Bennet H. Young, 9 L. C. J. 50, per Badgley, J. (b) 20 U. C. Q. B. 168. commitment for trial if the crime or offence had been there committed. This shews that nothing more can be meant by the other form of expression than by this, since by the treaty evidence sufficient to commit the party for trial is all that is required to warrant his being given up, and it would not be reasonable to require more.' The other alteration is in the second clause, and con-sisted in omitting the words, "or under the hand of the officer or person having the legal custody thereof." (a) All the above points apply to the present Act, for on reference to them, it is in substance the same as the 24 Vic., c. 6. C. The next statute on the subject is the 31 Vic., c. 94, (b) which came into operation on the 8th of August, 1868. This statute was passed to extend the provisions of the 24 Vic., c. 6, to the whole Dominion. (c) It superseded and repealed the Con. Stat. Canada, c. 89, and the 24 Vic., 6, and is now the governing enactment on the subject of extradition throughout the Dominion. So much of the first section of this Act as is in the words following, that is to say "or any police magistrate or stipendiary magistrate in Canada, or any judge of the sessions of the peace in the Province of Quebec, or any inspector and superintendent of police empowered to act as a justice of the peace in the Province of Quebec," was repealed by the 33 Vic., c. 25. It now becomes advisable to consider how the Treaty and statutes are to be construed and carried out in order to effectuate the objects they were designed to accomplish. These were the surrender by each country to the other of fugitives from justice charged with certain spe (a) See 31 Vic., c. 94, s. 2. (b) See Stat. 1869, Reserved Acts. (c) Reg. v Morton, 19, U. C. C. P. 21; per Wilson, J. cified crimes (a); and thereby to subject parties against whom a charge coming within the Treaty and statutes is sustained by evidence of criminality to be put upon trial before the proper tribunal of the country where the offence was committed (b); and thus to prevent the failure of justice which would naturally result from offenders in one country seeking refuge in the other, and there being amenable to no punishment: for by the principles of the Common Law pervading the jurisprudence of both Great Britain and the United States, crimes are unquestionably considered local, and cognizable exclusively within the country where they are committed. (c) Extradition laws are to be interpreted by the law of nations, in so far as the obligations created by them on the part of one nation to another are concerned; and the then existing public law of both nations forms an essential part of the national compact which is created by the passage of an extradition treaty. Consequently, on the passing of our extradition Acts, the public law of Great Britain, as well as the public law of the United States, became incorporated into the national compact. (d) The words of this Treaty should not be held to too narrow a construction; and if the words used to carry out a design of general utility can properly be construed so as to give effect to and not defeat that design, the larger construction must be adopted. (e) The Treaty must be construed in a liberal and just spirit; not labouring with legal astuteness to find flaws or doubtful meanings in its words, or in those of the legal forms re (a) Reg. v. Morton, 19 U. C. C. P. 18 per Hagarty, J. (b) Reg. v. Reno and Anderson, 4 U. C. P. R. 299, per Draper, C. J.; the Chesapeake case, 44, per Ritchie, J. (c) Ib. 44, per Ritchie, J. (d) Reg. v. Bennet H. Young; the St. Alban's Raid, 469, per Smith, J. (e) Re Warner 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 18, per Hagarty, J. quired for carrying it into effect. Its avowed object is to allow each country to bring to trial all prisoners charged with the expressed offences, and it is based on the assumption that each country should be trusted with the trial of offences committed within its own jurisdiction. We are to regard its avowed object in construing its provisions. (a) We should look to it for an indication of what was probably meant by anything that may seem ambiguous in the language of the statute. (b) The Treaty applies to all persons being subjects of both nations, and as well slaves as freemen. (c) The words of the 31 Vic., c. 94, are large enough to embrace all persons, subjects, denizens, or aliens, who have committed the crimes enumerated in the United States, and who are found in this Province; and a British subject committing one of the crimes enumerated in the Treaty, within the jurisdiction of the United States, and afterwards fleeing to Canada, is subject to the provisions of the Treaty, and the Statutes which provide for the surrender of "all persons" who, being charged, etc. (d) Só a person convicted of forgery, or uttering forged paper, in the United States, who escapes to Canada after verdict, but before judgment, is liable to be surrendered, although, technically speaking, after judgment, or verdict of guilty, a man is incorrectly spoken of as "charged with a crime" in the language of the Statute. (e) But political offenders have always been held to be excluded from any obligation of the country in which they take refuge to deliver them up, whether such delivery is claimed to be due (a) Re B. G. Burley, 1 U. C. L. J. N. S. 49-50, per Hagarty, J.; and see Reg. v. John Paxton, 10 L. C. J., 216, per Drummond, J. (b) Re Anderson, 20 U. C. Q. B. 160, per Robinson, C. J. C |