party, who was thereby defrauded, was sufficient evidence of an intent to defraud. (a) The instrument must be made with intent to defraud, which is the chief ingredient of the offence. (b) On an indictment for forgery, there must be evidence of an intent to defraud, (c) and the writing of a signature in sport, without any intention to defraud, or pass it off as genuine, is not a forgery. (d) A man may draw a promissory note for any sum he pleases, and in favour of any person, and payable to him, or to his order, or to bearer, and on demand, or at any time after date, at any place, and, so long as it remains simply as his own promissory note, in his own possession, and charging no other person but himself with liability, he may alter it, at his own free will, in all or any particulars. But that right of alteration ceases when another person becomes interested in the note, either by acquiring it as his own property, or by becoming a party to or responsible for its payment; and an alteration then made, prejudicial to any such person, and under circumstances which afford ground for inferring an intention to defraud, is a criminal act. It would seem that, even after another person becomes a party to the note-if, for instance, the note was made by the prisoner, and endorsed by another, but still retained in the hands of the prisoner, and not uttered as genuine, there would be nothing to establish the intention to defraud, and the prisoner could not be convicted of forgery. (e) Under the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19, s. 51, the indictment need not allege an intent to defraud any particular per (a) Reg. v. Craig, 7 U. C. C. P. 239. (b) 2 Russ. Cr. 774. (c) Reg. v. Craig, supra, 244, per Draper, C. J.; Reg. v. Dunlop, 15 U. C. Q. B. 119, per Robinson. C. J. (d) Ib. 119, per Robinson, C. J. (e) Reg. v. Craig, 7 U. C. C. P. 241, per Draper, C. J. son. (a) Nor is it necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person, but it is sufficient to prove that the party accused did the act charged, with intent to defraud. (b) It is also immaterial whether any person is actually defrauded by the forgery. (c) If, from circumstances, the jury can presume that it was the defendant's intention to defraud, it is sufficient to satisfy the allegation in the indictment, even though, from circumstances unknown to the defendant, he could not, in fact, defraud the prosecutor. (d) The making of a false instrument is forgery, though it may be directed by statute that such instrument shall be in a certain form, which, in the instrument in question, may not have been complied with, the Statute not making the informal instrument absolutely void, but it being available for some purposes. (e) Upon the same principle, a man may be convicted of forging an unstamped instrument, though such instrument can have no operation at law. A prisoner was convicted of forging an unstamped bill, which, under 23 Geo. 3, c. 58, s. 11, it was declared should not be pleaded, or be given in evidence, or admitted in any Court to be good, or available in law, unless stamped. The conviction was held good, as the words of the Act only meant the bill should not be made use of to recover the debt; and, besides, the holder was authorized to get it stamped after it was made (f) If the instrument forged, on the face of it, is such as (a) See Reg. v. Hathaway, 8 L. C. J. 285; Reg. v. Carson, 14 U. C. C. P. 309. (b) 32 & 33 Vic. c. 19, s. 51. (c) R. v. Crooke, 2 Str. 901; R. v. Goate, 1 Ld. Raym, 737. (d) R. v. Holden, R. & R. 154; R. v. Marcus, 2 C. & K. 356; R. v. Hoatson, क्र. 777. (e) Rex v. Lyons, Russ. & Ry. 255. (f) Rex v. Hawkeswood, 1 Leach, 257; Rex. v. Lee, ib. 258 n. would be valid, provided it had a proper stamp, the offence of forgery is complete. (a) It seems that an indictment for forging a note or agreement, which is declared by law to be wholly void, cannot be maintained, if the instrument, on its face, affords evidence that it comes within the Statute declaring it void. (b) A false letter of recommendation, through the uttering of which to a chief-constable the prisoner obtained a situation as constable, is the subject of forgery at common law. (c) But a forgery must be of some document or writing; therefore, the painting of an artist's name in the corner of a picture, with the intention to pass it off as the original production of that artist, is not a forgery. (d) An agreement in the following form : "GLANFORD, Jany. 29, 1834. I, John Hostine, do agree to William Carson, of Warstead Plymp, the full rite and privilege of all the white oke and elm and hickory lying and standing on Lot 26, south part, on the third concession of Plymp, for the sum of thirty dollars now paid to Hostine by Carson, the receipt whereof is hereby by me acknowledged. JOHN HOSTINE." may be considered as a contract or agreement for the sale of timber, and parol evidence, of the surrounding circumstances, at the time it was written, would be admissible to explain it; and, at all events, should it fail as an agreement, it is clearly a receipt for the payment of money within the Con. Stats. Can., c. 94, s. 9. (e) (a) Taylor v. Golding, 28 U. C. Q. B. 201, per Richards, C. J. (b) Taylor v. Golding, 28 U. C. Q. B. 202, per Richards, C. J. (c) Reg. v. Moah, 4 U. C. L. J. 240; Dears. & B. 550; 27 L. J. (M. C.) 204. (d) Reg. v. Closs, 4 U. C. L. J. 98; 1 Dears. & B. 460. (e) Reg. v. Carson, 14 U. C. С. Р. 309. The prisoner was secretary of a friendly society, called the Ancient Order of Foresters, having branches in various towns. A member of this society, having paid up all his dues, wished to obtain a "clearance," or certificate that he had paid all his dues, in order that he might be entitled to membership in a branch of the society in another town. The prisoner, having received the dues and fees for the clearance, neglected to pay them over to the proper officer, and forged the signature of the latter to a clearance :-Held, that the clearance was not an acquittance or receipt for money within the corresponding English section of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19, s. 26 (a) The prisoner was indicted under the 24 & 25 Vic., c. 98, s. 24, for feloniously making, by procuration, in the name of one A., a security for money, to wit, £417 13s, without lawful authority or excuse, with intent to defraud. The document forming the subject of the indictment was in the following form :- "THORNTON, October, 1867. Received of the South Lancashire Building Society the sum of four hundred and seventeen pounds 13s. on account of my share, No. 8071. "£417 13s. p. p. SUSY AMBLER. WM. KAY." Held, that this document, though in form a mere receipt, given by a depositor to the Building Society, might properly be described in an indictment as a "warrant," authority," or "request," for the payment of money, if, by the custom of the society, such receipts were, in fact, treated as warrants, authorities, and requests, for the payment of money. (b) (a) Reg. v. French, L. R. 1C. C. R. 217; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 58. (b) Reg. v. Kay, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 257; 39 L. J. (М. С.) 118. The 16th section of this Statute, which is somewhat analogous to the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 19, ss. 19 and 20, extends to the engraving, in England, without authority, of notes purporting to be notes of a banking company, carrying on business in Scotland only, notwithstanding s. 65 enacts that nothing in the Act contained shall extend to Scotland. (a) Upon an indictment, under 1 Wm., 4 c. 66., s. 18, for engraving upon a plate part of a promissory note, purporting to be part of the note of a banking company, it was proved that the prisoner, having cut out the centre of a note of the British Linen Banking Company, on which the whole promissory note was written, had procured to be engraved upon a plate, merely the Royal Arms of Scotland and the Britannia which formed part of the ornamental border, but placed upon the plate in the same manner, as they are found in a complete note of the company :-Held, that the plate so engraved satisfied the words of the section. That the ornamental border of such a note is part of the note within the section, as "note is there used in the popular sense. That, in order to ascertain whether that which was engraved purported, within the section, to be part of a note, extrinsic evidence was admissible to the jury, and they might compare it with a genuine note of the company. (b) An indorsement, "per procuration J.S.," signed in the defendant's own name, was held on the repealed Statute, 11 Geo., 4 and 1 Wm. 4, c. 66, s. 3, not to be a forgery, though the defendant falsely alleged that he had authority from J. S. to indorse (c) But an indorsement, of the above description, will now be felony within the 31 & 32 Vic., c. 19, s. 27. (a) Reg. v. Brackenridge, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 133; 37 L. J. (М. С.) 86. |