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according actions affections agent appear apply approbation arising Aristotle association become Benevolence Book called causes Chapter character common condition conduct Conscience consequences considers consists constitution desire determined disposition distinction doctrine duty equal Ethics evil exercise existence expressed fact faculty feelings follow given gives ground happiness highest honour human idea important individual interest judgment Justice kind knowledge less mankind matter means mind moral moral sense moral sentiment motive nature never object obligation opinion original ourselves pain particular passions perfect person philosophy pleasure political position practical present principle proper Prudence punishment purely question rational reason reference regard relation remarks requires respect result right and wrong rules sanction says sense sentiment social society standard sympathy takes theory things tion true truth universal Utility virtue virtuous whole
Page 288 - The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
Page 136 - From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth, as for peace, and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.
Page 292 - The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same — a feeling in our own mind ; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility.
Page 292 - ... derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement.
Page 133 - By manners I mean not here decency of behaviour, as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the "small morals"; but those qualities of mankind that concern their living together in peace and unity.
Page 218 - What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience...
Page 290 - I grant that they are, notwithstanding, of opinion that in the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct.
Page 133 - Also to receive benefits, though from an equal or inferior, as long as there is hope of requital, disposeth to love; for, in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of aid and service mutual, from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting, the most noble and profitable contention possible, wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.
Page 294 - Life would be a poor thing, very ill provided with sources of happiness, if there were not this provision of nature, by which things originally indifferent, but conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure more valuable than the primitive pleasures, both in permanency, in the space of human existence that they are capable of covering, and even in intensity.
Page 140 - Philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, yet, not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions ; as if not the cause but the degree of daring made fortitude ; or not the cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality.