Inquiry Into the Relation of Cause and Effect

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H. G. Bohn, 1835 - 461 pages
 

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Page 385 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.
Page 371 - This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no rea- s8t soning or process of the thought and understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent.
Page 334 - ... is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.
Page 335 - But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion.
Page 347 - All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses.
Page 290 - ... from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle, but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance.
Page 315 - We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse ; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.
Page 350 - We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant ; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for.
Page 328 - Now, here arises a question, on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen in all these relations, that when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain ? This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect.
Page 348 - All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.

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